Obsolete carrier air wing

The U.S. Navy is starting to realize that it is facing the prospect of taking an obsolete carrier air wing to war.

The Super Hornet won't be up for emerging threats in the Pacific.

The Navy states that the solution against anti-access threats will not depend on just one weapon. The problem is that as far as fighter aircraft off of carriers, they do not have even one weapon to take on such threats.

It gets worse. The F-35 is in no way up for the challenge. By virtue of its operational document drawn up in the 1990's to determine a design need, it was assumed that there would be hundreds of F-22s to take on the high-end threats.

Finally, what the Navy will not say publicly is that the Super Hornet beats the F-35 in every relevant operational metric.

Unless the Just So Failed can someday actually prove otherwise.

And, at what cost?

-UPDATE-Statements by sub commander finish any hope for Collins fleet

In today's The Australian, Cameron Stewart reports that a newly retired sub commander proclaims that the Collins-class submarine program is 'a lost cause' by virtue of being obsolete and unsustainable.

In comments that will rattle the Defence hierarchy, Commander James Harrap, a 20-year navy veteran, said Australia's submarines had "the least reliable diesel engines ever built", and attempts to upgrade the boats would be a waste of money because their performance would only get worse.

"I don't believe the Collins-class are sustainable in the long term and many of the expensive upgrade plans which have been proposed would be throwing good money after bad," he said in a written account of his time as commander, obtained by The Weekend Australian.

Commander Harrap, who has commanded both HMAS Waller and, until last month, HMAS Collins, said: "Lack of available stores inventory, increased equipment failure rates and submarines living with reduced capability is something I expect will persist for the remaining life of the class.

Harrup adds:

"I do not believe we have the capability to independently design and build our own submarines.

In response to a recent negative report of Australia's submarine prospects in the coming years authored by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), top Navy brass released a statement to the fleet which claims confidence in the Collins subs to meet the operational requirements of the government.

Yet, the hard truth seems otherwise. Harrup also states:

"Over the last two years, I believe these problems have become worse," he wrote. "Throughout my command of both Collins and Waller, full capability was never available and frequently over 50 per cent of the identified defects were awaiting stores.

"Collins has consistently been let down by some fundamental design flaws, leading to poor reliability and inconsistent performance. The constant stream of defects and operation control limitations makes getting to sea difficult, staying at sea harder and fighting the enemy a luxury only available once the first two have been overcome."

Tying up the Collins subs and scrapping them could be a big money saver. They offer no credible capability.

The first boat of an off-the-shelf sub purchase could start to be fielded within only a few years. Then, as the capability proves itself, further boats could be added. This would provide a real submarine force as opposed to a dream submarine force that only consumes billions and has no return on investment.

For the capability it delivers (or doesn't deliver) the $27B per year defence budget needs a haircut. A bloated civilian workforce (over 21k and counting), an incompetent Defence Material Organisation (DMO), way too many flag-ranks and senior executives, a corrupt leadership environment, along with a variety of useless items on the Project of Concern list means a house-cleaning is in order.

The condition of Australia's submarine fleet is iconic of the state of the entrenched Defence bureaucracy.

Moribund and dysfunctional.


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UPDATE--- "Barking mad".

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