USAF's dream of all-stealth fighter force--now even more dead

Another damning indictment has appeared showing the United States Air Force (USAF) dream wanting an all-stealth fighter force is even more dead. The November-December 2012 issue of Air & Space Power Journal has an article, (The F-22 Acquisition Program,Consequences for the US Air Force’s Fighter Fleet) by a former USAF test pilot and F-22 squadron commander, Lt. Col. Christopher J. Niemi (PDF below).

It is good reading, although in many areas, not ground-breaking and maybe a bit too historical. The power in it comes from a person with significant operational experience. The timing of it and our future budget disaster era, could pretty much put an end to any claim USAF has on wanting the F-35 because Col. Niemi has provided a very large hammer to be used for more legacy fighter buys to recap USAF "needs".

This is OK in the coming years,  if the threats in the Pacific Rim allow legacy aircraft to operate in an acceptable fashion. I don't believe they will.

Note as always, articles from serving military members end with this:

The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government.

Where Niemi is strong:
-He has actual F-22 ops experience; as well as F-15E ops experience.
-He notes all the kinds of conflicts where high-cost (and high operating cost) stealth aircraft are not needed. This includes a mention that history being what it is, one could buy 3 Super Hornets for the cost of one F-22.
-He notes the budget reality including poor procurement thinking at all levels.

Niemi states: F-22 range is less than F-15 range and requires more tanking. This disagrees with another former F-22 squadron commander, (BG Molloy from the Molloy paper (PDF). Niemi also states that super-cruise with the F-22 has limitations but due to his position of not being able to present hard operational scenarios he is unable to explain further.

HOBS heaters and WVR. The F-22 currently does not have this capability; years after it was a known combat need for every other fighter design; years after initial operating capability. Note; the F-35, if it is fielded to real operational squadrons, will have AIM-9x for external carry, in the non-stealth mode (rah, rah).

Niemi brings up the high-end SAM threat but seems less convinced about the high-end air-to-air threats.

For Niemi, the F-22 is superior in air-to-air and survivability vs. high end threats but is inferior to legacy aircraft designs in all other mission sets. Niemi's review of USAF fighter procurement history since the end of The Cold War, like the efforts of Aviation Week's Bill Sweetman, show that, with current U.S. military-industrial-congressional-complex skill-sets, "stealth is not free".

I would wager that if the House and Senate Armed Service Committee types and others, use this Niemi paper as a hard source, then:

-Reopening F-22 production, as an idea is dead.
-The F-35 program is in even more serious jeopardy.

Niemi's most important statements point toward USAF senior-leadership ethics. Those seem to be even more faulty than any aircraft design. And, the future of America's air superiority is still a flying question mark.

Empty offices up in USAF HQ

There are some alarming vacancies up in USAF HQ. Interesting how some of these vacancies appeared with a variety of failed USAF acquisition attempts.

Retired and all that.

E-Ring offices throughout the Air Force corridors of the Pentagon are vacant. There is no undersecretary, no acquisition chief and no deputy weapons buyer.

One of the new guys up near the top office--General Davis--is there to help things move. It was his over-optimism as head of the DOD Joint Strike Fighter office just a few years ago, that helped prolong the jet's woes. Even back in 2008, some of us knew there was trouble. Instead of acting brutally honest, Davis went native to the program, trying to help it in for the big win.

I guess this is how one gets promoted. Can't pick up an extra star or two saying the F-35 is a big fat failure. Props to his career planning and all that.

This is a common DOD disease in that line of work.

All this, and there is a change-over in top leadership with Schwartz going out soon and Welsh coming in.

Anyway, should be interesting the next few years. A deskilled acquisition leadership, budget woes, and a sick-elephant on their back known as the F-35.

Audible--"Duwup!...Duwup!....sink-rate...sink-rate..."

USAF-For the love of the F-35

Looking at the cockpit video below is an interesting exercise in spin. The seller implies that only "5th generation aircraft" can have sensor fusion. A ridiculous claim. The video also assumes F-35 invisibility. Good luck with that.

Big budget cuts are coming. The USAF doesn't know how many F-35s it can afford but somehow wants them. How will the service pay for the F-35 in the coming years?

Sacrifice.

I suggest that this exercise in force structure suicide happen as follows:

F-15E-Retire all small-motor F-15Es (about half the fleet)
F-16-Retire all non- Block 5X F-16s
F-15-Retire all F-15C/D
Remove the nuclear mission for bombers
Bombers-Retire all B-52s
Tankers-Retire half of the remaining KC-135 fleet
C-5-Anything that can't be refurbished to a C-5M standard gets retired.
C-17-Retire 10 percent of the force.
C-130-Retire all non-C-130J assets
VIP-Remove the E4 family of aircraft from service (leadership by example)
Retire JSTARS
Remove 20 percent of initial pilot training capacity.

Manning:
Remove the 0-10 and E-9 Rank except for USAF HQ
Remove all SES

All this needs to be done fast. Don't think about it. Pull the trigger.

Remaining F-15E and F-16 Block 5X will go into the Guard as "blended" units (Active, Reserve, Guard members with Guard leadership). They will take on home-air-defense alert at 17-20 (what used to be ASA) locations as well as other missions. This means for the F-15E, a crammed training schedule. Big time.

But hey, it is all about living the dream.

In-coming USAF boss faces significant F-35 troubles

USAF's General Welsh--the nominee to replace out-going boss General Schwartz--told the Senate Armed Services Committee that until it is known what the F-35 will cost to own and operate, there is no way to know how many the service can have. He also mentioned that the production line is under-performing.

His thoughts on F-35 affordability and numbers the service intends to have go like this:

“If we can’t clearly identify how much this airplane will cost to buy and to fly after we acquire it, then we really have no idea how many airplanes we can afford or how many we should expect to receive.”

High-level thinking!

On F-35 production he had this to say:

“Our manufacturing process, our assembly line, is not up to speed and running to the level we’d hope it would be at this point in time.”

As a gauge of progress, we already know that F-35 low-rate-initial-production batch 3 (aka LRIP-3) is behind schedule by several months. The customers have just received their first of 17 LRIP-3 jets. The LRIP-3 contract was supposed to be complete in December of 2011. LRIP-4 is to be complete in March of 2013; not that far off. LRIP's 1,2, and 3 are around $1B over-cost.

Also, what is being delivered needs numerous kinds of fixes and re-enginnering (the mistake-jet syndrome) because such little testing has happened. 5-and-a-half years after first flight and there is still a very limited flight envelop: no real weapons system testing and no credible pilot training efforts.

What were they thinking in 2003? Ponzi scheme? Rico Statute? Theft by-trick-or-device? Congress believed it hook, line and sinker. Woe to us.

That, along with other challenges (such as fielding an obsolete-to-the-threat F-35) are what faces General Welsh.

USAF's alleged need for 1763 F-35s can't be taken seriously.

Welsh also took a big swipe at the out-going USAF leadership on the issues of Air National Guard force structure planning and relations.

Welcome to the top office boss. You will have your work cut out for you. Best you re-read LeMay and Rickover after evening prayers.

Force structure decline

Flight Global's newly minted Super Hornet combat crewman Dave Majumdar has collected some good photos of F-35 ops in relation to qualifying the Air National Guard's first instructor pilot.

What we all need to do though is question how the Air National Guard will survive.

USAF justifies its gutting of operational Air Guard units by stating that an active duty airman's ratio of deployment time to non-deployment time is 1 to 3. That ratio for the Guard is 1 to 5, although I wonder with high-demand units such as JSTARS. USAF states that with all the taskings of a smaller force (the continuing of an Operation: Deny Christmas mindset born in the 1990s) that it is cheaper to pay for active duty forces in the zero-sum funding game.

Those numbers could be in dispute when you consider how much it takes to train someone and retain that tribal knowledge. Guard flying units are efficient.

What is needed of course is to only use these limited forces for real and justified deployments and not fishing expeditions.

As we try and field the Thunderchief III, it will gobble up even more funds best used for something else.

Organisational force-structure suicide continues.

USAF admits not keeping a useful spectrum of capability

Maybe there is still time to save the USAF from itself.

One of its leaders has admitted the obvious: for years the USAF has concentrated on limited COIN-op tech at the expense of other needed communities that actually provide real and valid deterrent capability to the nation.

“I think right now what we’re trying to do is remind everybody that we’ve got to start planning to build systems and to field capabilities to fight in a contested environment again,” Lt. Gen. Charles “CR” Davis, the Air Force military deputy for acquisition, said during his first interview since becoming the service’s top uniformed weapons buyer.

The lost decade-plus. Any USAF leadership that doesn't concentrate on all areas of needed combat capability is cheating the nation, especially when you consider the billions we pump into the USAF every year.

Fielding the RC aircraft club using permissive-air, permissive-WX drones with up-rated snowmobile engines was only one segment of needed air power, and a very small one at that.

Also, a great way to sink a military article is to quote the Teal Group who on any given day, might be able to estimate future airliner sales.

We do not need a $500B long-range bomber, since any kind that is made won't be survivable in anti-access scenarios where the enemy has a broad suite of sensors, fighters and SAMS.

If the USAF is to invest anything for the Pacific Rim anti-access world what should it be?

1. Keep B-1 bombers and F-15Es updated/sustained for JASSM.
2. Convert some C-130s and C-17s into JASSM carriers.
3. Qualify the Tomahawk Block IV on the B-52.
4. Build the FB-22.
5. Build a new F-22.
6. Cancel the F-35
7. Invest in a few different models of 737 ISR.

USAF sees more challenges with fuel bills

As an add-on to this previous USAF cost per flying hour post, there is this piece which gives you a good summary of the challenges the USAF has paying for fuel.

*UPDATE* Enemy within

In their continuous war against the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard, USAF boss General Schwartz and Secretary of the USAF Donley have scored another victory.

Currently there are only a handful of C-130s that can be configured for fire-fighting duties. Efforts to improve the situation look bleak as USAF continues to waste billions each year on the failed F-35.

Using excuses like Operation: USELESS DIRT 1 and 2 or the coming budget sequestration fear-mongering as a cause and future cause are invalid.

Keeping a variety of AF Reserve and Air National Guard special use, convertible C-130's operational is not hard to justify or fund.

*UPDATE* And we just lost one of the configurable USAF C-130s doing fire-fighting ops. Status on crew not certain. Word is three picked up by helicopter.

H/T-War News Updates

UPDATE--USAF facing serious money trouble with JSTARS, RIVET JOINT and AWACS

David Fulghum of Aviation Week writes that the USAF is having big trouble funding its "iron triangle". That would be, the three ageing large-body intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft: AWACS, JSTARS and RIVET JOINT.

Remember, JSTARS (while currently in the middle of undergoing a program to replace its old engines with new ones UPDATE-only one airframe in test with new engines at the moment) started USAF service as a used aircraft. RIVET JOINT is in the best health and AWACS really needs a technology refresh of some kind.

One of the gambles not mentioned in the article is that USAF put great hope in having the F-35 as a survivable and networked ISR platform.

AWACS has been (at least in some public statements) minimised because some say the F-22 has become its own AWACS. The aircraft--because of its AN/ALR-94 passive emissions sensor--has even been labelled a "mini-RIVET JOINT" by some.

The F-22 and F-35 would do ISR, survive, and the the network would pick up the slack. In a funding zero-sum game, the iron triangle was pushed off into later years for any kind of decision. Remember: E-10 (a 767-body JSTARS replacement) was cancelled. "No" was the answer from dream-works. There would be 380-some F-22s to do 10 AEFs after that oh-so-terrible cut from the 750 plan, lots of F-35s (by now...where are they?) and we just wouldn't need as many of those old aircraft.

Even an ex-secretary of the USAF (some already know my contempt for empty-suit-SecUSAFs) stated the iron triangle needs to be eliminated to pay for the 5th-gen dream.

Somehow I don't picture us driving F-22s up and down the N. Korean boarder in peacetime to update various electronic orders of battle. A job the RIVET JOINT does very well.

I don't picture us doing no-fly-zones with F-22s-only.

I don't picture us supporting ground forces with F-35s versus JSTARS, which also bring their own command and control assets.

A broad team effort and persistent-over-lap (including UAVs) is the safe way to go.

Today, with the 5th-generation fighter disaster and no real air power leaders of worth, the USAF has put everything into keeping the F-22 and F-35 going on the funding treadmill. It really does look like a high-stakes Monopoly game where USAF has put a bunch of its property into hock for short-term gain hoping it will contribute to a long-term win.

But now, USAF has had a real bad run by drawing the "Go-Directly-To-Jail, do not pass 'Go'" card too many times. That and landing on Park Place and Boardwalk and now things look really bleak.

Can we agree this kind of thinking has failed?

Every single day it gets more difficult for me to have any sympathy for USAF management incompetence.

And I love the USAF.

Future of the USAF--do less with less

America needs a new air force

For the investment in tax dollars, today's United States Air Force (USAF) is not effective.

That does not mean all of it is not effective. There are some incredibly good people and organisations in the service. However, today's senior USAF leadership is next to worthless.

Today's air force needs to transform to where it can:

1. Provide expeditionary, anti-access destruction, interdiction and close-air-support.
2. Provide strategic and tactical airlift and air-refueling support.
3. Defend home air-space.
4. Provide a healthy ICBM force
5. Provide air-breathing ISR.
6. Provide management of military space assets.
7. Take maximum advantage of the efficiency of the Air National Guard to perform a variety of missions.
8. Do this for under $100B per year.
9. Do less with less.

Notice that the list above does not show everything done by today's USAF.

The USAF does not need to:

1. Provide dedicated special operations support.
2. Provide ground security in war-zones better done by the U.S. Army.
3. Provide a long-range nuclear bomber mission.
4. Provided a gold-plated long-range bomber at $500M each.

As we already know, the USAF tac-air problem is a huge mess. Various generals since the end of the Cold War refused to refresh existing squadrons of new aircraft.

Also, they believed the "fifth-generation fighter" marketing nonsense which, after over $100B invested, has left us with around 120 combat coded F-22s and an F-35 program in the ditch.

Fighter aircraft need to be organized under a "blended" unit force structure. That is, that they include Guard, USAF Reserve and USAF Active duty in one unit.

What is the proper organic flying organisation? The Group. The Wing is gone except as an expeditionary organisation.

To illustrate, A Fighter Group will be lead by a full colonel. Generals in the new USAF will be very few. The Fighter Group will have two squadrons. One squadron will provide home air defense and training. The other will be used for expeditionary taskings.

For example: An F-16 Fighter squadron will have 12 aircraft. Maintenance, ops and other support will be merged into the unit. Closer to what a Navy squadron does and what the USAF does when such ideas are good for the PowerPoint warriors.

Since there are around 20 home air defense locations that are realistic needs and not just made up, this gives us 480 combat-coded aircraft to do home defense and expeditionary warfare.

In expeditionary warfare, the second squadron of the group will deploy and be composited in-theater into whatever Group or Wing Structure is needed.

The F-22 will go to desert locations to prolong its service life and only deploy for anti-access exercises or deterrence. It will not be part of the home air-defense mission. F-15Es will replace home air defense needs in places like Alaska.

The end-strength goals for tac-air will be to phase out all F-16s and replace them with F-15Es. These will be more expensive per flying hour, however when needed, will provide the combat punch options needed for the Pacific Rim when mated with the F-22.

A small number of A-10s will exist.

USAF, while having a dramatically smaller tac-air fleet, will invest in having a dedicated R&D group which will launch a variety of X-plane projects and just as important, help develop prototypes to a much higher production-ready level.

Airlift and tanker resources will be downsized to where one day, C-130H will be gone, C-17s at their current number along with the C-5M roadmap. A C-777-200LR will be bought in small numbers to equip one airlift group.

A new ICBM with a new warhead will be constructed. Some of this technology will indirectly help the U.S. Navy refresh their nuclear enterprise.

The nuclear long-range bomber mission will end. Also, there will be no new long-range bomber. We cannot afford it. Back in the late 1970's the first B-1 bomber was cancelled. The reason was that it was judged that cruise-missiles for long range nuclear strike would be more efficient. We have a similar problem now. No long-range bomber can penetrate a modern integrated air defense (which includes modern fighter aircraft) and expect to survive.

For now, any long-range bomber project has to be based on the idea that it will be survivable in COIN war, need some kind of escort in legacy air defense scenarios and be the shooter of long-range stand-off weapons in an anti-access scenario. More study has to be put in this direction.

Air-breathing Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) will in-part be refreshed by a wide variety of 737 airframes. Current AWACS, JSTARS and RIVET-JOINT-like missions will end up in this airframe type.

The USAF will joint with the Navy in the J-UCAS project. Whatever the U.S. Navy picks for its carrier mission is what the USAF will use for select deployed locations.

As part of the ICBM refresh, USAF will get some technology assist to the space-system enterprise with a new booster rocket for, if not all needs, many future needs for the coming years.

Dedicated special operations support will go away as part of a do less-with-less mantra. USAF will have its own rescue helicopter refresh someday, just that it won't be gold-plated and it won't be special.

The USAF will be under dramatic budget constraints in the coming years. Dramatic cuts will be the norm. The USAF will have to live within its means.

Dream about the long range bomber

There will be no next-generation long-range bomber for the United States Air Force.

Let us look at what we already know:

The USAF has poor ability to set requirements, choose winners of bids and generally have an idea of what they are doing when procuring major weapons systems. They have a long track record of failure. CSAR, Tanker lease failure, Tanker rejection, Long-range bomber concept cancelled, C-27 fubar, light combat aircraft goof, F-35 and, I may have missed some.

USAF claims they can bring in the next-generation bomber but consider the following:

A new U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) report on the KC-46 tanker shows some interesting numbers. While it may succeed, consider that the USAF will spend over $50B to field: tankers. In comparison to a new long-range bomber design, these tankers are modest modifications of existing commercial aircraft at well above $200B each.

So how, in a difficult budget environment, is an institution that has severe trouble managing large military procurements, supposed to be believed that they can make this new long-range bomber fantasy work?

I don't believe it. And, until the USAF gets its act together, neither should you.

Poor us

Our USAF generals are stupid.

"The F-22 does better air-to-groud than anybody than the F-35," Carlisle said, "and the F-35 does air-to-air better than anything in the world except the F-22."

---


Cuckoo in the nest--U.S. DOD DOT&E F-35 report is out

USAFs F-35 procurement plan is not believable

USAFs F-35 procurement plan is not believable

United States Air Force (USAF) aircraft FY2013 procurement numbers (PDF) for the F-35 have taken an alarming cost rise since the FY2009 budget.

To be fair, much of that is due to leadership and management incompetence on the part of the DOD F-35 program office and the prime vendor, Lockheed Martin. Because there are so many significant engineering defects, real costs in the program are unknown.

The USAF is an important measure of F-35 procurement health. It is on record as the biggest potential buyer at 1763 aircraft. The USAF F-35A variant is also similar to what most foreign partner nations hoped to buy.

If the USAF large volume buy is in trouble, so is everyone else.

For the  FY2009 budget, USAF predicted that each aircraft purchased that year (we will use weapons system cost) would be $226M. Then, USAF predicted it would pay $100M for each F-35 in FY2013.

The recently released USAF budget prediction shows that for FY2013, the service expects to pay $181M for each F-35. A cost rise of $81M each from the FY2009 prediction.

In FY2009, the USAF expected to pay $172 billion for 1763 F-35s. For FY2013, the USAF predicts that 1763 F-35s will cost $212B; $40B over the FY2009 prediction.

In FY2009, USAF predicted the average cost of each aircraft would be $90M over the span of the total buy of 1763 aircraft. For FY2013, the USAF expects to pay $120M as an average cost of each F-35 for the programs buy of 1763 aircraft. This rise of 33% in just 4 years spells trouble.

If the USAF wants to stay on budget in relation to its FY2009 prediction, it would have to cut 529 aircraft; leaving 1234 F-35s for the USAFs total program buy.

Where will we be in another 4 years? What will future USAF leaders think of their predecessors when having to budget for a significant tac-air short-fall?

“It’s about $37 million for the CTOL aircraft, which is the air force variant.”
- Colonel Dwyer Dennis, U.S. JSF Program Office, 2002-

Not believable

True lies; true nonsense.

According to Bolton, funding also remains in place for the F-35 Lightning II joint strike fighter -- the centerpiece for future modernization to be able to prevail in contested environments.

USAF moves 98 F-35s out of 5 year procurement plan

Via Inside-Defense (subscription)-

Air Force Request Moves 98 JSFs Out of FYDP, Buys Fewer Reapers

The Air Force's fiscal year 2013 budget request recommends moving the procurement of 98 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft out of the current five-year defense plan, buying half as many MQ-9 Reapers as in FY-12, cutting two acquisition programs designed to build partnership capacity and continuing early research on a next-generation bomber, two senior service budget officials said this morning.

So much for "commitment". But they were not getting anything near "plan" anyway.

USAF does not know a date for F-35 IOC; slows rate of procurement

USAF will slow down its rate of F-35 orders. The service doesn't even know when they can declare IOC. Don't act shocked, the service is not displaying a bold leadership decision on par with Curtis LeMay.

Take it for what it is. This is a safe, bureaucratic move that goes with the flow. The F-35 program is starting to collapse under its own weight, so the timid can state that they will slow down procurement while pretending leadership.

History:

USAF was to order 110 F-35s per year when full-rate kicked in. As a result of the 2004 SWAT, this went to 80 per year for full-rate in 2006 and extending out the years. In 2008, USAF plans and programs declared they couldn't see a way to pay for more than 48 each year.


The take-away from this article is the following:

“That call is well into the future,” Schwartz said.

Of course. He will be retired by then. Let us not make any strong leadership decisions at the service level. Just continue to rake in that 4-star pay and benefits.

"With rank comes responsibility" is only uttered as a platitude in USAF HQ. It should read, "With rank comes responsibility to protect my job and any post-retirement employment opportunities."

USAF's air power leadership deficit

I love the USAF.

However, its senior leadership is way off the reservation on the definition of air power.

Despite production delays for the F-35, Air Force Secretary Michael Donley insisted the government remained fully committed to the program and to purchasing a total of 2,443 of the aircraft as planned.

'This is a must-do for our armed forces. It's the future of the fighter force, not only for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, but also about 12 other international partners as well,' he said.

We may be in trouble for the long term if this is not turned around.

USAFs tail-spin

Bankrupt thinking from the United States Air Force seems to be here to stay.

The USAF is getting rid of 5 A-10 squadrons in favor of the F-35. This shows poor air power thinking. The USAF has been woefully short of real air power leaders for some years now. This also highlights how a service that consumes up to $160B per year has trouble making ends meet. Scary.

The general quoted in the article somehow thinks that the F-35 will be combat capable in a multi-role environment but has no proof to back up that idea. The F-35 program is in deep trouble.

This quote from a recent government report makes things very clear:

"Operational Assessment

The JSF Operational Test Team completed an operational assessment of the F-35 program and determined that it is not on track to meet operational effectiveness or operational suitability requirements. The JSF Operational Test Team assessed the program based on measured and predicted performance against requirements from the JSF Operational Requirements Document, which was re-validated in 2009."

Even in the unlikely event that the F-35 ever gets fielded, it only carries 150 rounds of gun ammo. Experience has shown that ground troops still need strafing.

Someone got a bee in their bonnet about multi-mission aircraft having the only true value. OK, well, you have to actually field something that works to replace existing capability. What the USAF is doing is hoping that the F-35 works out with no proof to back up their pet theory. That makes their version of air power thinking just as dangerous to the defense of the United States as any enemy.

Current USAF leadership are ruining the combat capability of the service. It is time for our Congress to realize this and stop it.

USAF announces Luke AFB as preferred alternative for F-35 operational training

USAF has named Luke Air Force Base, Arizona as the preferred alternative for USAF F-35 operational training. This could involve up to 6 F-35 squadrons and up to 144 aircraft.

Assuming everything works out for Luke, after USAF pilots get their initial training at Eglin AFB, Florida, they would go on to Luke AFB to get their operational training. From there they would go on to a front-line F-35 squadron.

Currently, the pilot pipeline for the F-35 is suffering delays due to safety issues with current production aircraft for use as initial pilot trainers at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. This means the initial pilot training effort at Eglin is grounded until further notice.

Of interest, Arizona Senator McCain would naturally be interested in this Luke AFB announcement. McCain is also the lead Republican chair on the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC).

A look at USAFs tac-air road map

Assuming we can keep F-22 pilots breathing, the program Block definition looks "OK" if in my opinion slow and delayed due to money being misdirected to other projects.

From this article, a snap-shot of the USAF fighter road map. Also a shame they could not even afford the hybrid center-line drop-tank IRST for USAF F-15Cs that the U.S. Navy is getting for their Hornets. All that money spent on the USAF; and when they can't even push out putting an originally planned item and then plan-B a SNIPER pod, well, that is penny pinching.

Also being considered are long-term upgrades for the newest fighter, the F-22. Near-term upgrades to be fielded in the next five years are already under way, but the service soon expects to define the content of the next package—Increment 3.2C. Potential elements include multi-spectral capabilities to expand the offensive and defensive frequency potential of the fighter, required upgrades such as Mode 5 integration friend or foe, or automatic ground collision and terrain avoidance. Officials are examining how best to share F-22 data, collected by an unprecedented onboard sensor suite, with legacy fighters. Eventually a data-sharing network with F-35s is planned, but delays in the latter’s development have made passing F-22 data to fourth-generation fighters a higher priority.

The first major F-22 enhancement—Increment 3.1—is now entering service, with an initial pair of upgraded stealth fighters recently delivered to Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska. Fleet retrofits will continue through 2016 and include the hardware and software modifications needed to drop eight Small-Diameter Bombs, take synthetic aperture radar (SAR) pictures and provide precision location and electronic attack capabilities.

Full operational test and evaluation is still being completed, but Maj. Richard Foster, Air Combat Command requirements officer, says the results are positive. SAR accuracy is 55% better than specified and geolocation accuracy is 15% better. Also, electronic attacks have proven 100% successful in testing.

The F-22 also will get a rudimentary AIM-120D firing capability next year (through the so-called Update 4), although full integration is not planned until Increment 3.2B in 2017. An initial capability to fire the Raytheon AIM-9X dogfight missile also has been accelerated to 2015 (under Update 5), with full integration also to come with Increment 3.2B.

Next on the upgrade path is Increment 3.2A, a software enhancement that includes expanded Link 16 data-link functionality, combat identification and electronic protection. It should emerge around 2014.

Besides the full integration of the latest air-to-air missiles, Increment 3.2B also expands geolocation by 88% beyond what is now being introduced.

In addition, around 2016 USAF expects to have moved to two F-22 configurations, the Block 20 aircraft to be used for training and development and Block 30/35s for the operational fleet. Foster says 36 aircraft will be in the Block 20 standard with 149 to settle on the Block 30/35 configuration.

So probably at anyone time once the F-22 fleet gets stable, 149 F-22s. Given all of the mismanagement in the area of air power "leadership" since the end of the Cold War, I guess we are "lucky".