Not a cure

Taxpayer funded “analysis” just isn’t working so well in this country when it comes to air power topics.

Take this latest from some that should know better:

Why the US Air Force needs the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

So according to ASPI, the USAF is in bad shape.

Yeah we know that.

Why someone would suggest a failed program to solve USAF problems makes me wonder.

Only just a little bit.

Am I being too harsh? Not when we are talking about spending tens-of-billions on a faulty product...and tens-of-billions more to fix the mistakes.

But, OK, if I am too harsh, consider another reason for ASPI failings re: air power topics.

They aren't stupid. They just have bad luck when thinking.

Family of 737 ISR for USAF?

When you filter out the industry marketing in this piece you still have what is a very important conversation for the USAF: the iron triangle (JSTARS, AWACS, RIVET JOINT).

Maybe if we get some sound USAF leadership along with sound USAF procurement skills, this can be solved. Without that, it does not matter if times are lean nor fat.

Will we someday see a Wedgetail in USAF colors?

Commander's call topic propaganda

F-35 propaganda even shows up in Squadron Commander's Call topic sheet.

Pretty sad.



(click image to make larger)

Not the first time either.

Maybe they should explain during a commanders call how numerous USAF bosses bungled the tacair roadmap.

For years.

Darker shades of blue

Conversations around a Doctrine Man post (Facebook) asked how a commanding officer could have influence on aircraft accidents.

Besides the cover-up years ago by the USMC on Osprey maintenance, we have this from many years ago, when a "rogue" pilot in a USAF B-52 Wing Stan-Eval shop was allowed to break rules over a long period of time. The Wing leadership knew of the rogue, but little was done. And events played out to a natural conclusion.

On the 24th of June 1994, Czar 52, a B-52H assigned to the 325th Bomb Squadron, 92d Bomb Wing, Fairchild Air Force Base, WA, launched at approximate 1358 hours Pacific Daylight Time (PDT), to practice maneuvers for an upcoming airshow. The aircrew had the planned and briefed a profile, through the Wing Commander level, that grossly exceeded aircraft and regulatory limitations. Upon preparing to land at the end of the practice airshow profile, the crew was required to execute a "go-around" or missed approach because of another aircraft on the runway. At mid-field, Czar 52 began a tight 360 degree left turn around the control tower at only 250 feet altitude above ground level (AGL). Approximately three quarters of the way through the turn, the aircraft banked past 90 degrees, stalled, clipped a power line with the left wing and crashed. Impact occurred at approximately 1416 hours PDT. There were no survivors out of a crew of four field grade officers.

Alveoli vs the F-22

This Fort Worth Star Telegram article on F-22 life-support issues doesn't match USAF over-optimism on marking all this as problem-solved.

Normal air contains about 21 percent oxygen. The moment F-22 pilots strap on their air masks, they're breathing 60 percent oxygen. Within the seconds it takes the plane to reach 11,000 feet after takeoff, the pilot is breathing air that's 93 percent oxygen.

But that's far more than the body needs except at the highest altitudes and in high-G-force maneuvers, some experts say.

As the aircraft accelerates and the rich oxygen is forced into the lungs and can't be absorbed, it creates a condition called "acceleration atelectasis," in which alveoli, which transmit oxygen to the blood and remove carbon dioxide, collapse.

That causes breathing to become more labored as pilots maneuver at high speeds, with high G-forces hampering the blood supply. Their blood can't get rid of the carbon dioxide and can't get oxygen to the body's organs.

That could explain the disorientation and dizziness reported by pilots. It's almost like being intoxicated.

"If you get enough of that, you could certainly pass out," said Paul McDonough, an associate professor of kinesiology at the University of Texas at Arlington.

In addition to alveoli collapse, the body needs CO2 to gauge breathing regulation. Obviously, the USAF still has work to do.

USAF knew for over a decade...

ABC News rightly alerts us to the fact that the USAF knew about the oxygen flaw in the F-22 for over a decade that ended up killing the Alaska mishap pilot. USAF justification at the time was to save a buck.

Then USAF blames the pilot for the mishap.

Lack of honor times ten.

The document, written by a member of the Combined Test Force at California's Edwards Air Force Base in March 2000 and updated in 2002, described a problem with the design of the plane's Environmental Control System (ECS), which is charged with regulating several systems in the plane including the conditions in the cockpit. During certain specific high-altitude maneuvers, the ECS system would shut down and it was built so that if it failed, it would spark a cascade effect that would also cut off the pilot's primary oxygen supply.

Under the heading "Impact If Not Fixed," the test group member wrote, "Real-world failure of [the oxygen system] due to ECS shutdown is unacceptable. ECS failure and the subsequent loss of supplemental breathing oxygen may result in pilot debilitation or fatality due to either altitude hypoxia [oxygen deprivation] or decompression sickness in the event of cabin depressurization."

"Investigate and take corrective action," the 2000 document says. "Suggest repairing the ECS system so it will provide continuous, adequate service throughout the flight envelope. Suggest providing a reliable source of bleed air for [the oxygen system] in the event of ECS failure... [C]onsider addition of pilot breathing air plenum to fill gaps when [the oxygen system] is not operating, as during ECS shutdown."

Yet, ABC commits yellow journalism against the F-22 capability stating that it hasn't been used in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Gee, I guess we need to get rid of nuclear ballistic missile submarines.

Senator McCain also jumps in.

Dumb attitudes like that mean that America will lose air power deterrence in the Pacific and elsewhere.

Personal account of USAF Cold War MiG squadron

Bill Sweetman has a great story of a recent personal account from a former USAF guy that was part of the Cold War program flying Soviet-made (or similar) MiG aircraft in Nevada.

Those days were secret, dangerous yet eye-opening.

That proved to be a very important test. "In 1987 we had the AIM-9P, which was designed to reject flares, and when we used US flares against it would ignore them and go straight for the target. We had the Soviet flares – they were dirty, and none of them looked the same – and the AIM-9P said 'I love that flare'.

"Why’d that happen? We had designed it to reject American flares. The Soviet flares had different burn time, intensity and separation. The same way, every time we tried to build a SAM simulator, when we got the real thing it wasn’t the same.

"I use the AIM-9P because it is out of the system and I can talk about it. The same thing happened to a lot of things that are still in the system and that I can’t talk about."

USAF-For the love of the F-35

Looking at the cockpit video below is an interesting exercise in spin. The seller implies that only "5th generation aircraft" can have sensor fusion. A ridiculous claim. The video also assumes F-35 invisibility. Good luck with that.

Big budget cuts are coming. The USAF doesn't know how many F-35s it can afford but somehow wants them. How will the service pay for the F-35 in the coming years?

Sacrifice.

I suggest that this exercise in force structure suicide happen as follows:

F-15E-Retire all small-motor F-15Es (about half the fleet)
F-16-Retire all non- Block 5X F-16s
F-15-Retire all F-15C/D
Remove the nuclear mission for bombers
Bombers-Retire all B-52s
Tankers-Retire half of the remaining KC-135 fleet
C-5-Anything that can't be refurbished to a C-5M standard gets retired.
C-17-Retire 10 percent of the force.
C-130-Retire all non-C-130J assets
VIP-Remove the E4 family of aircraft from service (leadership by example)
Retire JSTARS
Remove 20 percent of initial pilot training capacity.

Manning:
Remove the 0-10 and E-9 Rank except for USAF HQ
Remove all SES

All this needs to be done fast. Don't think about it. Pull the trigger.

Remaining F-15E and F-16 Block 5X will go into the Guard as "blended" units (Active, Reserve, Guard members with Guard leadership). They will take on home-air-defense alert at 17-20 (what used to be ASA) locations as well as other missions. This means for the F-15E, a crammed training schedule. Big time.

But hey, it is all about living the dream.

In-coming USAF boss faces significant F-35 troubles

USAF's General Welsh--the nominee to replace out-going boss General Schwartz--told the Senate Armed Services Committee that until it is known what the F-35 will cost to own and operate, there is no way to know how many the service can have. He also mentioned that the production line is under-performing.

His thoughts on F-35 affordability and numbers the service intends to have go like this:

“If we can’t clearly identify how much this airplane will cost to buy and to fly after we acquire it, then we really have no idea how many airplanes we can afford or how many we should expect to receive.”

High-level thinking!

On F-35 production he had this to say:

“Our manufacturing process, our assembly line, is not up to speed and running to the level we’d hope it would be at this point in time.”

As a gauge of progress, we already know that F-35 low-rate-initial-production batch 3 (aka LRIP-3) is behind schedule by several months. The customers have just received their first of 17 LRIP-3 jets. The LRIP-3 contract was supposed to be complete in December of 2011. LRIP-4 is to be complete in March of 2013; not that far off. LRIP's 1,2, and 3 are around $1B over-cost.

Also, what is being delivered needs numerous kinds of fixes and re-enginnering (the mistake-jet syndrome) because such little testing has happened. 5-and-a-half years after first flight and there is still a very limited flight envelop: no real weapons system testing and no credible pilot training efforts.

What were they thinking in 2003? Ponzi scheme? Rico Statute? Theft by-trick-or-device? Congress believed it hook, line and sinker. Woe to us.

That, along with other challenges (such as fielding an obsolete-to-the-threat F-35) are what faces General Welsh.

USAF's alleged need for 1763 F-35s can't be taken seriously.

Welsh also took a big swipe at the out-going USAF leadership on the issues of Air National Guard force structure planning and relations.

Welcome to the top office boss. You will have your work cut out for you. Best you re-read LeMay and Rickover after evening prayers.

Force structure decline

Flight Global's newly minted Super Hornet combat crewman Dave Majumdar has collected some good photos of F-35 ops in relation to qualifying the Air National Guard's first instructor pilot.

What we all need to do though is question how the Air National Guard will survive.

USAF justifies its gutting of operational Air Guard units by stating that an active duty airman's ratio of deployment time to non-deployment time is 1 to 3. That ratio for the Guard is 1 to 5, although I wonder with high-demand units such as JSTARS. USAF states that with all the taskings of a smaller force (the continuing of an Operation: Deny Christmas mindset born in the 1990s) that it is cheaper to pay for active duty forces in the zero-sum funding game.

Those numbers could be in dispute when you consider how much it takes to train someone and retain that tribal knowledge. Guard flying units are efficient.

What is needed of course is to only use these limited forces for real and justified deployments and not fishing expeditions.

As we try and field the Thunderchief III, it will gobble up even more funds best used for something else.

Organisational force-structure suicide continues.

Working the unthinkable

The F-35 doesn't make sense for the USAF, however people are going forward with the plan to field it. How will the USAF operate and sustain the troubled F-35A in a slim budget time?

I will look at this in a future post which details a very small "Fighter Group" with one squadron and various thin support squadrons. This will make up a stateside basing.

Due to high operating costs, the squadron will only have around 12 fighter aircraft. This higher operating cost for the F-35 points more to the number of airframes you see in some large-airframe airlift squadrons.

For ISO/phase, an aircraft is flown off to another base that not only has a Fighter Group, but Wing HQ which oversees 4 Fighter Groups.

Again, the goal is to take today's operating budgets and live within some kind of an organisational structure that can exist due to the high F-35 operating cost.

Because of such slow F-35 production and unpredictable annual budgets, USAF has no real way of knowing how many operational Wings/Groups/Squadrons it will have to stand up.

Like the effort of not declaring IOC because no one knows, not declaring a total number of F-35s for the USAF, for now, is OK.

Standing up 1 F-35 Wing with the above mentioned structure, is at least a start, and, unless there are more serious discoveries in F-35 development, something that the USAF can actually achieve with reasonable certainty.

Taking the illogical to its logical conclusion and all that.

USAF CV-22 Squadron commander relieved over aircraft mishap

Via Inside Defense (subscription):

Squadron Commander Relieved Of Duties After CV-22 Osprey Crash

The Air Force has removed the commander of the 8th Special Operations Squadron, citing a lack of confidence in his leadership following last week's crash of a CV-22 Osprey.

AOL Defense has confirmed that the pilot-in-command of the June CV-22 crash in Florida that injured 5 people was also the co-pilot of the 2010 CV-22 crash in Afghanistan that killed 2 people.

Recent analysis of USAF budgets shows that the CV-22 costs $73,000 per flying hour in 2011 and $80,000 per flying hour in 2010 (exceeding the troubled F-22 for that year). This also exceeds the hourly cost of much heavier and larger aircraft such as the C-5 transport, B-1 and B-52 bombers.

While the CV-22 offers some niche capability, one has to wonder about the value at any cost.

Out of uniform

There are a couple of problems with this photo of two air force members (makes no difference if they are guard, active-duty or reserve).

First, I don't have a problem with anyone breast-feeding kids where ever the opportunity presents itself as a necessity.

However, the two people are out of uniform; in public. There are a lot of things that are not in the regulations/instructions on wearing the uniform. So, stating that the regulation or instruction says nothing about breast-feeding is a dodge. The regulations/instructions are clear about what defines correct uniform wear. Also, they are outside not wearing a hat. There is no indication that is a posted no-hat area. Strike two.

What is sad is the person on the right is an NCO and should know better. If one is unsure of why they have to wear the uniform a certain way or think they can freelance to suit themselves, maybe they do not belong in the military.

M113 with the USAF

An interesting photo from 2008, Iraq; USAF Security Forces doing perimeter watch with a modified M113.

A user history that goes all the way back to the Vietnam War.

Faith-based cheerleaders and air power dead weights

The F-35B won't be able to meet USAF sortie rate expectations.

The US Air Force has concluded that the short take-off vertical landing (STOVL) Lockheed Martin F-35B- model aircraft cannot generate enough sorties to meet its needs; therefore the service will not consider replacing the Fairchild Republic A-10 Warthog close air support jet with that variant.

And by design, no F-35 variant can achieve high-sortie rates. With things like an integrated power pack (IPP) which is having up-time problems, there is no way the F-35 will meet its high mission capability (MC) rates in the plus-90 percent region which are a key performance perimeter (KPP).

But then the leader of the absence of air power knowledge has this to say:

"The F-35B is well-suited to support of the Marine Air Ground Taskforce (MAGTF) in very austere locations," says USAF chief of staff Gen Norton Schwartz, speaking at an event hosted by the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. "But the reality is, is that scenario is not a high sortie generation scenario."

I'm glad this guy is leaving. He contributes nothing on this topic. The whole idea of USMC STOVL ops is high-sortie rate and being close to the battlefield. On other point, the F-35B is not "well-suited" for this mission because it is unreliable, expensive, faulty, and is yet to prove it can operate in such an environment. Faith-based PowerPoint is not real.

A retired member of the United States Marketing Corps chimes in:

Retired Lt Gen George Trautman, a former US Marine Corps (USMC) deputy commandant for aviation, disputes Schwartz's assertion that the F-35B cannot generate as many sorties as the A or C model aircraft.

"The F35B has highest sortie generation rate among the three JSF [Joint Strike Fighter] variants," Trautman says. "There may be other reasons the air force doesn't want the B, but sortie rate isn't a factor."

No it is not the "highest sortie generation rate among the three JSF variants", (or any variant) because there is no proof to back up the faith.

The key performance parameters (KPP) for the F-35 require higher sortie rates for the B-model at four sorties per day. The A and C models are only required to generate three sorties per day.

Good luck with that. And 7-tons of gas for every sortie out of an "austere" base.

USAF boss General Schwartz argument about not needing C-27 is shot down by Australia

The boss of the USAF is wrong.

Again.

Australia will purchase 10 C-27J aircraft. Read the reasons why below from the Defence press release. Note the airfield comparison metrics between the C-130 and C-27.

Schwartz (never a 4-star genius on air power issues) assumes America will never need to get into airfields unavailable to the C-130.

Minister for Defence and Minister for Defence Materiel – Joint Media Release – New Battlefield aircraft for the Air Force

10 May 2012

Minister for Defence Stephen Smith and Minister for Defence Materiel Jason Clare today announced that the Government had agreed to purchase 10 Alenia C-27J Spartan Battlefield Airlift aircraft at a cost of $1.4 billion.

The C-27J will replace the Caribou aircraft which was retired from service in 2009 after a career spanning more than four decades. The C-27J complements the capabilities of the C-130 and C-17 aircraft and uses common infrastructure and aircraft systems such as engines, avionics and the cargo handling systems.

The acquisition of the C-27J will significantly improve the ADF’s ability to move troops, equipment and supplies. The C-27J has the capacity to carry significant load and still access small, soft, narrow runways that are too short for the C-130J or runways which are unable to sustain repeated use of larger aircraft.

In Australia, the C-27J can access over 1900 airfields compared to around 500 for the C-130 Hercules aircraft. In our region, the C-27J will be able to access over 400 airfields compared to around 200 for the C‑130 Hercules aircraft.

These aircraft will provide battlefield airlift but are also capable of conducting airlift in our region. They will be able to operate from rudimentary airstrips in Australia and overseas and will be able to support humanitarian missions in remote locations.

The flexibility of the C-27J allows it to undertake a wide range of missions from delivering ammunition to front line troops to undertaking aero-medical evacuation of causalities.

A Battlefield Airlifter needs to be able to operate in a high threat environment. The C-27J with its missile warning systems, electronic self protection, secure communications and battlefield armour provides protection from threats ranging from small arms to highly lethal man portable air defence systems (MANPADS).

The C-27J was assessed by Defence as the aircraft which best met all the essential capability requirements and provides the best value for money. It was assessed as being able to fly further, faster, higher while carrying more cargo and requiring a smaller runway than the other aircraft under consideration, the Airbus Military C-295.

The acquisition of the 10 C-27J aircraft with associated support equipment will be conducted through a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) arrangement with the United States (US) at a cost of around $1.4 billion. The first aircraft are expected to be delivered in 2015 with the Initial Operating Capability scheduled for the end of 2016.

Initial logistic support, including training for aircrew and maintenance personnel will be provided through the FMS program, utilising the system that has been established in the US. Defence will seek a separate agreement with the C-27J manufacturer, Alenia, in order to ensure that RAAF can operate, maintain and modify the aircraft throughout its planned life.

Since the retirement of the Caribou fleet in 2009, Australia’s military airlift capability has comprised C‑17 heavy lift aircraft, C‑130 H and J model Hercules aircraft, the Interim Light Transport aircraft (8 Beechcraft King Air 350 aircraft) and Navy and Army helicopters.

In the Budget the Government announced the retirement of the C-130H, which will proceed in an orderly fashion over the course of the year.

The 10 C-27J will be based in Richmond.

Media Contacts:

Mr Smith’s Office: Andrew Porter (02) 6277 7800 or 0419 474 392

Mr Clare’s Office: Korena Flanagan (02) 6277 7620 or 0418 251 316

Defence Media Operations (02) 6127 1999

Schwartz and Donley violating federal whistle-blower laws?

Here is the full 60 Minutes piece about the two pilots that have decided not to fly the F-22 out of concern for their safety.

There are in fact some revelations. Bullying and punishment over core flying safety concerns. Incompetence in finding the root cause of aircrew breathing troubles on the jet.

If what they say is true, General Schwartz who is the boss of the Air Force and Mr. Donely who is the Secretary of the Air Force, need to be fired on behalf of the American people as a message that this kind of negligence and bullying will not be allowed.

This is serious to the extreme.

Reference threat

USAF is looking for ways to improve their red-air opposition training.

Or so they say.

In February, Lt Gen Herbert "Hawk" Carlisle, the USAF's deputy chief of staff for operations, plans and requirements said that it is almost impossible to build a realistic, challenging training scenario for the F-22 and F-35 during real-world exercises. There is no way to replicate the kinds of electronic warfare threats or the sheer scale of enemy opposition that those aircraft might face during a real war except - to certain extent - during some select large-force exercises like Red Flag at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada.

The DOD has a real opportunity to see if the F-35 can take on anti-access threats. By using the F-22 as the red-air opponent, we have an idea of what the F-35 will be capable of in these situations. If it can beat the F-22, it can take on the PAK-FA and J-20.

If not, well, the F-35 will be as we fear: obsolete against anti-access threats. We already know the F-35 is too expensive to use for anything else.

The USAF has the wrong boss

General Schwartz is the wrong person to lead the USAF. Unfortunatly, no one in power knows or cares.

Schwartz has been at the helm during a number of questionable actions.

Some claim he saw the USAF through increasing drone capability in the wars. The problem is that there are few supporting metrics to make this seem like a wise thing to do.

He (along with an empty suit of a Secretary of the USAF) helped kill the F-22 program. And, 380-some F-22s to support 10 AEFs was not a theory. It was a solid plan. By the way; this also killed the hope of a theater bomber we really needed in the Pacific, the FB-22.

He states that the F-35 is the way forward for tac-air but there isn't much to make this a great idea. The jet is late, has huge problems, is overly expensive (to the point of where USAF will never see 1763 F-35s let alone a few hundred) and is obsolete. Interesting, whether he knew it or not, he stated the aircraft was obsolete the other day:

Gen. Norton Schwartz, the Air Force chief of staff, told members of the House Appropriations defense subcommittee Tuesday that reducing the combat radius of the F-35A by five miles is more cost-effective than modifying the fighter to meet performance goals set a decade ago.

Over a decade actually. The JSF JORD is for an aircraft that will not be able to take on modern threats. It also assumed we would have enough F-22s to do the work needed.

Long term deterrence in the Pacific is now problematic.

Schwartz also ruined a promising C-27 capability for the Army and USAF by killing the program. He stated that there were not any airfields in Afghanistan that couldn't be serviced by a C-130. Where was all this great analysis some years ago when all the brainiacs thought the C-27 was a good idea? In any event, a sensible replacement for the Army's C-23 (of which I think is an uninspired POS) is now gone. Not very helpful. As long as we will only fight in Afghanistan, Schwartz is our guy. Oh wait. We are pulling out.

Over 10 years into a COIN warfare environment, USAF can't field a simple prop-driven CAS aircraft without screwing up the contract. There is also the KC-46 tanker contract which was almost Nunn-McCurdy material before the ink was dry.

The USAF future is in trouble. I don't know where we'll be then, but we won't smell too good thats for sure. General Schwartz IS an air power problem.

Cutting corners?

I hope these guys know what they are doing.

The declaration means the Air Force is satisfied that its version of the aircraft, the F-35A, is safe to fly. It also means that the Air Force understands and accepts the risks where there are gaps in the jet’s compliance with service airworthiness regulations, Ebersole said.