The following is a short analysis of what to do about Australia's submarine situation.
It is all about the requirement.
I would recommend shooting for a basic sub capability instead of a U.S.-made Virginia-class sub mission-set (as described by SEA1000( without the nuke power....coming in at a much higher price than a Virginia.
Remove the rent-seeking South-Australian government cabal and others away from a conversation that is pure national Defence and not industry/government graft.
The Collins sub replacement could be set down to the following choices:
1. Off the shelf submarine to meet the basic requirements of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and the ability to ambush in choke points. Nice if the sub can carry a torpedo-tube capable sub-launched anti-surface (sea/land target) missile but don't knock yourself out on the budget trying to get that. Anti-ship mines, same deal: if easy and low-cost, fine. if not, then no. Mission area: the close littorals to the North. With DMO managing everything: $1B program unit price.
2. Same capability as above (small and basic) only home made (HM). Double the program unit price compared to Option 1 so as to be less surprised at the inefficiency.
3. HM with Special Forces (SpecFor) deployment ability. Any stretch of a hull increases weight and throws off other performance and engineering assumptions. Cost: 2.5 times Option 1. Note with the added complexity I use the term "cost" instead of "price" because there are significant unknowns.
4. HM but with a stretch for increased range. Same assumptions on the stretch of Option 3. Cost 2.5 times Option 1.
5. HM with SpecFors and increased range. 3 times the cost of Option 1.
6. HM with Tomahawk missile tubes. 2.5 times the cost of Option 1.
7. HM with Tomahawk and increased range. 3 times the cost of Option 1.
8. HM with Tomahawk and Specfors. 3 times the cost of Option 1.
9. HM with Tomahawk, Specfors and increased range. 3.5 times the cost of Option 1.
10. Australia ends its sub fleet saving billions of dollars available to other Defence services (land, sea, air).
With Option 1 and 2 we have a good comfort level on the operational requirement. With the other options we don't know if we will get a requirement that spans a large portion of the Pacific as mentioned in the Defence White Papers and other places. If the home made options are kept to a shorter operational requirement of the littorals to the North (Options 2,3,6 and 8) this may help to keep things in a bit better perspective on costs and complexity.
If Option 1 is taken, we can start buying 1 off-the-shelf sub per year (total 6) around 2025-2031 depending on the remaining Collins service ability and assuming today's maintenance plan sees some success.
The other big cost? Crew assumptions. The original Collins design under-shot the crew needed to run the boat. Options 1 and 2 do not require a large crew.
Sustainment costs of each new sub? Again Options 1 and 2 offer the lowest-cost solution.
A 12 sub requirement without knowing building/skilling for the home made option is extreme-risk. Option 1 gives the best chance of affording 12 subs if an operational requirement document states as much.
With the usual under-skilled suspects running the decision making, the sub replacement plan will be a big Defence planning wild-card for the foreseeable future.
Options 1 and 2 have the best chance of success given the current mind-set of the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy.
Option 10, should not be ruled out.
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