The littlest and biggest Joint Strike Failure participants (or prisoners) have massive trouble with their fighter recapitalisation plan.
It appears faith and ignorance were not enough to carry the theory.
Denmark is finding out what happens when one believes a Ponzi scheme
:
“Industry leaders had much higher expectations when we joined the JSF,” Villumsen said. “By 2009, the government was still talking about contracts for Danish firms potentially worth up to $4.5 billion. This hasn’t happened. The contracts that have emerged have been relatively small.
"The government", who, like others, used Lockheed Martin (and U.S. State Department) talking points as a substitute for hard analysis.
Don't pity the foolish. Yet, Denmark is only one of many in the same boat who now realize their mistake.
It would be funny if the behaviour wasn't so stupid. Betting on something that isn't even anywhere close to being a final go-to-war aircraft. Worse, betting on PowerPoint slides...as a defense plan.
The JSF senior faithful will still use Denmark as an example to others: don't be Denmark; who still have not ordered any aircraft. See them? That is what happens when you don't believe in what the U.S. says. The "U.S." when it comes to defense deals, being made up of a bought and paid for group of industry funded politicians.
Today, we do not know what the Danes next fighter aircraft will be. That has not been decided. The JSF memorandum of agreement does not demand a country actually buy jets. Also in a recent Danish requirement, slots for new aircraft have changed from 48 down to 30.
It is hard to expect industry pay-days for the rent-seeking class when Mr. 1763, the biggest alleged buyer of F-35s, the United States Air Force, is in huge trouble.
The fantasy plan everyone hoped for, a big part of it, was that when full rate production kicked in, USAF would buy 110 F-35s per year. That is a lot of industry "potential" for sure.
After figuring out that Operations: USELESS DIRT 1&2 had to be paid for, a serious deskilling of procurement professionals (a problem which existed before the wars), and of course the fallout from the 2004 F-35 weigth reduction event (STOVL weight attack team-SWAT) which fixed terrible design assumptions with more terrible design assumptions, cost and affordability hopes blew out.
In 2006, USAF readjusted their F-35 procurement plan so that when full-rate production did kick in, they were good for 30 less jets a year. 80 was the new full-rate F-35 committment for USAF. To make this work, instead of finishing all their procurement by 2028, they would push it out to 2037. This is, in effect, a cut on orders. That is pulling money for 30 jets per year when full-rate starts. That slows down all kinds of things including motor buys.
USAF gets less jets. Rent-seekers get less money per year.
It gets worse.
In 2008, the plans and programs people in USAF--these are the ones that tell the USAF what money is actually available every year to make ends meet--stated that realistically, when full rate production starts up, USAF can only afford 48 F-35s per year.
Those fantasy per-aircraft prices floated about by the Ponzi-zombies could only work if:
1.There was a working aircraft.
2.Thousands were bought on-schedule.
Without that, what the faithful have is...
...nothing.
Yet, for years, so many in government, defense, industry and media circles ignore the hard fact that the biggest cash cow for the F-35 program isn't good for the huge number of the buys needed for all this not to look like a fraud.
They pinned a large portion of hopes on a USAF procurement system that could not:
1.Buy simple air-refueling tankers until the third try
2.Flunked badly trying to buy replacement rescue helicopters.
3.10 years after a major COIN war started, was unable to field simple turbo-prop strike aircraft.
4.Failed at managing the F-22 initial operating capability by not having proper life-support gear on the jet. This was a known risk from many years ago.
5.Has little skill at fielding new fighter aircraft because, (besides the F-22) has not bought any new fighter aircraft in quantity for years.
There are other examples but that will do.
The F-35 program is composed of several performance assumptions (procurement, management, aircraft design) that are weak, poorly risk-assessed and now even those of the model airplane glue fume affected hobby-shop brigade can see the bleeding wounds.
Most of this was before the global financial crisis hit. Those using the GFC as a justification for weak F-35 buys do not know their history.
While the Danes may have problems with their fighter recapitalisation efforts, they have a good chance of recovery. The USAF on the other hand, the major tool for dishing out
His righteous might, will be facing growing emerging threats with too many old aircraft.
It isn't just the Danes who were asleep at the wheel. And, with the Danes deciding that their replacement fighter will be an open process, some of them look like the smart people in the room when discussing the great F-35 dellusion.
