Showing posts with label readiness. Show all posts
Showing posts with label readiness. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 6, 2012

Today's Army of little use in the Pacific

Maybe the reason the Army gets a bad rap in the Pacific emphasis by the U.S. DOD is that--as organized today--they bring so little to the table.

AIBANO TRAINING AREA, Japan — In a muddy field full of Japanese media and troops watching American military might in action, the Stryker Mobile Gun System unceremoniously broke down.

The vehicle — a variant of the fast, lightweight Stryker armored troop carrier that’s been deployed throughout Iraq and Afghanistan — was able to fire only three of the dozens of rounds that were planned Tuesday morning.

The mechanical glitch turned the demonstration into a watch-us-fix-it event, but the snafu wasn’t all bad. It underscored the point of Orient Shield, a field training exercise that the two allied armies conduct every year for the sake of “interoperability” — military-speak for teamwork.

“The MGS is a helluva machine, but it can break down at critical times,” Maj. Randall Baucom, U.S. Army Japan spokesman, said. The malfunction wasn’t good, but it was beneficial for the Japanese to see that “things don’t always go according to plan.”

Keep spinning it public affairs guy. Depending on the variant, the Stryker is $5~6M each. Useful against somethings (like low-threat wars) but a death trap against the NORKs or the Chicoms. And, the one pictured doesn't even have its Mel Gibson, Road Warrior cage on.

Fortunately, the 105mm gun reliability has never been a problem for this Stryker variant.

Just kidding.

This from the GAO in 2004:

The Mobile Gun System has a 105mm cannon with an autoloader for rapidly loading cannon rounds without outside exposure of its three-person crew. The principal function of the Mobile Gun System is to provide rapid and lethal direct fires to protect assaulting infantry. The Mobile Gun System cannon is designed to defeat bunkers and create openings in reinforced concrete walls through which infantry can pass to accomplish their missions. According to the Army's Stryker Program Management Office, the autoloader system was responsible for 80 percent of the system aborts during initial Mobile Gun System reliability testing because of cannon rounds jamming in the system. As of February 2004, the Army was planning additional testing and working with the autoloader's manufacturer to determine a solution. A functioning autoloader is needed if the Mobile Gun System is to meet its operational requirements because manual loading of cannon rounds both reduces the desired rate of fire and requires brief outside exposure of crew. In its March 2004 Stryker acquisition decision, OSD required the Army to provide changes to the Mobile Gun System developmental exit criteria within 90 days, including the ability to meet cost and system reliability criteria.

What a joke.

Well maybe things like the opening hours of Korea 1950 only happen once. We know the Army has such a good memory.

Just kidding again. As Colonel Hackworth stated, "The Army suffers from CRS:...

...can't remember shit."


I believe the Army has a place in the Pacific. But only with real combat readiness; with robust weapon's systems.

If not, there is always the Bataan Death March II awaiting.

Saturday, February 18, 2012

Award winner

And the rent-seeker award of the week goes to...

Sunday, November 27, 2011

What is normal for the Australian Navy?

This article states more woe with the Australian Navy's fleet readiness.

Since all navies have a percentage of their ships in some sort of repair cycle, I don't know what is considered normal for the RAN.

There are some more severe mentions in the article that point to outright waste.

Two of the navy's newest ships, minehunters HMAS Hawkesbury and HMAS Norman - built by Australian Defence Industries in Newcastle and commissioned in 2000 - were "decrewed" and placed into reserve this year.

If the ships were required to come back into service, the Department of Defence estimates it would take up to five years to bring them back to operational status.

There also seems to be events of rework where repairs were not done right the first time.

Available crew for the ships is still a problem.

Australia is a nation that needs frigates, patrol boats, troop transports and logistics ships. I would like to put submarines on that list but skills are short there too.

How ships that are bigger, more expensive to operate and require more crew (the planned Air Warfare Destroyers and the Canberra flattop amphibs) are going to be sustained over their service life is a big question mark.

I suspect more long-term dock space to park them will be required because this navy and defence community is not skilled enough to keep what they have in an operationally ready status.

The taxpayer generously pays $27B for Defence each year. What they get in return is low value for the money spent.