Poor analysis

Not the best analysis.

As Lockheed Martin has found out with the both the F-22 and the F-35, fifth-generation fighters are hard to get right: the F-22 was recently grounded with a system problem that was causing pilots to black out, while the F-35 is behind schedule, over budget and testing the patience of the U.S. Air Force to the limits.

So, because a U.S. deskilled and groupthink-rich environment has such problems, those same problems will be there for the Chinese? Well, that is an environment that would have people shot for doing what the U.S. military-industrial-congressional-complex has done.

Also, I am curious how many communist factories let you drink your lunch under a tree in your pick-up truck?

And, the U.S. only has one fifth-generation fighter. The other that marketing pukes are trying to push as such is a complete disaster.

I suspect that Chinese problems will be somewhat different.

The key challenge facing Chinese designers is not in coming up with a stealthy platform, but the systems that go inside it. These include electro-optic sensors and an AESA fire-control radar – a generational jump in technology that comes as standard on F-35s and F-22s; stealthy coatings; and reliable engines. The latter are a particular bugbear for China, which has for years relied on Russian technology to power its fast jets. Many Western observers believe the Shen Fei is powered by two Russian-sourced Klimov RD-93 turbofans, reinforcing perceptions that this particular weakness is holding China back. The fact that the same images show that these engines appear to be ill-fitting suggests that Shenyang may be following the lead of Chengdu, which is believed to be trying out a number of different engines on the J-20.

The author needs to use a push mower on a warm summer day while wearing winter gear. Then maybe he will understand the concept of "thermal issues" with the F-35 and the show room options he claims work in an unproven and troubled weapons system that is way short of real operational testing.

As for the avionics, I would think the Chinese will not over reach like the U.S. has with the Just-So-Failed. They might use something like, oh, I don't know, a HUD, instead of a helmet/display fubar.

Engines? Yeah sure. And, we will see.

Stars for hire

The following is a good review of what some of us already know. The reason you really want to make flag-rank isn't the military per-se, and while the retirement pay is top-notch, your post military employment prospects are pretty good:

An hour after the official ceremony marking the end of his 35-year career in the Air Force, General Gregory “Speedy’’ Martin returned to his quarters to swap his dress uniform for golf attire. He was ready for his first tee time as a retired four-star general.

But almost as soon as he closed the door that day in 2005 his phone rang. It was an executive at Northrop Grumman, asking if he was interested in working for the manufacturer of the B-2 stealth bomber as a paid consultant. A few weeks later, Martin received another call. This time it was the Pentagon, asking him to join a top-secret Air Force panel studying the future of stealth aircraft technology.

Martin was understandably in demand, having been the general in charge of all Air Force weapons programs, including the B-2, for the previous four years.

He said yes to both offers.

In almost any other realm it would seem a clear conflict of interest — pitting his duty to the US military against the interests of his employer — not to mention a revolving-door sprint from uniformed responsibilities to private paid advocacy.

But this is the Pentagon where, a Globe review has found, such apparent conflicts are a routine fact of life at the lucrative nexus between the defense procurement system, which spends hundreds of billions of dollars a year, and the industry that feasts on those riches. And almost nothing is ever done about it.

The Globe analyzed the career paths of 750 of the highest ranking generals and admirals who retired during the last two decades and found that, for most, moving into what many in Washington call the “rent-a-general’’ business is all but irresistible.

From 2004 through 2008, 80 percent of retiring three- and four-star officers went to work as consultants or defense executives, according to the Globe analysis. That compares with less than 50 percent who followed that path a decade earlier, from 1994 to 1998.

In some years, the move from general staff to industry is a virtual clean sweep. Thirty-four out of 39 three- and four-star generals and admirals who retired in 2007 are now working in defense roles — nearly 90 percent.

You can also bet that for problems like this, our hired gun has the solution.

Raytheon Chairman and CEO William H. Swanson said in a written statement, ”General Cartwright’s deep understanding of defense and broad experience in military operations and matters of national security will be of great value to our Board.”

And, back to the Boston Globe piece:

The generals are, in many cases, recruited for private sector roles well before they retire, raising questions about their independence and judgment while still in uniform. The Pentagon is aware and even supports this practice.

Street gang

This is one of the more amazing examples of dredging up government/industry revolving doorism to support the F-35 cause.

Take this commentary over at Defence News by Gordon England.

Again we hear concern about the government's fault (or is it lack of religious faith?) in not pressing hard enough with the buys on F-35 mistake-jets.

This is more of the same of the recent script by those that have a large stake in seeing the F-35 succeed at any cost. Politicians. Marketeers. And so on.

According to England; hey, the F-16 had trouble too. The F-16 program used concurrency and this will work for the F-35.

Not a valid comparison. The original General Dynamics program was managed mostly by people that knew what they were doing. It took a handful of years to get F-16s into real flying squadrons.

Lockheed Martin was under the illusion that they were General Dynamics just because they bought them.

Faith-based program management has not been a success.

The reason we don't have an F-35 in a real front-line flying squadron is due to technical and management incompetence by LM and friends.

England does not care about America having a credible air power deterrent. He cares about making sure the spigot of billions keeps going to Fort Worth.

For people like England: "Mi barrio".