Rent-seeker alert

(Houston tells the board a really big fish story)

A lease/rental of U.S. Virginia-class nuke subs may be goofy. On the flip side of that coin we have a rent-seeking orgnisation that will do anything to sling mud at the idea of buying good, existing, off-the-shelf conventional subs to get a capability up now with a long and steady path of crew tribal knowledge.

And, little mention of fixing the DMO.

Here are two worrying points all in one short paragraph:

Speaking after being appointed to the South Australian government's Defence SA advisory board, Air Chief Marshal Houston said building the 12-boat strong future submarine fleet was critical to sustaining Australia's defence industry.

Good post-retirement work if you can get it.

In 2002, the then Air Vice-Marshall Houston stated that the F-35 would be affordable because there were 3000 jets on the order-book.

No such "order-book" existed.

The federal budget is billions in debt due to a spend-thrift government. No amount of crying about cost being less important than some questionable military spending project will matter because there isn't any money.

"Small" fire on Collins sub

On the 15th of September, according to Defence, a "small" fire happened aboard a Collins class sub. Decide how many smalls were used in this release for yourself.


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More sub misinformation from the usual sources

It is that time again. About every few months or so the discussion comes up about Australia's useless submarine fleet.

Then we have those that want to continue under the fantasy that subs can be built here at home.

Those stating that off-the-shelf subs will not work, (due to the nonsense-need called "Australianisation" of the product)..guarantee a plan to have no subs.

The ASC, DMO, Navy and rent-seekers are a poisonous team that  ensure failure by their own incompetence on managing the current 6 subs we have.

They do not deserve the taxpayer's trust when talking about submarines.

Off-the-shelf subs make it certain that we can have a continuous, skilled, crew capability. Off-the-shelf subs make it certain that the RAN has some submarine capability as opposed to none.

Not a hard choice if ones only goal is the defence of the nation.

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-Find out who is responsible for the Air Warfare Destroyer mess
-Analysis of Defence Materiel Organisation Major Projects Management and What Needs to be Fixed
-How dangerous is the Defence Material Organisation to our Defence Industry?
-Australia's Failing Defence Structure and Management Methodology

Goal of new sub not to defend country

The goal of the new sub program is to provide jobs for the rent seekers.

But we knew that already.

IF Australia goes with a Japanese design for its Future Submarines it must build the vessels in SA to keep taxpayers dollars and jobs in this country.

Defence Teaming Centre chief executive officer Chris Burns was commenting about the head of the Royal Australian Navy's Future Submarine Program heading to Japan this month to look at its Soryu-class vessels.

"If we can take a Japanese design and adapt it to Australia's needs and then fabricate it in SA then that's investing in Australian jobs, Australian innovation and Australian security for the future," Mr Burns said.

Just a few challenges ahead, I suspect. Behaviour and all that.

Article, less flawed than sub plan or defence white paper

I know I have my bad days but I don't get paid to write.

This submarine story doesn't even end with a proper sentence.

Until the Soryu became theoretically available, off-the-shelf submarines included only German, French and Spanish designs of about 2000 tonnes.

It is almost as bad a sin as referring to the failed-within-one second of launch 2009 Defence White Paper as if it had value.

And yes the article fails to mention that Defence/DMO/RAN do not have the skill to sustain and crew 6 subs let alone 12.

30 years of graft and rent seeking

Operation: Barking Mad continues.

The fleet is being enlarged because of concerns over increases in the naval forces of Australia's Southeast Asian neighbors, in particular China which is in the process of introducing its first aircraft carrier.

Even if no one knows how to keep 6 subs crewed and operational. I would prefer any 5 year plan that put subs in the water over the the white-elephant inspired by the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy.

Good luck.

-UPDATE-Statements by sub commander finish any hope for Collins fleet

In today's The Australian, Cameron Stewart reports that a newly retired sub commander proclaims that the Collins-class submarine program is 'a lost cause' by virtue of being obsolete and unsustainable.

In comments that will rattle the Defence hierarchy, Commander James Harrap, a 20-year navy veteran, said Australia's submarines had "the least reliable diesel engines ever built", and attempts to upgrade the boats would be a waste of money because their performance would only get worse.

"I don't believe the Collins-class are sustainable in the long term and many of the expensive upgrade plans which have been proposed would be throwing good money after bad," he said in a written account of his time as commander, obtained by The Weekend Australian.

Commander Harrap, who has commanded both HMAS Waller and, until last month, HMAS Collins, said: "Lack of available stores inventory, increased equipment failure rates and submarines living with reduced capability is something I expect will persist for the remaining life of the class.

Harrup adds:

"I do not believe we have the capability to independently design and build our own submarines.

In response to a recent negative report of Australia's submarine prospects in the coming years authored by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), top Navy brass released a statement to the fleet which claims confidence in the Collins subs to meet the operational requirements of the government.

Yet, the hard truth seems otherwise. Harrup also states:

"Over the last two years, I believe these problems have become worse," he wrote. "Throughout my command of both Collins and Waller, full capability was never available and frequently over 50 per cent of the identified defects were awaiting stores.

"Collins has consistently been let down by some fundamental design flaws, leading to poor reliability and inconsistent performance. The constant stream of defects and operation control limitations makes getting to sea difficult, staying at sea harder and fighting the enemy a luxury only available once the first two have been overcome."

Tying up the Collins subs and scrapping them could be a big money saver. They offer no credible capability.

The first boat of an off-the-shelf sub purchase could start to be fielded within only a few years. Then, as the capability proves itself, further boats could be added. This would provide a real submarine force as opposed to a dream submarine force that only consumes billions and has no return on investment.

For the capability it delivers (or doesn't deliver) the $27B per year defence budget needs a haircut. A bloated civilian workforce (over 21k and counting), an incompetent Defence Material Organisation (DMO), way too many flag-ranks and senior executives, a corrupt leadership environment, along with a variety of useless items on the Project of Concern list means a house-cleaning is in order.

The condition of Australia's submarine fleet is iconic of the state of the entrenched Defence bureaucracy.

Moribund and dysfunctional.


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UPDATE--- "Barking mad".

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Some don't understand strategic strike

From The Australian today:

Since the demise of the F111 we have lacked strategic strike. Among many other functions, the new subs would remedy that by being equipped with land attack cruise missiles. They would have a range and capability far beyond the ageing and almost completely useless Collins class boats they would replace.

Subs with cruise missile capability are not a "remedy" for the F-111 strike capability (given away by Defence on a lie).

The F-111 could reach out with stand-off weapons and hit a target within hours; not days. Fly home. Rinse and repeat.

Subs with cruise missiles are unable to do such a thing. Ever. While the capability may be useful, it isn't a "remedy" for long-range strike capability delivered by aircraft.

Another update on the Collins replacement fantasy

The allegedly independent Australian Strategic Policy Institute is in the news again about the countries running sore of a submarine program.

Yes, the situation is not getting any better.

Even some deception by Defence and DMO is mentioned.

Since 2006 and according to Defence records, the number of annual ''ready days'' has been steadily decreasing, from about 240 days per submarine in 2005-06 to barely over 100 days in 2008-09, they say. The government stopped reporting on ready days after 2008-09, on national security grounds.

The usual suspects quote the 2009 White Paper as if it has value. Again I say, it does not.

There is some illumination. Even if it is late to the game.

"Many options, including that of a locally designed submarine, are looking increasingly implausible."

:::shock:::

The rent-seekers that want to destroy a bunch of tax-dollars on home grown subs are still crying.

I say, let them cry. We need submarines, but not at any price and not some fantasy capability.

Does anyone find it interesting that during the last few years Defence does impulse buys of things because the senior DMO/Defence cabal can't spend on the dud project of concern list due to incompetent program management?

We could be well on our way now to starting a replacement submarine with off-the shelf solutions.

Instead, money is wasted on making dud-electronic warfare aircraft out of the Super Hornet situation; an extra Navy ship is bought while being called an amphib, and another C-17 is being purchased.

You may also add the bad idea of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter along with the extra insult of supposedly being contractually committed to buying two "test" aircraft. These aircraft are mistake jets piled on to a gargantuan mistake of an air capability plan.

Add the additional waste of money that is Operation:USELESS DIRT, the Hobart-class Air Warfare Destroyer and Canberra-class amphib projects.

Defence and politicians are not committed to having a real submarine force. They have demonstrated this with their impulse buys and other silliness.

In sum:

ASPI estimates 12 home-built submarines would cost about $36 billion compared with only $9bn for smaller off-the-shelf boats. The ASPI report says there are grave doubts about how long the Collins-class boats will last given their chronic unreliability.

Some of us figured this out already, but nice to see it again.

If it comes down to no submarines or a home-grown jobs program with gold-plated submarines, I prefer no submarines.

Until sane strategic thought appears.

MP fact-finding trip on troubled sub and F-35 plan

An Australian fact-finding mission is off to foreign lands.

Their goal is to find out about this Euro-sub thing. And to take a trip to see the F-35 production line. Hint: Seeing the F-35 production line, getting treated well and seeing fraudulent PowerPoint briefings is not the same as fact-finding.

I suspect it is all a sham. There won't be any fact finding. They will come back and state that home-grown subs, like it or not is the only proper kind of graft and rent-seeking course.

They may even find that the F-35 program is "on-track" and that Australia will get their aircraft. After all, it is the fault of the customer for not ordering all those mistake jets on schedule.

I could be wrong. The team might actually deliver a realistic report.

Original Collins project boss would rather be in off-the-shelf sub design

One of the team leaders that brought the Collins-class sub into this world has some different views compared to some the entrenched defence and industry bureaucracy. Hans Ohff says the Collins class is not survivable against modern threats from the 2020's onward. He also has a different view from the locals on how the Collins should be replaced.

"I am very proud of what we achieved [with Collins] but if one of those went up against a modern submarine such as a German HDW 209 or 214, I would rather be in them,'' he said. ''By 2035 you might just as well stay in port - you'd get blown out of the water [if you put to sea]."

Mr Ohff backs a "military-off-the-shelf solution" to be developed in partnership with a European submarine company. If the future submarines can't be built in Adelaide for less than $1.5 billion each they should be built overseas.

New sub report ignores conflict of interest

James Brown makes some great points about conflict of interest and a new sub report.

Before it was released, questions had been raised about the objectivity of this report. Its lead author, Brice Pacey, was formerly a strategic analyst for the Australian Submarine Corporation, the company most likely to benefit financially from a decision to build the future submarine in Australia. But this detail is missing from the report's author biography.

The report was sponsored by a coalition of ten defence industry entities, all of which have an interest in a future submarine being built in Australia. But nowhere is it mentioned that their sponsorship on this occasion was linked to this particular report, rather than to the Kokoda Foundation generally.

One of those ten entities is Defence SA, and it may be entirely coincidental that this report finds that the federal government should fund home-grown future submarines and a land-based propulsion test facility in South Australia. It may also be coincidental that the report was launched on the very same day the South Australian Treasurer is in Canberra to lobby Defence on those exact same issues.

It may be yet another coincidence that this 90-page report can spare only one paragraph for a cost analysis of nuclear propulsion, yet devotes 20 pages to advocating a greater role for private sector program management and recommends Defence 'engage private sector engineering and project management specialists', a service offered by one of the sponsors.

Different opinions on Australian sub roadmap

Expert slams flawed submarines report

"Holland operates their European-designed submarines in both the Antilles and near Somalia," he said. "South Korea regularly deploys its submarines to Hawaii, something we seemed unable to do with our Collins class in 2010, not sending a submarine to RIMPAC [maritime exercise] for the first time in decades." He names eight different submarines, ranging in size from 1390 tonnes to more than 3000 tonnes, that come close to - or can better - the range of the existing 3350 tonne Collins Class boats.

And, off the shelf subs allow for more stability of crew training, scheduling and submarine maintenance time-lines. Off-the shelf subs can be an all-in-one solution or a bridge to a later effort once (if) home industry ever gets their act together with building subs at home.

On this issue, the rent-seekers need to be taken to task.

Bad White Paper authors, Bad DMO, Bad sub ideas

The last Defence White Paper was near worthless. Yet some still entertain the authors of that mess when they come up with nonsense like this.

There are good reasons to buy off-the-shelf subs to help in securing our Northern approaches.

1. Subs by themselves are not the answer. Air power is needed to protect anti-submarine aircraft. Surface ships have their use once air power is established. Off the shelf subs will be part of a useful effort to block sea lanes.

2. Real deterrence and long range strike comes from long-range air power. Defence threw that away on a lie.

3. Off the shelf subs allow us to have a stable training program for crews. We do not have that. No other plan offers that at a faster rate.

4. Any other specialty subs should be considered only after the sub community is healthy. It is not because of the Collins fiasco. It will never be healthy with the poor thinking that goes for a "son of Collins" as the way forward.

5. For all the money we spend on Defence we don't get much. Off the shelf subs offer the least management hassle until we kill off the experiment known as the DMO and/or reshape the logistics support tail to make sense instead of being a money pit of dead weight.

Collins sham points to enemy within

More of the usual. This article notes that there is little justification to believe what Defence and politicians say when they want to build 12 home-grown boondoggles with no credible skills to back up the effort.

ON August 28, 1993, Paul Keating launched the first Collins-class submarine. The fanfare was impressive. Led by the ABC, the media hailed the event as a triumph. But it was a hoax.

Steel plates were timber painted black. The engine had never been tested in salt water. The pipe fabrication was not finished. Nor was the design of the vessel itself. And the combat system didn't work. As the champagne bottle cracked, the gleaming submarine posed a greater threat to Australia's taxpayers than to its enemies.

Had Keating been the director of a listed company, the stunt would have landed him in hot water. Instead, the experience left a legacy of distrust about defence programs. Now a series of reports, all issued late last year, suggest that distrust is still merited.

Few realistic options for the Collins sub replacement

If one wants to dream about unobtainable submarine capability for Australia, look no further than here.

With the Defence, DMO and RAN management in a mess, we will be lucky to have any replacement for our 5 defective Collins boats (the 6th one being a source of parts).

Because Defence gave up our long range F-111 strike capability on a lie, that is it. We have none. Those thinking of using a submarine as some kind of long range punitive strike weapon are off their rocker. Note the mention of cruise missile capable subs in the above linked article. Only an aircraft gives you the ability to hit numerous targets: per day. A submarine is not a replacement for this ability. It can only be value-added.

Considering the past dumbassery from the certain think-tanks that our government officials listen to we might be seeing some hope. There is noise from those circles that the moronic 2009 Defence White Paper may be faulty; that building 12 subs at home to replace the Collins nightmare might be unworkable. Good on them. A small hint of progress.

There is other noise of nuclear subs as one option. This political climate makes that idea impossible.

Which leaves us with few options. Those few are as follows:

A German 214 class. It is powerful with knowns. It is doubtful that even the DMO could ruin this idea. The advantages are to get some consistency into the submarine workforce. A handful of these boats would have predictable mission and repair schedules. And, it has killing power to aid in securing our Northern approaches. Notice I said “aid”. You need air power so that your own anti-submarine aircraft can do their work unmolested. Add some 214s at choke points an now you have a workable defence plan. Air domination is linked to submarine capability. Unless you enjoy the idea of enemy anti-submarine aircraft fishing for your subs.

Once the RAN is stable (workforce/logistics/readiness consistency) with that, you can press ahead with other specialist subs. If one wants something more they should look no further than the Spanish effort known as the S-80.

The submarines of the S-80 class are designed to better complete their mission in threat scenarios. Their operational mobility will allow them to operate in remote areas, traveling discreetly at high speeds. Their air independent propulsion (AIP) system will ensure their ability to remain long periods of time in an area without being detected and their ability to operate in possible conflict zones.

Their capabilities include:

* A combat system for multiple target acquisition in different scenarios
* The ability to transport personnel, including special operations forces
* Low noise and magnetic signatures in order to minimize detection
* Low radar and infrared signatures in order to minimize detection

Risk alert. The production of this boat is not complete. However that beats the other loony ideas floated by some. And it even knocks down those that claim only a Collins-like ability will work for Australia. This last one of course used as a club by the rent-seekers when lobbying government.

Some advisors to our government are fixated on the unobtainable and unrealistic. This disease has to be broken. Or, we can just continue the laughing stock which is synonymous with the words “submarine” and “Defence” in the Australian public mind.

Report--Collins sub fleet unsafe

Cameron Stewart from The Australian writes that a new report commissioned by the Gillard government warns of "profound safety risks arising from inexperienced crews, a paucity of experts, poor reliability and a dysfunctional maintenance system."

The short version is that the entire submarine organisation was now "unfit for purpose".

In what the report described as a "worrying statistic", it said crew shortages mean that one-third of trained submariners have now been qualified for less than two years.

"Crews are inexperienced and with reduced (submarine) availability it is getting more difficult to achieve the required levels of training," it said.

"With submarines having to live with defects of operational safety significance, decisions on what to live with and what to return to harbour to fix are being made by inexperienced people; a worrying feature with profound implications for safety.

And this via today's print edition of the Australian Financial Review.

He (Coles) suggested there was an unhealthy "master-slave" relationship between the Defence Material Organisation and ASC which discouraged the latter from taking responsibility.

Projects do have to be realistic

My limited understanding of project management involves the idea that one starts projects that they can realistically finish based on realistic resourcing and realistic skills.

Government's perception of the Collins replacement project does not meet those goals.

BTW, great picture at the link of a dolphin in front of the sub.

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Toxic Collins

More on this story the other day.

Below from today's The Australian. Funny how Defence did the press release on a Friday evening 24 hours after it happened.

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Faulty Australian sub fleet costs $800M per year

Story surfaces of HMAS Farncomb dive and propulsion failure incident (Update-with Defence Response)

Great story about a Collins-class sub in an exercise that never happened

Collins sub refrigerant gas leak, no one hurt

Another piece of bad news for the Collins class submarine program.

This from Defence.

The Royal Australian Navy submarine HMAS Farncomb is returning to Singapore after partial failure of its cooling system during the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) Exercise Bersama Lima 2011 (BL11).

The submarine crew followed standard emergency operating procedures to clear the refrigerant gas, Freon which had leaked as a result of the failure. No one was injured.

Farncomb will undertake repairs in Singapore over the coming days.

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Faulty Australian sub fleet costs $800M per year

Story surfaces of HMAS Farncomb dive and propulsion failure incident (Update-with Defence Response)

Great story about a Collins-class sub in an exercise that never happened