One of our readers has found a Flight Global piece which confirms the USMC plan to keep Harriers going out to 2030 has good logistics merit behind it due to the purchase of retired UK Harrier airframes.
This will be an important point to consider in relation to the coming DOD budget sequestration which will remove $50B per year.
For those that think STOVL capability is important, they now have breathing space until or if the F-35B STOVL Joint Strike Fighter gets fielded.
Not mentioned much in the conversation is how the USMC will be able to afford annual squadron operations budgets which could double as a result of predicted, high, F-35B cost-per-flying hour figures.
Also it is the F-35B STOVL requirement which has dragged down the A and C F-35 with numerous development challenges in an effort to have the short-take-off and landing capability while keeping a joint design with the other variants.
It is quite possible that conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) and aircraft carrier (CV) variants of the F-35 would have been well on the way to being fielded by now if it wasn't for the STOVL requirement.
STOVL land-basing close to the battlefield (the whole justification of USMC Harrier ops to realize high daily sortie-rates for close-air-support missions) will be a problem with the F-35B due to its huge fuel requirements (7 tons of fuel per sortie) from a austere base. Maintenance complexity of the F-35B will also be a challenge. After over 10 years of program development, it is yet to be seen how the F-35 will meet one of its key performance perimeters (KPP) (sortie rate per day)--3 for the CV and CTOL and 4 for the STOVL--and the other KPP; mission capability rates in the high 90 percentile group. At this time, F-35B advocate retired USMC General Trautman is only talking theory, not fact.
Some STOVL advocates like Second Line of Defense (SLD) also fail to mention the shrinking number of flat-top amphibious ships which will be retiring in the coming years with limited dollars to afford a 1-1 replacement scheme.
Funding 10 replacement amphibious flat-tops could require $30B in the coming years.
With poor purchasing plans in place by the U.S. Navy, money will be wasted on the faulty and paper-tiger Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), the expensive and faulty F-35B/C and wasted manpower and sustainment funds on the gold-plated and vulnerable DDX Zumwalt-class destroyer.
As one USAF general put it in a briefing recently in relation to U.S. DOD budget prospects, "2012 will be bad, 2013 will be worse."
Programs that are realistically sustainable out to 2030 have a good chance of surviving the coming budget problems. Those that don't, won't. With limited money and classic Hornets approaching death-hospice decision time, it is quite possible that the only USMC close air support jet available in the 2020s will be the Harrier.
12 comments:
Logistically supportable, probably. Survivable though?
I realise that the F-35 won't work, but the need for a STOVL force needs to be reconsidered very carefully when you consider its costs. Compare the cost/effectiveness balance between the Harrier and the USAF A-10. You will see that the STOVL capability comes at high financial cost and a huge penalty in firepower and staying power.
There was a time when Marine aviators needed different aircraft so they weren't taken over by USAF or USN squadrons that had no intention of providing CAS to Marines. That time has passed. The performance and reliability of the A-10 in the persian gulf over the last 25 years shows clearly the need for ad hoc CAS aircraft with ad hoc CAS pilots. It also shows how cost-effective CAS squadrons are in comparison to multirole aircraft trying to provide CAS from high altitude at high speed.
Nobody will seriously argue that Marine Aviation should be incorporated into the USN or USAF just because they adopted a tough, effective and inexpensive CAS aircraft like the A-10. That machine would be much better and also much cheaper. The only disadvantage is that it needs 4000 feet of makeshift runway. That's a tiny disadvantage when you consider its superior survivability, lethality, reliability and affordability.
"That machine would be much better and also much cheaper. The only disadvantage is that it needs 4000 feet of makeshift runway"
Here is a clue, rengine the beasty.
Problem solved.
Waste of money either way. Their contribution to the forces continuum isn't worth the money.
Distiller you are correct, the F35 is a waste of money.
Over the past year or so, I've personally read Distiller vacillate between pro-Super Hornet procurement as USN's 'hedge' and pro-F-35C as USAF+USN's joint procurement, and back-and-forth again.
Is Distiller now officially killing off the joint (or single) service F-35C concept altogether?
Time for a fast-tracked strategic alternative recapitalization plan? Finally?
As far as DoD, USN and USMC in particular go, vis-a-vis 'staying the course F-35 procurement', it's scary to think that even when given $510+ bn per year in base budget, USAF/USN/USMC will be facing a 'Catastrophic TACAIR Implosion' within 10 years.
Something is tragically missing in the competence and strategic thinking department, even still today.
@ Anon: A full year and I'm not yet on the iggy list? LOL. I was referring to either STOVL fastmover as a waste of money.
I'm still for a F-35C-only joint USAF-USN JSF programme, with a SHornet joint USAF-USN procurement second best option.
My priority would primarily be a unified tacair, by 2025-30 equipped with NGAD/FAXX as primary tactical fastmover (heavy), but there's the need for something to fill the squadrons in the meantime.
Ceterum autem censeo, that the Marines should get out of fast jet aviation. Which would also do away with the F-35B
One thing I do not understand, why does the USA need three Airforces, and two Armys?
To Anon, while performing similar roles and capabilities in the high-end demands and expectations sphere of infantry mission requirements, the USMC can attract recruits the Army would not otherwise attract.
It's largely an historical perception thing for young recruits, but it is what it is. And it recruits.
But with USMC arguably being the most cost-effective and adaptive service of all 4 Armed services, if you want to shave 10-30 billion of the US Army's massive $290 billion budget, and give 5 billion for equipment upgrades to Marines to supplement their $29 billion budget, then I'll agree to save $10 +/- billion in Defense budget right there.
Regarding USMC airpower, I have no problem with specialized, CAS-specific air power capability, be it with A-10, Harrier, UAV, Super Tucano, or AC-130.
But it's fairly argued that USMC cannot in fact afford, nor does it truly need, a very high-cost stealth STOVL jet. It would cannibalize too much funding from more critically needed Marine budgets.
----But with USMC arguably being the most cost-effective and adaptive service of all 4 Armed services,---
I agree. It is arguable. One can't be the most "cost effective" of all services when it doesn't manage major warships, nuclear weapons, or major air power and space assets. All needed to allow infantry to live and breath. Then there is the fact that because of Operations: USELESS DIRT 1 and 2, we have been using the USMC as a second land Army instead of a littoral iron-fist response force. For some years now, you have Marines that have never been near a boat.
Do not forget that the USAF is sustaining the A10 to 2014.
Indeed new wings are being manufactured and installed now.
I wonder why?
2040
An USMC with AV-8B+ + A-10C+ + UAV would be a fearsome interim capability mix to cover troops on the ground, out to 2030.
Just replace with a seamless, manned-optional long-endurance CAS platform + next-gen UAV platform mix, receiving delivery by 2025.
Call it a day.
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