The UK's paper tiger carrier

The negative sounding LOL’s are well deserved when we have something like this:

A typical deployment of one 65,000t vessel outside UK territorial waters would include an embarked air wing of 12 short take-off and vertical landing F-35Bs.

Wars can have a bad way of showing up quickly, in the here and not days from now.

For any deployment.

The Boy Scouts have it right: “Be prepared.”

A 6$,000 ton vessel deploying with 12 faulty, short-ranged strike aircraft that have a horrific cost-per-flying hour.

No on-board tanking or proper fixed-wing AWACs.

And if this kind of “force” was sunk outright, quickly, as an object lesson by an aggressor, what would the UK do?

Not much, because they are now officially, a hollow force.

And, the UK taxpayer is getting taken to the cleaners.

As always, best to make buying decisions when looking at a complete go-to-war product. Every potential F-35 customer / partner won’t have intelligent buying-power knowledge until 2019-2020 at the earliest.

First drop of a test weapon shape from F-35

F-35 (BF-3). a short-take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) B-model test aircraft flying out of Patuxent River Naval Air Station, has been used to drop the first inert weapon's test shape--similar to a 1000-pound JDAM. Similar, because you don't drop $18,000 JDAM kits into the drink for a first clearance test.

United States Marketing Corps press release here. Of course, for the faithful, this is a big achievement after almost 11 years of development (not counting the JSF effort before the 2001 contract).

Farnborough fluff

In it's latest PR move, LM will "deliver" to the UK its first F-35B aircraft.

Not mentioned by the trade press is the following.

LRIP-3 deliveries--which the jet came from--are behind. The LRIP-3 contract should have been complete at the end of 2011.

The aircraft the U.K. will receive, will go to Eglin Air Force Base (AFB), Florida to join the training program. The training program is still grounded for training real students until DOD and industry can resolve many F-35 safety-of-flight issues identified in a 2011 audit. Training should have been well under way by now.

Instead, what we get are crickets chirping.

Also, years after first flight, the aircraft still has a very limited flight envelop.

The aircraft delivered to the U.K. is under-tested, under-developed and will require numerous structural fixes and changes before it can ever be front-line material. Hardware (known as TR-2) that is needed to drive Block III software won't be fielded for a few years.

Stay tuned. I am sure we will hear more amazing stories from Farnborough this week.

USMC Harrier logistically supportable out to 2030

One of our readers has found a Flight Global piece which confirms the USMC plan to keep Harriers going out to 2030 has good logistics merit behind it due to the purchase of retired UK Harrier airframes.

This will be an important point to consider in relation to the coming DOD budget sequestration which will remove $50B per year.

For those that think STOVL capability is important, they now have breathing space until or if the F-35B STOVL Joint Strike Fighter gets fielded.

Not mentioned much in the conversation is how the USMC will be able to afford annual squadron operations budgets which could double as a result of predicted, high, F-35B cost-per-flying hour figures.

Also it is the F-35B STOVL requirement which has dragged down the A and C F-35 with numerous development challenges in an effort to have the short-take-off and landing capability while keeping a joint design with the other variants.

It is quite possible that conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) and aircraft carrier (CV) variants of the F-35 would have been well on the way to being fielded by now if it wasn't for the STOVL requirement.

STOVL land-basing close to the battlefield (the whole justification of USMC Harrier ops to realize high daily sortie-rates for close-air-support missions) will be a problem with the F-35B due to its huge fuel requirements (7 tons of fuel per sortie) from a austere base. Maintenance complexity of the F-35B will also be a challenge. After over 10 years of program development, it is yet to be seen how the F-35 will meet one of its key performance perimeters (KPP) (sortie rate per day)--3 for the CV and CTOL and 4 for the STOVL--and the other KPP; mission capability rates in the high 90 percentile group. At this time, F-35B advocate retired USMC General Trautman is only talking theory, not fact.

Some STOVL advocates like Second Line of Defense (SLD) also fail to mention the shrinking number of flat-top amphibious ships which will be retiring in the coming years with limited dollars to afford a 1-1 replacement scheme.

Funding 10 replacement amphibious flat-tops could require $30B in the coming years.

With poor purchasing plans in place by the U.S. Navy, money will be wasted on the faulty and paper-tiger Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), the expensive and faulty F-35B/C and wasted manpower and sustainment funds on the gold-plated and vulnerable DDX Zumwalt-class destroyer.

As one USAF general put it in a briefing recently in relation to U.S. DOD budget prospects, "2012 will be bad, 2013 will be worse."

Programs that are realistically sustainable out to 2030 have a good chance of surviving the coming budget problems. Those that don't, won't. With limited money and classic Hornets approaching death-hospice decision time, it is quite possible that the only USMC close air support jet available in the 2020s will be the Harrier.

Value of STOVL combat ops questioned before JSF program started

I have posted about the over-hype of STOVL tac-air before.

Yesterday, I discovered a Command Staff study by a Marine Major on the topic of STOVL tac-air that was done back in April of 2001. This study is a stark warning along with some important history of doubt about going forward with the STOVL requirement for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The author applied excellent logic to the perceived need of STOVL fast tac-air by its fan-base. It is a must read and needs to be entered into the record for any discussion about the history of USMC Harrier ops, the JSF STOVL requirement, and bad decision making on a large scale.

For your convenience, the study is below.

The study warns us that any STOVL requirement for the JSF (now the F-35) had to address doubt about the over-hyped and under-performing Harrier jump-jet used by the United States Marine Corps. In spite of the marketing effort, the Harrier has never given the U.S. DOD a combat capability that was of any significant worth.

“[T]he only two-lane road that the vast majority of USMC Harrier pilots have ever flown off of or landed on is Lyman Road in Camp Lejeune, N.C. In my own personal experience involving 1,300 hours of Harrier flight time which includes two deployments to the Mediterranean, a Western Pacific deployment, and Desert Shield/Desert Storm, I have never landed on a road or austere VSTOL pad except at Camp Lejeune…. Except to prove the concept, USMC AV-8Bs do not operate off of grass strips either. If STOVL jets will take-off with full internal fuel and any significant payload, then a lot more than just a pad is needed.”

The Harrier is harder to maintain. Compared to conventional strike aircraft it has lower mission readiness rates. Pilots often received less training in the aircraft over time compared to their Hornet comrades because of lack of flyable jets.

The Harrier has worse sortie rates per day in combat. The Harrier was never really used in any operationally relevant situation that demanded STOVL. When such claims of Harrier value were presented, it turns out that conventional fixed wing strike aircraft were right there doing more.

The AV8-B program was created as a means to generate more combat power for the Marine Air Ground Team, but in wartime, it under-performed the sortie rate of its contemporaries. During Desert Storm, the Harrier posted an average of 38.8 total sorties per aircraft, compared to 46.4 for Hornets, 50.5 for the F-15, 53.7 for the F-16, and 59.4 for the A-10. The Harrier Review Panel has determined that, “despite a substantial level of effort on the part of the Marine Corps, the aircraft still lacks an appropriate synergy of attributes that would make it truly relevant in today’s operational environment.” Many options exist within the capabilities of America’s conventional aviation inventory that can deliver a higher sortie rate and more total ordnance than the Harrier.

With the engineering limitations of STOVL design, many believe that the Marine JSF will also under-perform its conventional peers.

While the F-35B STOVL is supposed to improve on things like ease of flying, it is unlikely that the overly-optimistic need for STOVL will prove its worth. While the F-35 was supposed to have high commonality over the 3 variants, STOVL still makes the B model complex, hard to maintain and expensive to procure and operate.

And, as we know now, the JSF STOVL requirement has seriously tainted the A and C model jets.

Just as bad, the United States Marine Corps reputation for spending money wisely is on the line. Well, they had a good reputation of being frugal; over 20 years ago. Some of the faith-based USMC-must-have-F-35B STOVL evangelicals actually think that if this aircraft doesn't come in for the big win, USMC tac-air is finished.

I disagree. The value of the USMC tac-air is not based on having a heavy, underwhelming, expensive strike jet.

USMC tac-air is about fire-support for the guys the ground. For COIN ops, the USMC has excellent support in the form of the Yankee and Zulu helicopters. Credit has to be given to the USMC for fielding these aircraft.

The USMC has precision artillery. This has a faster response time than aircraft. There are also more options to increase this capability.

The USMC can top this off by showing grand intelligence and stepping away from the F-35B. In-turn they can look even more intelligent and order a few squadrons of Block II two-seat F/A-18F Super Hornets.

But what about the flat-top amphibs? Well, what about them? The USMC has stated already that they will fly Harriers out to 2030. The Harrier doesn't offer enough value but they are doing it. The USMC is going to lose flat-top amphibs simply because the DOD is running out of money. The few that we end up with in the 2020s and beyond should make good helicopter carriers.

The USMC will go through some serious transitions over the next several years due to lack of money. I think Marine aviators are important. One of the reasons is that they have to go through a platoon leader course first. Given the mission of the USMC, this is very solid thinking.

I hope to see more solid thinking as the USMC rationalises its tac-air needs. The Harrier is a very poor capability. The F-35 promises to be worse. Various studies before and during the planning states of the JSF program show that we were warned about the lack of STOVL-jet value. No-one of importance listened.

F-35C not compatible with French carrier

Besides what I tweeted on the right, note that the UK thinks that if they go with the F-35C, it won't be compatible with the French aircraft carrier.

A reassessment of the programme, ordered by the Prime Minister, found the F35C would only provide one operable carrier, rather than two, and would carry an extra cost of up to £1.8billion, the Times reported. The review also found the programme would not be compatible with France's aircraft carrier and the new vessel would not be likely to come into service until 2025.

EMALS, critical to F-35C success in the U.S. Navy? Oh wait. Someone has to prove that you can trap an F-35C.

USMC Transition From Legacy Fighters To F-35 Delayed Eight Years

Inside Defense (subscription) is reporting that the United States Marine Corps (USMC) will have an 8 year delay added to their F-35 transition plan. If anyone is interested, compared to the original plan, it is closer to 15 or more years in delay. But moving right along:

While the strike fighter shortfall is still manageable, the Marines "may experience elevated operational risk in the 2020s if the predicted shortfall comes to fruition," as the service expects to finish its tactical aircraft transition in 2031 rather than in 2023, according to the joint testimony of several Navy and Marine Corps officials submitted in advance of a March 20 House Armed Services tactical air and land forces subcommittee hearing.

USMC tac-air was at risk the minute it signed up for the F-35 pie-in-the-sky.

Legacy Hornets will soldier on until 2027 (good luck with that) and Harriers will continue flying until 2030. Reserve Hornet squadrons won't receive F-35s until 2030. Good luck with that too, assuming those squadrons don't case their flag hoping for the F-35 and end up a victim of downsizing.

I guess all those computers in General Amos's office that know when a guy in Fort Worth is on break were not gung ho enough by telling him what he wanted to hear.

What does that do to the force structure? Take a guess:

The shortfall has already arrived for the Marine Corps, at least to a limited extent. The Marines will operate with a shortfall of 10 aircraft this fiscal year, and that shortfall will grow to 12 in FY-13. At the end of FY-13, the Marines will be able to retire a squadron to "meet [Marine Corps] manpower reductions," according to the testimony, "allowing the remaining squadrons to operate without a shortfall."

Given the funding problems, over the long term, I figure more than "a squadron" will disband.

Harriers will get some more funds to improve things like data-links, targeting pods, and well, anything they damn well want because they are the only true and reliable STOVL force.

My prediction? DOD is figuring out how to bury the F-35B STOVL. Once that is done, money can be handed over to field USMC Super Hornets.

This downsizing has a serious effect on USMC (U.S. Navy) amphibious flat-tops. Many of the existing ones retire in the coming years. The fantasy by fans from SLD et al of 10 "carriers" (not carriers folks, limited-scope amphibs) will never happen. With less USMC tac-air (and Marines) we have less fantasy amphibious assault wantabees to feed.

Where is the Great Santini when we need him?

USMC Commandant in damage control over F-35B woes

The top Marine, USMC Commandant General Amos is trying to do some damage control after getting his F-35 advocacy thrashed by the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC).

It was Amos who advised U.S. Department of Defense boss Panetta, to lift the probation on the F-35B STOVL. That did not work out so well. Amos was responsible for Panetta getting the rug pulled out from him by the chairs of the SASC.

Great advice Amos. Great work at keeping the boss out of trouble. Not.

Amos has another problem with his F-35B STOVL advocacy. The jet is operationally useless for any future U.S. conflict. The F-35 is too weak to stand up to high-end threats and for anything else, it is too expensive to operate compared to existing solutions. It is doubtful that 7 tons of fuel per sortie is any kind of solution for an austere base.

Given the reliability problems with the F-35B, it is doubtful that it will ever see its above 90 percent mission capability rate. This is a key performance perimeter (KPP).

Amos can't be bothered to answer the question;"Can he see a situation where the USMC would fight in a major war (not a Libya side-show) where U.S. aircraft carriers were not present?"

As Lex posted in 2010, the USMC also has an attitude problem. Note the end decision by the then USMC general in question was reversed some months later. In any event, a two-seat Super Hornet makes more sense for the USMC.

We do not need STOVL at any price. The USMC is bigger than that. We also do not need mindless advocates like General Amos, doing fool's errands like the F-35B STOVL.

I suspect the budget woes, along with the ills of the F-35 program, will make Amos advocacy irrelevant.

Amos can increase his knowledge here, here and here.

Lifting "probation" on F-35B STOVL was a PR move-- SASC not happy

Oh dear...I am truly shocked....

The top Democrat and Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee on Monday blasted the Pentagon's decision to lift a 'probation' imposed on the Marine Corps variant of the Lockheed Martin Corp F-35 fighter a year earlier than planned, saying the decision appeared premature and was not vetted with Congress.

UPDATE- Marine questions value of STOVL Harrier and F-35B

A Marine has stated a different opinion compared to the party line.

The Harrier has surely been a large part of Marine aviation since 9/11, but its STOVL characteristics were rarely, if ever, critical to the conduct of operations. If anything, the capability was a liability when it came to the requirement for long on-station times, multiple ordnance options, and tedious scanning of compounds and cities with targeting pods in support of troops on the ground.

While Harriers have conducted some forward rearming and refueling at shorter strips, these were more driven by the Harrier's limitations and the desire to validate its expeditionary capability than a value added to the fight. That is, while a Harrier was rearming and refueling, a Hornet would be overhead, sensor still on target, refueling from a KC-130, more weapons still on the wing.

So, when the program hits a rough spot again, which I think it will, and when the budget adjusters come knocking, the Marine Corps needs to be honest about how much STOVL capability it really needs to maintain its close air support capability aboard amphibious shipping, how soon unmanned aerial systems can fill that gap, and what the best option is for the rest of our close air support needs.

H/T- Sky Talk

Here are some other thoughts I blogged last year about the limited value of STOVL jets at any price vs. how the U.S. fights air wars. And for the F-35B, consider 7 tons of gas per sortie from an "austere" base.

In every major conflict involving US ground troops since Operation DESERT STORM, the USMC Harriers have not been unique in their ability to “move forward” and operate “close to the fight”. For example, during DESERT STORM “Hornets based at Shaik Isa utilized the airfield at Jabayl as a FARP [Forward Arming Refueling Point], just as the Harriers did at Tanajib, thus reducing transit time to and from the target area”.
Furthermore, USAF “F16s…generated a tremendous number of sorties while operating from a forward operating location (FOL) at King Khalid Military City (KKMC) in Saudi Arabia, located just 60 miles from the Iraqi border”.

“F-16s operating there were able to exchange their drop-tanks for extra ordnance: KKMC-based missions carried four Mk-84 2,000-pound bombs (double the normal load of two). FOL operations allowed the wing to fly more sorties per day; KKMC missions launched from the…main base in Abu Dhabi to bomb the KTO [Kuwait theater of operations]; landed and rearmed at KKMC for a second sortie to the KTO (which did not require refueling); landed and rearmed at KKMC for a third mission and after attacking the KTO, air refueled to return to Abu Dhabi.”

Like the USMC Harrier, the USAF F-16’s took advantage of a FOL, but the “F-16 carried a larger payload than either the Harrier or the Hornet, and delivered tons of ordnance…with a very small transit and turnaround time”.

Again, nearly ten-years later, during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), the USMC Harriers were not alone in their ability to move forward and operate “close to the fight”. In October 2002, a six-airplane detachment of Harriers from Marine Attack Squadron (VMA)-513 set up shop at Bagram, near Kabul, where A-10s had been operating since March of that year.

Later during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), Harriers took advantage of a FARP “at An Numaniyah, 60 miles south of Baghdad” but USAF A-10’s also “deployed forward” and operated out of “Tallil Air Base in Iraq”. However, logistics hampered Harrier operations. According to a “Harrier squadron commander…it was a major task keeping such aircraft supplied with jet fuel at that site”. This squadron commander went on to say, “It takes a lot of support and logistics…so we chose to use other platforms”.

Like the Harrier, the F-35B will be a logistics challenge. A number of logistics risks exist with the STOVL variant that do not exist for the other JSF variants, the primary being the vertical lift fan. Although a revolutionary design concept, the reliability and maintainability of the lift fan is still unproven. The lift fan operates on a single shaft that connects to the main engine and spins at a high-rate of speed. According to one study, this lift fan design causes “ added complexity” due to “the need for the clutch to engage and disengage the lift fan”.

Repair of the vertical lift components would very likely call for removing the engine, a traditionally “high repair time task”. Further, the lift fan and swivel nozzle adds to the logistics footprint especially when forward deployed.

According to one study, “While the JSF designers strive to reduce the complexity of the aircraft systems, the fact remains that the STOVL…will by nature be more difficult to maintain than either corresponding CTOL or [Navy] version”. This conclusion centered on “Naval Post Graduate School [studies] which compare projected component designs for the STOVL JSF to current Harrier design and projected [F-35C] design”.

Of course that paper assumes a working F-35C.

---

Update:

On that day, after the fall of Kandahar, the Marines dispatched two Harriers to a partly destroyed airstrip there. Marine leaders touted this as evidence that the planes were operating where others could not.

But the two planes stayed only one night, flying four sorties and dropping no bombs, according to the Marines. Capt. Chris Raible, who piloted Harriers in Afghanistan, said the flights "were like photo ops."

When medals were awarded for Operation Anaconda, the major battle in eastern Afghanistan in March, the honors went to the Marine helicopter pilots who provided low-level fire for ground troops while the Harriers circled above.

Harriers have been operating alongside A-10s at a high-altitude air base at Bagram since October, where the Marines say they have provided "essential support to ground units." But the thin air and a torn-up runway have restricted vertical flight.

Panetta's false hope

Don't get too close Mr. Panetta least you get entangled in the puppet strings. His speech today out at Pax gives the public false hope on the serious nature of the F-35 program.

"As a result of your hard work and the hard work of JSF's government and industry team -- and it's a tremendous team; I've had the opportunity to meet many of its members today -- the STOVL variant has made, I believe and all of us believe, sufficient progress so that as of today, I am lifting the STOVL probation."

What "sufficient progress"?

"It's not to say we don't have a long way to go; we do. We've got a long way to go with the JSF testing, and it's obviously not out of the woods yet. But I am confident that if we continue to do the hard work necessary, if we continue to do the dedicated work that all of you have been doing, that both the carrier and the STOVL variants are going to be ready for operations and are going to be ready for doing the work that they have to do, which is to help protect this country."

If something is "not out of the woods yet", what justification is there for lifting the probation? Who is advising this guy? This report shows that the whole of the F-35 program is far enough in the woods not to see sunshine.

"Secondly, we can't hollow out this force. We've made that mistake in the past. Every one of those draw downs I talked about, there were cuts across the board. They took big numbers, cut everything across the board, weakened everything across the board. That's hollowing out the force.

We are not going to do that."

By spending money we do not have on over-priced and under-performing weapon's systems we will do exactly that. Money wasted on the F-35 is money that can be better used for any other operationally relevant community.

"We know we're going to be dealing with a smaller force. It was going to happen regardless of the budget constraints as we were beginning to draw down. So we're going to be a smaller force. It's going to be leaner."

And with that, you can forget any peace keeping operations because those are inherently manpower intensive. We already experienced this from the end of the Cold War up to 9/11. This includes the fact that Operations: USELESS DIRT 1 and 2 have taken resources away from nuclear deterrence and numerous conventional deterrence capabilities.

As a review: 9/11 happened because of poor airport and airline security; poor visa control and agencies like the NSA having a raft of clues something was up but not communicating that correctly to national security decision-makers. The nation-building nonsense of OUD 1 and 2 ate up a lot of resources best used elsewhere.

On a side note, (get this) we need the F-35 STOVL because the Harrier is crucial to fighting terrorism. Can it get more silly?

Many news sources have given Panetta a free pass with the F-35B probation story. The lifting of F-35B probation isn't unlike giving false hope to a terminally ill patient.

Lobbyists hired to help Cherry Point get their junk jet

Sad but true. The rent-seekers want the F-35B, faulty or not. And they are bringing out hired guns.

(click images above to make larger)

What motivates an all F-35B force?

Being a Bloom County fan from its early days, I liked the cartoons from the 1980s. I have all the books that were published from that era.

I am reminded of one of the characters in the series, Steve Dallas; a shady lawyer when he had to defend a crazy old lady that chopped up her husband with a hatchet.

Since the analogy is now kind of set, as Steve Dallas would say, "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, let me try this one on you."

Marketing seems to be the latest USMC skill-set for fielding weapon's systems. They learned from the bad days of V-22 (now MV-22) development history. So now, whenever their pet program is under threat, be that the now canceled EFV or the F-35B short-take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant, they invite press in to give them a whiz bang show.

Just like a day or so ago with the gathering of press on the USS Wasp to see the F-35B do short take-offs and vertical landings. USMC needed the press in an attempt to pull the rug out from decision makers on the Hill and DOD.

The U.S. Department of Defence better hope this kind of marketing effort doesn't go too far or the U.S. Navy big carrier community and USAF will face difficulty. Interesting as only the USMC has been pushing in a heavy way for the F-35, the USN and USAF just use their boiler-plate statements when it comes up to needs of their services.

The USMC got there first with gathering the press. They may win.

With the U.S. extremely short of budget money for the foreseeable future, the U.S. DOD risks looking like the size of the U.K. MOD of the 1980's.

There are those that think big carriers could never come under threat. It is big for taxpayer enabled jobs and the big carrier mafia is assumed to be a major part of our defense.

Big carriers are fearfully expensive to buy but even more fearfully expensive to operate every year. And, look at all the manpower which itself is no longer cheap.

Many would think that building and sustaining big carriers will never go away. To that I say; best to look at the fall of the Soviet Union and what happened to its defense structure and state run defense industry. We are beyond broke assuming "the people" don't all vote to close down several over-stuffed non-defense federal government agencies.

So many love their government entitlements. For some, the idea that you have a right to pursue happiness is no longer valid. You must have happiness provided to you by a government program. Touche to anyone stating that some in the DOD think the same way. I doubt we will see needed wholesale shut down of dead-wood departments in the federal government; at least until crushing reality sets in.

So it is back to Defense.

It is important for some to consider that an F-35B demo performing short-take-offs and vertical landings on the USS Wasp does not equal a complete go-to-war weapon system; not even close. And it will never be able to survive modern advanced threats. The only thing the F-35 program brings to the defense of the nation is STOVL capability. But only if you believe in STOVL as a needed combat capability to go to war.

I do not believe we need STOVL for fast jets. Many do.

Appearances not substance is what is at the bottom of the USMC PR effort. The PR effort is important to those who think they know what they know but can't be bothered to justify it for a valid strategic defense need.

If budget doom and gloom is strong, I can see enough push so that a leap from the STOVL-is-important crowd to those on the Hill who know budget is policy (more than ever) conspire to hatch a plan that makes the F-35B the only variant that should be built.

Here is some of the thinking that would enable that dangerous theory.

The original F-35 business plan is now dead. Get over it. The F-35 will always be expensive. We know that now. We will never see the numbers promised early in the program (defense procurement tradition). Having all services have the F-35B as the only F-35 makes for a true joint force for tac-air in the dark budget climate. Other non-U.S. JSF partner nations were always shaky anyway. If they want an F-35, they can have an F-35B STOVL.

To continue with their line of thought and an all F-35B force, Navy ship building won't need all the expensive gear associated with today's big carriers. More airfields can be flown from and military construction crews will have less work to do when they get there.

Here is where all that thinking gets really dangerous for military communities depending on their institution to never change.

Force structure with tac-air will get significantly smaller. We can retire big expensive carriers because PR people have told us many wars will be like Libya (no big carriers). An F-35B force structure for all services could easily look like the following when the realities of small amounts of money sink in.

F-35B combat-coded force structure DOD:

U.S. Navy-

-Build small $3B ski-jump non-nuclear carriers. The number ships for the program will be 10. The "air-wing" if you want to call it that, will be one squadron of F-35Bs (12 jets) and some helicopters. AWACs will be done by land-based aircraft. These ships can be paid for in-part by the money farmed back by retiring big carriers and useless cruisers. You can get 5 of these for every super carrier. The capability is not comparable, but that is not the goal with the budget-is-policy people. This will be a huge savings in sustainment and manpower costs per year.

USMC-

Someone brought an important thought to my attention. Most of the big USMC amphib flat-tops have old style propulsion and will face retirement. In these budget times, the USMC will not see a large number of big flat-top amphibs.

-Build to a total of 4 big amphibs. There won't be any more Tarawas simply because there are too many modern weapons to make it a disaster. And, while we need a USMC for small littoral ops, we do not need a second land army. 4 F-35B USMC squadrons of 12 aircraft each.

USAF-

20 Fighter Groups at 20 locations to justify current ASA (Air Sovereignty Alert) requirements. This could be as low as 18 locations. Each Group will have 24 F-35B.

Total DOD combat-coded F-35s

USN-- 120
USMC- 48
USAF- 432-480

While those jets may be “expensive”. The over-all logistics back-end for everything (over-all less force structure) is cheap money .

When capital hill goes nuts with ideas like this, you can thank the good-ol' folks over at USMC-PR and their friends. It is a plan that may work if threats were no greater than ALLIED FORCE 1999. Simply because, 8 SDBs per aircraft (along with other things like Tomahawk from ships and JASSM from multiple platforms) will yield a lot of dead legacy IADS targets in the first nights of a war.

However, not much of this should be confused with provided a true defense of the nation when comparing emerging reference threats. We may get an F-35 in operational service. What good it will do is another story.

Appearances and all that -- F-35B STOVL take-offs and landings on the Wasp

Going forward (in honor of corporate group-speak). In dire budget times, appearances like this could put the big carrier in big trouble.