(from a Steidle paper, 1997 - click image to make larger)
In an editorial by USN Rear Adm. (ret.) Craig Steidle ("Fixing the real JSF problems" p.90 Aviation Week & Space Technology/November 5/12, 2012, subscription), We hear from the former JSF DOD program boss of many years ago.
A bit of history: below is a 1997 paper of his which begs the question: how much of the fairy dust did he believe then?
In the recent AV Week opinion piece he writes about how the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program has lost its way. Here are some of the higlights.
1.1993 goal from then DOD boss “bottom-up review”, was to develop a joint family of systems to reduce life-cycle costs.
2.Following principles established by the 1986 Packard commission, warfighters and technologists worked together to make cost-performance trades, while applying technology to cut costs, not just to add performance. Technology was to be matured before engineering and manufacturing development started, and government and industry would form integrated product teams to incorporate all available best practices. These initiatives were underpinned by a disciplined requirements generation process and rigorous cost-performance trade studies.
3.But as the program moved on, leadership let the focus on affordability atrophy. Both the government and contractor were at fault. What should have been a core pillar did not evolve into a culture that would drive process development, induce change and inform decision-making.
4.While chairing several “independent manufacturing review team" meetings from 2008-10, Steidel and his colleagues were appalled that neither the contractor nor JSFPO mentioned “affordable” or “affordability” during initial presentations.
5.The statements of work he reviewed did not incorporate cost reduction.
6.Recovery of problems was made more difficult by the JSFPO’s arrogance in shutting out the technical authority of the services’ systems commands.
7.Contractors’ rigid adherence to legacy manufacturing practices—to the point of “normalization of deviance,” or “we have always done it that way and it worked.”
8.Results: immature risk-management process; change-control managers could neither define process problems or forecast change volumes; schedules were constantly revised with no integrated program management schedule.
9.Blind optimism.
10.Technical arrogance.
But then the Admiral ends with the following, applying his own “normalisation of deviance" and even faith:
"The current F-35 program leadership has made strides in bringing this system to full-rate production and has embraced the pillar of affordability. Our requirements reviews show that the warfighters will have the best complement to their F-22 and Super Hornet/Growler strike capabilities, with a system performance beyond our initial expectations. We need to remain strongly committed to this joint program. Use these hard-learned lessons, embrace affordability as a core best practice, and together deploy this system to the fleet—or watch our board of directors on Capitol Hill take it away."
The problem with that hope is that it was he who mentioned years ago, that costs on the program don’t “flatten out” until you reach about 1500 aircraft. That would assume no serious technical problems. That was part of the “business plan” that Admiral Venlet, the recent F-35 DOD (JSFPO) boss lost confidence in.
At the rate the program is going, there won’t be 1500 airframes.
Ever.
Which leads us back to 1993 and the affordability goal of the program. Admiral Stiedle is looking at a death-hospice patient.
Not only "normalization of deviance" sir, but a total indifference to what is real.
--- What Steidle thought back in 1997 ---
