Today's Army of little use in the Pacific

Maybe the reason the Army gets a bad rap in the Pacific emphasis by the U.S. DOD is that--as organized today--they bring so little to the table.

AIBANO TRAINING AREA, Japan — In a muddy field full of Japanese media and troops watching American military might in action, the Stryker Mobile Gun System unceremoniously broke down.

The vehicle — a variant of the fast, lightweight Stryker armored troop carrier that’s been deployed throughout Iraq and Afghanistan — was able to fire only three of the dozens of rounds that were planned Tuesday morning.

The mechanical glitch turned the demonstration into a watch-us-fix-it event, but the snafu wasn’t all bad. It underscored the point of Orient Shield, a field training exercise that the two allied armies conduct every year for the sake of “interoperability” — military-speak for teamwork.

“The MGS is a helluva machine, but it can break down at critical times,” Maj. Randall Baucom, U.S. Army Japan spokesman, said. The malfunction wasn’t good, but it was beneficial for the Japanese to see that “things don’t always go according to plan.”

Keep spinning it public affairs guy. Depending on the variant, the Stryker is $5~6M each. Useful against somethings (like low-threat wars) but a death trap against the NORKs or the Chicoms. And, the one pictured doesn't even have its Mel Gibson, Road Warrior cage on.

Fortunately, the 105mm gun reliability has never been a problem for this Stryker variant.

Just kidding.

This from the GAO in 2004:

The Mobile Gun System has a 105mm cannon with an autoloader for rapidly loading cannon rounds without outside exposure of its three-person crew. The principal function of the Mobile Gun System is to provide rapid and lethal direct fires to protect assaulting infantry. The Mobile Gun System cannon is designed to defeat bunkers and create openings in reinforced concrete walls through which infantry can pass to accomplish their missions. According to the Army's Stryker Program Management Office, the autoloader system was responsible for 80 percent of the system aborts during initial Mobile Gun System reliability testing because of cannon rounds jamming in the system. As of February 2004, the Army was planning additional testing and working with the autoloader's manufacturer to determine a solution. A functioning autoloader is needed if the Mobile Gun System is to meet its operational requirements because manual loading of cannon rounds both reduces the desired rate of fire and requires brief outside exposure of crew. In its March 2004 Stryker acquisition decision, OSD required the Army to provide changes to the Mobile Gun System developmental exit criteria within 90 days, including the ability to meet cost and system reliability criteria.

What a joke.

Well maybe things like the opening hours of Korea 1950 only happen once. We know the Army has such a good memory.

Just kidding again. As Colonel Hackworth stated, "The Army suffers from CRS:...

...can't remember shit."

I believe the Army has a place in the Pacific. But only with real combat readiness; with robust weapon's systems.

If not, there is always the Bataan Death March II awaiting.

Free speech folks

In regard to foreign policy, I don't think Romney is the sharpest tool in the bag. Neither is the current U.S. President.

However, absent from this discussion are:

1. The imporantance of free speech above all.
2. And, a bulling Chinese communist leadership which is affecting Pacific rim security.

I did wonder about this:

And of course we should be encouraging the positive forces unleashed by the Arab Spring.

What "positive" forces? Those that make government sponsored religious extremism even more efficient in the finest traditions of fascism?

If an uprising is unwilling to produce a country that can exercise free speech above all else, the effort is not worth backing by the U.S.

At any price.

Even if the current U.S. Secretary of State has little concept of the notion.

APA brief on Russian weapons proliferation in Asia

Air Power Australia has released a new briefing (PDF) entitled Russian Weapons Proliferation in Asia.

The brief includes 25 slides detailing proliferation background issues, and 75 slides covering A2/AD technologies.

The brief was presented as a seminar for Monash Asia Institute yesterday.

Since the end of the Cold War Russia’s defence industry has become a highly successful commercial export industry, with a global footprint. Infusion of Western basic technology, especially digital computing and monolithic microwave technology, has seen rapid evolution of Russian weapons technology, which now in many categories outperforms US and EU products. While Western defence industries are heavily constrained by regulatory regimes, Russia’s is not, and unrestrained exports from Russia have become the principal enabler in the Asian arms race. This seminar will survey the advanced systems being exported by Russia across Asia, including stealth aircraft, counter stealth radars, guided munitions and air defence weapons, and discuss the resulting and manifold strategic impacts of this proliferation.

UPDATE-Chinese made Backfire long range bomber to see West Pacific service

What will a Mach-capable Backfire long-range bomber that can be air-to-air refueled mean to the future of the West Pacific anti-access discussion? As it seems now, quite a lot.

Back in 2001, there were indications that China wanted to buy 32 Backfire bombers from Russia. A deal at the time which could have been up to $1 biillion dollars. There was mention of this hope as early as 1998.

It seems now that sometime in 2010, China just decided to instead, buy the Russian production line for the jet.

A move by Russia to sell its production line of Tu-22M3 long-range bombers to China for US$1.5 billion to China was confirmed by the US-based US-China Economic and Security Review Commission two years ago and the bomber's name will be changed to the Hong-10, reports the state-run China News Service.

The Chinese name for their version of the Backfire (version is important because it is bound to have PLAAF specific items in it) is expected to fly in the second half of next year.

---
UPDATE: Google translate Chinese to English, this source says the H-10 "is expected to go into production next year". Different from the above first-flight mention.

--

The continent purchase Backfire bomber production line put into operation next year will be called the H -10

At 12:36 on June 15th, 2012

Aging bomber fleet replacement of old, the Chinese mainland to Russia for $ 1.5 billion purchase of Tu-22M3 Backfire (Backfire) long-range bomber production line, named "H -10", is expected to go into production next year, combat The deployment of 36.

According to Japan's "Sankei Shimbun" reported that, after the end of the Cold War, the continent had financial difficulties in Russia express willingness to buy the Tu-22M bombers, but would undermine the military balance in East Asia, Russia grounds to refuse.

After years of fight, Russia agreed to sell $ 1.5 billion Backfire bomber production line is expected to go into production next year, the actual deployment of 36, the People's Liberation Army into the military after named "H -10". As early as two years ago, the hearings held by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission is responsible for assessing the safety of US exchanges (The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission), has confirmed the deal.

Tu-22M3 bombers maximum combat radius of 2880 kilometers, took off from mainland China in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and even the activities of the Western Pacific, is expected to be a serious threat to the safety of the air defense of the Western Pacific countries.

Free peoples do not need Keating's hope for the future

I like Hugh White even if I don't agree with him all the time. I haven't read his new book so I won't comment about it.

I will comment on Keating and his dangerous thinking.

The U.S. has done a lot of dumb things. However the alternative to their protection in the Pacific Rim doesn't look good for things like free speech and human rights.

Keating is right to question Australian involvement in stupid U.S. wars. Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq are good examples. Australia can say "no" and still be a credible ally and friend. Australia should tell the U.S. where it stands instead of being a door mat.

Along with that comes the idea that friends like Australia and the U.S. should help each other out. Australia should--at every opportunity--tell its friend when it is wrong instead of following off on a useless war.

At the same time though, when a crisis appears like the recent communist Chinese bullying in the South China Sea, Australia should stand tall and say they will have none of it. This by itself is doing the right thing and giving a kick in the shin to a currently spineless U.S. to bring some carrier diplomacy down to warmer waters. Naturally from that, Singapore, Japan, South Korea and other regional nations will feel reassured and respond with more resolve.

I do wonder if Keating really has an appreciation of the buzz-word's "Asian Century" being thrown about recently.

The last century for Asia was pretty good, minus the wars of course. But let us focus on the outcome of some of those wars. Keating mentions "American failure" in Korea. Sorry if I don't see it.

Today South Korea is a realitively free country with a strong economy. I wonder if Keating prefers North Korea? That would have been the result if the U.S. had not stepped in.

It is interesting that Keating avoids World War II. Without U.S. concern over the Pacific, Japan would have occupied Australia.

Japan would not be what it is today without the U.S. and General MacArthur's enlightened administration; which also gave women the right to vote.

Keating is right about the U.S. not needing to get involved in a war "on mainland Asia". The U.S. agrees. That is why the U.S. Army has almost no place in the U.S. DOD's Pacific plan. Air power and naval power is where it is at when it comes to hard power and thus the important thing: deterrance.

Keating doesn't seem to have an appreciation of the dangers of a totalitarian power. Hitler, Stalin and Mao murdered millions of people. Yet, Keating is willing to give communists a free pass.

Keating's idea for Australia's place in a future Pacific is dangerous. His kind would rather give in to communist bullying than step in to help a friend in need like the Philippines.

Keating and his kind appear to be the type of people you can't depend on when the going gets rough. That is the ultimate definition of being un-Australian.

What Keating does not understand is the following. While Japan, South Korea and the U.S. may argue about things from time to time, the U.S. strong military support, for a free and unmolested Japan and South Korea is unmovable.

Bullying Japan and South Korea is the equal of doing the same to the U.S.

Communist appeasement aside--for example, those in the Bush administration that balked at selling Japan the F-22--most of America will not tolerate Japan and South Korea in peril.

By the way, a strong, free military coalition of deterrence in the Pacific will not hurt trade. The communists may get mad, but they are not stupid. They, more than Keating, respect strength.

Mr. Keating would be wise to remember that when considering some alternate-reality "Asian Century"; under the thumb of totalitarianism.

That is about all we have

JASSM has had its trouble over the years.

It is now integrated for use by the F-15 Strike Eagle community.

For the Pacific--in the non-long-range bomber category--the F-15 Strike Eagle can at least carry JASSM some distance.

The B-1, B-2, B-52, F-15 Strike Eagle and F-22 are the aircraft with any real "anti-access" fire-power for the Pacific.

The Navy helps out with the Tomahawk: which would be nice to see cleared for the B-52.

Shoot first. Shoot enough.

With the coming budget woes, this situation is unlikely to improve much.

The U.S. Army in the Pacific

OK fine. Interesting.

What can the U.S. Army bring to the Pacific?

1. Training. The Army Special Forces, Rangers and Engineers should be used to perform continuous training (at an increased rate) with our Pacific Allies.

2. Provide 1 airborne brigade on alert, ready to deploy by C-17s from the U.S. within 48 hours.

3. Have 2 Stryker Brigades train for operations in the Philippines. Deploy pre-positioned equipment to the Philippines for these Brigades.

4. Provide 1 Stryker brigade to deploy to the Philippines within 1 week via military airlift and the civilian reserve air fleet. It would meet up with its pre-positioned equipment.

5. Provide (active,reserve,guard) support units to deploy to the Pacific within 1 week.

These assets should deploy in exercises once a year.

This capability would provide a demonstration of U.S. commitment, which is what any Pacific Rim strategy should be all about.

Play nice now

Not mentioned in this piece is that communism only understands force.

That means we have to try to persuade Washington not to confront China, as it is doing now, but to work with it. We should also try to persuade China that it, too, must accept a continuing role for America in Asia. Both will have to do a lot of compromising.

Maybe the communists will act nice if we tell them to pretty-please, stop bullying the Philippines over South China Sea areas the communists have no claim over.

Cdr Salamander... arriving

(The USS Quincy, caught in the searchlights from attacking Japanese cruisers, on fire and sinking as a result of numerous gunfire and torpedo hits. The flames at the far left of the picture are probably from the USS Vincennes, also on fire from gunfire and torpedo damage)



G is doing a nice series with naval thinkers.

God bless 'em. They will need to pull a rabbit out of their hat to paint much hope for the U.S. Navy in the Western Pacific in the coming years.

It is an apt time to mention all of this with the 70th anniversary of the Battle of Midway. As a kid I loved the Walter Lord book Incredible Victory. His famous words are etched in the stone of the WWII monument in DC. I owe my knowledge of Pacific geography to reading the whole Morison series in the 6th and 7th grade. It was in the reference section of our very small county library.

I was also fascinated with a book about the last voyage of the USS Lexington on their way to the Coral Sea and destiny. I was also stunned with the battles around Savo Island (Iron Bottom Sound) and other places: read from the comfort of a hammock on a nice Michigan summer day after doing the chores.

There are a lot of lessons from WWII Pacific battles that apply toward today.

Cdr Salamander is doing his best to raise the red flags. The U.S. Navy and others ignore his thoughts at their own peril.

As I have warned before, the U.S. Navy carrier air wing is fast going obsolete. Which in-turn, puts a whole carrier battle group at risk. We have trimmed down our ASW assets (flying and otherwise) to a dangerous level. For the Western Pacific, the USN best get used to not being able to go some places.

There are also some other problems to consider. What if someday the Chinese Navy doesn't want to be defensive? What if they wage a U-boat war against Alaska, Guam, the Panama Canal, Pearl Harbor and the very vulnerable LA Harbor? A place where most of our just-in-time supply chain goes through?

How many in the days before December 7th, 1941 thought things would never go as bad as they did?

History is full of such examples.

And for those that say wars don't solve anything, tell that to Japan.

Or Carthage.

The (U.S.) Navy was still obsessed with a strong feeling of technical and mental superiority over the enemy. In spite of ample evidence as to enemy capabilities, most of our officers and men despised the enemy and felt themselves sure victors in all encounters under any circumstances. The net result of all this was a fatal lethargy of mind which induced a confidence without readiness, and a routine acceptance of outworn peacetime standards of conduct. I believe that this psychological factor, as a cause of our defeat, was even more important than the element of surprise.

Admiral Turner commenting on the first battle of Savo Island.

Panetta just isn't very bright

LOL...

Among the specific new weapons Mr. Panetta mentioned were the advanced fifth-generation aircraft known as the Joint Strike Fighter, the enhanced Virginia-class fast-attack submarine that can operate in shallow and deep waters, new electronic warfare and communications capabilities, and improved precision weapons.

Such weapons would give the United States the freedom to manoeuvre in areas where access was denied, Mr. Panetta said.

Air-Sea Battle concept ideas

There are many wasteful spending projects that take away needed funds for the Air-Sea Battle concept marketed by the Pentagon. The following is a list of items that work against the Air-Sea Battle concept.

1. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). The LCS is a disaster in the making. It is taking food from the mouths of Navy programs that actually work and provide real combat value.

2. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The F-35 (by design) will not be able to take on emerging threats. It is too expensive to use for any other kind of threat already taken care of by today's platforms.

3. DDX-Zumwalt "Destroyer". The best thing to do with this program would be to cut the losses and scrape it now. It will be too expensive to operate; consumes crew that could be better used elsewhere. It is not especially difficult to sink. We should not't make our ships so expensive least we lose one.

4. Kill the new long range bomber concept in its current dream-form. It will be (surprise) unaffordable and unsurvivable against modern IADS ("integrated" being the most important word).

5. Retire cruisers. They consume manpower and resources best used for other needed missions and only provide a juicy target in a big war. They are too expensive to operate in lower threat environments.

6. End U.S. participation in NATO. World War II is long over. The Soviet threat is long gone. NATO consumes too much money best used for other things. With this comes the removal of U.S. forces from Europe.

Where money needs to be invested to support the Air-Sea Battle concept:

1. A new long range bomber, but built to be: a. Drop stand-off weapons vs. anti-access threats; b. Have reasonable self-defense jamming against legacy threats. c. Be highly useful against low-end threats (range and persistence); d. Be built using common airliner technology.

2. Invest in an all nuclear-powered carrier strike group. This, while expensive, will lower the operational stress on fossil-fuel logistics. This means the need for a nuclear powered destroyer. The weapons systems it uses should be based on proven technology. A one-for-one mimic of Burke-class weapons-systems would be fine.

Remember those days?

3. Invest in conventional, small AIP submarines. These would have limited use but they would free up the nuke-subs for other missions only they can do. Conventional subs would be based out of Japan, Korea, Australia, Guam, Hawaii and would even see deployments out of the Philippines. So, given transit and down-time, about 60 would be useful.

4. Refurbish and field more P-3 Orions. The P-8 will be useful but will not be a perfect replacement for the P-3. Have both platforms compliment each other and not compete. In addition, P-3s are also already established as useful COIN-ISR helpers. Retiring the P-3 leaves a few holes in capability.

5. Bring back the S-3 to the carrier air wing; both for ASW and ISR work.

6. Every C-130 (no matter the service) that does general trash-hauling work in the Pacific needs to be Harvest Hawk capable. The C-17 does (and will continue to do so) take a lot of business away from C-130s. When using the C-130 for what it best does; best to have it multi-functional capable so as to be flexible.

7. Qualify the Tomahawk Block-IV on the B-52 and new long-range bomber. This weapon is already established in the Navy battle network and gives more joint flexibility than JASSM.

8. Do more deployments to the Philippines and Australia. This sends a message to the communists and their political fan-base abroad. Add to that; more joint routine exercises throughout the Pacific Rim.

9. Do routine (like #8, this takes extra ops funding) drive-bys of carrier battle groups through the South China Sea. As a message. This problem has to be nipped in the bud today. A strong position from the U.S. on this would be helpful.

10. USMC fast-jet air will only be Super Hornet Block IIs. No hand-me-downs. Every 4th jet squadron that rides on a carrier will be USMC with 2-seat Super Hornets.

11. Take a harder line on North Korea. The message should be: step out of line and it is a matter for the JDAM-party committee. This includes bullying all naval and air traffic in and out of the NK. "Excuse me sir. Do you know why I pulled you over? Your tail-light does't work. Would you mind stepping out of the car? I have to conduct a safety check."

That of course is not everything but it is a start. It sure beats platitude and faith-based ideas which can only lead to major war.

American Enterprise Institute off on PacRim U.S. force-structure needs

The American Enterprise Institute (bless their little neocon heart--note neocons really are not "conservative" in any normal sense) have stated the U.S. needs more stealth aircraft in the Pacific.

They are right, but their solution is wrong.

Their primary fix for all this is to "invest heavily" in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

The problem is that the F-35 is not survivable for the threats mentioned. That and the F-35 is neither affordable or in possession of any worth-while range.

The F-35 program is also defective.

They also don't understand that we only have about 120 combat capable F-22s. This is what you get when you build complex "A" models of anything these days.

The AEI is in no way skilled up on this issue or the solution. Best for them to go back and do more extensive research.

Operation Pharos Cocos Islands 1944 - 1945

(Oblique aerial photograph showing bombs exploding among transshipment sheds and jetties on Chatham Island, during a raid by Consolidated Liberators of No. 231 Group on Port Blair in the Andaman Islands.)


Nice photo essay with captions of allied air ops in the Cocos Islands.

A little known aspect of the history of Australia's Cocos (Keeling) Islands offshore territory in the Indian Ocean was the prominent role intended for it during the planned Operation Zipper, the joint invasion of South East Asia planned to retake Malaya, Singapore and the Dutch East Indies.