Reference threat

USAF is looking for ways to improve their red-air opposition training.

Or so they say.

In February, Lt Gen Herbert "Hawk" Carlisle, the USAF's deputy chief of staff for operations, plans and requirements said that it is almost impossible to build a realistic, challenging training scenario for the F-22 and F-35 during real-world exercises. There is no way to replicate the kinds of electronic warfare threats or the sheer scale of enemy opposition that those aircraft might face during a real war except - to certain extent - during some select large-force exercises like Red Flag at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada.

The DOD has a real opportunity to see if the F-35 can take on anti-access threats. By using the F-22 as the red-air opponent, we have an idea of what the F-35 will be capable of in these situations. If it can beat the F-22, it can take on the PAK-FA and J-20.

If not, well, the F-35 will be as we fear: obsolete against anti-access threats. We already know the F-35 is too expensive to use for anything else.

The concurrency fraud

For the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force the tac-air mess known as the "fighter-gap", was totally avoidable.

The fighter-gap is based on the idea that the military has not bought enough aircraft to support operations into the future years. Fighter aircraft are getting old and so on. Yet, the responsibility for this problem rests on the shoulders of the military. It is senior leadership's fault and no-one else.

The military believed the F-35 concurrency lie. That is that the F-35 could be built cheap in high numbers, early and any development problems along the way would be fixed up. The risks in relation to the complexity of the program were waved away with a can-do attitude or ignored.

If the F-35 program was built without that concurrency nightmare that deeply worries the current DOD F-35 program manager, there would be less risk. The people that have been consistently accurate (for years) about these risks--The Government Accounting Office (GAO)--even told us so.

Counting airframes, motors and military construction, in procurement dollars alone, the F-35 program from U.S. fiscal year budget 2007 to 2012, will have cost us $29.2B.

Instead, the Navy could have used their $14B to procure 186 extra Block II Super Hornets. Probably several more if they could commit to only buying single-seaters. Combined with their existing multi-year buy, most of the legacy Hornets on our big aircraft carriers could have been replaced.

Instead of buying LRIP F-35 mistake-jets, the USAF could have used their $15B to procure 214 F-16s.

The USMC? Their Harriers are good to go until around 2023-24. Oh, they didn't tell you that?

Once F-16 and F-18 numbers got up to reasonable health, low-rate production of both the F-16 and F-18 could continue. No fighter-gap.

And the F-35? It would still be in development. Until it was mature enough for production.

The faulty F-35A cost per flying hour is unsustainable

AOL Defense is taking a look at the latest DOD select acquisition report for the F-35.

They are reporting that it will cost $35,200 per flying hour for the F-35A CTOL (the most common variant). Or in other words, the annual take-home pay of many Americans.

Burned up.

Every hour. For no valid return in credible combat capability.

Curious because years ago, in order to generate interest with a gullible U.S. military and Congress, the then JSF program had to show how great the jet would be using less operations and sustainment dollars than existing strike-fighters.

A tall order.

A look back 10 years to the 2002 SAR offers some illumination. What did the sales-force do in order to convince everyone that the F-35 was cheap to operate for such incredible (imagined) capability? Their projections cut the manpower required to run an F-35A squadron by two-fifths compared to a USAF F-16 squadron. Not figured in was that a heavy aircraft with a really big engine would burn more fuel per hour.

The comparison also did not take into account that a stealth aircraft, with more complexity, would cost more to operate. Or, they figured it and decided it didn't count because the numbers were inconvenient to the cause.

Observe the 2002 F-35 SAR predictions for the F-35A cost per flying hour compared to the recent SAR reported by AOL Defense.

(click image to make larger)

$9145 per flying hour vs. $35,200 per flying hour. Even when counting in the FY2002 baseline dollars to today's money, that is a big difference.

On a different note, the 2002 SAR shows the Navy (including USMC) as ordering their last F-35 to complete the program of record by the year 2021. That would be 690 F-35B&C aircraft.

Also according to the 2002 SAR, the USAF F-35 program of record would have ordered their last jet for a total of 1763 in 2026.

The latest meme out there is that this will be a program of sustainment spanning over 50 years.

Early SARS also stressed that the F-35 program was to be "affordable" as a reason to exist.

With what we know now, we can see nothing in the F-35 program is affordable. There is also enough information available to challenge the assumptions by the faithful that the F-35 has combat worth.

The program has failed. It is time for some adult supervision to recognize this fact. This extravagant program must end.

New AIM-120D motor production slow down--JDRADM cancelled

As mentioned here, the AIM-120 price in the DOD's proposed FY2013 budget has gone into the stratosphere.

More on the story here.

Also, JDRADM, which was supposed to be a dual-role missile is gone.

Van Buren said the quality of the missiles that have been delivered is “fine,” but the weapons can’t be produced in quantity due to a high rejection rate for the rocket motors being built.

“I wouldn’t characterize it as a defect, I would characterize it as a through-put issue,” he said. “The through-put of acceptable motors is not meeting production schedules.”

But the Pentagon must have the new AMRAAM variant.

“The AMRAAM is a critical part of the air-to-air mission,” Van Buren said.

The next-generation Joint Dual-Role Air Dominance Missile, which would have replaced both the AMRAAM and the AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation missile, which is used to suppress enemy air defenses, has been terminated because it was unaffordable.

Expensive tac-air stuff in the FY2013 budget proposal

Take a look at the U.S. DOD FY2013 budget proposal. Some of these weapons systems used to be “affordable”.

The sample below represents the total acquisition cost for each item in the FY2013 budget proposal.

Back in the 1990's the JASSM was supposed to be an affordable cruise missile at around 400k each. Remember Powell complaining about bouncing rubble with million dollar cruise missiles in Desert Storm? Well, that "affordable' post Desert Storm JASSM is now shockingly high. At $1.57 mil each, it better be one heck of a target to be worth that money. And; the JASSM has had some significant troubles over the years performing up to any reasonable level....in highly scripted range events. Some recent tests have been good, but I wonder what will happen if a USAF general points to a bomber unit and has them do no-notice live-fire tests on different production lots gathering dust in the igloos.

The other part of that is that the accuracy of cruise missiles is always a tightly guarded secret. Hint; they didn't do all that well in Desert Storm, yes that was a long time ago, but I'm not so convinced on the bang for the buck. Granted it beats sending a pilot to a fixed target, but in the case of Libya, the air defense was so weak that it didn't require cruise missiles. It was more for show. A JDAM party would have been fine.

The JSOW now costs what a JASSM was supposed to cost. JSOW was supposed to be around the 200k region depending on variant.

JDAM was supposed to be around 18k per kit. Today those kits are 33k each.

The AIM-120 has taken a giant leap for defense contractor kind; well beyond the cost of the JA$$M.

I don't think I am getting that old. I am just a bit concerned about what we are buying.

Hard path ahead

How do we avoid disaster with the F-35 and not let it be cancelled with a complete halt on work? It will be difficult and maybe even impossible given that it was poor and limited thinking that got us into the tac-air disaster in the first place.

I suggest the following:

Stop LRIP production of the F-35. The F-35A, B and C will become X-35A, X-35B and X-35C falling into an open-ended test program that will use these airframes to learn what works and what does not over the long term.

Jobs will be lost. But not as many as the outcome of the pending program failure as we see it now.

Lessons learned will spill over into USAF and Navy requirements for a new Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. There will be a CV variant and a CTOL variant. No STOVL.

The requirement should include the following:

2x1000lb internal carry of weapons. The F-22 main weapons bay will be used for this design. There will be a gun on both variants. Again, the F-22 configuration with lots (compared to the F-35) of ammo. There will be a HUD and JHMCS system. There will be a bubble canopy for better rear visibility. It will have two motors on it. The same ones used in the F-18 Super Hornet. It will have an internal self-defense jammer and towed decoy. Low observable quality will be robust and maintenance friendly over ultimate-stealth.

The end joint strike fighter could be a mixed vendor deal where Boeing and LM work together. Any foreign sales will be traditional FMS. It will not be an ultimate fighter but a good strike fighter that should work well with the F-22.

F-22 production will be started up. This could take a few years just to get the supply chain restarted. This means that refurbs on old fighter aircraft continue.


F-22A

1. Upgrade path
2. Training
3. Test
4. Long term sustainability initiatives

F-22B

- US and export for ABC's (Australia, Britain, Canada).

F-22C

- Export version of B, for non-ABC's (Israel, Japan)

F-22D

- Technology demonstrators (D-1,D-2, D-3 and so on) for a variety of F-22 initiatives: IRST, Cheek AESA, LO external storage, 2 aircrew, etc.

F-22E

1. Follow on of B from what was learned from D model

F-22F

- Follow-on of C from what was learned from D model

All of this will be very hard to do to pick up the pieces left from a raft of poor air power leadership since the end of the Cold War. However, it beats the alternative of faith-based insanity sponsored by the failed F-35 team.

South Korea and U.S. in mil-tech tampering disagreement

S.Korea is being accused of tampering with purchased U.S. mil tech. The explanation of "Tiger Eye" in the article is not correct but the message in the article is what is important.

This is why different FMS (foreign military sales) customers need different "requirements" that suit "their needs". Note the definition of Delta SDD in the F-35 program here.

Build and test was 'miscalculation,' DOD F-35 boss says production must slow

The head of the DOD F-35 program has stated production of the F-35 must slow down.

The reasons are those that the critics have already mentioned for years: the concurrency built into the original F-35 business plan is just too much to handle.

The original F-35 business plan is officially…officially dead.

Richard Whittle over at AOL Defense has the breaking story. Read all of it.

For some of us, the idea that the F-35 program had troubles with hair on them is not news.

What is news is that somebody with responsibility is starting to tell it like it is.

In my opinion Admiral Venlet still has some work to do. For instance: understanding that even as- delivered, the F-35 doesn’t bring enough for real U.S. tac-air value. However, I understand he is also a prisoner of the DOD project management system.

Yeah, there are alternatives "for" the F-35 program

This article in Aviation Week, "Are There Alternatives To The F-35 Program?" glosses over one of the main reasons the F-35 program is in trouble. While budget woes are mentioned, the reason for those woes are all of the technical problems with the jet.

One may discuss what budget x or budget y will provide but if the aircraft is faulty it doesn't matter much.

The "alternatives" involved with the F-35 program are doing whatever it takes to limit the damage to the defense posture of the United States. The current F-35 program will eat up funds best used for other defence communities.

What I propose is the following:

Make all non-U.S. F-35 buys under the U.S. Government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. This is familiar ground for U.S. customers. Other FMS programs involve foreign parts suppliers and this can be rolled into the traditional "off-set" deal making.

It is doubtful that the U.S. Federal Budget can sustain paying for 50,80,130,170 F-35s per year as proposed under previous fantasy JSF plans.

What can the U.S. afford? What we are seeing now: around 30-some aircraft per year. This may rise to 40 to 50 aircraft per year IF the program can show improved health.

Because of the expensive nature of the aircraft and its limited war-fighting ability against high-end threats, the aircraft should be looked as a stop-gap until other programs--based on lessons learned from this disaster--can get going.

I would say that a realistic production run for the F-35 would be around 10 years for a total of 300-400 F-35s as a new program of record.

In some ways this is easy to write up because there is no active milestone-B or supporting DAB as stated in the article above. This is the equal of a clean slate for the path ahead.

Next we come to the issue of what variants to produce. The only unique thing that the F-35 brings--for all of its huge expense and technical trouble--is STOVL.

The U.S. should have 300-400 F-35B STOVL aircraft as a program of record. The U.S. Air Force can field a few of these squadrons along with the USMC. The U.S.Navy won't miss the F-35C because it brings nothing for most missions that the Super Hornet already does for less money. The U.S. Navy is struggling to pay for ships. The F-35C is a weight around their neck. The F-35A brings no real value to the USAF because it is expensive and will not be lethal against high-end threats and it will be too expense to use for any other kind of strike-fighter work. Maybe there is hope for it as a USAF STOVL asset.

Any FMS sales would be STOVL or nothing. Since the behavioral patterns of the U.K. MOD are completely unreliable they can take it or leave it. Other "partner nations" can adapt or get out of the program. They are not handing over large amounts of money for jet orders under the current plan so no real loss there.

I believe for the F-35, the "alternatives" are to dramatically scale down the scope of the program or cancel it. Let us see how far institutional groupthink can make governments jump off the cliff.

A look at USAFs tac-air road map

Assuming we can keep F-22 pilots breathing, the program Block definition looks "OK" if in my opinion slow and delayed due to money being misdirected to other projects.

From this article, a snap-shot of the USAF fighter road map. Also a shame they could not even afford the hybrid center-line drop-tank IRST for USAF F-15Cs that the U.S. Navy is getting for their Hornets. All that money spent on the USAF; and when they can't even push out putting an originally planned item and then plan-B a SNIPER pod, well, that is penny pinching.

Also being considered are long-term upgrades for the newest fighter, the F-22. Near-term upgrades to be fielded in the next five years are already under way, but the service soon expects to define the content of the next package—Increment 3.2C. Potential elements include multi-spectral capabilities to expand the offensive and defensive frequency potential of the fighter, required upgrades such as Mode 5 integration friend or foe, or automatic ground collision and terrain avoidance. Officials are examining how best to share F-22 data, collected by an unprecedented onboard sensor suite, with legacy fighters. Eventually a data-sharing network with F-35s is planned, but delays in the latter’s development have made passing F-22 data to fourth-generation fighters a higher priority.

The first major F-22 enhancement—Increment 3.1—is now entering service, with an initial pair of upgraded stealth fighters recently delivered to Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska. Fleet retrofits will continue through 2016 and include the hardware and software modifications needed to drop eight Small-Diameter Bombs, take synthetic aperture radar (SAR) pictures and provide precision location and electronic attack capabilities.

Full operational test and evaluation is still being completed, but Maj. Richard Foster, Air Combat Command requirements officer, says the results are positive. SAR accuracy is 55% better than specified and geolocation accuracy is 15% better. Also, electronic attacks have proven 100% successful in testing.

The F-22 also will get a rudimentary AIM-120D firing capability next year (through the so-called Update 4), although full integration is not planned until Increment 3.2B in 2017. An initial capability to fire the Raytheon AIM-9X dogfight missile also has been accelerated to 2015 (under Update 5), with full integration also to come with Increment 3.2B.

Next on the upgrade path is Increment 3.2A, a software enhancement that includes expanded Link 16 data-link functionality, combat identification and electronic protection. It should emerge around 2014.

Besides the full integration of the latest air-to-air missiles, Increment 3.2B also expands geolocation by 88% beyond what is now being introduced.

In addition, around 2016 USAF expects to have moved to two F-22 configurations, the Block 20 aircraft to be used for training and development and Block 30/35s for the operational fleet. Foster says 36 aircraft will be in the Block 20 standard with 149 to settle on the Block 30/35 configuration.

So probably at anyone time once the F-22 fleet gets stable, 149 F-22s. Given all of the mismanagement in the area of air power "leadership" since the end of the Cold War, I guess we are "lucky".

USMC-air delusion

USMC-air leadership seems to have a lack of ability to face reality.

The comments from this article show an insane want to cut real war fighting aircraft that contribute well to the Corps.

The Yankee and the Zulu are highly useful. Yet the leadership is toying with the idea of pulling money from the program to pay for the waste that is the F-35.

USMC standard dumb-as-a-brick thinking doesn't help much.

But the Marines must have 420 F-35s, Trautman said. "There is no give there," he said. "The pace they reach 420 is the only thing in question."

Overall, the Marines' aviation portfolio is in great shape, Trautman said.

"There is not a lot of flexibility in the Marine Corps aviation portfolio because a lot of money is tied up in platforms," Trautman said. "They are 100 percent committed to these platforms," he said.

There isn't a lot of flexibility because there isn't a lot of reality going on in their thinking.

Given the current problems with the F-35 program, I figure the USMC will see their 420 F-35s around 35-40 years from now.

Will the F-35 program be around that long? Doubtful

I am sure we will hear more from the marketing department of the Corps as the budget battles heat up.

Hopefully that will include valid discussions of why the taxpayer should fund a second land army.

When will F-35 pilot training start?

There are so many ways that the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) requirement for the F-35 program screwed up the design.

Today the fat-dumpy aircraft is still trying to get through certification so initial pilot training (that is for non-test pilots) can start at Eglin AFB. There are still safety concerns.

Non-test pilots can get into a bit more trouble. Take a look at the video below where a Canadian exchange test pilot in the USAF explains how something as simple as a hard turn with an F-16 can be an issue with an asymmetric load.

What are the flight certification challenges for the F-35? At almost 5 years after the first flight, they seem to be many.

Which makes you wonder how this 2007 flight test schedule could have been anything more than wishful thinking.

F-35 officially 7 years late for USAF service

The United States Air Force (USAF) has officially stated that initial operating capability (IOC) for the F-35 won't happen until sometime in 2018. This was sort of expected when looking at the tea leaves over the past several months.

F-35 IOC for the USAF is now 7 years late compared to the original plan back in 2001.

Trends and program progress would indicate this will slip again.

Until then, USAF can count on about 300-350 F-16s being modernised with AESA and airframe work. Which will give them about another 7-8 years of additional life depending on each airframe. F-16 Blocks have various health issues. For instance, Block 4X are now very old. The smaller number of Block 5X are no longer young. USAF thinks they can do more above the 300-350 but I wouldn't count on it.

There are around 170-some F-15Cs that will get AESA and various upgrades which will allow them to operate out to the 2020s. We will have 170-some F-22s. When you get rid of the small-motor F-15Es, we will have a few handfuls of large motor F-15Es.

Add all that up and take away some for not being combat-coded, and that is the fast-jet fighter force for the USAF for the 2020-2030 era.

The idea that the F-35 will be able to be helpful in recapitalising the USAF fighter force doesn't seem very credible.

Eurofighter Typhoon analysis by APA

Some of this is a bit dated (as it doesn't include the Block II variant of the Super Hornet) but it is a good analysis to put things into perspective since the Typhoon has been mentioned re: Japan.

The following quote points back to the original intent of creating the Typhoon.

"The strength of the Typhoon is its very modern and comprehensive avionic package, especially that in the RAF variant, and its excellent agility when operated around its optimum combat radius of about 300 NMI (a figure to be found in older Eurofighter literature, which has since disappeared with the export drive to compete against the bigger F-15 and F-22)."

Unless Japan can conjure up the F-22, the Typhoon is still the best of the 3 options facing Japan for its F-4 replacement.

.