Marine-Air fast jet community is too expensive

The USMC-air will have to find a way to be thrifty in the coming hard budget times. Something that they used to have a history of doing when flying a very effective close air support aircraft, the A-4.

The A-4 was carrier capable. Today, for the kinds of wars the USMC has been fighting (Afghanistan) it would be good enough, thrifty and manageable once the threat was realized. It would be more survivable compared to its past with the ability to stand off some with precision guided weapons such as JDAM backed up by the LITENING pod along with modern avionics and defensive gear.

Leaving of course, advanced IADS for someone else to solve. The same idea which will have to be used with the F-35.

The A-4 was simple and always left the deck with guns. It was also not too expensive to lose.

Today, USMC-air is still stuck on the bad theory of STOVL fast jets. If the U.S. had a war and STOVL jets were not involved, no one would miss the hyped "capability". Recently, STOVL Harriers have been flying from very long hard runways. That is a pretty expensive pet-theory to support.

Look at the cost comparison of the "expensive" per-flying-hour costs of the USMC AV-8B Harrier on past deployments.

We will use a cost per flying hour of $18,900.


Scenario 1: VMA-513, 2002-3 Afghanistan deployment; 3763 flying hours for a total of $71M.

Scenario 2: VMA-513, 2006 Afghanistan deployment; 4519 flying hours for a total of $85M.

Scenario 3: VMA-231, 2003 Iraq deployment; 5158 flying hours for a total of $97M.

So how much would the F-35B STOVL cost per flying hour in these deployment scenarios? Well, it is expected that the F-35A conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) variant will cost $35,500 per flying hour. The USMC F-35B could be more expensive per flying hour given its complexity and unique STOVL appliances. So a comparison will not be perfect. However consider the follwing:

Scenario 1: AV-8B/$71M, F-35B/$136M
Scenario 2: AV-8B/$85M, F-35B/$160M
Scenario 3: AV-8B/$97M, F-35B/$183M

That is a lot of gold-plating for a defective F-35 when comparing it to a faulty pet-theory of alleged value such as the AV-8B.

I would hope at sometime, the DOD can rationalize its tacair portfolio, because the United States federal budget is in a $16T cruise-climb powered by red ink.

STOVL hopes

A description of the base in Afghanistan where that attack took place that removed most of a USMC short take-off-and vertical landing (STOVL) Harrier squadron.

Sturdevant said that move became possible in part because of the expansion and development at Bastion, which already was in use in 2009 and 2010 despite not yet having an entirely closed perimeter wall. A $200 million runway stretching more than two miles was installed in 2010, enabling U.S. forces there to land C-5 cargo planes, 747 passenger jets, which are used as troop charters, and other behemoth aircraft.

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-Value of STOVL F-35B over-hyped

Farnborough fluff

In it's latest PR move, LM will "deliver" to the UK its first F-35B aircraft.

Not mentioned by the trade press is the following.

LRIP-3 deliveries--which the jet came from--are behind. The LRIP-3 contract should have been complete at the end of 2011.

The aircraft the U.K. will receive, will go to Eglin Air Force Base (AFB), Florida to join the training program. The training program is still grounded for training real students until DOD and industry can resolve many F-35 safety-of-flight issues identified in a 2011 audit. Training should have been well under way by now.

Instead, what we get are crickets chirping.

Also, years after first flight, the aircraft still has a very limited flight envelop.

The aircraft delivered to the U.K. is under-tested, under-developed and will require numerous structural fixes and changes before it can ever be front-line material. Hardware (known as TR-2) that is needed to drive Block III software won't be fielded for a few years.

Stay tuned. I am sure we will hear more amazing stories from Farnborough this week.

USMC Harrier logistically supportable out to 2030

One of our readers has found a Flight Global piece which confirms the USMC plan to keep Harriers going out to 2030 has good logistics merit behind it due to the purchase of retired UK Harrier airframes.

This will be an important point to consider in relation to the coming DOD budget sequestration which will remove $50B per year.

For those that think STOVL capability is important, they now have breathing space until or if the F-35B STOVL Joint Strike Fighter gets fielded.

Not mentioned much in the conversation is how the USMC will be able to afford annual squadron operations budgets which could double as a result of predicted, high, F-35B cost-per-flying hour figures.

Also it is the F-35B STOVL requirement which has dragged down the A and C F-35 with numerous development challenges in an effort to have the short-take-off and landing capability while keeping a joint design with the other variants.

It is quite possible that conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) and aircraft carrier (CV) variants of the F-35 would have been well on the way to being fielded by now if it wasn't for the STOVL requirement.

STOVL land-basing close to the battlefield (the whole justification of USMC Harrier ops to realize high daily sortie-rates for close-air-support missions) will be a problem with the F-35B due to its huge fuel requirements (7 tons of fuel per sortie) from a austere base. Maintenance complexity of the F-35B will also be a challenge. After over 10 years of program development, it is yet to be seen how the F-35 will meet one of its key performance perimeters (KPP) (sortie rate per day)--3 for the CV and CTOL and 4 for the STOVL--and the other KPP; mission capability rates in the high 90 percentile group. At this time, F-35B advocate retired USMC General Trautman is only talking theory, not fact.

Some STOVL advocates like Second Line of Defense (SLD) also fail to mention the shrinking number of flat-top amphibious ships which will be retiring in the coming years with limited dollars to afford a 1-1 replacement scheme.

Funding 10 replacement amphibious flat-tops could require $30B in the coming years.

With poor purchasing plans in place by the U.S. Navy, money will be wasted on the faulty and paper-tiger Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), the expensive and faulty F-35B/C and wasted manpower and sustainment funds on the gold-plated and vulnerable DDX Zumwalt-class destroyer.

As one USAF general put it in a briefing recently in relation to U.S. DOD budget prospects, "2012 will be bad, 2013 will be worse."

Programs that are realistically sustainable out to 2030 have a good chance of surviving the coming budget problems. Those that don't, won't. With limited money and classic Hornets approaching death-hospice decision time, it is quite possible that the only USMC close air support jet available in the 2020s will be the Harrier.

Faith-based cheerleaders and air power dead weights

The F-35B won't be able to meet USAF sortie rate expectations.

The US Air Force has concluded that the short take-off vertical landing (STOVL) Lockheed Martin F-35B- model aircraft cannot generate enough sorties to meet its needs; therefore the service will not consider replacing the Fairchild Republic A-10 Warthog close air support jet with that variant.

And by design, no F-35 variant can achieve high-sortie rates. With things like an integrated power pack (IPP) which is having up-time problems, there is no way the F-35 will meet its high mission capability (MC) rates in the plus-90 percent region which are a key performance perimeter (KPP).

But then the leader of the absence of air power knowledge has this to say:

"The F-35B is well-suited to support of the Marine Air Ground Taskforce (MAGTF) in very austere locations," says USAF chief of staff Gen Norton Schwartz, speaking at an event hosted by the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. "But the reality is, is that scenario is not a high sortie generation scenario."

I'm glad this guy is leaving. He contributes nothing on this topic. The whole idea of USMC STOVL ops is high-sortie rate and being close to the battlefield. On other point, the F-35B is not "well-suited" for this mission because it is unreliable, expensive, faulty, and is yet to prove it can operate in such an environment. Faith-based PowerPoint is not real.

A retired member of the United States Marketing Corps chimes in:

Retired Lt Gen George Trautman, a former US Marine Corps (USMC) deputy commandant for aviation, disputes Schwartz's assertion that the F-35B cannot generate as many sorties as the A or C model aircraft.

"The F35B has highest sortie generation rate among the three JSF [Joint Strike Fighter] variants," Trautman says. "There may be other reasons the air force doesn't want the B, but sortie rate isn't a factor."

No it is not the "highest sortie generation rate among the three JSF variants", (or any variant) because there is no proof to back up the faith.

The key performance parameters (KPP) for the F-35 require higher sortie rates for the B-model at four sorties per day. The A and C models are only required to generate three sorties per day.

Good luck with that. And 7-tons of gas for every sortie out of an "austere" base.

Value of STOVL combat ops questioned before JSF program started

I have posted about the over-hype of STOVL tac-air before.

Yesterday, I discovered a Command Staff study by a Marine Major on the topic of STOVL tac-air that was done back in April of 2001. This study is a stark warning along with some important history of doubt about going forward with the STOVL requirement for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The author applied excellent logic to the perceived need of STOVL fast tac-air by its fan-base. It is a must read and needs to be entered into the record for any discussion about the history of USMC Harrier ops, the JSF STOVL requirement, and bad decision making on a large scale.

For your convenience, the study is below.

The study warns us that any STOVL requirement for the JSF (now the F-35) had to address doubt about the over-hyped and under-performing Harrier jump-jet used by the United States Marine Corps. In spite of the marketing effort, the Harrier has never given the U.S. DOD a combat capability that was of any significant worth.

“[T]he only two-lane road that the vast majority of USMC Harrier pilots have ever flown off of or landed on is Lyman Road in Camp Lejeune, N.C. In my own personal experience involving 1,300 hours of Harrier flight time which includes two deployments to the Mediterranean, a Western Pacific deployment, and Desert Shield/Desert Storm, I have never landed on a road or austere VSTOL pad except at Camp Lejeune…. Except to prove the concept, USMC AV-8Bs do not operate off of grass strips either. If STOVL jets will take-off with full internal fuel and any significant payload, then a lot more than just a pad is needed.”

The Harrier is harder to maintain. Compared to conventional strike aircraft it has lower mission readiness rates. Pilots often received less training in the aircraft over time compared to their Hornet comrades because of lack of flyable jets.

The Harrier has worse sortie rates per day in combat. The Harrier was never really used in any operationally relevant situation that demanded STOVL. When such claims of Harrier value were presented, it turns out that conventional fixed wing strike aircraft were right there doing more.

The AV8-B program was created as a means to generate more combat power for the Marine Air Ground Team, but in wartime, it under-performed the sortie rate of its contemporaries. During Desert Storm, the Harrier posted an average of 38.8 total sorties per aircraft, compared to 46.4 for Hornets, 50.5 for the F-15, 53.7 for the F-16, and 59.4 for the A-10. The Harrier Review Panel has determined that, “despite a substantial level of effort on the part of the Marine Corps, the aircraft still lacks an appropriate synergy of attributes that would make it truly relevant in today’s operational environment.” Many options exist within the capabilities of America’s conventional aviation inventory that can deliver a higher sortie rate and more total ordnance than the Harrier.

With the engineering limitations of STOVL design, many believe that the Marine JSF will also under-perform its conventional peers.

While the F-35B STOVL is supposed to improve on things like ease of flying, it is unlikely that the overly-optimistic need for STOVL will prove its worth. While the F-35 was supposed to have high commonality over the 3 variants, STOVL still makes the B model complex, hard to maintain and expensive to procure and operate.

And, as we know now, the JSF STOVL requirement has seriously tainted the A and C model jets.

Just as bad, the United States Marine Corps reputation for spending money wisely is on the line. Well, they had a good reputation of being frugal; over 20 years ago. Some of the faith-based USMC-must-have-F-35B STOVL evangelicals actually think that if this aircraft doesn't come in for the big win, USMC tac-air is finished.

I disagree. The value of the USMC tac-air is not based on having a heavy, underwhelming, expensive strike jet.

USMC tac-air is about fire-support for the guys the ground. For COIN ops, the USMC has excellent support in the form of the Yankee and Zulu helicopters. Credit has to be given to the USMC for fielding these aircraft.

The USMC has precision artillery. This has a faster response time than aircraft. There are also more options to increase this capability.

The USMC can top this off by showing grand intelligence and stepping away from the F-35B. In-turn they can look even more intelligent and order a few squadrons of Block II two-seat F/A-18F Super Hornets.

But what about the flat-top amphibs? Well, what about them? The USMC has stated already that they will fly Harriers out to 2030. The Harrier doesn't offer enough value but they are doing it. The USMC is going to lose flat-top amphibs simply because the DOD is running out of money. The few that we end up with in the 2020s and beyond should make good helicopter carriers.

The USMC will go through some serious transitions over the next several years due to lack of money. I think Marine aviators are important. One of the reasons is that they have to go through a platoon leader course first. Given the mission of the USMC, this is very solid thinking.

I hope to see more solid thinking as the USMC rationalises its tac-air needs. The Harrier is a very poor capability. The F-35 promises to be worse. Various studies before and during the planning states of the JSF program show that we were warned about the lack of STOVL-jet value. No-one of importance listened.

USMC Commandant in damage control over F-35B woes

The top Marine, USMC Commandant General Amos is trying to do some damage control after getting his F-35 advocacy thrashed by the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC).

It was Amos who advised U.S. Department of Defense boss Panetta, to lift the probation on the F-35B STOVL. That did not work out so well. Amos was responsible for Panetta getting the rug pulled out from him by the chairs of the SASC.

Great advice Amos. Great work at keeping the boss out of trouble. Not.

Amos has another problem with his F-35B STOVL advocacy. The jet is operationally useless for any future U.S. conflict. The F-35 is too weak to stand up to high-end threats and for anything else, it is too expensive to operate compared to existing solutions. It is doubtful that 7 tons of fuel per sortie is any kind of solution for an austere base.

Given the reliability problems with the F-35B, it is doubtful that it will ever see its above 90 percent mission capability rate. This is a key performance perimeter (KPP).

Amos can't be bothered to answer the question;"Can he see a situation where the USMC would fight in a major war (not a Libya side-show) where U.S. aircraft carriers were not present?"

As Lex posted in 2010, the USMC also has an attitude problem. Note the end decision by the then USMC general in question was reversed some months later. In any event, a two-seat Super Hornet makes more sense for the USMC.

We do not need STOVL at any price. The USMC is bigger than that. We also do not need mindless advocates like General Amos, doing fool's errands like the F-35B STOVL.

I suspect the budget woes, along with the ills of the F-35 program, will make Amos advocacy irrelevant.

Amos can increase his knowledge here, here and here.

UPDATE- Marine questions value of STOVL Harrier and F-35B

A Marine has stated a different opinion compared to the party line.

The Harrier has surely been a large part of Marine aviation since 9/11, but its STOVL characteristics were rarely, if ever, critical to the conduct of operations. If anything, the capability was a liability when it came to the requirement for long on-station times, multiple ordnance options, and tedious scanning of compounds and cities with targeting pods in support of troops on the ground.

While Harriers have conducted some forward rearming and refueling at shorter strips, these were more driven by the Harrier's limitations and the desire to validate its expeditionary capability than a value added to the fight. That is, while a Harrier was rearming and refueling, a Hornet would be overhead, sensor still on target, refueling from a KC-130, more weapons still on the wing.

So, when the program hits a rough spot again, which I think it will, and when the budget adjusters come knocking, the Marine Corps needs to be honest about how much STOVL capability it really needs to maintain its close air support capability aboard amphibious shipping, how soon unmanned aerial systems can fill that gap, and what the best option is for the rest of our close air support needs.

H/T- Sky Talk

Here are some other thoughts I blogged last year about the limited value of STOVL jets at any price vs. how the U.S. fights air wars. And for the F-35B, consider 7 tons of gas per sortie from an "austere" base.

In every major conflict involving US ground troops since Operation DESERT STORM, the USMC Harriers have not been unique in their ability to “move forward” and operate “close to the fight”. For example, during DESERT STORM “Hornets based at Shaik Isa utilized the airfield at Jabayl as a FARP [Forward Arming Refueling Point], just as the Harriers did at Tanajib, thus reducing transit time to and from the target area”.
Furthermore, USAF “F16s…generated a tremendous number of sorties while operating from a forward operating location (FOL) at King Khalid Military City (KKMC) in Saudi Arabia, located just 60 miles from the Iraqi border”.

“F-16s operating there were able to exchange their drop-tanks for extra ordnance: KKMC-based missions carried four Mk-84 2,000-pound bombs (double the normal load of two). FOL operations allowed the wing to fly more sorties per day; KKMC missions launched from the…main base in Abu Dhabi to bomb the KTO [Kuwait theater of operations]; landed and rearmed at KKMC for a second sortie to the KTO (which did not require refueling); landed and rearmed at KKMC for a third mission and after attacking the KTO, air refueled to return to Abu Dhabi.”

Like the USMC Harrier, the USAF F-16’s took advantage of a FOL, but the “F-16 carried a larger payload than either the Harrier or the Hornet, and delivered tons of ordnance…with a very small transit and turnaround time”.

Again, nearly ten-years later, during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), the USMC Harriers were not alone in their ability to move forward and operate “close to the fight”. In October 2002, a six-airplane detachment of Harriers from Marine Attack Squadron (VMA)-513 set up shop at Bagram, near Kabul, where A-10s had been operating since March of that year.

Later during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), Harriers took advantage of a FARP “at An Numaniyah, 60 miles south of Baghdad” but USAF A-10’s also “deployed forward” and operated out of “Tallil Air Base in Iraq”. However, logistics hampered Harrier operations. According to a “Harrier squadron commander…it was a major task keeping such aircraft supplied with jet fuel at that site”. This squadron commander went on to say, “It takes a lot of support and logistics…so we chose to use other platforms”.

Like the Harrier, the F-35B will be a logistics challenge. A number of logistics risks exist with the STOVL variant that do not exist for the other JSF variants, the primary being the vertical lift fan. Although a revolutionary design concept, the reliability and maintainability of the lift fan is still unproven. The lift fan operates on a single shaft that connects to the main engine and spins at a high-rate of speed. According to one study, this lift fan design causes “ added complexity” due to “the need for the clutch to engage and disengage the lift fan”.

Repair of the vertical lift components would very likely call for removing the engine, a traditionally “high repair time task”. Further, the lift fan and swivel nozzle adds to the logistics footprint especially when forward deployed.

According to one study, “While the JSF designers strive to reduce the complexity of the aircraft systems, the fact remains that the STOVL…will by nature be more difficult to maintain than either corresponding CTOL or [Navy] version”. This conclusion centered on “Naval Post Graduate School [studies] which compare projected component designs for the STOVL JSF to current Harrier design and projected [F-35C] design”.

Of course that paper assumes a working F-35C.

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Update:

On that day, after the fall of Kandahar, the Marines dispatched two Harriers to a partly destroyed airstrip there. Marine leaders touted this as evidence that the planes were operating where others could not.

But the two planes stayed only one night, flying four sorties and dropping no bombs, according to the Marines. Capt. Chris Raible, who piloted Harriers in Afghanistan, said the flights "were like photo ops."

When medals were awarded for Operation Anaconda, the major battle in eastern Afghanistan in March, the honors went to the Marine helicopter pilots who provided low-level fire for ground troops while the Harriers circled above.

Harriers have been operating alongside A-10s at a high-altitude air base at Bagram since October, where the Marines say they have provided "essential support to ground units." But the thin air and a torn-up runway have restricted vertical flight.

Panetta's false hope

Don't get too close Mr. Panetta least you get entangled in the puppet strings. His speech today out at Pax gives the public false hope on the serious nature of the F-35 program.

"As a result of your hard work and the hard work of JSF's government and industry team -- and it's a tremendous team; I've had the opportunity to meet many of its members today -- the STOVL variant has made, I believe and all of us believe, sufficient progress so that as of today, I am lifting the STOVL probation."

What "sufficient progress"?

"It's not to say we don't have a long way to go; we do. We've got a long way to go with the JSF testing, and it's obviously not out of the woods yet. But I am confident that if we continue to do the hard work necessary, if we continue to do the dedicated work that all of you have been doing, that both the carrier and the STOVL variants are going to be ready for operations and are going to be ready for doing the work that they have to do, which is to help protect this country."

If something is "not out of the woods yet", what justification is there for lifting the probation? Who is advising this guy? This report shows that the whole of the F-35 program is far enough in the woods not to see sunshine.

"Secondly, we can't hollow out this force. We've made that mistake in the past. Every one of those draw downs I talked about, there were cuts across the board. They took big numbers, cut everything across the board, weakened everything across the board. That's hollowing out the force.

We are not going to do that."

By spending money we do not have on over-priced and under-performing weapon's systems we will do exactly that. Money wasted on the F-35 is money that can be better used for any other operationally relevant community.

"We know we're going to be dealing with a smaller force. It was going to happen regardless of the budget constraints as we were beginning to draw down. So we're going to be a smaller force. It's going to be leaner."

And with that, you can forget any peace keeping operations because those are inherently manpower intensive. We already experienced this from the end of the Cold War up to 9/11. This includes the fact that Operations: USELESS DIRT 1 and 2 have taken resources away from nuclear deterrence and numerous conventional deterrence capabilities.

As a review: 9/11 happened because of poor airport and airline security; poor visa control and agencies like the NSA having a raft of clues something was up but not communicating that correctly to national security decision-makers. The nation-building nonsense of OUD 1 and 2 ate up a lot of resources best used elsewhere.

On a side note, (get this) we need the F-35 STOVL because the Harrier is crucial to fighting terrorism. Can it get more silly?

Many news sources have given Panetta a free pass with the F-35B probation story. The lifting of F-35B probation isn't unlike giving false hope to a terminally ill patient.

Marines are not defined by aircraft; especially faulty ones

It is sad to see some who think that the F-35 defines the Marine Corps; or STOVL for that matter.

Since the F-35 will not be able to take on emerging threats, what the USMC is in the market for is a reliable second-tier fighter.

USMC has around 9 or so Harrier squadrons and another 15 or so Hornet/EA-6 squadrons.

The USMC can make some cuts and come out more powerful and more "joint" by retiring the Harrier now and convert the money wasted on the F-35B and put it into 2 seat, Block 2, Super Hornets.

So the flat-top amphibs only end up with helicopters/MV-22s. Big deal. If anything that will be an improvement on air ops by not wasting resources on a handful of STOVL fighters.

Many can't imagine a real war where there isn't a big nuke carrier supporting Marines on the ground. Same goes for long-range bombers and the USAF in-general. Also, a Marine amphib group by itself is dead meat against a real air threat.

With 15 or so F-18F and EA-18G USMC squadrons, you would have an aircraft that helps out the Navy for the carrier air wing numbers and gives the Marine some excellent support.

Fast response CAS? Answer: GPS/INS rocket artillery and attack helicopters. Something the USMC already has.

I will finish to remind some about the myth of STOVL for the U.S. We could do a war and never miss it.

Yeah, there are alternatives "for" the F-35 program

This article in Aviation Week, "Are There Alternatives To The F-35 Program?" glosses over one of the main reasons the F-35 program is in trouble. While budget woes are mentioned, the reason for those woes are all of the technical problems with the jet.

One may discuss what budget x or budget y will provide but if the aircraft is faulty it doesn't matter much.

The "alternatives" involved with the F-35 program are doing whatever it takes to limit the damage to the defense posture of the United States. The current F-35 program will eat up funds best used for other defence communities.

What I propose is the following:

Make all non-U.S. F-35 buys under the U.S. Government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. This is familiar ground for U.S. customers. Other FMS programs involve foreign parts suppliers and this can be rolled into the traditional "off-set" deal making.

It is doubtful that the U.S. Federal Budget can sustain paying for 50,80,130,170 F-35s per year as proposed under previous fantasy JSF plans.

What can the U.S. afford? What we are seeing now: around 30-some aircraft per year. This may rise to 40 to 50 aircraft per year IF the program can show improved health.

Because of the expensive nature of the aircraft and its limited war-fighting ability against high-end threats, the aircraft should be looked as a stop-gap until other programs--based on lessons learned from this disaster--can get going.

I would say that a realistic production run for the F-35 would be around 10 years for a total of 300-400 F-35s as a new program of record.

In some ways this is easy to write up because there is no active milestone-B or supporting DAB as stated in the article above. This is the equal of a clean slate for the path ahead.

Next we come to the issue of what variants to produce. The only unique thing that the F-35 brings--for all of its huge expense and technical trouble--is STOVL.

The U.S. should have 300-400 F-35B STOVL aircraft as a program of record. The U.S. Air Force can field a few of these squadrons along with the USMC. The U.S.Navy won't miss the F-35C because it brings nothing for most missions that the Super Hornet already does for less money. The U.S. Navy is struggling to pay for ships. The F-35C is a weight around their neck. The F-35A brings no real value to the USAF because it is expensive and will not be lethal against high-end threats and it will be too expense to use for any other kind of strike-fighter work. Maybe there is hope for it as a USAF STOVL asset.

Any FMS sales would be STOVL or nothing. Since the behavioral patterns of the U.K. MOD are completely unreliable they can take it or leave it. Other "partner nations" can adapt or get out of the program. They are not handing over large amounts of money for jet orders under the current plan so no real loss there.

I believe for the F-35, the "alternatives" are to dramatically scale down the scope of the program or cancel it. Let us see how far institutional groupthink can make governments jump off the cliff.

What motivates an all F-35B force?

Being a Bloom County fan from its early days, I liked the cartoons from the 1980s. I have all the books that were published from that era.

I am reminded of one of the characters in the series, Steve Dallas; a shady lawyer when he had to defend a crazy old lady that chopped up her husband with a hatchet.

Since the analogy is now kind of set, as Steve Dallas would say, "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, let me try this one on you."

Marketing seems to be the latest USMC skill-set for fielding weapon's systems. They learned from the bad days of V-22 (now MV-22) development history. So now, whenever their pet program is under threat, be that the now canceled EFV or the F-35B short-take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant, they invite press in to give them a whiz bang show.

Just like a day or so ago with the gathering of press on the USS Wasp to see the F-35B do short take-offs and vertical landings. USMC needed the press in an attempt to pull the rug out from decision makers on the Hill and DOD.

The U.S. Department of Defence better hope this kind of marketing effort doesn't go too far or the U.S. Navy big carrier community and USAF will face difficulty. Interesting as only the USMC has been pushing in a heavy way for the F-35, the USN and USAF just use their boiler-plate statements when it comes up to needs of their services.

The USMC got there first with gathering the press. They may win.

With the U.S. extremely short of budget money for the foreseeable future, the U.S. DOD risks looking like the size of the U.K. MOD of the 1980's.

There are those that think big carriers could never come under threat. It is big for taxpayer enabled jobs and the big carrier mafia is assumed to be a major part of our defense.

Big carriers are fearfully expensive to buy but even more fearfully expensive to operate every year. And, look at all the manpower which itself is no longer cheap.

Many would think that building and sustaining big carriers will never go away. To that I say; best to look at the fall of the Soviet Union and what happened to its defense structure and state run defense industry. We are beyond broke assuming "the people" don't all vote to close down several over-stuffed non-defense federal government agencies.

So many love their government entitlements. For some, the idea that you have a right to pursue happiness is no longer valid. You must have happiness provided to you by a government program. Touche to anyone stating that some in the DOD think the same way. I doubt we will see needed wholesale shut down of dead-wood departments in the federal government; at least until crushing reality sets in.

So it is back to Defense.

It is important for some to consider that an F-35B demo performing short-take-offs and vertical landings on the USS Wasp does not equal a complete go-to-war weapon system; not even close. And it will never be able to survive modern advanced threats. The only thing the F-35 program brings to the defense of the nation is STOVL capability. But only if you believe in STOVL as a needed combat capability to go to war.

I do not believe we need STOVL for fast jets. Many do.

Appearances not substance is what is at the bottom of the USMC PR effort. The PR effort is important to those who think they know what they know but can't be bothered to justify it for a valid strategic defense need.

If budget doom and gloom is strong, I can see enough push so that a leap from the STOVL-is-important crowd to those on the Hill who know budget is policy (more than ever) conspire to hatch a plan that makes the F-35B the only variant that should be built.

Here is some of the thinking that would enable that dangerous theory.

The original F-35 business plan is now dead. Get over it. The F-35 will always be expensive. We know that now. We will never see the numbers promised early in the program (defense procurement tradition). Having all services have the F-35B as the only F-35 makes for a true joint force for tac-air in the dark budget climate. Other non-U.S. JSF partner nations were always shaky anyway. If they want an F-35, they can have an F-35B STOVL.

To continue with their line of thought and an all F-35B force, Navy ship building won't need all the expensive gear associated with today's big carriers. More airfields can be flown from and military construction crews will have less work to do when they get there.

Here is where all that thinking gets really dangerous for military communities depending on their institution to never change.

Force structure with tac-air will get significantly smaller. We can retire big expensive carriers because PR people have told us many wars will be like Libya (no big carriers). An F-35B force structure for all services could easily look like the following when the realities of small amounts of money sink in.

F-35B combat-coded force structure DOD:

U.S. Navy-

-Build small $3B ski-jump non-nuclear carriers. The number ships for the program will be 10. The "air-wing" if you want to call it that, will be one squadron of F-35Bs (12 jets) and some helicopters. AWACs will be done by land-based aircraft. These ships can be paid for in-part by the money farmed back by retiring big carriers and useless cruisers. You can get 5 of these for every super carrier. The capability is not comparable, but that is not the goal with the budget-is-policy people. This will be a huge savings in sustainment and manpower costs per year.

USMC-

Someone brought an important thought to my attention. Most of the big USMC amphib flat-tops have old style propulsion and will face retirement. In these budget times, the USMC will not see a large number of big flat-top amphibs.

-Build to a total of 4 big amphibs. There won't be any more Tarawas simply because there are too many modern weapons to make it a disaster. And, while we need a USMC for small littoral ops, we do not need a second land army. 4 F-35B USMC squadrons of 12 aircraft each.

USAF-

20 Fighter Groups at 20 locations to justify current ASA (Air Sovereignty Alert) requirements. This could be as low as 18 locations. Each Group will have 24 F-35B.

Total DOD combat-coded F-35s

USN-- 120
USMC- 48
USAF- 432-480

While those jets may be “expensive”. The over-all logistics back-end for everything (over-all less force structure) is cheap money .

When capital hill goes nuts with ideas like this, you can thank the good-ol' folks over at USMC-PR and their friends. It is a plan that may work if threats were no greater than ALLIED FORCE 1999. Simply because, 8 SDBs per aircraft (along with other things like Tomahawk from ships and JASSM from multiple platforms) will yield a lot of dead legacy IADS targets in the first nights of a war.

However, not much of this should be confused with provided a true defense of the nation when comparing emerging reference threats. We may get an F-35 in operational service. What good it will do is another story.

The F-22 is a better value for the USMC

Should the United States Marine Corps go with the F-22 instead of the F-35?

While some may think of this APA paper on the topic dated February 2009, a similar idea ("F–35B Needs a Plan B") comes from this recent article in the Marine Corps Gazette.

So what about the beloved STOVL jet mission? The F-35 program is on life support. Much more than the author of the USMC Gazette article thinks. Hint; it is technical as well as fiscal.

Prepare for the USMC to say good-bye to STOVL jets.

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