The audits (here and here) of the RAAF fast jet running debacle are weak, shallow, and ignore some significant issues.
Noteworthy too is that the original purpose of the Super Hornet decision was to cover for F-35 delays. Nelson (who was PowerPointed into the con) stated as much. More on that here (including the weak justification for getting rid of the F-111).
The normalization of deviance approach to this issue is not useful.
More on the dangers of a normalization of deviance approach to risks--enhanced by group-think--can be seen here.
Following the F-35 path will cost Australia loss of regional air supremacy. What is interesting in the above mentioned audit is the meme of that will not die; the F-35 as a "fifth-generation fighter".
The audit goes into describing the specs of the F-35 and the Super Hornet but (and this is where the shallowness comes in full-bore) portrays no grasp of why the technical details are important beyond a few simplistic claims.
Here are a few things to consider; what the audit didn't tell the public:
History they don’t want you to know
Boeing official-Super Hornet-handles air-to-air with technology, not speed and acceleration
The Super Hornet Stores Story
More on the dud-jamming gear Defence wants to buy
The audit also labels the Super Hornet as "low observable" when such a claim shows a real weakness of understanding balanced defensive measures taken in the design of the aircraft. Those are some low-observable methods to lower signature but just as important: to establish a better known baseline of exposure risks of the aircraft to different threats so that the on-board defensive jamming system is much more efficient. Great, if one does not want to carry any significant weapons capability. Unlike real stealth aircraft, the Super Hornet carries its weapons (not counting the gun) externally. Not very "low observable".
In short, the audit doesn't do much to help the Australian public who are being taken for a ride of billions in wasteful spending for faulty aircraft that will not be competitive against growing Pacific Rim threats.
Showing posts with label Super Hornet. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Super Hornet. Show all posts
Thursday, October 4, 2012
Tuesday, September 18, 2012
Friday, August 24, 2012
60 more Super Hornets for Australia?
Mr. Thomson of ASPI isn't stupid. He is just a bit misinformed on various things that have to do with tribal knowledge of military issues.
With that, he does have his sources. Even if he comes up with some really odd conclusions. There are things that he has to be informed on; or that someone "in the know" told him.
Take for example his opinion piece the other day, and this:
One does not need a tin-foil-hat to consider that it is possible that the number of 60 was not pulled out of thin air or part of Thomson's imagination.
I believe it is possible that you are looking at a fall-back plan by Defence when faced with limited future budgets, an unworkable F-35 program and the really bad idea of pushing old classic Hornets through the refurb mill (again) to make them last out to the 2020's. Whatever happens, Australia's most expensive flying club, must go on.
Status-quo is something hard to deal with. How would 60 fall into the current legacy Hornet RAAF squadron structure when 71-72 are needed?
It is still workable with some adjustment.
The F-35 may show up someday. However, it is unaffordable and ineffective for any non-anti-access scenario done better by the Super Hornet. Both are unsurvivable for emerging Pacific threats.
Ponder the finer details of squadron conversion amongst yourselves.
With that, he does have his sources. Even if he comes up with some really odd conclusions. There are things that he has to be informed on; or that someone "in the know" told him.
Take for example his opinion piece the other day, and this:
"Second, some of the remaining big-ticket items from the 2009 White Paper need to be discarded in favour of more modest alternatives. Think along the lines of an air force built around 60 F/A 18 Super Hornets rather than 100 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters..."
One does not need a tin-foil-hat to consider that it is possible that the number of 60 was not pulled out of thin air or part of Thomson's imagination.
I believe it is possible that you are looking at a fall-back plan by Defence when faced with limited future budgets, an unworkable F-35 program and the really bad idea of pushing old classic Hornets through the refurb mill (again) to make them last out to the 2020's. Whatever happens, Australia's most expensive flying club, must go on.
Status-quo is something hard to deal with. How would 60 fall into the current legacy Hornet RAAF squadron structure when 71-72 are needed?
It is still workable with some adjustment.
The F-35 may show up someday. However, it is unaffordable and ineffective for any non-anti-access scenario done better by the Super Hornet. Both are unsurvivable for emerging Pacific threats.
Ponder the finer details of squadron conversion amongst yourselves.
Tuesday, August 7, 2012
Growler's roosting chickens have been home awhile
In Australia, when reporting defence issues, occasionally the local news people figure out the plot.
Today's Canberra Times points out what some of us have known for years. That is, that the idea from Defence senior leadership to field a jammer-capable Super Hornet is bad.
The "Growler" upgrade for 12 of Australia's 24 Super Hornets is a bad idea because the gear to be put on it is obsolete.
The U.S. Navy, has known this.
For at least 10 years.
$1.7B (if not more) will be thrown away on dud jamming gear.
Par for the course with Defence senior leadership's faulty air power thinking.
(Slides from U.S. Navy briefing via www.dtic.mil dated 2002-3)
Today's Canberra Times points out what some of us have known for years. That is, that the idea from Defence senior leadership to field a jammer-capable Super Hornet is bad.
The "Growler" upgrade for 12 of Australia's 24 Super Hornets is a bad idea because the gear to be put on it is obsolete.
The U.S. Navy, has known this.
For at least 10 years.
$1.7B (if not more) will be thrown away on dud jamming gear.
Par for the course with Defence senior leadership's faulty air power thinking.
(Slides from U.S. Navy briefing via www.dtic.mil dated 2002-3)
Tuesday, May 29, 2012
Obsolete carrier air wing
The U.S. Navy is starting to realize that it is facing the prospect of taking an obsolete carrier air wing to war.
The Super Hornet won't be up for emerging threats in the Pacific.
The Navy states that the solution against anti-access threats will not depend on just one weapon. The problem is that as far as fighter aircraft off of carriers, they do not have even one weapon to take on such threats.
It gets worse. The F-35 is in no way up for the challenge. By virtue of its operational document drawn up in the 1990's to determine a design need, it was assumed that there would be hundreds of F-22s to take on the high-end threats.
Finally, what the Navy will not say publicly is that the Super Hornet beats the F-35 in every relevant operational metric.
Unless the Just So Failed can someday actually prove otherwise.
And, at what cost?
The Super Hornet won't be up for emerging threats in the Pacific.
The Navy states that the solution against anti-access threats will not depend on just one weapon. The problem is that as far as fighter aircraft off of carriers, they do not have even one weapon to take on such threats.
It gets worse. The F-35 is in no way up for the challenge. By virtue of its operational document drawn up in the 1990's to determine a design need, it was assumed that there would be hundreds of F-22s to take on the high-end threats.
Finally, what the Navy will not say publicly is that the Super Hornet beats the F-35 in every relevant operational metric.
Unless the Just So Failed can someday actually prove otherwise.
And, at what cost?
Saturday, May 26, 2012
Spend-thrift Defence faces new budget reality--badly
The Defence project to equip 12 of the 24 RAAF Block II Super Hornets with jamming gear that the U.S. Navy has stated is obsolete against emerging threats has blown out by almost 6-times or $1.4B dollars The Australian has learned.
Back in the Joel Fitzgibbon regime as Defence Minister, the project was supposed to cost $300M. Recently, a U.S. Government Defence proposal has stated this work would cost up to $1.7B.
This conversion which turns a two-seat F-18F Super Hornet into an electronic jamming F-18G would cost Defence and you the tax-payer $142M per jet. This is almost twice the cost of a new F-18F Super Hornet. A new F-18G costs the U.S. Government around $90-100M each.
Defence, uses the argument that the jamming capability of the F-18G was used successfully in last years fight against Libya. This is a crock. Libya's air defence capability was a joke and will be nothing close to the emerging threat picture in the Pacific Rim. Also, the F-18G is draggy, short-ranged and highly dependent on air-refueling resources.
While the F-18G may be fine to electronically jam older (or "legacy") air defence systems from the Soviet-era, the single-seat F-18E Super Hornet and the two-seat F-18F Super Hornet, in their Block II configuration, can already detect, pin-point and destroy this kind of threat. This includes the fact that the on-board jamming system and towed-decoy of the E and F Super Hornet provide outstanding self-defence capability against older threats.
Defence does not seem to be acting in a responsible manner with our tax dollars in the current budget environment.
A few days after the federal budget announcement, Defence spent $1.4B for 10 C-27J light airlift aircraft stating they were a Caribou replacement when they were not. The other reason Defence used justify this purchase was that the C-27J gets into more airfields than a C-130. True, but the C-130J's purchased by Defence were justified as "strategic air-lifters". And, while a variety of aircraft can get into more airfields than a C-130J, there was no formal tender for the C-27J against its world-wide competitor, the Airbus C-295.
Using the justification that they have to make ends meet under the new federal budget, Defence has cut funds used to get single enlisted soldiers fighting in Afghanistan home on leave. These troops in a combat theatre will have to pay for their own flights. The general that helped make this decision, can easily afford such flights.
Back in the Joel Fitzgibbon regime as Defence Minister, the project was supposed to cost $300M. Recently, a U.S. Government Defence proposal has stated this work would cost up to $1.7B.
This conversion which turns a two-seat F-18F Super Hornet into an electronic jamming F-18G would cost Defence and you the tax-payer $142M per jet. This is almost twice the cost of a new F-18F Super Hornet. A new F-18G costs the U.S. Government around $90-100M each.
Defence, uses the argument that the jamming capability of the F-18G was used successfully in last years fight against Libya. This is a crock. Libya's air defence capability was a joke and will be nothing close to the emerging threat picture in the Pacific Rim. Also, the F-18G is draggy, short-ranged and highly dependent on air-refueling resources.
While the F-18G may be fine to electronically jam older (or "legacy") air defence systems from the Soviet-era, the single-seat F-18E Super Hornet and the two-seat F-18F Super Hornet, in their Block II configuration, can already detect, pin-point and destroy this kind of threat. This includes the fact that the on-board jamming system and towed-decoy of the E and F Super Hornet provide outstanding self-defence capability against older threats.
Defence does not seem to be acting in a responsible manner with our tax dollars in the current budget environment.
A few days after the federal budget announcement, Defence spent $1.4B for 10 C-27J light airlift aircraft stating they were a Caribou replacement when they were not. The other reason Defence used justify this purchase was that the C-27J gets into more airfields than a C-130. True, but the C-130J's purchased by Defence were justified as "strategic air-lifters". And, while a variety of aircraft can get into more airfields than a C-130J, there was no formal tender for the C-27J against its world-wide competitor, the Airbus C-295.
Using the justification that they have to make ends meet under the new federal budget, Defence has cut funds used to get single enlisted soldiers fighting in Afghanistan home on leave. These troops in a combat theatre will have to pay for their own flights. The general that helped make this decision, can easily afford such flights.
Thursday, April 12, 2012
The concurrency fraud
For the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force the tac-air mess known as the "fighter-gap", was totally avoidable.
The fighter-gap is based on the idea that the military has not bought enough aircraft to support operations into the future years. Fighter aircraft are getting old and so on. Yet, the responsibility for this problem rests on the shoulders of the military. It is senior leadership's fault and no-one else.
The military believed the F-35 concurrency lie. That is that the F-35 could be built cheap in high numbers, early and any development problems along the way would be fixed up. The risks in relation to the complexity of the program were waved away with a can-do attitude or ignored.
If the F-35 program was built without that concurrency nightmare that deeply worries the current DOD F-35 program manager, there would be less risk. The people that have been consistently accurate (for years) about these risks--The Government Accounting Office (GAO)--even told us so.
Counting airframes, motors and military construction, in procurement dollars alone, the F-35 program from U.S. fiscal year budget 2007 to 2012, will have cost us $29.2B.
Instead, the Navy could have used their $14B to procure 186 extra Block II Super Hornets. Probably several more if they could commit to only buying single-seaters. Combined with their existing multi-year buy, most of the legacy Hornets on our big aircraft carriers could have been replaced.
Instead of buying LRIP F-35 mistake-jets, the USAF could have used their $15B to procure 214 F-16s.
The USMC? Their Harriers are good to go until around 2023-24. Oh, they didn't tell you that?
Once F-16 and F-18 numbers got up to reasonable health, low-rate production of both the F-16 and F-18 could continue. No fighter-gap.
And the F-35? It would still be in development. Until it was mature enough for production.
The fighter-gap is based on the idea that the military has not bought enough aircraft to support operations into the future years. Fighter aircraft are getting old and so on. Yet, the responsibility for this problem rests on the shoulders of the military. It is senior leadership's fault and no-one else.
The military believed the F-35 concurrency lie. That is that the F-35 could be built cheap in high numbers, early and any development problems along the way would be fixed up. The risks in relation to the complexity of the program were waved away with a can-do attitude or ignored.
If the F-35 program was built without that concurrency nightmare that deeply worries the current DOD F-35 program manager, there would be less risk. The people that have been consistently accurate (for years) about these risks--The Government Accounting Office (GAO)--even told us so.
Counting airframes, motors and military construction, in procurement dollars alone, the F-35 program from U.S. fiscal year budget 2007 to 2012, will have cost us $29.2B.
Instead, the Navy could have used their $14B to procure 186 extra Block II Super Hornets. Probably several more if they could commit to only buying single-seaters. Combined with their existing multi-year buy, most of the legacy Hornets on our big aircraft carriers could have been replaced.
Instead of buying LRIP F-35 mistake-jets, the USAF could have used their $15B to procure 214 F-16s.
The USMC? Their Harriers are good to go until around 2023-24. Oh, they didn't tell you that?
Once F-16 and F-18 numbers got up to reasonable health, low-rate production of both the F-16 and F-18 could continue. No fighter-gap.
And the F-35? It would still be in development. Until it was mature enough for production.
Thursday, April 5, 2012
Define "theoretical"
Interesting what some "experts" think:
Let us compare the F-35 to the slowest 4th gen out there; the Block II Super Hornet:
-Sortie rate per-day/per week: Super Hornet
-Deliver with in agreed cost and schedule: Super Hornet
-Affordable in acquisition and sustainment: Super Hornet
-Able to take on non-anti-access threats better-cheaper: Super Hornet
-Better to assist in anti-access threats (note; by virtue of the JORD, the F-35 and this study, the F-35 will not be able to stand up to anti-access threats). Again: Super Hornet.
-Two-aircrew attack option: Super Hornet
-Two-engines: Super Hornet
-Structural survivability: Super Hornet
-Radar threat survivability: Super Hornet
-Better in Within-Visual-Range (WVR) combat (HOBS, working helmet, manoeuvre, etc.): Super Hornet.
-Better value to the joint theater commander (networking, and proven effectiveness): Super Hornet.
-Buddy tanker: Super Hornet.
-Escort jammer option: Super Hornet.(An important distinction for Growler hopefuls; the difference between an escort jammer and a stand-off jammer. Against anti-access threats; and even with the great hope of a next-generation jammer, long range emerging threats will still be out of reach).
-Proven clearance of a wide variety of short and long range precision guided munitions: Super Hornet.
-Affordable within a $9B procurement budget and $7B 20 year maintenance budget? Unknown. If one needs 72 Super Hornets, (a more viable operational need), you might be looking in the $22B region with 300 flying hours per airframe per year. If you go with 65 jets and less annual flying hours, then you might be able to swing the $16B number for 20 years. And, there are actual existing figures to look at with the Super so Canadian decision makers have realistic information in front of them.
There is more to this list. But it is my opinion that the "theoretical" label applies to every F-35 metric. The F-35 does not have the maturity to be properly evaluated. It is possible that it may never reach that milestone.
What is not "theoretical" is how long one can keep CF-18s operationally viable. 2020 is the realistic limit. If a procurement decision is made within the next year, it may be possible for Canada to retire the CF-18 with dignity while maintaining operational capability for home defense and operations abroad.
Boeing Super Hornet flipbook (PDF)
Even if the Conservatives announced a new competition, the F-35 would still come back as the winner, according to Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military and Strategic Studies.
“It’ll come back and say there is no other competitor,” he said, disputing Wheeler’s claim that there are alternatives.
Huebert said the “theoretical” alternatives are either outdated like the F/A-18 Super Hornet or just as expensive like the Eurofighter.
Let us compare the F-35 to the slowest 4th gen out there; the Block II Super Hornet:
-Sortie rate per-day/per week: Super Hornet
-Deliver with in agreed cost and schedule: Super Hornet
-Affordable in acquisition and sustainment: Super Hornet
-Able to take on non-anti-access threats better-cheaper: Super Hornet
-Better to assist in anti-access threats (note; by virtue of the JORD, the F-35 and this study, the F-35 will not be able to stand up to anti-access threats). Again: Super Hornet.
-Two-aircrew attack option: Super Hornet
-Two-engines: Super Hornet
-Structural survivability: Super Hornet
-Radar threat survivability: Super Hornet
-Better in Within-Visual-Range (WVR) combat (HOBS, working helmet, manoeuvre, etc.): Super Hornet.
-Better value to the joint theater commander (networking, and proven effectiveness): Super Hornet.
-Buddy tanker: Super Hornet.
-Escort jammer option: Super Hornet.(An important distinction for Growler hopefuls; the difference between an escort jammer and a stand-off jammer. Against anti-access threats; and even with the great hope of a next-generation jammer, long range emerging threats will still be out of reach).
-Proven clearance of a wide variety of short and long range precision guided munitions: Super Hornet.
-Affordable within a $9B procurement budget and $7B 20 year maintenance budget? Unknown. If one needs 72 Super Hornets, (a more viable operational need), you might be looking in the $22B region with 300 flying hours per airframe per year. If you go with 65 jets and less annual flying hours, then you might be able to swing the $16B number for 20 years. And, there are actual existing figures to look at with the Super so Canadian decision makers have realistic information in front of them.
There is more to this list. But it is my opinion that the "theoretical" label applies to every F-35 metric. The F-35 does not have the maturity to be properly evaluated. It is possible that it may never reach that milestone.
What is not "theoretical" is how long one can keep CF-18s operationally viable. 2020 is the realistic limit. If a procurement decision is made within the next year, it may be possible for Canada to retire the CF-18 with dignity while maintaining operational capability for home defense and operations abroad.
Boeing Super Hornet flipbook (PDF)
DND depended on the "fifth-generation fighter" meme to sole source F-35
The F-35 part of the Canadian Auditor General's report is here. If you follow fighter tech, a read of the report will show many holes in DND assumptions.
For instance, in 2008, DND wanted to sole-source the F-35. In order to do so they needed something that set it apart from other fighter aircraft. That something was the "fifth-generation fighter" meme.
Here is how the AG report defined a "fifth-generation" fighter:
Emphasis added. "According to manufacturers".
While the report shows that DND supposedly researched other available fighter aircraft, there is no evidence that DND has received the classified U.S. Navy Super Hornet briefing (approved by the U.S. State Department) which is a precursor to any consideration of that aircraft.
As an aside: Boeing has delivered Super Hornets to the U.S. Navy and Australia, on-time and on-budget. The same also applies to Korea's order of F-15K's.
It is my opinion that one of the steps that has to be taken to fix this mess is to fire some people; pour encourager les autres.
--
Canadian AG report states DND misled Parliament over the F-35
For instance, in 2008, DND wanted to sole-source the F-35. In order to do so they needed something that set it apart from other fighter aircraft. That something was the "fifth-generation fighter" meme.
Here is how the AG report defined a "fifth-generation" fighter:
Fifth generation capability—Fighter jets that, according to manufacturers, incorporate the most modern technologies, such as stealth, advanced radar, and integrated avionics. There is no accepted or objective definition of fifth generation capability.
Emphasis added. "According to manufacturers".
While the report shows that DND supposedly researched other available fighter aircraft, there is no evidence that DND has received the classified U.S. Navy Super Hornet briefing (approved by the U.S. State Department) which is a precursor to any consideration of that aircraft.
As an aside: Boeing has delivered Super Hornets to the U.S. Navy and Australia, on-time and on-budget. The same also applies to Korea's order of F-15K's.
It is my opinion that one of the steps that has to be taken to fix this mess is to fire some people; pour encourager les autres.
--
*UPDATE* AG- DND misled Parliament over the F-35
Canadian AG report states DND misled Parliament over the F-35
Still no time left for Canada
DND costing figures on the F-35 are wrong
Exploring another option for Canada's CF-18 replacement
A CF-18 replacement scenario for Canada
Friday, March 30, 2012
Defence on the verge of throwing away money on dud jamming aircraft 'upgrade'
This is another reason you can't trust the current senior defence leadership with your tax dollars: they don't know what they are doing. Again.
It was a bad idea then when deciding to wire 12 of Australia's F-18Fs for the ability to be set up as an ECM jet and it is a bad idea now.
Well over half a billion dollars could be wasted on this project.
And, why is it a waste?
Because the Growler is obsolete against modern threats. What is funny is how some mention it was used in a cream-puff of an air defense "system" like Libya last year.
Here is some additional thoughts by the U.S. Navy concerning the gear Defence wants to put into those 12 aircraft.
But what about the "next-generation jammer?"
What about it? The program may show up. However in these tight budget times and the U.S. Navy getting bled white by outrageously expensive defense projects, I wouldn't count on it.
If Defence goes through with this sham, it will be another monument to their incompetence.
It was a bad idea then when deciding to wire 12 of Australia's F-18Fs for the ability to be set up as an ECM jet and it is a bad idea now.
Well over half a billion dollars could be wasted on this project.
And, why is it a waste?
Because the Growler is obsolete against modern threats. What is funny is how some mention it was used in a cream-puff of an air defense "system" like Libya last year.
Here is some additional thoughts by the U.S. Navy concerning the gear Defence wants to put into those 12 aircraft.
But what about the "next-generation jammer?"
What about it? The program may show up. However in these tight budget times and the U.S. Navy getting bled white by outrageously expensive defense projects, I wouldn't count on it.
If Defence goes through with this sham, it will be another monument to their incompetence.
Monday, February 13, 2012
Victory for a second-tier strike fighter solution
RAAF Super Hornets (good AESA radar foot-prints) and the Wedgetail (at whatever capability delivered) on deployment.
via Defence:
via Defence:
Super Hornets and Wedgetail arrive in Guam for
Exercise COPE NORTH
The Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF) newest capabilities have soared over the coastline of Guam on their first overseas mission together for 2012 during Exercise COPE NORTH.
This is the first time the RAAF has participated in Exercise COPE NORTH, a bi‑annual exercise historically for the United States Air Force (USAF) and the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) that started in 1978.
The Super Hornets and Airborne Early Warning and Control Wedgetail aircraft, along with 300 Air Force personnel, have commenced the tri-lateral air defence exercise that allows the aircrew to enhance their tactical skills and joint operational capability alongside military aircraft from the USAF and Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF).
Six of the ‘Rhinos’ from Amberley’s Number 1 Squadron and a Wedgetail from Williamtown’s Number 2 Squadron have touched down at Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, to participate in their first overseas deployment with the JASDF. It is the second overseas deployment for both the Super Hornet and Wedgetail since they were delivered to the Air Force.
Commander of the Australian contingent for the exercise, Group Captain Geoffrey Harland, said the exercise will provide excellent opportunities for RAAF personnel to integrate with a joint task force to learn how other countries operate.
“The training will be invaluable and there will be many important lessons learnt from our participation in this exercise,” Group Captain Harland said.
“Exercise COPE NORTH will allow the aircrew to develop an appreciation of the capabilities and strengths of the different aircraft types which is valuable training for air combat and Surveillance and Response Group personnel who may be required to operate in a coalition environment in the future.”
The international aircraft comprises the USAF’s F-16s, B-52s, F-15Cs, F-16CJs and KC-135, and JASDF’s F-15Js, F2s and E2Cs. More than 1,000 military personnel from around the world are expected to participate.
During Exercise COPE NORTH, Number 37 Squadron’s C-130 will also participate in a separate exercise on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
The exercise will run from the 13 to 24 February.
Saturday, February 11, 2012
Australian Defence pushes more misinformation on the F-35 to the press
Defence is misleading the press.
Again.
The F-35 cheerleaders are afraid that Smith will sign up for another order of Super Hornets. They think a preemptive strike in the media--which proclaims that the F-35 debacle is manageable--can't hurt.
Today's Canberra Times has a read that has the usual Defence talking points which are wrong. They are yet to figure out the following:
1. The F-35 is not a fifth-generation fighter (except in the dreams of marketing people)
2. The 2009 Defence White Paper is a joke.
3. The F-35 will not be able to take on modern anti-access threats.
4. The F-35 program has significant problems.
5. Some major U.S. political leaders are not happy about those problems.
Again.
The F-35 cheerleaders are afraid that Smith will sign up for another order of Super Hornets. They think a preemptive strike in the media--which proclaims that the F-35 debacle is manageable--can't hurt.
Today's Canberra Times has a read that has the usual Defence talking points which are wrong. They are yet to figure out the following:
1. The F-35 is not a fifth-generation fighter (except in the dreams of marketing people)
2. The 2009 Defence White Paper is a joke.
3. The F-35 will not be able to take on modern anti-access threats.
4. The F-35 program has significant problems.
5. Some major U.S. political leaders are not happy about those problems.
A CF-18 replacement scenario for Canada
My last off the cuff figure of what it would take for Canada to do a Super Hornet deal was stripped and not equipped. As someone suggested, it would be in the end, too low.
What would a real deal look like? Probably something like below. Interesting. Because it isn't too far off from the non-DND studies thrown about for an F-35 procurement (much higher than the Lockheed Martin talking point crowd). My scenario has support for 20 years and not 30 years. More; note the language that I used in the fake DSCA release below. It hints at an open competition for replacement of Canada's aging CF-18s.
I propose that the second order of Super Hornets would be for 36 single-seat E models. A package very similar to above in content for $6.3B. Grand-total: 72 aircraft.
Operating and sustainment figures for 20 years will be for cost of flight hour only. I am averaging this out to $22k per flight hour; 300 flight hours per airframe, per year.
Grand total (not counting facilities upgrades) is around $22.3B to replace Canada's CF-18s with 72 Super Hornets including 20 years of basic operations and sustainment costs.
What would a real deal look like? Probably something like below. Interesting. Because it isn't too far off from the non-DND studies thrown about for an F-35 procurement (much higher than the Lockheed Martin talking point crowd). My scenario has support for 20 years and not 30 years. More; note the language that I used in the fake DSCA release below. It hints at an open competition for replacement of Canada's aging CF-18s.
Canada – F/A-18E/F Super Hornet Aircraft
WASHINGTON, August 8, 2013 – Today the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Canada of 28 F/A-18E Super Hornet Aircraft, eight F/A-18F Super Hornet Aircraft, 72 F414-GE-400 installed engines, a host of spare parts and munitions at an estimated value of $6.5 billion; with an option to purchase at a later date an additional 36 aircraft.
The Government of Canada has requested proposals from several foreign suppliers, including the United States, to provide the next generation fighter for the Canadian Defence Force. In this competition, the Government of Canada has yet to select the United States Navy-Boeing proposal.
This notification is being made in advance of receipt of a letter of request so that, in the event that the US Navy-Boeing proposal is selected, the United States might move as quickly as possible to implement the sale. If the Government of Canada selects the U.S. Navy-Boeing proposal, the Government of Canada will request a possible sale of 28 F/A-18E Super Hornet Aircraft, eight F/A-18F Super Hornet Aircraft, 72 F414-GE-400 installed engines, four F414-GE-400 spare engines, 36 AN/APG-79 Radar Systems, 36 M61A2 20mm Gun Systems, 36 AN/ALR-67(V) three Radar Warning Receivers, 144 LAU-127 Launchers, 44 Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems (JHMCS), 144 AIM-120D Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), 144 AIM-9X SIDEWINDER Missiles, and 36 AN/ASQ-228 (V2) Advanced Targeting Forward-Looking Infrared (ATFLIR) Pods. Also included are 36 AN/ALQ-214 Radio Frequency Countermeasures. 40 AN/ALE-47 Electronic Warfare Countermeasures Systems, 112 AN/ALE-55 Towed Decoys, 12 air-to-air refueling kits, Joint Mission Planning System, support equipment, spare and repair parts, personnel training and training equipment, ferry and tanker support, flight test, software support, publications and technical documents, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support.
I propose that the second order of Super Hornets would be for 36 single-seat E models. A package very similar to above in content for $6.3B. Grand-total: 72 aircraft.
Operating and sustainment figures for 20 years will be for cost of flight hour only. I am averaging this out to $22k per flight hour; 300 flight hours per airframe, per year.
Grand total (not counting facilities upgrades) is around $22.3B to replace Canada's CF-18s with 72 Super Hornets including 20 years of basic operations and sustainment costs.
(ATFLIR on BlockII F-18F)
Thursday, February 9, 2012
Canada has to identify the root cause of their DND air power problem
I applaud some in Canada who, more and more, are discussing alternatives to the failed project known as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. With that, the discussion seems to be in error when specifics of aircraft performance are mentioned; for instance, suggesting that drones can do air policing duty.
When looking at a plan-B to the F-35 one has to first identify all the problems before suggesting a solution. Paramount in the discovery process is noting that DND leadership either has no available skill-sets in the profession of air power or, senior leadership is ignoring the in-house experts (if there are any). This is the very first thing that has to be sorted out.
Next everyone has to come to grips with the fact that there isn’t a lot of money to spend on a replacement for the CF-18. Note that when the CF-18 was being considered years ago, aircraft like the F-14 and F-15 were ruled out because they were too expensive. Today is no different. Canada is a price-only buyer.
Another error I have seen mentioned recently are those crowing that the CF-18s had a recent refurb and are good out to 2020. This is a grave error. If the Canadian government does not start a solid replacement action for the CF-18s by 2013, there will be significant operational problems retiring these old jets by 2020. While the jets may have had some refurbishment, it is not a zeroing out of their airframe life hours. Time is short.
There is talk of the Super Hornet. No matter what; this will always be a second-tier fighter solution that will be unable to take on serious anti-access threats in the coming years. Yet, in every area of practical proven performance, it will beat the F-35 (even if the Just so Failed gets fixed). And, the F-35 will never be able to take on serious anti-access threats by the very nature of the requirement that was its blueprint.
I have thrown around very rough calculations (nothing serious) and figure that in order for Canada to go with the Super Hornet option, it would look something like this:
12x F-18F two-seaters
60x F-18E single-seaters
20 years operations and sustainment costs (300 hours per year per airframe)
Upgrade of facilities at 3 major bases and up to 8 deployable locations with in Canada
Weapons and spares
For around $13 billion dollars; not counting industrial off-sets.
I will defer to someone that has hard access to figures.
And while one can point fingers at this idea and state it makes no sense. It makes significantly more sense than committing to a disaster of project management (the F-35) based entirely on Lockheed Martin talking points.
When looking at a plan-B to the F-35 one has to first identify all the problems before suggesting a solution. Paramount in the discovery process is noting that DND leadership either has no available skill-sets in the profession of air power or, senior leadership is ignoring the in-house experts (if there are any). This is the very first thing that has to be sorted out.
Next everyone has to come to grips with the fact that there isn’t a lot of money to spend on a replacement for the CF-18. Note that when the CF-18 was being considered years ago, aircraft like the F-14 and F-15 were ruled out because they were too expensive. Today is no different. Canada is a price-only buyer.
Another error I have seen mentioned recently are those crowing that the CF-18s had a recent refurb and are good out to 2020. This is a grave error. If the Canadian government does not start a solid replacement action for the CF-18s by 2013, there will be significant operational problems retiring these old jets by 2020. While the jets may have had some refurbishment, it is not a zeroing out of their airframe life hours. Time is short.
There is talk of the Super Hornet. No matter what; this will always be a second-tier fighter solution that will be unable to take on serious anti-access threats in the coming years. Yet, in every area of practical proven performance, it will beat the F-35 (even if the Just so Failed gets fixed). And, the F-35 will never be able to take on serious anti-access threats by the very nature of the requirement that was its blueprint.
I have thrown around very rough calculations (nothing serious) and figure that in order for Canada to go with the Super Hornet option, it would look something like this:
12x F-18F two-seaters
60x F-18E single-seaters
20 years operations and sustainment costs (300 hours per year per airframe)
Upgrade of facilities at 3 major bases and up to 8 deployable locations with in Canada
Weapons and spares
For around $13 billion dollars; not counting industrial off-sets.
I will defer to someone that has hard access to figures.
And while one can point fingers at this idea and state it makes no sense. It makes significantly more sense than committing to a disaster of project management (the F-35) based entirely on Lockheed Martin talking points.
Thursday, December 29, 2011
Finding budget sanity in the carrier air wing
The carrier air wing has one more mission that is not talked about much. That is, to provide a purpose to keep big aircraft carrier pork and graft moving in the system.
The Navy will need to make some serious budget decisions in the coming years.
The first one would be to ditch the requirement for the F-35C. There is no amount of lipstick that can make this pig a useful jet for carriers. And it was never a credible anti-access threat player anyway.
Once that is done, a move has to be made to simplify the fast jet portion of the carrier air wing. To accomplish this, retiring all of the legacy Hornet squadrons sooner rather than later can save a lot of cash.
Today fast jet composition of the carrier air wing is 2 classic and 2 Super Hornet squadrons. Dumping all the classics and reforming into 3 Super Hornet squadrons as the total fast jet composition for the carrier air wing can simplify things and save money.
Given the severe budget problems, we may see some carriers go away due to lack of money to operate them. If 3 carriers go away, that frees up taskings for 6 Super Hornet squadrons.
Super Hornet production can proceed at a continued rate to replace early Super Hornet Block I (and early Lot) that are showing age.
3 fast jet squadrons (not counting the Grizzly detachment) should be good enough for peace time. In times of war, a carrier can be beefed up with more squadrons and/or the physical size of the squadron can be increased.
The USMC picking up the Super Hornet (after realization of F-35B failure) will help the situation.
While not a true anti-access player, in many situations that allow for the F-22, the large radar foot-print of the Block II Super Hornet will add to over-all capability.
In the case of lesser threats like Iran trying to close off access to the gulf, an all Super Hornet Block II force will be highly effective in killing off a wide variety of targets that are a threat to maritime security.
Hard and/or painful budget cut decisions are coming. How the U.S. Navy survives all this is yet to be seen. It is possible that there is salvation in simplifying the carrier air wing.
The Navy will need to make some serious budget decisions in the coming years.
The first one would be to ditch the requirement for the F-35C. There is no amount of lipstick that can make this pig a useful jet for carriers. And it was never a credible anti-access threat player anyway.
Once that is done, a move has to be made to simplify the fast jet portion of the carrier air wing. To accomplish this, retiring all of the legacy Hornet squadrons sooner rather than later can save a lot of cash.
Today fast jet composition of the carrier air wing is 2 classic and 2 Super Hornet squadrons. Dumping all the classics and reforming into 3 Super Hornet squadrons as the total fast jet composition for the carrier air wing can simplify things and save money.
Given the severe budget problems, we may see some carriers go away due to lack of money to operate them. If 3 carriers go away, that frees up taskings for 6 Super Hornet squadrons.
Super Hornet production can proceed at a continued rate to replace early Super Hornet Block I (and early Lot) that are showing age.
3 fast jet squadrons (not counting the Grizzly detachment) should be good enough for peace time. In times of war, a carrier can be beefed up with more squadrons and/or the physical size of the squadron can be increased.
The USMC picking up the Super Hornet (after realization of F-35B failure) will help the situation.
While not a true anti-access player, in many situations that allow for the F-22, the large radar foot-print of the Block II Super Hornet will add to over-all capability.
In the case of lesser threats like Iran trying to close off access to the gulf, an all Super Hornet Block II force will be highly effective in killing off a wide variety of targets that are a threat to maritime security.
Hard and/or painful budget cut decisions are coming. How the U.S. Navy survives all this is yet to be seen. It is possible that there is salvation in simplifying the carrier air wing.
Thursday, December 8, 2011
Marines are not defined by aircraft; especially faulty ones
It is sad to see some who think that the F-35 defines the Marine Corps; or STOVL for that matter.
Since the F-35 will not be able to take on emerging threats, what the USMC is in the market for is a reliable second-tier fighter.
USMC has around 9 or so Harrier squadrons and another 15 or so Hornet/EA-6 squadrons.
The USMC can make some cuts and come out more powerful and more "joint" by retiring the Harrier now and convert the money wasted on the F-35B and put it into 2 seat, Block 2, Super Hornets.
So the flat-top amphibs only end up with helicopters/MV-22s. Big deal. If anything that will be an improvement on air ops by not wasting resources on a handful of STOVL fighters.
Many can't imagine a real war where there isn't a big nuke carrier supporting Marines on the ground. Same goes for long-range bombers and the USAF in-general. Also, a Marine amphib group by itself is dead meat against a real air threat.
With 15 or so F-18F and EA-18G USMC squadrons, you would have an aircraft that helps out the Navy for the carrier air wing numbers and gives the Marine some excellent support.
Fast response CAS? Answer: GPS/INS rocket artillery and attack helicopters. Something the USMC already has.
I will finish to remind some about the myth of STOVL for the U.S. We could do a war and never miss it.
Since the F-35 will not be able to take on emerging threats, what the USMC is in the market for is a reliable second-tier fighter.
USMC has around 9 or so Harrier squadrons and another 15 or so Hornet/EA-6 squadrons.
The USMC can make some cuts and come out more powerful and more "joint" by retiring the Harrier now and convert the money wasted on the F-35B and put it into 2 seat, Block 2, Super Hornets.
So the flat-top amphibs only end up with helicopters/MV-22s. Big deal. If anything that will be an improvement on air ops by not wasting resources on a handful of STOVL fighters.
Many can't imagine a real war where there isn't a big nuke carrier supporting Marines on the ground. Same goes for long-range bombers and the USAF in-general. Also, a Marine amphib group by itself is dead meat against a real air threat.
With 15 or so F-18F and EA-18G USMC squadrons, you would have an aircraft that helps out the Navy for the carrier air wing numbers and gives the Marine some excellent support.
Fast response CAS? Answer: GPS/INS rocket artillery and attack helicopters. Something the USMC already has.
I will finish to remind some about the myth of STOVL for the U.S. We could do a war and never miss it.
Monday, November 28, 2011
Over 10 years ago the Super Hornet was a "non-starter" for the RAAF
Times change. Not always for the better.
Years ago, Australia was being setup to buy the F-22. Back then, the Super Hornets that Nelson fell for in 2006 and that are now in service was considered a "non-starter".
Years ago, Australia was being setup to buy the F-22. Back then, the Super Hornets that Nelson fell for in 2006 and that are now in service was considered a "non-starter".
(click image for large view)
Monday, November 7, 2011
Canada still has a lot of work to do in order to validate a proper CF-18 replacement
Canada still seems to be confused on the topic of what should replace its CF-18 fighter fleet.
There is a lot of talk about 65 aircraft not being enough to meet its requirements for home defence and deployment needs.
In order to do this properly one has to decide if the F-35 will make it into service. If so, training can be done in the United States and thus free more airframes for operational taskings. If not then Canada will either have to increase their final number of CF-18 replacement aircraft or just deal with the shortfall.
If the F-35 does not become the way forward, Canada needs to consider the following for “combat-coded” fighter aircraft.
1. How many will be dedicated to training?
2. What percentage will be going through periodic maintenance?
3. How many aircraft will be pulled for overseas deployments?
4. When there are overseas deployments will there be enough combat-coded aircraft to perform home defence?
Since the Canadian DND never properly looked at the Super Hornet let us look at some of the considerations of this aircraft as a CF-18 replacement.
1. Two engines
2. Two air-crew (if required; for instance CAS support of ground troops)
3. Better procurement and operating cost compared to an F-35.
4. Suitable home industry workshare.
5. Short pilot upgrade training between the CF-18 and Super Hornet (for instance, the Australian example).
6. It is an off-the-shelf and proven joint weapons platform with coalition partners including excellent network and communications gear.
7. Adding to that, is part of a joint team with the U.S. Navy and Australia in the area of platform knowledge growth.
8. As the upgrade process happens, the Super Hornet provides excellent enhancement of the C-18 with the ability to provide increased threat and mission situational awareness and other advantages such as buddy-tanking when needed.
9. Excellent capability against peer or legacy threats.
Here is an example of how the Canadians could deploy to support a joint coalition with the Super Hornet.
8x Super Hornets, Accessories to include, HACTS, 10 ATFLIR, 3 SHARP recon pods, 3 buddy-refuel kits. Weapons could include AMRAAM, AIM-9X, JSOW, Laser-JDAM, HART-JDAM, SLAM-ER and Harpoon.
1. Deployment to the Philippines as a barcap, sea-control and ISR and strike capability in response to increased tension in the Spratly Islands.
2. Deployment to Japan as a barcap, sea-control and ISR and strike capability in response to increased tension with North Korea.
3. Deployment to Italy as a barcap, sea-control and ISR and strike capability in response to increased tension in the in the Balkans.
4. Deployment to Kuwait as a barcap, sea-control and ISR and strike capability in response to increased tension with Iran.
The above considerations can be used to look at other kinds of aircraft that may be suitable as a CF-18 replacement.
I do not think that the CF-18 controversy is over. Simply because Canada's political decision makers have been fed so much bad information on the topic.
There is a lot of talk about 65 aircraft not being enough to meet its requirements for home defence and deployment needs.
In order to do this properly one has to decide if the F-35 will make it into service. If so, training can be done in the United States and thus free more airframes for operational taskings. If not then Canada will either have to increase their final number of CF-18 replacement aircraft or just deal with the shortfall.
If the F-35 does not become the way forward, Canada needs to consider the following for “combat-coded” fighter aircraft.
1. How many will be dedicated to training?
2. What percentage will be going through periodic maintenance?
3. How many aircraft will be pulled for overseas deployments?
4. When there are overseas deployments will there be enough combat-coded aircraft to perform home defence?
Since the Canadian DND never properly looked at the Super Hornet let us look at some of the considerations of this aircraft as a CF-18 replacement.
1. Two engines
2. Two air-crew (if required; for instance CAS support of ground troops)
3. Better procurement and operating cost compared to an F-35.
4. Suitable home industry workshare.
5. Short pilot upgrade training between the CF-18 and Super Hornet (for instance, the Australian example).
6. It is an off-the-shelf and proven joint weapons platform with coalition partners including excellent network and communications gear.
7. Adding to that, is part of a joint team with the U.S. Navy and Australia in the area of platform knowledge growth.
8. As the upgrade process happens, the Super Hornet provides excellent enhancement of the C-18 with the ability to provide increased threat and mission situational awareness and other advantages such as buddy-tanking when needed.
9. Excellent capability against peer or legacy threats.
Here is an example of how the Canadians could deploy to support a joint coalition with the Super Hornet.
8x Super Hornets, Accessories to include, HACTS, 10 ATFLIR, 3 SHARP recon pods, 3 buddy-refuel kits. Weapons could include AMRAAM, AIM-9X, JSOW, Laser-JDAM, HART-JDAM, SLAM-ER and Harpoon.
1. Deployment to the Philippines as a barcap, sea-control and ISR and strike capability in response to increased tension in the Spratly Islands.
2. Deployment to Japan as a barcap, sea-control and ISR and strike capability in response to increased tension with North Korea.
3. Deployment to Italy as a barcap, sea-control and ISR and strike capability in response to increased tension in the in the Balkans.
4. Deployment to Kuwait as a barcap, sea-control and ISR and strike capability in response to increased tension with Iran.
The above considerations can be used to look at other kinds of aircraft that may be suitable as a CF-18 replacement.
I do not think that the CF-18 controversy is over. Simply because Canada's political decision makers have been fed so much bad information on the topic.
Sunday, November 6, 2011
The F-35 loses the value comparison to the Super Hornet
Comparing the Super Hornet to the F-35....
Take an aircraft that is in production and has some warts on it, and it completely beats anything that the F-35 program can ever be.
Why? Because the F-35 program is deficient.
Neither aircraft will be able to stand up to major threats in the coming years; yet there is a lot of need for second tier fighter aircraft. And we don't need a second-tier strike-fighter at an outrageous cost.
When looking at the chart below, it is hard to believe that the F-35 has sensor fusion when the DAS / helmet fiasco has ruined any claim of greatness. Check your 6? Good luck with that.
If you are flying the F-35B or C, you may have left the deck that day without a gun.
Close air support? Nothing of value here that a Super Hornet--especially a 2 seat variant can't do better--and safer.
The Joint Commander will not see F-35 networking of worth until Block 4 thru 6...if it ever gets that far.
As for combat radius... well since the claims below do not come from the F-35 faith-based community, they can only be wrong?
All something to consider for Canada; who do not have much in writing stating they must maintain regional air superiority. Since they have stated they are not in the market for the F-22, that issue is settled.
Take an aircraft that is in production and has some warts on it, and it completely beats anything that the F-35 program can ever be.
Why? Because the F-35 program is deficient.
Neither aircraft will be able to stand up to major threats in the coming years; yet there is a lot of need for second tier fighter aircraft. And we don't need a second-tier strike-fighter at an outrageous cost.
When looking at the chart below, it is hard to believe that the F-35 has sensor fusion when the DAS / helmet fiasco has ruined any claim of greatness. Check your 6? Good luck with that.
If you are flying the F-35B or C, you may have left the deck that day without a gun.
Close air support? Nothing of value here that a Super Hornet--especially a 2 seat variant can't do better--and safer.
The Joint Commander will not see F-35 networking of worth until Block 4 thru 6...if it ever gets that far.
As for combat radius... well since the claims below do not come from the F-35 faith-based community, they can only be wrong?
All something to consider for Canada; who do not have much in writing stating they must maintain regional air superiority. Since they have stated they are not in the market for the F-22, that issue is settled.
Wednesday, November 2, 2011
Defence and how they are creating an air combat capability gap
“The (Australian) government will not allow an air combat capability gap to emerge in the event of JSF schedule delay,” said Australian defence department spokesman Elliott Bator.
Interesting theory, but the gap filler Mr. Smith's crew is shooting for will hardly be useful except to maintain a façade for the flying club.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)