USMC loses firepower as SAW departs

This is worrying for our brave Marines that have to put down fire--Via the Captain's Journal:

FORWARD OPERATING BASE SABIT QADAM, Afghanistan – As full integration of the Infantry Automatic Rifle into the Marine Corps’ arsenal becomes complete, the M249 Light Machine Gun, formerly the Squad Automatic Weapon, slowly fades into the history of the Corps.

The SAW has seen action since 1984 and has protected Marines since. Replaced by an automatic rifle of similar size and weight of the M16A4 service rifle already issued to rank and file Marines, the familiarity with the new weapon is almost instant.

“The IAR has fewer moving parts than the SAW does making it a lot more ‘grunt friendly,’” said Lance Cpl. Tyler Shaulis, an IAR gunner with 4th Platoon, Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, Regimental Combat Team 7. “It has a direct piston system, so there are fewer jams. It stays cleaner, longer with less carbon build up after it’s been fired. The muscle memory stays the same with it as it would an M16. If an IAR gunner goes down, any Marine could grab the weapon and lay down accurate suppressive fire without thinking twice.”

“We’re going back to what we had in WWII with the Browning Automatic Rifle,” Henderson said. “Since the 1980s, we gave the infantry squad the light machine gun, and now we’re having another shift in the Marine Corps to get back to what we were doing right the first time.”

I asked Daniel, my former Marine, what he thought about this.

This is sad. The reason we went with the SAW was because the BAR and its associated concept were inadequate. At times in combat in Iraq, we had all nine SAW gunners firing during engagements, and I’m glad that we did. We needed the fire power. In the thousands of rounds I put down range stateside and Iraq, I never had a single problem … never … had … a … single … problem, with my SAW. I kept it clean. This change to the IAR is a testimony to laziness. What do Marines want to do – take someone out on a date? What else do they have to do when they’re deployed? What’s the problem with cleaning weapons? Mine worked because I maintained it right. All this has done is make the Marines weaker. It may be that this IAR could be used for select circumstances like room clearing, but the death of the SAW will bring nothing good.

Marine-Air fast jet community is too expensive

The USMC-air will have to find a way to be thrifty in the coming hard budget times. Something that they used to have a history of doing when flying a very effective close air support aircraft, the A-4.

The A-4 was carrier capable. Today, for the kinds of wars the USMC has been fighting (Afghanistan) it would be good enough, thrifty and manageable once the threat was realized. It would be more survivable compared to its past with the ability to stand off some with precision guided weapons such as JDAM backed up by the LITENING pod along with modern avionics and defensive gear.

Leaving of course, advanced IADS for someone else to solve. The same idea which will have to be used with the F-35.

The A-4 was simple and always left the deck with guns. It was also not too expensive to lose.

Today, USMC-air is still stuck on the bad theory of STOVL fast jets. If the U.S. had a war and STOVL jets were not involved, no one would miss the hyped "capability". Recently, STOVL Harriers have been flying from very long hard runways. That is a pretty expensive pet-theory to support.

Look at the cost comparison of the "expensive" per-flying-hour costs of the USMC AV-8B Harrier on past deployments.

We will use a cost per flying hour of $18,900.


Scenario 1: VMA-513, 2002-3 Afghanistan deployment; 3763 flying hours for a total of $71M.

Scenario 2: VMA-513, 2006 Afghanistan deployment; 4519 flying hours for a total of $85M.

Scenario 3: VMA-231, 2003 Iraq deployment; 5158 flying hours for a total of $97M.

So how much would the F-35B STOVL cost per flying hour in these deployment scenarios? Well, it is expected that the F-35A conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) variant will cost $35,500 per flying hour. The USMC F-35B could be more expensive per flying hour given its complexity and unique STOVL appliances. So a comparison will not be perfect. However consider the follwing:

Scenario 1: AV-8B/$71M, F-35B/$136M
Scenario 2: AV-8B/$85M, F-35B/$160M
Scenario 3: AV-8B/$97M, F-35B/$183M

That is a lot of gold-plating for a defective F-35 when comparing it to a faulty pet-theory of alleged value such as the AV-8B.

I would hope at sometime, the DOD can rationalize its tacair portfolio, because the United States federal budget is in a $16T cruise-climb powered by red ink.

Making the USMC worthwhile for a nation over $16T in the red

The U.S. cannot, and should not, fund, parts of the military that provide no value.

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) does have vaule. Just, not the way we are using it or funding it.

Unfortunately, today, the USMC depends much on its image as opposed to its actual vaule to America's warfighting ability.

Does it field nuclear weapons for strategic deterrance? No. Does it have the force to handle large wars? No. Is it useful in the National Guard structure? No.

Is the idea of fielding a large number of assets to refight Tarawa a good idea? No. For one reason being that against a real opponent, there is such a diverse collection of weapons to make plinking landing craft easy. Look again at the failed Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) requirement that got to $25M each. It was imagined that EFV ability would allow its big mother-ships to be farther out to sea when performing against opposed beach-heads. Reason distance from shore was used as a selling point? The diverse range of weapons available for a capable enemy to use.

History has not been kind to this kind of warfare thinking in an era where the military industrial congressional complex struggles to find an enemy worthy of American tax-payer support. A USMC amphibious landing could not be done in Desert Storm because it was too risky. Those forces sat out to sea. For starters, naval mines stopped that idea. Imagine if the enemy had been more capable. Also in Desert Storm we used a USMC land task force...doing the job of a second land army.

Like today, the United States Marketing Corps (Marketing is the mission not Marines) has to be where the main action is to keep funds rolling in, even if there is plenty of work for small-force USMC security actions in today's littorals. For some years now, new Marines have arrived in Afghanistan having never been near a boat.

We no longer have the funds to pay for such waste of resources.

Today, the second-land-army title fits. We do not need to fund a second land army. DOD planners should re-look at the map and recognize that Afghanistan is not a littoral environment. The littoral environment is the ONLY justification for having the USMC.

After Afghanistan, oh what will the United States Marketing Corps do?

Amos happy to make it up as he goes along

Amos, the CEO of the United States Marketing Corps F-35 cheerleaders, says no to the ECM support mission for the F-35B.

This was hyped forever by various F-35 faith-based communities. Even if the aircraft's faulty design has paper-thin to no usable weight margins.

Pipe-dream.

Amos fibs:

Amos said the AN/APG-81 Active Electronically Scanned Array radar installed on the F-35 already sets the fifth generation fighter apart as an electronic warfare platform.

“The airplane itself … with the AESA radar and sensors and information sharing capability is a pretty significant EW platform right now,” said Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Amos at a roundtable meeting with reporters in the Pentagon Aug. 23.

Good luck with that. Besides the fact that his F-35 as a "fifth-generation" meme still will not die, a forward arc-only, limited to in-band (X-band), limited power vs. thermal issues and limited over-all sustained power output AESA radar, Amos is out of his depth on this one.

For example, the Block II Super Hornets delivered to Australia show this as one thing hyped on the sales room floor that was only hope: that an on-board AESA fighter-radar could do realistic jamming (let alone the fantasy of being labeled credible electronic defense gear). AND, at least the Super Block II has a balanced and fused defensive suite; defensive jammer, towed decoy, etc. The F-35? When naked, it has some expendable decoys and (if the software works) enough situational awareness to see what will kill it.

Amos adds another fib at the end of this description of obsolete capability:

The Growler carries up to five ALQ-99 jamming pods as well as AIM-120 AMRAAM or AGM-88 HARM missiles to attack air defenses.

Of course, these ALQ-99s are three decades old and the Navy continues to build its Next Generation Jammer that will fool enemy radars with false returns. Amos said he didn’t see any reason the F-35 couldn’t carry these pods too.

Again, current Growler gear is obsolete against emerging threats, so it is interesting that one would bother putting on such gear to, again, the F-35 which has paper-thin to no usable weight margins in the design.

Also, the dumb idea of the F-35 being an EWO platform; limited aircrew. When they went from the EA-6 to Super-G, they went from 4 to 2 aircrew. This was mentioned as a problem in various reports. This causes workload problems. Maybe Amos can explain how one crew-person can manage all that workload, assuming the lash-up even works.

As time marches on, Amos, with his weak air power theory and his deceptive statements to elected officials, does more harm to the reputation of Marine Air than good.

He finishes though with the cost issue in a rare display of common sense. Like a lot of fantasy "notional" Block 4,5 and 6 efforts for the F-35, what is needed now is to stick to the knitting of making a warfighter-capable F-35 Block 3 exist.

This is far from guaranteed.

USMC not to be slowed down by "bureaucratic obstacles"

The USMC is going to start real pilot training with the F-35B at Eglin soon. Allegedly.

Marine Corps leaders, increasingly concerned about replacing their current fleet of aging fighters, decided to skip the formal evaluation of the plane's operational utility that the Air Force is completing before proceeding with its own pilot training flights at the base.

"The Marines are determined to get this plane into the field as soon as it can be safely accomplished. They don't want to be slowed down by bureaucratic obstacles," said Loren Thompson, chief operating officer of the Lexington Institute think tank.

I wonder which "bureaucratic obstacles" Thompson means? This set of "bureaucratic obstacles", or this set of "bureaucratic obstacles"?

Gilmore, the Pentagon's director of operational test and evaluation, declined to comment on Wednesday on the Marine Corps' decision to skip the operational utility evaluation, according to his spokeswoman.

After all, according to Thompson and one of his pay-masters, Lockheed Martin, most of the F-35 troubles are the government's fault. So good to go ahead and get this done sooner. If a few $200M-plus mistake-jets are dumped in the process, well, the USMC survived the Osprey debacle. At least an F-35 mishap doesn't kill people by the bushel.

The Trautman fantasy

This week we learned that the first drop of a weapon shape was performed with the F-35. As time goes on, these first-time events give the appearance that their purpose is to benefit Lockheed Martin, so as not to incur U.S. Government schedule penalties, than they are to help America win wars.

As someone rightly pointed out, according to the United States Marketing Corps and others, 2012 was to be initial operating capability (IOC) for the USMC.

The USMC told us so.

Again. And again.

Let us look back oh-so-long-ago (2010) for how this was being projected by the con-artists in the USMC and DOD.

USMC: Still Holding the Beachhead on JSF IOC (March 2010)

"Our IOC is still 2012 and [full operational capability] 2024. Nothing has changed," says Maj. Carl Redding, Marine Corps spokesman.

Eager Marines to Deploy Early Version of JSF While Navy and Air Force Wait (April 2010)

Lieberman asked Marine Corps aviation chief, Lt. Gen. George Trautman, if he wasn’t taking a risk by fielding a squadron of Block 2B aircraft instead of waiting for the Block 3 version, like the Navy and Air Force. The F-35B is so much more capable than the AV-8 Harrier squadron it will be replacing that “its an easy decision to make” Trautman said. It will give Marine air component commanders their first ever stealthy STOVL aircraft operating off Marine amphibs.

JSF F-35B performs first vertical landing (March 2010)

The Marine Corps anticipates reaching JSF F-35B initial operational capability (IOC) in December 2012. IOC assets will include the first F-35B training squadron of 15 aircraft in VMFAT-501 at Eglin AFB, an operational test and evaluation detachment of 4 aircraft at Edwards AFB, and VMFA-332, the Corps' first operational squadron of 10 aircraft at MCAS Yuma. TheVMFA-332 aircraft will be equipped, manned and trained to execute Marine missions and deploy ashore or afloat.

SASC Hearing Sets Record Straight on JSF (March 2010)

We now know, thanks to Michael Gilmore, DoD’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, that there is a new system vulnerability issue that he describes thus:

“The program office is executing a comprehensive, robust, and fully funded Live Fire test plan. However, the program’s recent removal of shutoff fuses for engine fueldraulics lines, coupled with the prior removal of dry bay fire extinguishers, has increased the likelihood of aircraft combat losses from ballistic threat induced fires.

“F-35 live fire testing to date has shown that threat impact into fuel tanks results in sustained fires. In addition, the F-35 will be more vulnerable to typical non-combat fires caused by fuel leaks and other system failures without the fire-suppression systems. At present, only the Integrated Power Plant (IPP) bay has a fire suppression system.

“Though the configuration control process has approved the program office’s request to remove these safety systems as an acceptable system trade to balance weight, cost, and risk, I remain concerned regarding the aircraft’s vulnerability to threat-induced and safety-related fires.” (This quote is excerpted from Gilmore’s prepared statement, which he did not read out during the hearing—Ed.)

2010 also marked the year when the F-35 had another Nunn-McCurdy budget increase alert. The last link above mentions more of the scale of problems at the time than does anything that came out of the offices of the faith-based F-35 program cheerleaders.

USMC fire support options looking good

Harriers that will last out to 2030.

The Yankee and Zulu helicopters.

And, Excalibur.

The U.S. Marine Corps successfully fired two Raytheon Company (NYSE: RTN) Excalibur 155mm precision-guided artillery projectiles from a range of 36 kilometers (22.3 statute miles) in theater. These shots mark the longest distance the Excalibur round has been fired in combat since its fielding in 2007.

With more than 500 rounds fired in theater to date, Excalibur is the revolutionary family of precision projectiles for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps artillery. The Marines have significantly increased the operational use of Excalibur in the last year, firing as many as 32 rounds in one week. By integrating Excalibur into close-combat formations, U.S. forces avoid collateral damage even when warfighters are in close proximity to the target.

"Having true precision artillery that can defeat the targets – and from such a great distance – gives our warfighters the ability to engage these targets that would otherwise be out of reach," said Michelle Lohmeier, vice president of Land Combat Systems at Raytheon Missile Systems. "Raytheon developed and fielded the world's first extended-range GPS-guided artillery, and we are proud of the unprecedented precision capability Excalibur gives our warfighters."

Oh and there is also that USMC truck thing-a-magingy that has long range guided rockets on it (with GPS/INS assist) that will pulverize a whole range of targets. It can reach out to 300km with quick response and a most unpleasant result for the enemy. Could even have fun chaining one of these to the aviation deck of an LCS.

A Marine and their rifle are powerful. Even more so with that kind of backup.

I would say that without the overly expensive and faulty F-35B STOVL, fire-support options for the Marine facing the enemy look pretty good in the coming lean budget era. Just remember that the next time Amos and Trautman cry us a river.

--

UPDATE- Duh. Forgot to mention the very nice USMC C-130J Harvest Hawk.

USMC Harrier logistically supportable out to 2030

One of our readers has found a Flight Global piece which confirms the USMC plan to keep Harriers going out to 2030 has good logistics merit behind it due to the purchase of retired UK Harrier airframes.

This will be an important point to consider in relation to the coming DOD budget sequestration which will remove $50B per year.

For those that think STOVL capability is important, they now have breathing space until or if the F-35B STOVL Joint Strike Fighter gets fielded.

Not mentioned much in the conversation is how the USMC will be able to afford annual squadron operations budgets which could double as a result of predicted, high, F-35B cost-per-flying hour figures.

Also it is the F-35B STOVL requirement which has dragged down the A and C F-35 with numerous development challenges in an effort to have the short-take-off and landing capability while keeping a joint design with the other variants.

It is quite possible that conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) and aircraft carrier (CV) variants of the F-35 would have been well on the way to being fielded by now if it wasn't for the STOVL requirement.

STOVL land-basing close to the battlefield (the whole justification of USMC Harrier ops to realize high daily sortie-rates for close-air-support missions) will be a problem with the F-35B due to its huge fuel requirements (7 tons of fuel per sortie) from a austere base. Maintenance complexity of the F-35B will also be a challenge. After over 10 years of program development, it is yet to be seen how the F-35 will meet one of its key performance perimeters (KPP) (sortie rate per day)--3 for the CV and CTOL and 4 for the STOVL--and the other KPP; mission capability rates in the high 90 percentile group. At this time, F-35B advocate retired USMC General Trautman is only talking theory, not fact.

Some STOVL advocates like Second Line of Defense (SLD) also fail to mention the shrinking number of flat-top amphibious ships which will be retiring in the coming years with limited dollars to afford a 1-1 replacement scheme.

Funding 10 replacement amphibious flat-tops could require $30B in the coming years.

With poor purchasing plans in place by the U.S. Navy, money will be wasted on the faulty and paper-tiger Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), the expensive and faulty F-35B/C and wasted manpower and sustainment funds on the gold-plated and vulnerable DDX Zumwalt-class destroyer.

As one USAF general put it in a briefing recently in relation to U.S. DOD budget prospects, "2012 will be bad, 2013 will be worse."

Programs that are realistically sustainable out to 2030 have a good chance of surviving the coming budget problems. Those that don't, won't. With limited money and classic Hornets approaching death-hospice decision time, it is quite possible that the only USMC close air support jet available in the 2020s will be the Harrier.

Faith-based cheerleaders and air power dead weights

The F-35B won't be able to meet USAF sortie rate expectations.

The US Air Force has concluded that the short take-off vertical landing (STOVL) Lockheed Martin F-35B- model aircraft cannot generate enough sorties to meet its needs; therefore the service will not consider replacing the Fairchild Republic A-10 Warthog close air support jet with that variant.

And by design, no F-35 variant can achieve high-sortie rates. With things like an integrated power pack (IPP) which is having up-time problems, there is no way the F-35 will meet its high mission capability (MC) rates in the plus-90 percent region which are a key performance perimeter (KPP).

But then the leader of the absence of air power knowledge has this to say:

"The F-35B is well-suited to support of the Marine Air Ground Taskforce (MAGTF) in very austere locations," says USAF chief of staff Gen Norton Schwartz, speaking at an event hosted by the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. "But the reality is, is that scenario is not a high sortie generation scenario."

I'm glad this guy is leaving. He contributes nothing on this topic. The whole idea of USMC STOVL ops is high-sortie rate and being close to the battlefield. On other point, the F-35B is not "well-suited" for this mission because it is unreliable, expensive, faulty, and is yet to prove it can operate in such an environment. Faith-based PowerPoint is not real.

A retired member of the United States Marketing Corps chimes in:

Retired Lt Gen George Trautman, a former US Marine Corps (USMC) deputy commandant for aviation, disputes Schwartz's assertion that the F-35B cannot generate as many sorties as the A or C model aircraft.

"The F35B has highest sortie generation rate among the three JSF [Joint Strike Fighter] variants," Trautman says. "There may be other reasons the air force doesn't want the B, but sortie rate isn't a factor."

No it is not the "highest sortie generation rate among the three JSF variants", (or any variant) because there is no proof to back up the faith.

The key performance parameters (KPP) for the F-35 require higher sortie rates for the B-model at four sorties per day. The A and C models are only required to generate three sorties per day.

Good luck with that. And 7-tons of gas for every sortie out of an "austere" base.

Value of STOVL combat ops questioned before JSF program started

I have posted about the over-hype of STOVL tac-air before.

Yesterday, I discovered a Command Staff study by a Marine Major on the topic of STOVL tac-air that was done back in April of 2001. This study is a stark warning along with some important history of doubt about going forward with the STOVL requirement for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The author applied excellent logic to the perceived need of STOVL fast tac-air by its fan-base. It is a must read and needs to be entered into the record for any discussion about the history of USMC Harrier ops, the JSF STOVL requirement, and bad decision making on a large scale.

For your convenience, the study is below.

The study warns us that any STOVL requirement for the JSF (now the F-35) had to address doubt about the over-hyped and under-performing Harrier jump-jet used by the United States Marine Corps. In spite of the marketing effort, the Harrier has never given the U.S. DOD a combat capability that was of any significant worth.

“[T]he only two-lane road that the vast majority of USMC Harrier pilots have ever flown off of or landed on is Lyman Road in Camp Lejeune, N.C. In my own personal experience involving 1,300 hours of Harrier flight time which includes two deployments to the Mediterranean, a Western Pacific deployment, and Desert Shield/Desert Storm, I have never landed on a road or austere VSTOL pad except at Camp Lejeune…. Except to prove the concept, USMC AV-8Bs do not operate off of grass strips either. If STOVL jets will take-off with full internal fuel and any significant payload, then a lot more than just a pad is needed.”

The Harrier is harder to maintain. Compared to conventional strike aircraft it has lower mission readiness rates. Pilots often received less training in the aircraft over time compared to their Hornet comrades because of lack of flyable jets.

The Harrier has worse sortie rates per day in combat. The Harrier was never really used in any operationally relevant situation that demanded STOVL. When such claims of Harrier value were presented, it turns out that conventional fixed wing strike aircraft were right there doing more.

The AV8-B program was created as a means to generate more combat power for the Marine Air Ground Team, but in wartime, it under-performed the sortie rate of its contemporaries. During Desert Storm, the Harrier posted an average of 38.8 total sorties per aircraft, compared to 46.4 for Hornets, 50.5 for the F-15, 53.7 for the F-16, and 59.4 for the A-10. The Harrier Review Panel has determined that, “despite a substantial level of effort on the part of the Marine Corps, the aircraft still lacks an appropriate synergy of attributes that would make it truly relevant in today’s operational environment.” Many options exist within the capabilities of America’s conventional aviation inventory that can deliver a higher sortie rate and more total ordnance than the Harrier.

With the engineering limitations of STOVL design, many believe that the Marine JSF will also under-perform its conventional peers.

While the F-35B STOVL is supposed to improve on things like ease of flying, it is unlikely that the overly-optimistic need for STOVL will prove its worth. While the F-35 was supposed to have high commonality over the 3 variants, STOVL still makes the B model complex, hard to maintain and expensive to procure and operate.

And, as we know now, the JSF STOVL requirement has seriously tainted the A and C model jets.

Just as bad, the United States Marine Corps reputation for spending money wisely is on the line. Well, they had a good reputation of being frugal; over 20 years ago. Some of the faith-based USMC-must-have-F-35B STOVL evangelicals actually think that if this aircraft doesn't come in for the big win, USMC tac-air is finished.

I disagree. The value of the USMC tac-air is not based on having a heavy, underwhelming, expensive strike jet.

USMC tac-air is about fire-support for the guys the ground. For COIN ops, the USMC has excellent support in the form of the Yankee and Zulu helicopters. Credit has to be given to the USMC for fielding these aircraft.

The USMC has precision artillery. This has a faster response time than aircraft. There are also more options to increase this capability.

The USMC can top this off by showing grand intelligence and stepping away from the F-35B. In-turn they can look even more intelligent and order a few squadrons of Block II two-seat F/A-18F Super Hornets.

But what about the flat-top amphibs? Well, what about them? The USMC has stated already that they will fly Harriers out to 2030. The Harrier doesn't offer enough value but they are doing it. The USMC is going to lose flat-top amphibs simply because the DOD is running out of money. The few that we end up with in the 2020s and beyond should make good helicopter carriers.

The USMC will go through some serious transitions over the next several years due to lack of money. I think Marine aviators are important. One of the reasons is that they have to go through a platoon leader course first. Given the mission of the USMC, this is very solid thinking.

I hope to see more solid thinking as the USMC rationalises its tac-air needs. The Harrier is a very poor capability. The F-35 promises to be worse. Various studies before and during the planning states of the JSF program show that we were warned about the lack of STOVL-jet value. No-one of importance listened.

USMC Transition From Legacy Fighters To F-35 Delayed Eight Years

Inside Defense (subscription) is reporting that the United States Marine Corps (USMC) will have an 8 year delay added to their F-35 transition plan. If anyone is interested, compared to the original plan, it is closer to 15 or more years in delay. But moving right along:

While the strike fighter shortfall is still manageable, the Marines "may experience elevated operational risk in the 2020s if the predicted shortfall comes to fruition," as the service expects to finish its tactical aircraft transition in 2031 rather than in 2023, according to the joint testimony of several Navy and Marine Corps officials submitted in advance of a March 20 House Armed Services tactical air and land forces subcommittee hearing.

USMC tac-air was at risk the minute it signed up for the F-35 pie-in-the-sky.

Legacy Hornets will soldier on until 2027 (good luck with that) and Harriers will continue flying until 2030. Reserve Hornet squadrons won't receive F-35s until 2030. Good luck with that too, assuming those squadrons don't case their flag hoping for the F-35 and end up a victim of downsizing.

I guess all those computers in General Amos's office that know when a guy in Fort Worth is on break were not gung ho enough by telling him what he wanted to hear.

What does that do to the force structure? Take a guess:

The shortfall has already arrived for the Marine Corps, at least to a limited extent. The Marines will operate with a shortfall of 10 aircraft this fiscal year, and that shortfall will grow to 12 in FY-13. At the end of FY-13, the Marines will be able to retire a squadron to "meet [Marine Corps] manpower reductions," according to the testimony, "allowing the remaining squadrons to operate without a shortfall."

Given the funding problems, over the long term, I figure more than "a squadron" will disband.

Harriers will get some more funds to improve things like data-links, targeting pods, and well, anything they damn well want because they are the only true and reliable STOVL force.

My prediction? DOD is figuring out how to bury the F-35B STOVL. Once that is done, money can be handed over to field USMC Super Hornets.

This downsizing has a serious effect on USMC (U.S. Navy) amphibious flat-tops. Many of the existing ones retire in the coming years. The fantasy by fans from SLD et al of 10 "carriers" (not carriers folks, limited-scope amphibs) will never happen. With less USMC tac-air (and Marines) we have less fantasy amphibious assault wantabees to feed.

Where is the Great Santini when we need him?

Marines are not defined by aircraft; especially faulty ones

It is sad to see some who think that the F-35 defines the Marine Corps; or STOVL for that matter.

Since the F-35 will not be able to take on emerging threats, what the USMC is in the market for is a reliable second-tier fighter.

USMC has around 9 or so Harrier squadrons and another 15 or so Hornet/EA-6 squadrons.

The USMC can make some cuts and come out more powerful and more "joint" by retiring the Harrier now and convert the money wasted on the F-35B and put it into 2 seat, Block 2, Super Hornets.

So the flat-top amphibs only end up with helicopters/MV-22s. Big deal. If anything that will be an improvement on air ops by not wasting resources on a handful of STOVL fighters.

Many can't imagine a real war where there isn't a big nuke carrier supporting Marines on the ground. Same goes for long-range bombers and the USAF in-general. Also, a Marine amphib group by itself is dead meat against a real air threat.

With 15 or so F-18F and EA-18G USMC squadrons, you would have an aircraft that helps out the Navy for the carrier air wing numbers and gives the Marine some excellent support.

Fast response CAS? Answer: GPS/INS rocket artillery and attack helicopters. Something the USMC already has.

I will finish to remind some about the myth of STOVL for the U.S. We could do a war and never miss it.

Tracking mistake-jets

Tracking F-35 mistake-jet woe...

-- An interior bulkhead that fits around the jet's Pratt & Whitney F135 engine and extends into the wings has been redesigned because of cracks in it discovered after 1,500 hours of durability testing. The bulkhead in question is titanium in the conventional and carrier versions of the aircraft but aluminum in the B variant to save weight. The redesigned bulkhead has been installed in the 24th F-35B built and corrections will be retrofitted into the first 23 B variants, five of which are being used in tests and the rest of which are in various stages of production.

-- Devices that operate the roll post nozzles were overheating when the F-35B hovered or flew forward at less than 60 knots, or about 75 mph, in vertical flight mode. These "actuators" are being insulated and the fix has been successful in flight test. Pratt & Whitney may change an adhesive used in the actuators to solve the excessive heating problem and obviate the need for the insulation in the future.

-- The drive mechanism that opens two Auxiliary Air Intake doors behind the clamshell lift fan door on top of the fuselage and holds them steady as the F-35B hovers or flies in vertical mode has been redesigned to be more robust and is being replaced. The change was made because turbulence created by the lift fan door causes the AAI doors to oscillate excessively with the current drive mechanism, making them likely to wear out too soon.

-- The driveshaft that runs from the engine to the lift fan to turn its blades has proven to fit imperfectly into its designed space by an "infinitesimally small" amount, as Amos described it. This means mechanics may have to pre-stress the part to install it. That creates problems when the shaft expands and contracts due to changes in its temperature as the aircraft warms up in flight. A thin steel "spacer," shaped something like a washer and about the diameter of a volleyball, has been incorporated to make the driveshaft fit better in the fifth F-35B variant as an interim fix. A redesigned driveshaft will become a standard production part beginning in early 2014.

-- Improved cooling and temperature monitors have been added to ensure safe operation when lift fan clutch plates that sometimes drag against one another during normal flight produce excessive heat. Adjusting the distance between the clutch plates is expected to solve take care of the problem.

And the wing rebuild for A and B models. Looks like the assumptions from the results of the 2004 SWAT effort were overly optimistic.

But our second land army says it needs the F-35B. Even if the U.S. could do a war and never miss STOVL fighter ability.

That is if we can afford to go to war.

"We still are going to be a global power," he said. Although there may be some commitments around the world that the military will not be able to do with less funding, it must be able to give the president the option of responding to international conflicts or humanitarian assistance situations.

We tried that in the 1990s. It didn't go so well. And then, we were not staring at trillions of unworkable debt.

USMC-air delusion

USMC-air leadership seems to have a lack of ability to face reality.

The comments from this article show an insane want to cut real war fighting aircraft that contribute well to the Corps.

The Yankee and the Zulu are highly useful. Yet the leadership is toying with the idea of pulling money from the program to pay for the waste that is the F-35.

USMC standard dumb-as-a-brick thinking doesn't help much.

But the Marines must have 420 F-35s, Trautman said. "There is no give there," he said. "The pace they reach 420 is the only thing in question."

Overall, the Marines' aviation portfolio is in great shape, Trautman said.

"There is not a lot of flexibility in the Marine Corps aviation portfolio because a lot of money is tied up in platforms," Trautman said. "They are 100 percent committed to these platforms," he said.

There isn't a lot of flexibility because there isn't a lot of reality going on in their thinking.

Given the current problems with the F-35 program, I figure the USMC will see their 420 F-35s around 35-40 years from now.

Will the F-35 program be around that long? Doubtful

I am sure we will hear more from the marketing department of the Corps as the budget battles heat up.

Hopefully that will include valid discussions of why the taxpayer should fund a second land army.

U.S.S. Paper Tiger

U.S. leadership is full-on in the budget is strategy mode. Many are making big about the F-35B STOVL landing on a ship; even if things like weapons clearance, qualified mission systems and tribal knowledge from a real operational squadron are long in the future.

Oh yeah, and, if budget is strategy, why are we paying for this thing?

Is it possible for the Hill and the Department of Defense to get the wrong message about the F-35B STOVL?

Sources like Second Line of Defense are happy to carry water for the U.S. Marine Corps' wrong idea that amphib flat-tops are like carriers. They are not, but the visuals and misinformation are there in enough quantity to make our political leaders think so.

And read this bit by G of how the amphibs are getting less in number. Cheerleaders of the above theory have to bang their drum about this too.

Things are lining up to make the USMC the premier expeditionary strategy: no large carriers needed. And nothing else needed if you believe the hype. It wouldn't be such a terrible idea if all we were to face in the future were 3rd-rate threats. That is not the reality.

But who do you go to when the Army is all but gone? When the amphibs and Marines on them get sunk, I guess no one.

DOD mission is politics first

The U.S. Marine Corps are crying (again) over their budget woes. How will they equip their forces with new equipment?

It is a problem of their very own making simply for trying to get gold-plated and high-risk stuff; EFV, F-35, MV-22.

Then there is this:

"The Corps draws off less than 8 percent of Pentagon spending, including Marine aviation funded through the Navy, Robling said. “For that piece of the budget, the nation gets 19 percent of its tactical helicopter force, 12 percent of its tactical fixed-wing aviation and 30 percent of its maneuver battalions,” he said, in a speech before the national sea services advocacy group."

Easy solution. Roll those resources into the other services. Yet again: we do not need a second land Army. Also; USMC-air existed and performed its mission before the Harrier came along.

In any event, I would say that The Hill and DOD will end up creating more of a hollow force because of political graft instead of doing a major reorganization (based on logic) of roles and missions throughout the military.

We will have a very expensive military without much capability. Politics first.

The F-22 is a better value for the USMC

Should the United States Marine Corps go with the F-22 instead of the F-35?

While some may think of this APA paper on the topic dated February 2009, a similar idea ("F–35B Needs a Plan B") comes from this recent article in the Marine Corps Gazette.

So what about the beloved STOVL jet mission? The F-35 program is on life support. Much more than the author of the USMC Gazette article thinks. Hint; it is technical as well as fiscal.

Prepare for the USMC to say good-bye to STOVL jets.

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USMC rethink of force structure

The U.S. Marine Corps is rethinking their plans of how to secure and hold that beach...er... I mean budget.

They are trying to work out their reason to exist in a post-Iraq/Afghanistan world where they have been used like a second land army.

Still it takes some aggressive spin and sophistry take Gold beach simply because Red beach has to be taken first.

"A humanitarian mission is a [amphibious operation]."

It is interesting because some years ago, during a Haiti remove and replace the DOD took the air wings off of two carriers; loaded them up with U.S. Army (elements of the 82nd Airborne and 10th Mountain) and minimized the USMC for other than war operations.

In the 20th century the USMC grew. In the 21st century the challenge will be how to shrink it.

Stop wasting money on a second land army

A U.S. Marine won the Medal of Honor recently. Well deserved, and then some. Where did he win it? In a location far from any ocean. With the defense budget in dire trouble, we do not need, nor can we pay for, a second land army.

The USMC is useful; but how much?

Amos wrote a letter the other day marketing the USMC to the big DOD boss. The operative word is "marketing". Not mentioned in the letter is that the USMC is doing work that the U.S. Army can and should do.

Amos goes on in the letter to paint faulty, poor and expensive weapons systems as needed and of high value. Examples; being the F-35 and EFV.

Death traps.

The U.S. will struggle to keep amphibious task forces going. They have already. We can't pay for the kinds of large boat exercises common in the past. Additionally the wide spectrum of threats available to take on a USMC boat exercise means that we will see another Tarawa (without the win) against a real threat and for what?

The USMC is described as useful door kicker. Maybe so for wars that don't involve a large traditional threat. The other part, known as the U.S. Navy won't be able to protect them in a big threat war.

Maybe Congress can see through the USMC spin. If not, we will be spending billions to support a weak theory based on WWII history instead of a valid need.

America's "aircraft carriers" of the future

The future of an in-debt Navy.

Since the USMC has shown the idea that the F-35B can do a short take-off and vertical landing, the Navy now has to worry.

No matter that the F-35 has unfinished mission systems, is yet to drop a weapon or get qualified in an actual go-to-war squadron; with a known price.

The USMC has also claimed that their flat-tops are carriers; feeble minded fantasy but marketing is everything. This is good news to a Congress that is trying to pay for DOD largess and has no realistic way to pay for large traditional carrier groups. They are talking about cutting big carriers and not making any more fifteen billion dollar replacements.

So in that sense, even if it doesn't work much, the F-35B will be cheaper for America; as long as you don't count the expense of losing a major war.

The USMC amphib groups could represent the Navy of the future. Park the big carriers and the USMC (along with their "aircraft carriers") will keep us safe. Their carriers even carry Marines and other stuff.

The cheerleaders and USMC have said as much.

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