The real F-35 LRIP-5 costs

The U.S. Defense Department and Lockheed Martin have reached an agreement for the F-35 low rate initial production contract batch 5 also known as LRIP-5.

This has taken over a year to figure out due to the new requirement for fixed price contracts for the program.

The word is that the contract is somewhere around $4 billion for 32 aircraft. Little-to-no mention is given to an additional over $2B dollars that make up LRIP-5 production costs.

The spend on LRIP-5 F-35s is not around $4B. It is over $6B.

Last year, at the end of December, an undefinitized DOD contract for LRIP-5 F-35 airframes was released. At the time LRIP-5 was projected to be for 30 aircraft, down from 42 aircraft when long-lead contracts started being issued in 2010.

Trends: when the program started many years ago, LRIP-5 was to be 120 aircraft.

The recent announcement (with a released contract expected sometime in December), is hailed as a success. However, according to this must-read analysis from early in 2012 (based on LRIP-5 being 30 aircraft and not the newly revised 32), $4B only gets you some of the roll-away price for the jets.

So, in procurement dollars alone, expect the average cost of a LRIP-5 F-35 to be over $198M each, not counting engineering changes.

Also, TR2 hardware, needed to drive Block 3 software, does not arrive until LRIP-6 aircraft are delivered.

All this is for a troubled aircraft that is still nowhere near go-to war trim.

" ...about $77 million per copy."
-Robert Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Feb. 2008.

Acquired acquisition taste

An NY Times piece that does in-fact have some interesting info about not only the history of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program but also some interesting signs that don’t go with the prettier parts of this story by AV Week Reuters.

Lockheed has already lost profits, earning only $28 million of a possible $87.5 million in award fees for meeting development goals in 2010 and 2011.

That LRIP-5 contract should be any day now...

Faulty F-35s limp to Yuma's Operational Test Community

From a reader in relation to the Yuma fraud:

The funny thing is that all 3 jets hobbled to Yuma, yet were envisioned last month by Amos to arrive together for this ceremony. He even wanted 2 of them to perform a slow landing and a vertical landing, respectively, for the press and Sen McCain. That was vetoed by the test community as they have no test instrumentation with which to telemeter data to ground test stations (which Yuma doesn't have, either). Enough STOVL things still have a limited life on them or can't be trusted without external monitoring, yet "probation" was cleared??? Oh, and the Yuma pilots were not qualified in Mode 4 STOVL operations, either. Details.

Only 1 jet was ready last week, so off it went from Fort Worth with its KC-130 tanker (TX to AZ w/o weapons...tell me about the great range again...) and an F-18 chase plane. The "operational" F-35B still can't squawk an IFF code, thus part of the reason for the F-18 chase. The F-35B encountered clutch heating problems before the halfway point, and was forced to a lower altitude to open up a cooling envelope where the clutch cooling fan could be used. Sounds like the clutch drag problem isn't quite as solved as LM and the USG have told us. Be advised that none of this involved converting to STOVL inflight, it was merely cruising in CTOL-type mode at 20K feet.

The second and third jets were to deliver together today. Alas, one had a flight control problem and had to abort. So one went on its own with its KC-130 and F-18 to Yuma. As it held for the ceremonial arrival, it lost all nav systems. So elegant.

The third one departed hours later after having undergone emergency maintenance (any pressure to perform on a day like today??!!!). And yes, it too had its own KC-130 and F-18 chase. It had yet to arrive and some press releases already stated that 3 jets were on the ramp at Yuma. That's our beloved press, to include the cut and paste aerospace press beholden to their advertisers - as you have pointed out so well, Eric. Can't wait to hear about the state of F-35B #3 when it arrived at Yuma.

Operational...hmmm, I don't think so

LM Buzz

What are the the chances DOD LM Buzz could "report" accurately about the F-35 Yuma Fraud?

Not so good.

They have advert dollars to chase you know:

(click image to make larger)

RICO flight lands at Yuma

While there is no hard proof that Lenin said it, the term "useful idiots" applies to some of the F-35 fan-base.

For the rest, I suspect fraud is the justification to harness taxpayers to fund a faulty and obsolete weapon system that a country over $16T in the red can ill afford.

Much of the pro-F-35 publicity efforts are stitched up with faith-based arguements, hearsay and meme-theory all rolled up into a thana-marketing package which will hurt DOD combat readiness.

For years.

Consider the lastest effort by the cheerleaders at Second Line of Defense (SLD). Their "Gold Sponsor", Lockheed Martin, also the maker of the troubled F-35, want you to believe that delivering F-35B (short take-off and landing variant) Joint Strike Fighters to Yuma, Arizona is a good thing for the United States Marketing Corps.

The USMC leadership is using the same kind of plan that they used to field the MV-22 Osprey: market, hype, market, and get a woefully undertested aircraft to an operational test squadron as soon as possible.

The F-35B is not ready.

The mission software for the aircraft is not ready. The helmet and its visual cueing, (the aircraft has no heads-up-display) is not ready. The logistics system for maintenance people is not ready. The flight envelop is not fully expanded. There are no working weapons. This would entail a wide range of clearance scenarios and hitting actual air and surface targets.

SLD's big problem with being a zombie marketer of the Joint Strike Failure is that the U.S. DOD just handed an operational test squadron a non-ready aircraft. Operational test squadrons are supposed to figure out how to use a weapon for war and write up the procedure for operational training so other training squadrons have a solid (and safe) training program.

All that is pretty hard to do when the development testers are far from finished. Hard to work on tactics when you are just trying to make the aircraft work.

What we have is another piece of the puzzle of the F-35 fraud:

Produce the appearance of capability; meet "milestones" to get big pay-days and for the military leadership, advance your career.

At any cost.

I am curious when Congress--who have run out of other-peoples money to spend--will realise that their shift to the Pacific is depending on what the U.S. Justice Department and FBI in their world would call: "a criminal enterprise"?

Pinning the RICO Statute on all of this is not hard to do.

As America's combat readiness gets worse because its' "Department of Defense" buys a long line of dud combat systems (LCS, F-35, DDX, obsolete carrier air wings, amphibs with no well-deck, etc) the best strategy for the U.S. is to avoid war because we are not capable of winning.

And, propaganda from the likes of SLD won't improve that situation.

Stryker--legacy of lies -- Logistics

The Stryker used by the U.S. Army is a fraud of the highest order.

If you thought the protection and air mobility videos were interesting, consider the logistics issues surrounding this nonsense:

Chapter 6: Logistics-

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

Part 6

Part 7

Part 8


----------

Stryker--legacy of lies--protection

Stryker--legacy of lies -- air mobility

Stryker--legacy of lies -- air mobility

Hopefully you enjoyed the low tech presentation on the defective Stryker in relation to survivability.

The whole program was a con-artist dream by former and serving military and industry.

Enjoy this installment which shows you how the Stryker failed all of its critical air mobility requirements.

Chapter 5 - Air Mobility

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Stryker--legacy of lies

Reader Blacktail has provided a wonderful set of YouTube videos made from 2009, about the U.S. Army's faulty Stryker AFV. There are 8 chapters with multiple parts. I have linked the videos from Chapter 2 below which deals with Stryker protection or the lack of it.

I have been aware of Stryker failings for a long time. No other presentation method you may have seen on Stryker failings tops Blacktail's efforts.

I would go so far to say that these are award winning videos based on the information presented. The non-perfect presentation method has a charm all its own with the frack from a high-school band coronet around the 1 minute and 1 second mark of many videos.

I am a believer in the U.S. Army; to a point. What we can see is that in future real wars against non-dirt insurgents, the U.S. Army Stryker Brigade concept is less survivable than a Sherman tank in Operation:GOODWOOD.

This means all those Stryker Brigades are essentially undeployable against a hardcore threat. Please take the time to view all the videos in Chapther 2 below. And don't forget, there are 7 other chapters that tell of the Stryker fraud.

--Chapter 2 (Stryker protection)

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3 (best music award)

Part 4

Part 5

Part 6

Part 7

Part 8

Today's Army of little use in the Pacific

Maybe the reason the Army gets a bad rap in the Pacific emphasis by the U.S. DOD is that--as organized today--they bring so little to the table.

AIBANO TRAINING AREA, Japan — In a muddy field full of Japanese media and troops watching American military might in action, the Stryker Mobile Gun System unceremoniously broke down.

The vehicle — a variant of the fast, lightweight Stryker armored troop carrier that’s been deployed throughout Iraq and Afghanistan — was able to fire only three of the dozens of rounds that were planned Tuesday morning.

The mechanical glitch turned the demonstration into a watch-us-fix-it event, but the snafu wasn’t all bad. It underscored the point of Orient Shield, a field training exercise that the two allied armies conduct every year for the sake of “interoperability” — military-speak for teamwork.

“The MGS is a helluva machine, but it can break down at critical times,” Maj. Randall Baucom, U.S. Army Japan spokesman, said. The malfunction wasn’t good, but it was beneficial for the Japanese to see that “things don’t always go according to plan.”

Keep spinning it public affairs guy. Depending on the variant, the Stryker is $5~6M each. Useful against somethings (like low-threat wars) but a death trap against the NORKs or the Chicoms. And, the one pictured doesn't even have its Mel Gibson, Road Warrior cage on.

Fortunately, the 105mm gun reliability has never been a problem for this Stryker variant.

Just kidding.

This from the GAO in 2004:

The Mobile Gun System has a 105mm cannon with an autoloader for rapidly loading cannon rounds without outside exposure of its three-person crew. The principal function of the Mobile Gun System is to provide rapid and lethal direct fires to protect assaulting infantry. The Mobile Gun System cannon is designed to defeat bunkers and create openings in reinforced concrete walls through which infantry can pass to accomplish their missions. According to the Army's Stryker Program Management Office, the autoloader system was responsible for 80 percent of the system aborts during initial Mobile Gun System reliability testing because of cannon rounds jamming in the system. As of February 2004, the Army was planning additional testing and working with the autoloader's manufacturer to determine a solution. A functioning autoloader is needed if the Mobile Gun System is to meet its operational requirements because manual loading of cannon rounds both reduces the desired rate of fire and requires brief outside exposure of crew. In its March 2004 Stryker acquisition decision, OSD required the Army to provide changes to the Mobile Gun System developmental exit criteria within 90 days, including the ability to meet cost and system reliability criteria.

What a joke.

Well maybe things like the opening hours of Korea 1950 only happen once. We know the Army has such a good memory.

Just kidding again. As Colonel Hackworth stated, "The Army suffers from CRS:...

...can't remember shit."

I believe the Army has a place in the Pacific. But only with real combat readiness; with robust weapon's systems.

If not, there is always the Bataan Death March II awaiting.

USAF's dream of all-stealth fighter force--now even more dead

Another damning indictment has appeared showing the United States Air Force (USAF) dream wanting an all-stealth fighter force is even more dead. The November-December 2012 issue of Air & Space Power Journal has an article, (The F-22 Acquisition Program,Consequences for the US Air Force’s Fighter Fleet) by a former USAF test pilot and F-22 squadron commander, Lt. Col. Christopher J. Niemi (PDF below).

It is good reading, although in many areas, not ground-breaking and maybe a bit too historical. The power in it comes from a person with significant operational experience. The timing of it and our future budget disaster era, could pretty much put an end to any claim USAF has on wanting the F-35 because Col. Niemi has provided a very large hammer to be used for more legacy fighter buys to recap USAF "needs".

This is OK in the coming years,  if the threats in the Pacific Rim allow legacy aircraft to operate in an acceptable fashion. I don't believe they will.

Note as always, articles from serving military members end with this:

The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government.

Where Niemi is strong:
-He has actual F-22 ops experience; as well as F-15E ops experience.
-He notes all the kinds of conflicts where high-cost (and high operating cost) stealth aircraft are not needed. This includes a mention that history being what it is, one could buy 3 Super Hornets for the cost of one F-22.
-He notes the budget reality including poor procurement thinking at all levels.

Niemi states: F-22 range is less than F-15 range and requires more tanking. This disagrees with another former F-22 squadron commander, (BG Molloy from the Molloy paper (PDF). Niemi also states that super-cruise with the F-22 has limitations but due to his position of not being able to present hard operational scenarios he is unable to explain further.

HOBS heaters and WVR. The F-22 currently does not have this capability; years after it was a known combat need for every other fighter design; years after initial operating capability. Note; the F-35, if it is fielded to real operational squadrons, will have AIM-9x for external carry, in the non-stealth mode (rah, rah).

Niemi brings up the high-end SAM threat but seems less convinced about the high-end air-to-air threats.

For Niemi, the F-22 is superior in air-to-air and survivability vs. high end threats but is inferior to legacy aircraft designs in all other mission sets. Niemi's review of USAF fighter procurement history since the end of The Cold War, like the efforts of Aviation Week's Bill Sweetman, show that, with current U.S. military-industrial-congressional-complex skill-sets, "stealth is not free".

I would wager that if the House and Senate Armed Service Committee types and others, use this Niemi paper as a hard source, then:

-Reopening F-22 production, as an idea is dead.
-The F-35 program is in even more serious jeopardy.

Niemi's most important statements point toward USAF senior-leadership ethics. Those seem to be even more faulty than any aircraft design. And, the future of America's air superiority is still a flying question mark.

Risks ignored with the JSF--2000

Continuing with the "what we knew, way back when" theme, below I have a PDF from Proceedings of the Naval Institute, August 2000. Chuck Spinney puts on his captain obvious hat and well, the rest is history...

In March 1999, the Congressional Budget Office reported to the Senate Armed Services Committee that JSF costs might be underestimated by as much a 50%; in March 2000, the General Accounting Office told Congress the development program should be lengthened to reduce technical/cost risks: "To allow the JSF to proceed as planned-without maturing critical technologies-would perpetuate conditions that have led to cost growth and schedule delays in many prior DoD weapons system acquisition programs."

The GAO claims DoD restructured the program so that the EMD decision will be made with even less information than originally planned, and the program has migrated toward the traditional practice of developing technologies and products concurrently. It is important to remember that the X-32 and X-35 JSF demonstrators are even more limited as concept demonstrators than was the YF-22, so the risks created by concurrency could be even greater. The winner of the JSF "competition" will be determined by a flyoff demonstrating only low-speed handling, STOVL capability, and producibility with at least 70% parts commonality; the YF-22 supersonic cruise demonstrator demonstrated aerodynamics of high-speed, high-G maneuvering, and high alpha, low-speed maneuvering in mock dogfights.

JAST blast from the past

Today, along with some future posts, we will look at historical thinking and compare it against what we are now paying for with the F-35 program.

We will start out with the commentary in the PDF below.

"Yet our community has again embarked upon an expensive design and construction exercise focused on 'form,' which historically breeds powerful technology-business coalitions and political constituencies that become virtually unstoppable."

C.E. Myers, Jr.
November 1995

More misleading statements by LM on F-35 unit cost

It keeps coming up every now and then. The DOD F-35 project office even asked LockMart to stop public statements about F-35 unit costs that were insanely low that are now, at this juncture; fantasy.

He said labor costs were coming down faster on the F-35 program than any previous fighter jet program in over 40 years. Lockheed is on track to hit its target unit "flyaway" cost, excluding development, of $67 million in fiscal 2012 dollars by 2018, he added.

TR-2 hardware and Block 3 software has to actually work in a go-to-war configuration by that time.

Also, what is sad about this article is that a reporter that has been on the F-35 beat for a while, refuses to actively challenge such nonsense other than some occasional weak efforts. Not really reporting.

The alleged biggest buyer of the F-35, the USAF, has significant issues trying to afford the F-35. Note: R&D dollars not counted. It is doubtful that $67M will buy you even the roll-away price without a motor.

In the end, more evidence to log in the area of RICO statute and the Ponzi scheme Thana-marking fraud-like behavior associated with the marking of the Just So Farcical.

Cry for help: The Pentagon has no clue how to make the F-35 affordable and sustainable

(from a long time ago)




LOL--

Solicitation Number:
N00019-13-R-0012
Notice Type:
Combined Synopsis/Solicitation
Synopsis:
Added: Oct 19, 2012 11:45 am
The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, MD intends to negotiate on a non-competitive basis with A.T. Kearney Public Sector and Defense Services, LLC., 1300 Wilson Blvd, Ste.1050, Arlington, VA 22209 for Sustainment Business Case Analysis (BCA) and Affordability Program Support, Phase II for the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO). The period of performance for this contract is estimated to be nine (9) months from date of award.

** Note: This synopsis is an amendment to the previous (N00019-12-R-0084) that was issued on January 23, 2012.

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program Office (JSFPO) has completed Phase I of the JSF Sustainment Business Case Analysis (BCA) and Affordability Program, and plans to complete Phase II in the next nine (9) months. Phase I included deep dives of four (4) functional areas, including Supply Chain Management (SCM), Sustaining Engineering, Field Support Operations, and Fleet Management. Phase II will address other high priority areas not included in Phase I and complete the F-35 Sustainment Strategy Analysis. It also includes deep dives of the following additional functional areas: Autonomic Logistics Information Systems (ALIS), Training, Support Equipment, Depot Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul & Upgrade (MRO&U) Planning, Software, and Eglin Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) Maintenance not addressed in Phase I. Provide support to the Phase I implementation in order to provide continuity between BCA recommended changes and development and execution of required changes in people, processes and systems to achieve a new sustainment strategy.

A.T. Kearney has completed the support services for this requirement. It is in the Government's best interest to issue a new contract to A.T. Kearney for a continuation of services.

Responses must be received within 15 days of publication of this notice. Any responses should reference the solicitation number N00019-13-R-0012. The point of contact is Ms. Lisa Ellis, email: lisa.ellis@jsf.mil, or Ms. Emily Bannan, email: Emily.Bannan@jsf.mil

Family of 737 ISR for USAF?

When you filter out the industry marketing in this piece you still have what is a very important conversation for the USAF: the iron triangle (JSTARS, AWACS, RIVET JOINT).

Maybe if we get some sound USAF leadership along with sound USAF procurement skills, this can be solved. Without that, it does not matter if times are lean nor fat.

Will we someday see a Wedgetail in USAF colors?

Poor old Navy?

Hard for the Navy to cry poor-old-me when they want stupid gold-plated stuff like this.

Some comments on a Romney Navy

Defense News has some information of what a Romney Navy could look like if it were ever to happen.

Here is what I think of it:

OK:

-Begin a frigate program
-More Super Hornets
-Increase the number of destroyers
-Reserve carrier air wing
-Cut flag ranks (hopefully)


Not OK:

-Continue Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
-..."no intention to cancel it" (LCS)
-Increase in amphibs
-"Missle defense ship"
-"Essential" to keep F-35 in production

How will it be paid for? Well, the only way I can see is to kill off things that contribute nothing to the defense of the nation.

"The bureaucracy itself has almost doubled what it was during the Reagan administration. The Navy is half the size it was, the Air Force is half the size, the Army is half the size."

JSF dollars then and now

What Boeing was thinking about their Joint Strike Fighter concept back in the early to mid 1990's. Source: Boeing.

The Boeing JSF unit flyaway costs meet the government target values for the Conventional Takeoff and Landing (CTOL) variant-$28M, the Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant-$30M-$35M, and the Carrier-based (CV) variant-$31M-$38M (CY94$).

Emphasis added.

What that means in today's dollars:

The Boeing JSF unit flyaway costs meet the government target values for the Conventional Takeoff and Landing (CTOL) variant-$44M, the Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant-$48M-$59M, and the Carrier-based (CV) variant-$31M-$38M (CY2012$).

That is an increase of 55.5 percent. And that would assume everything goes to the rosy plan back in the days of wild fantasy.

Making ready for the rent-seekers

SLD continues with its' propaganda campaign which imagines value in the F-35 program.

All this....


And...

Operational testing is nowhere near realized.

A tremendous waste.

Paying for misleading shareholders?

"Lockheed’s Shareholders Have A Lot Riding On The F-35 Program’s Success".

All the more reason for LM leadership not to mislead shareholders. Past statements from them could be rated as such.