Who told Defence that Wedgetail was ready for IOC and is it true?

Australian Defence has declared initial operating capability (IOC) with the Wedgetail aircraft, so says this this press release.

"The Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) Wedgetail aircraft has achieved Initial Operational Capability,..."

But is it true?

One of the anonymous Internet mind-guards who help to push the message of various tribal elements within the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy isn't so sure:

Quote:
Originally Posted by Gordon Branch
Did anyone else notice the that The E-7 Wedgetail has achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC)?

Depends on how the Proj defined IOC. There is no standard definition and my understanding is that there is still a fair way to go.

Sometimes there is confusion because the Proj may meet "Interim" rarther than "Initial"

the former is a compromise used to get the platform up and about but still work towards meeting OC

All in all, I'm suggesting that the claim about meeting real world IOC may not be so as the press release claims

In fact I know its not so.

Is the Wedgetail ready for IOC? I don't know. I do know that it was delayed for years; and was looking at shooting for a 90 percent capability of the original expectation after experiencing technology problems.

The root cause of Wedgetail problems appeared where they do in many ill-conceived projects: in the beginning. Numerous identified risks were waved away by the program leadership as being workable. Later when those identified risks evolved into show-stopping problems, the Wedgetail became a project management object lesson.

So, either the Defence Minister's office, the DMO and RAAF are wrong and trying to push an alleged success story where none exists or the anonymous mind-guards are wrong.

This has the potential to be a worthy topic of interest at the next Senate Estimates get-together.

I am curious how the Minister's office will address this gross difference in communication?

The potential greatness of Senator Johnston

A speech the other day by a person that could be the next Defence Minister under a new leadership, Senator David Johnston, shows a man that has his heart in the right place for Defence.

The video here, is recommended viewing.

Unfortunately, he admits he is not very knowledgeable on Defence. Historically this isn't a new situation for Defence Ministers in Australia. It does seem that he has the potential to be more up-to-speed than other Defense Ministers before him even if Johnston admits he is a “slightly educated amateur” in relation to the portfolio.

In my opinion, he still has some views of Defence that are not realistic.

For example he said that Australia's air combat capability is “relatively straight forward” when in fact it has serious challenges ahead. He mentions that in spite of critics, the F-35 will be a “fantastic” capability. He then goes on to mention that DAS on the F-35 saw a rocket launch from 800 some miles away. Hint: it was one of the biggest boosters available on the market. Or as one critic said of this Lockheed Martin marketing effort (that is where it came from and has been pushed elsewhere when hyping the F-35): “With the naked eye, I can see 93 million miles in daylight; quite a bit further at night.”

Johnston goes on to mention the alleged net-centric-warfare capability of the F-35 when this technology exists today in other platforms. He mentions the wonders of the F-35 pilot's integrated sensor helmet but doesn't mention this system is in deep trouble. He mentions that the F-35 will give Australia a “fantastic, regionally dominant capability.” He doesn't mention that the Joint Operational Requirement Document (JORD) for the Joint Strike Fighter, drawn up in the 1990's and signed off on at the beginning of the last decade, insures that this aircraft, as delivered, will be obsolete against regional threats. And that assumes that there are no development troubles. It is doubtful that the claim by the maker of the F-35, that it is affordable, lethal, supportable and sustainable, has any credibility.

In short, he was easily taken in by all the glamour of a junket to Fort Worth to visit the F-35 factory and consume the blue-sky marketing, but has little-to-no critical thinking capability in this area of Defence.

Senator Johnston should not hitch his wagon to marketing hype.

Johnston refers back multiple times to the 2009 Defence White Paper (a wish list of $275B of spending short-falled by around $200B once realism hits), but he doesn't seem to grasp that the document is a horrific joke.

Which leads to something else where he stated that Parliament as a whole, does not understand the complexity of Defence. No surprise here. He praises ASPI for helping out (they do help) but mentions them as, “independent and non-partisan”.

I don't know about that:



If Senator Johnston becomes the next Defence Minister, here is what he must do:

-Make Defence officials accountable.

-Improve professional military education (PME) (art of war, leadership and management) which connects with:

-Improve the bad condition of the military justice system. Hint, this capability improves by leaps and bounds as PME quality improves. When this happens (regardless of the military procurement bungling by the entrenched defence bureaucracy) we will have a strong foundation that our soldiers, sailors and airmen deserve during peace and war.

Johnston may fail with the entrenched defence bureaucracy in relation to procurement stuff ups but if he can produce big victories with the human relations side of the fence for our war-fighters, he will have left a lasting legacy and, improved the defence posture of the nation.

Simply because ethics issues are what plague Defence. There is little difference between a soldier, sailor or airman receiving bad military justice and a $1.5B waste of the Sea Sprite, the many ship and submarine sustainment mistakes or other defence procurement disasters.

All of the bad behaviour comes from the same ills: poor senior leadership ethics and accountability.

Consider the DMO, ASC, RAN relationship which has been in serious trouble for years and as Johnston states, is full of “malice”. Maybe a Defence Minister Johnston can let us know the alleged worse problems in that second and restricted DMO, ASC, RAN report. After all, for years, we have been paying billions for a Navy that has been short-changed by the entrenched defence bureaucracy leaving combat capability for the worse.

Senator Johnston has the potential to be a good Defence Minister. If we all help him out, maybe he can be a great Defence Minister.

Our poor senator

Our most useless war

The Australian government is still happy to mislead the public with its claims of hope and success in Afghanistan.

All; with no credible proof.

There is much more evidence to show that coalition trained Afghan “friendly” troops have poor fighting quality, poor morale, poor sense of mission, little unit cohesion or can even show up for work than there is evidence that they will be capable of standing up to an enemy unsupervised. What our tax money has been wasted on is a slightly less able version of the South Vietnamese Army. For Sale: slightly used rifle, only dropped once.

Until the Australian military bureaucracy can advise our civilian leadership about these facts of life, what they are doing is nothing less than despicable. Blood of our lost and wounded soldiers is on the hands of Russell Office senior leadership. And, guilty as charged for not understanding 4th generation warfare.

Afghanistan, in any condition, is not a threat against Australia. And, it is hard to take this government seriously about national security when they are unwilling and/or unable to perform basic border protection at home.

The ADF may be at war in Afghanistan, but the rest of Australia is at the shopping mall. And with no real justification for the Afghanistan deployment, mall-goers are justified in their behaviour.

Defence presses forward with their bad idea

Defence presses forward with their bad idea.

RAAF F-35 costs being ignored, spun, by leadership

Our old classic Hornets will have to go out to the years beyond 2020 because the Just So Failed is very late.

That is the best-case scenario reported by The Australian.

They report that our 71 old, classic F-18 Hornets cost $170M per year to sustain. That is about $2.39M per aircraft per year. Well, they are old, obsolete and should have been retired by now.

The following is what The Australian didn't report:

So what would each new F-35 cost per year to sustain according to estimates in the U.S.? Using American dollars, each F-35 is expected to cost $35,500 per flying hour. Throwing some numbers around, the cost (USD) to sustain one F-35 for one year could look like this depending on how much it was flown:

180 hours per year = $6.4M
200 hours per year = $7.1M
220 hours per year = $7.8M

An Australian government set of figures for cost per flying hour from last year showed our old classic Hornets as as: $11,770 per flying hour. That is based on a fleet of 71 totalling 13,000 flying hours for a year (183 hours per airframe per year) for $2.15M per airframe per year in sustainment.

The Australian Supers were shown as $23,000 per flying hour. One would hope that would come down as learning curve grows on a new type.

So, the F-35 is not only very expensive to acquire, but very expensive to own and operate. It has significant faults. There is still no finished go-to-war design to evaluate. It won't be able to stand up to emerging Pacific Rim threats.

Yet the government says, “buy”.

With budget troubles of all kinds, the RAAF is expected to live within its mean. I am sure the RAAF/DMO/Defence cabal will find a way to apply an interesting spin to all this.

They always do.

Poor analysis

Not the best analysis.

As Lockheed Martin has found out with the both the F-22 and the F-35, fifth-generation fighters are hard to get right: the F-22 was recently grounded with a system problem that was causing pilots to black out, while the F-35 is behind schedule, over budget and testing the patience of the U.S. Air Force to the limits.

So, because a U.S. deskilled and groupthink-rich environment has such problems, those same problems will be there for the Chinese? Well, that is an environment that would have people shot for doing what the U.S. military-industrial-congressional-complex has done.

Also, I am curious how many communist factories let you drink your lunch under a tree in your pick-up truck?

And, the U.S. only has one fifth-generation fighter. The other that marketing pukes are trying to push as such is a complete disaster.

I suspect that Chinese problems will be somewhat different.

The key challenge facing Chinese designers is not in coming up with a stealthy platform, but the systems that go inside it. These include electro-optic sensors and an AESA fire-control radar – a generational jump in technology that comes as standard on F-35s and F-22s; stealthy coatings; and reliable engines. The latter are a particular bugbear for China, which has for years relied on Russian technology to power its fast jets. Many Western observers believe the Shen Fei is powered by two Russian-sourced Klimov RD-93 turbofans, reinforcing perceptions that this particular weakness is holding China back. The fact that the same images show that these engines appear to be ill-fitting suggests that Shenyang may be following the lead of Chengdu, which is believed to be trying out a number of different engines on the J-20.

The author needs to use a push mower on a warm summer day while wearing winter gear. Then maybe he will understand the concept of "thermal issues" with the F-35 and the show room options he claims work in an unproven and troubled weapons system that is way short of real operational testing.

As for the avionics, I would think the Chinese will not over reach like the U.S. has with the Just-So-Failed. They might use something like, oh, I don't know, a HUD, instead of a helmet/display fubar.

Engines? Yeah sure. And, we will see.

Def. Min. Smith misses the mark: again

Poor Smith. A speech about not very much. And, troubling assumptions:

And we continue to progress our core capabilities, including the future submarines, the AWDs, the LHDs, the naval combat helicopters, the Joint Strike Fighter, the Caribou replacements, vehicles for Army, Chinooks and maritime patrol.

Well, if Defence and/or this Government were honestly concerned about "maritime patrol", we would have the successful Howard plan for illegal boats in action. Granted; more of an attitude and less platform specific. However, Smith mentioning platforms in excess is a plan to fail; but moving right along.

The intelligentsia, policy wonks, senior Defence leaders or other self-important actors, pay pretty poor attention to something that continues to put major weapons system buys at risk. Over and over again:

An Analysis of Defence Materiel Organisation Major Projects Management and What Needs to be Fixed

Australia's Failing Defence Structure and Management Methodology

I do have one additional theory of why Defence thinking in Australia is in such a bad way.

How Lockheed Martin took over Australia's leadership role for replacement fighter aircraft

Lockheed Martin runs nearly all aspects of decision-making for Australia's fighter replacement program. Oh, there is now some people waking up to the horror and slowing funding because of obvious gross risk, but that is only recently after many years of can-do delusion. And for those that oppose the F-35, it is pretty important to take the wanton rent-seekers in to account.

For years if there were problems with the F-35, talking points were filtered down from LM and became the de facto Australian government position on the matter.

Below is a letter and accompanying paper constructed by then Defence Minister Hill and his merry band back in 2003. Look at the big leap taken for Australia to join the risky F-35 program. All the chips were pushed in on one big bet. The greed of rent-seeking potential was just too strong.

And while there appears to be some words stating if it all doesn't work out, Australia can withdraw...

While the supplement does not guarantee work share, there is an explicit statement included in the supplement that enables Australia to withdraw from the SDD phase if Australian industry expectations are not realised.

Everyone is pretty much all-in. Victory or defeat. No in-between. Further:

Prior to signing the MOU, there was an Exchange of Letters (EoL) between the Australian and US Governments concerning Australia’s aspirations for long-term participation in the JSF program. Unlike the MOU, which only covers the SDD phase, the EoL addresses matters concerning the joint development, production, operation and support of an effective and affordable JSF. These letters affirm the importance of having no predetermined work share for any participating country and of maintaining a level playing field for industrial participation for the life of the program. The Australian Government expects to have visibility into industrial participation to monitor outcomes for Australian industry to assure the Government that subcontracting competitions are conducted fairly and provide best value.

How reassuring. So many years later, how are we doing today? Affordable? Not yet. Lots of industry work? No. Thousands of F-35s for the future? A dream. Notice that most of letter and paper below is industry, industry, industry and little mention if it is a valid weapon's system other than platitude.

As long as it can make an equal number of take-offs and landings most of the time, the grubby rent-seekers are happy.



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“It’s about $37 million for the CTOL aircraft, which is the air force variant.”
- Colonel Dwyer Dennis, U.S. JSF Program Office brief to Australian journalists, 2002-

". . . US$40 million dollars . . "
-Senate Estimates/Media Air Commodore John Harvey, AM Angus Houston, Mr Mick Roche, USDM, 2003-

" . . US$45 million in 2002 dollars . ."
-JSCFADT/Senate Estimates, Air Commodore John Harvey, Mr Mick Roche, USDM, 2003/2004-

". . average unit recurring flyaway cost of the JSF will be around US$48 million, in 2002 dollars . . "
-Senate Estimates/Press Club Briefing, Air Commodore John Harvey, 2006

". . the JSF Price (for Australia) - US$55 million average for our aircraft . . in 2006 dollars . ."
-Senate Estimates/Media AVM John Harvey ACM Angus Houston, Nov. 2006-

“…DMO is budgeting around A$131 million in 2005 dollars as the unit procurement cost for the JSF. .”
-AVM John Harvey Briefing, Office of the Minister for Defence, May 2007-

“There are 108 different cost figures for the JSF that I am working with and each of them is correct”
-Dr Steve Gumley, CEO of the DMO, Sep./Oct. 2007-

“…I would be surprised if the JSF cost us anymore than A$75 million … in 2008 dollars at an exchange rate of 0.92”
-JSCFADT Dr Steve Gumley, CEO DMO, July 2008-

". . Dr Gumley's evidence on the cost of the JSF was for the average unit recurring flyaway cost for the Australian buy of 100 aircraft . ."
-JSCFADT/Media AVM John Harvey, Aug. 2008-

Confirmed previous advice i.e. A$75 million in 2008 dollars at an exchange rate of 0.92,
-JSCFADT Dr Steve Gumley, CEO of the DMO, Sep. 2009-

" ...about $77 million per copy."
-Robert Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Feb. 2008.


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Australian Defence answers serious F-35 project concerns with "so what?"

Before there was "So what?" there was "Why worry?"

What the U.S. Senate was told about more F-35 trouble

The RAAF force structure cancer is a problem created by the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy.

Gross over-optimism and hope will not fix that problem.

This read is what was told to the U.S. Senate recently. Unaffordable, unsupportable, unable to face emerging threats. That is the F-35.

And, the RAAF even wants another try at the bad idea of extending the airframe life on legacy Hornets. Here is the problem faced by the U.S. Navy.

The Navy intends that a SLEP would extend the life of select legacy F/A–18s from 8,600 to 10,000 flight hours. As yet, the Navy does not have sufficient data to predict the failure rate for aircraft being inducted into the SLEP program. Too high a failure rate could leave the Navy with too few aircraft that could benefit from the SLEP program, which would exacerbate the shortfall projections.

RAAF boss gets it almost all...wrong

Enjoy this faith-based trip by the RAAF boss on the faulty aircraft he wants for Australia. The media laps it up wholesale with little reporting skill.

Going through the comments, it seems an alternate reality is the long-range strategy of the day.

"Our other choice is to go down the New Zealand route - it's pretty simple."

Simple thinking maybe. New Zealand isn't making the dumb decision to spend billions on an uncompetitive-to-the-threat air force.

He said Australia needed the JSF because by the mid-2020s the Super Hornet just wouldn't cut it against the planes our neighbours are considering buying.

If the Super Hornet won't cut it, the F-35, with so many faults and a weaker self-defense suite will fare worse.

And compare the following videos.

And, if we stick with the stealth fighter, quantity has a quality all its own.

70-100 defective aircraft are a quantity of waste.

"Capacity matters - and anything less than 100 JSFs severely limits the options available to government and only provides a boutique capability," Air Marshal Brown said.

"Boutique" implies that what one buys actually works. The Air Marshal has NO go-to-war example of the F-35 to look at and at this point is depending on a vivid imagination.

"You could buy more Super Hornets (instead of JSFs) but I'd argue (that) by 2025 or somewhere around that it becomes an uncompetitive fighter. You can be the best fighter pilot in the world but if the other guy has got some significant capability advantages over you you just don't fundamentally stand a chance."

Fundamentally, his logic doesn't stand a chance with the Just So Farcical.

"I'd argue the AGM-158 Joint Air To Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) equipped (classic) Hornets with the KC-30 (multi-role tanker) is a far superior strike capability than we ever possessed with the F-111," he said.

I'd argue that Defence was too intellectuality lazy to upgrade the F-111 with J-series weapons and SDB giving a deployed package of USAF F-22s and a joint operational team, lots of options.

And as for the JASSM, how many is Australia going to buy? 2000?, 3000 like the USAF? About 260. At $700,000 each. After those are fired, the war is over. Hopefully. Fusing issues with the JASSM still are not a done-deal. There will be a percentage that just don't hit the target or go "bang". The U.S. knows the rate of those weapons that just don't reach the target for any number of reasons. Cruise missiles (and evaluation of the BDA) wasn't so great in Desert Storm. Cruise missiles have improve some since then, but we have never fired them in a network/GPS denied environment. Also, unlike the short-range JDAM where time-of-flight and a tight INS don't matter with GPS jamming, the longer longer the weapon flys, the more you risk a chance of missing in a network/GPS denied environment.

Star-finder anyone?

Australia has only fired a handful of JASSMs on the test range. That was enough to take it off the project of concern list and declare IOC.

Also, we don't have enough tankers to feed the classic Hornets and it is unlikely we can protect those same tankers.

The above in anti-access environs and less of a factor against legacy threats.

The boss finishes with this:

Despite the government's recent decision to defer the purchase of the next 12 JSFs as part of the Defence cuts in the budget Air Marshal Brown says the fifth generation fighters are still affordable and could be in service with the RAAF before the end of the decade.

"We signed on for the JSF back in 2003 - about 10 years ago," he said. "We decided on a budget, an amount for the joint strike fighter. That hasn't changed. 100 JSFs are still affordable within that original budget range established in 2003."

Define "affordable". He is dreaming. Also, I wonder how he is going to scrounge up to 3 times the ops funds for a squadron to pay for the insane F-35 cost per flying hour?

I figure the budget can tolerate to own and operate less than half of the mistake jets. Assuming one wants to fly them.

You go to war with the RAAF you have; not necessarily the one you want, or hoped for.

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F-35 electronic warfare capability affected by production quality

Wishful thinking

Well, well.

A secret chapter from the Australian government's 2009 defense white paper detailed a plan to fight a war with China, in which the navy's submarines would help blockade its trade routes, and raised the prospect of China firing missiles at targets in Australia in retaliation.

A new book 'The Kingdom and the Quarry: China, Australia, Fear and Greed' reveals how Force 2030 set out in the white paper -- to include 12 big conventional submarines with missiles, revolutionary Joint Strike Fighters, air warfare destroyers and giant landing ships -- was being prepared for a possible war with Australia's main trading partner.

Then there is this childish behaviour.

Too bad such a dream of grandeur depends on an Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy (EDB). The following are a few examples (in no particular order) of the serious cancer with those in the EDB that use the uniform for personal or industry gain:

1. Has too many perk-hungry flag ranks and senior executives to feed.
2. Has 22,000 civilians to support such a small military.
3. Can't run a test program for parade boots before ordering them; and what they select is defective.
4. Is unable to logistically support the M-113 to a reasonable level.
5. Can't sustain 6 submarines, but is sure they want 12.
6. Is well on the way to turning the fighter-jet community into a very expensive flying club that won't be able to face emerging threats.
7. Doesn't have a clue what a Caribou replacement is but is confident they want to spend $1.4B on 10 light cargo aircraft.
8. Can't do bread and butter sustainment of ships without them rusting out.
9. Thinks an "Air Warfare Destroyer" is survivable and sustainable.
10.Thinks the Canberra-class amphibious ships are sustainable.
11.Helped retire the F-111 on a lie.
12.A Helicopter road-map that is a me$$.
13.Left the country with no air-to-air refueling assets for years.
14.Thinks the F-35 Joint Strike Failure has value.
15.Makes up stories in hearings to elected officials.
16.Misleads the news media.
17.Cries about $5B in Defence cuts when a more efficient organisation could provide much more combat power with $5B less...per YEAR..
18.Thinks the Defence White Paper of 2009 has value.
19.Thinks the Afghanistan mission has value (cheerleads for it) yet has little understanding of 4th-generation warfare.
20.Fails to give Defence Ministers sound advice and instead leads them on a string for the sake of careerism and Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy self-interest.
21.Fails to use the funds generously provided by the taxpayer in a sound manner.
22.Through these multiple failures (and more) provides Australia with a weak Defence posture.

New 2013 Defence White Paper failed before it starts

This morning, Australian Prime Minister Gillard announced a plan for a new Defence White Paper to be completed by 2013.

Unfortunately, her words from today are a dire warning:

"The Government is committed to delivering one of the most capable defence forces in our region with the people and equipment we need to do the job, including the joint strike fighters, the new amphibious ships, the new submarines and our air warfare destroyers," Ms Gillard said.

The 2013 Defence White Paper is a failure before it starts. Unworkable. Unaffordable. A loss of national defence capability; continuing.

With no end in sight.

The new submarines (with 12 being a made up number from the last failed White Paper in 2009) will be a challenge if Operation: BARKING MAD goes through.

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is a Joint Strike Failure. In spite of what the gone-native-to-Lockheed Martin entrenched defence bureaucracy (EDB) thinks, this aircraft is at severe risk of being late (again--now 7 years late. 9 years according to some comments back in 2002.); even more expensive and a disaster in the making for any air arm that intends to use it.

I still haven't figured out where they will find the crew for the large air warfare destroyers and large, new amphibious ships. Without a capable air supremacy or sub plan, they will be dead-meat in a war.

Instead of believing the fibs from the EDB maybe Gillard's team should do some independent investigations into these matters that does not involve the tainted Australian Strategic Policy Institute and others.

Gillard's team should also look at how Canada's Defence establishment misled Parliament over the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Or, look at how the Dutch Defence establishment misled their elected officials over the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Or, take a look at how the U.S. Defense Department misled their elected officials about the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Get the picture?

If the current (or next) PM's team is unable see through the fog, the 2013 Defence White Paper won't be much different than the failed 2009 paper.

I suspect the 2013 Defence White Paper will be an exercise in analysis using no credible analysis.

Any new Defence White Paper has to look first at fixing the core show-stopping problems with Defence. For the nation's top leader to commit to x,y and z faulty weapons programs is no way to start such an allegedly important document.

'Full-scale' F-35 training to start in 'fall'

I expected that an article with this title would indicate real student pilots are flying at Eglin.

Not so.

Some funny quotes though:

“The Fifth-generation aircraft that we have in the Air Force today and will have in the near future — the F-35 — cannot train in realistic conditions anywhere but in the sim.”

From the evidence, I agree.

Then there is this:

"We, the collective United States of America, can no longer afford to pay $90,000 an hour to fly an aircraft in live training,” Bakke said."

Does he know something we don't? If he is right, we can't have an Air Force shaped around the F-35 disaster.

Heat, real stress, discomfort, g-warm up exercises, real g's. More stress management.

I refer to something we may have thought about before:

Their most faithful disciples were the two cart-horses, Boxer and Clover. These two had great difficulty in thinking anything out for themselves, but having once accepted the pigs as their teachers, they absorbed everything that they were told, and passed it on to the other animals by simple arguments. They were unfailing in their attendance at the secret meetings in the barn, and led the singing of 'Beasts of England', with which the meetings always ended.

-UPDATE-Statements by sub commander finish any hope for Collins fleet

In today's The Australian, Cameron Stewart reports that a newly retired sub commander proclaims that the Collins-class submarine program is 'a lost cause' by virtue of being obsolete and unsustainable.

In comments that will rattle the Defence hierarchy, Commander James Harrap, a 20-year navy veteran, said Australia's submarines had "the least reliable diesel engines ever built", and attempts to upgrade the boats would be a waste of money because their performance would only get worse.

"I don't believe the Collins-class are sustainable in the long term and many of the expensive upgrade plans which have been proposed would be throwing good money after bad," he said in a written account of his time as commander, obtained by The Weekend Australian.

Commander Harrap, who has commanded both HMAS Waller and, until last month, HMAS Collins, said: "Lack of available stores inventory, increased equipment failure rates and submarines living with reduced capability is something I expect will persist for the remaining life of the class.

Harrup adds:

"I do not believe we have the capability to independently design and build our own submarines.

In response to a recent negative report of Australia's submarine prospects in the coming years authored by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), top Navy brass released a statement to the fleet which claims confidence in the Collins subs to meet the operational requirements of the government.

Yet, the hard truth seems otherwise. Harrup also states:

"Over the last two years, I believe these problems have become worse," he wrote. "Throughout my command of both Collins and Waller, full capability was never available and frequently over 50 per cent of the identified defects were awaiting stores.

"Collins has consistently been let down by some fundamental design flaws, leading to poor reliability and inconsistent performance. The constant stream of defects and operation control limitations makes getting to sea difficult, staying at sea harder and fighting the enemy a luxury only available once the first two have been overcome."

Tying up the Collins subs and scrapping them could be a big money saver. They offer no credible capability.

The first boat of an off-the-shelf sub purchase could start to be fielded within only a few years. Then, as the capability proves itself, further boats could be added. This would provide a real submarine force as opposed to a dream submarine force that only consumes billions and has no return on investment.

For the capability it delivers (or doesn't deliver) the $27B per year defence budget needs a haircut. A bloated civilian workforce (over 21k and counting), an incompetent Defence Material Organisation (DMO), way too many flag-ranks and senior executives, a corrupt leadership environment, along with a variety of useless items on the Project of Concern list means a house-cleaning is in order.

The condition of Australia's submarine fleet is iconic of the state of the entrenched Defence bureaucracy.

Moribund and dysfunctional.


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UPDATE--- "Barking mad".

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Another update on the Collins replacement fantasy

The allegedly independent Australian Strategic Policy Institute is in the news again about the countries running sore of a submarine program.

Yes, the situation is not getting any better.

Even some deception by Defence and DMO is mentioned.

Since 2006 and according to Defence records, the number of annual ''ready days'' has been steadily decreasing, from about 240 days per submarine in 2005-06 to barely over 100 days in 2008-09, they say. The government stopped reporting on ready days after 2008-09, on national security grounds.

The usual suspects quote the 2009 White Paper as if it has value. Again I say, it does not.

There is some illumination. Even if it is late to the game.

"Many options, including that of a locally designed submarine, are looking increasingly implausible."

:::shock:::

The rent-seekers that want to destroy a bunch of tax-dollars on home grown subs are still crying.

I say, let them cry. We need submarines, but not at any price and not some fantasy capability.

Does anyone find it interesting that during the last few years Defence does impulse buys of things because the senior DMO/Defence cabal can't spend on the dud project of concern list due to incompetent program management?

We could be well on our way now to starting a replacement submarine with off-the shelf solutions.

Instead, money is wasted on making dud-electronic warfare aircraft out of the Super Hornet situation; an extra Navy ship is bought while being called an amphib, and another C-17 is being purchased.

You may also add the bad idea of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter along with the extra insult of supposedly being contractually committed to buying two "test" aircraft. These aircraft are mistake jets piled on to a gargantuan mistake of an air capability plan.

Add the additional waste of money that is Operation:USELESS DIRT, the Hobart-class Air Warfare Destroyer and Canberra-class amphib projects.

Defence and politicians are not committed to having a real submarine force. They have demonstrated this with their impulse buys and other silliness.

In sum:

ASPI estimates 12 home-built submarines would cost about $36 billion compared with only $9bn for smaller off-the-shelf boats. The ASPI report says there are grave doubts about how long the Collins-class boats will last given their chronic unreliability.

Some of us figured this out already, but nice to see it again.

If it comes down to no submarines or a home-grown jobs program with gold-plated submarines, I prefer no submarines.

Until sane strategic thought appears.

More on the dud-jamming gear Defence wants to buy

As reported earlier, the plan by Australian Defence to put extra dedicated electronic jamming gear on 12 of its new Super Hornets is a bad idea.

Early in the last decade,  the U.S. Navy was trying to justify funding for a dedicated jamming version of the Super Hornet known as the "Growler". The U.S. Navy, in an effort to get the next generation jammer (NGJ) as the hardware of choice to put on the Super Hornet (Growler) had to state the obvious:  the existing years-old ALQ-99 jamming pods were for the bin. U.S. Navy said in plain language that the ALQ-99 pods were too legacy, couldn't keep up with the emerging threats and were becoming more expensive to maintain.

Guess what happened? When NGJ ran into funding problems, the U.S. Navy was forced to deploy their Growlers with a majority ALQ-99 pod configuration. They sure does look all nice painted up though boss.

Today, NGJ might be ready by 2020 according to a new report on airborne electronic attack (PDF) by the U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO). Label this a must-read. The report covers a wide range of current and future electronic attack (or jamming) solutions for the U.S. DOD. And to be fair, given the serious post Cold War deskilling of this electronic warfare brain-trust, DOD has done the best they can.

In a rush to save money at the end of the Cold War, DOD and Congress were short-sighted enough to think that all future threats would be broken-down countries with old and poorly maintained Soviet hardware. If anything else came along, well, future "affordable" stealth solutions would fix that for sure. And oh, only the U.S. had the ability to field anything advanced.

Things didn't work out that way.

Of interest in the recent GAO report is more pile-on of the state of affairs with the ALQ-99 pods on the Growler. They are over-kill, inefficient  and expensive to maintain for COIN warfare. And again, as already known, they will not be able to keep up with emerging threats.

Ever.

What is more? Even when the NGJ gets fielded; if it is fielded at the end of the decade, like the ALQ-99,  fitted with the Growler, what you have is still an escort-jammer and not a stand-off-jammer (SOJ). True, hardcore SOJ capability for the B-52 was shot down a few years ago. Like other needed programs, money was cut-off and sent to support  Operations: USELESS DIRT 1 and 2. In one of the more severe examples of U.S. DOD short-sighted strategy, electronic warfare against advanced threats was not on any key-decision-maker's top-ten list of needs. Years after the end of the Cold War.

The distinction between escort-jamming and stand-off jamming is important when you try and fly a pudgy Super-drag-Growler escort-jammer into the teeth of surface-to-air missile systems that can reach out and touch someone 250 miles away in, a very short amount of time. Any effective power output the Growler hopes to emit won't reach far enough, and, enemy defenses in the shape of upgraded S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missile systems will have enough sensor and command-control resources to put the Growler at risk of being out-matched and killed.

ALQ-99s will be foolhardy against these threats.To be nice, NGJ on Growler will fare only a little better. If the "I" in integrated air defense systems (IADS) includes enemy aircraft, well, the U.S. Navy is bringing an obsolete carrier air wing to the fight. The USAF; 120 some combat-coded F-22s that may or may not reach depending where the war is at and the F-35; a non-solution.

So back to Australia and the over-optimism of some. Wasting money Defence does not have for a fantasy capability that has no hope of becoming useful is a very bad idea.

Australian Defence needs real engineers that know these things and less vendors knocking on the door trying to sell us obsolete gear. Also, something must be done to stop a Defence/DMO cabal that, when money can't be spent on delayed faulty-project-of-concern high-dollar programs it gets redirected toward impulse buys so-as to make sure annual budget spending evens out.

The Growler upgrade for Australia's existing Super Hornets is one more bad idea for the RAAF.

First Dutch F-35 mistake-jet rolls out of LM factory

The Netherlands can barely pay to own and operate their F-16s but good news!

Their first F-35 mistake-jet has just rolled out. They own it now. Warts and all.

This aircraft will have numerous faults affecting airframe life, reliability and immature software. It also might not be safe to fly for anyone other than a test pilot accompanied by a chase aircraft. And while the Dutch are struggling to pay for F-16 operations, this F-35 will cost 2-3 times as much in operating cost per flying hour.

It was sold to the gullible in Dutch Defence as a training aircraft.

How much training of new pilots can be done is an issue still in contention in Florida. That effort is years late. They are still trying to work around a process which is safe. No final word on that yet.

DOD offers empty promises to fix tac-air recap

Empty promises. Depending on a failed program to come in for the big win.

DoD now plans to fully ramp up production of Marine Corps and Navy versions at a pace of 50 jets per year in 2018, according to the document. Last year’s report projected 50-aircraft-per-year buys beginning in 2017.

Air Force production is expected to hit 60 jets in 2018 and peak at 80 jets in 2021. Last year’s report projected 80-aircraft-per-year buys beginning in 2017.

It won't happen. Because previous promises have also been way off.

The faith based followers are an example of planning to fail. As seen here:

“Since we put all of our eggs in the F-35 basket … we’d better take care of the basket.”

My current bet is 300 F-35s before it is all wrapped up. That is a best-case scenario. And not many of those will be combat capable.

Canadian AG report states DND misled Parliament over the F-35

The Canadian government voyage of discovery with the F-35 program is getting more dramatic.

Next month, their Auditor-General’s office will report that the DND misled Parliament over the F-35.

Lockheed Martin talking points and gross over optimism are not suitable analysis products.

Also of interest, the government has repeatedly stated that the acquisition ceiling for a CF-18 replacement is 9-billion dollars.

Poor procurement research an analysis is nothing new for the DND. They have dropped the ball with the submarine debacle and the Chinook purchase. The C-130 purchase was not pretty either.

Parliament--who should have been more on the ball--now have a solid trend of DNDs lack of ability to research and produce procurement plans for weapons systems.

What is Parliament going to do to correct these negative trends by the DND?

Still no time left for Canada

DND costing figures on the F-35 are wrong

Exploring another option for Canada's CF-18 replacement

A CF-18 replacement scenario for Canada