The audits (here and here) of the RAAF fast jet running debacle are weak, shallow, and ignore some significant issues.
Noteworthy too is that the original purpose of the Super Hornet decision was to cover for F-35 delays. Nelson (who was PowerPointed into the con) stated as much. More on that here (including the weak justification for getting rid of the F-111).
The normalization of deviance approach to this issue is not useful.
More on the dangers of a normalization of deviance approach to risks--enhanced by group-think--can be seen here.
Following the F-35 path will cost Australia loss of regional air supremacy. What is interesting in the above mentioned audit is the meme of that will not die; the F-35 as a "fifth-generation fighter".
The audit goes into describing the specs of the F-35 and the Super Hornet but (and this is where the shallowness comes in full-bore) portrays no grasp of why the technical details are important beyond a few simplistic claims.
Here are a few things to consider; what the audit didn't tell the public:
History they don’t want you to know
Boeing official-Super Hornet-handles air-to-air with technology, not speed and acceleration
The Super Hornet Stores Story
More on the dud-jamming gear Defence wants to buy
The audit also labels the Super Hornet as "low observable" when such a claim shows a real weakness of understanding balanced defensive measures taken in the design of the aircraft. Those are some low-observable methods to lower signature but just as important: to establish a better known baseline of exposure risks of the aircraft to different threats so that the on-board defensive jamming system is much more efficient. Great, if one does not want to carry any significant weapons capability. Unlike real stealth aircraft, the Super Hornet carries its weapons (not counting the gun) externally. Not very "low observable".
In short, the audit doesn't do much to help the Australian public who are being taken for a ride of billions in wasteful spending for faulty aircraft that will not be competitive against growing Pacific Rim threats.
Showing posts with label audit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label audit. Show all posts
Thursday, October 4, 2012
Monday, May 28, 2012
M113 low availability due to poor project management and leadership
I really, really do not like having to write stuff like what I will point to below.
I wish it was as easy as the wonderful Orion crew the other day. Make a few comments about something good in a Defence press release and reinforce to the average civilian all the really great things happening in the ADF. BTW, there are a lot of good things happening in the ADF, just that what I am going to illustrate next is to put it mildly; exasperating.
In what one experienced observer of DMO/Defence efforts mentioned to me as, "how not to run a project", we have this new release of an audit (PDF at the jump) on the M113 armoured personnel carrier.
As some of you know, you can do a lot of neat things with M113s and still provide a useful weapons system to the troops. The Army is very lucky in having their very skilled and able personnel and also the Bushmaster which has allowed many a soldier to return home alive.
A modified M113 adds to this powerful ability by given the troops an additional tool in the bag for off-road operations.
The quotes from the audit are just sad. We spend gig-dollars on gold-plated stuff every year and can't even keep M113s going. This is one thing where the Australian spirit (yes, I know I am still the new guy), should be able to come up with solid-home-grown solutions; pat themselves on the back for a job well-done, and move on to the next challenge.
I cringe at the problems of the Navy, hit myself in the head with a hammer over RAAF problems, but there just is no reasonable excuse for getting basic bread and butter things wrong for the Army who have bullets whizzing by their heads, risk IEDs or worse and if they aren't killed, risk severe injury that will be with them all the rest of their days.
The audit states that availability for M113s at the armour school has gone into the ditch. A high percentage of vehicles are not available due to lack of spares, lack of oversight of vendor performance and thus poor project managment. Considering the way senior Defence throws billions in impulsive purchases because the Project of Concern list is hanging around their neck and they feel money must be spent...on something, there is NO credible excuse for APCs to be short of quality spares.
Take your time. Read the report. And, weigh in. Army officials have put their response at the end of the audit. I would think that if they were better at having their people running inspections, fixes would have already been long in-place on APC spares availability and in-turn because they are flag-ranks, telling the DMO what they can do with their balls-up style of project management.
I could bring up what I think about the DMO, senior Defence leadership and so on. But you know that drill already.
Imagine what the Army could do with $1.4B wasted on the C-27, or up to $1.7B of potential waste for obsolete Super Hornet jamming kit. How much would $214M have helped the M113 issue instead of being wasted on a rent-seeking submarine study?
Things mentioned in the M113 audit are a cancer that we must stop as a core interest in paying attention to the basics. If not, there will be no such thing as national security.
--
Click on the following images to make them larger.
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H/T- Richard
I wish it was as easy as the wonderful Orion crew the other day. Make a few comments about something good in a Defence press release and reinforce to the average civilian all the really great things happening in the ADF. BTW, there are a lot of good things happening in the ADF, just that what I am going to illustrate next is to put it mildly; exasperating.
In what one experienced observer of DMO/Defence efforts mentioned to me as, "how not to run a project", we have this new release of an audit (PDF at the jump) on the M113 armoured personnel carrier.
As some of you know, you can do a lot of neat things with M113s and still provide a useful weapons system to the troops. The Army is very lucky in having their very skilled and able personnel and also the Bushmaster which has allowed many a soldier to return home alive.
A modified M113 adds to this powerful ability by given the troops an additional tool in the bag for off-road operations.
The quotes from the audit are just sad. We spend gig-dollars on gold-plated stuff every year and can't even keep M113s going. This is one thing where the Australian spirit (yes, I know I am still the new guy), should be able to come up with solid-home-grown solutions; pat themselves on the back for a job well-done, and move on to the next challenge.
I cringe at the problems of the Navy, hit myself in the head with a hammer over RAAF problems, but there just is no reasonable excuse for getting basic bread and butter things wrong for the Army who have bullets whizzing by their heads, risk IEDs or worse and if they aren't killed, risk severe injury that will be with them all the rest of their days.
The audit states that availability for M113s at the armour school has gone into the ditch. A high percentage of vehicles are not available due to lack of spares, lack of oversight of vendor performance and thus poor project managment. Considering the way senior Defence throws billions in impulsive purchases because the Project of Concern list is hanging around their neck and they feel money must be spent...on something, there is NO credible excuse for APCs to be short of quality spares.
The data indicate that, over the three years to December 2010, the proportion of vehicles at the School of Armour classified as Fully Functional decreased from an average of 62 per cent in 2008 to 38 per cent in 2010, as shown in Figure 5.1. This decline in Fully Functional vehicles was accompanied by an increase in Restricted Use vehicles awaiting repairs that required spare parts.
Defence was unable to provide trend data for the period after December 2010, however, informed ANAO as at March 2012 that the percentage of ‘Fully Functional’ vehicles for the upgraded M113 fleet was 39 per cent, ‘Restricted Use’ was 37 per cent, and Not to be Driven (XX) was 24 per cent. Defence identified that this was above the minimum requirement that 75 per cent of the fleet be classed as at least ‘Restricted Use’.
Take your time. Read the report. And, weigh in. Army officials have put their response at the end of the audit. I would think that if they were better at having their people running inspections, fixes would have already been long in-place on APC spares availability and in-turn because they are flag-ranks, telling the DMO what they can do with their balls-up style of project management.
I could bring up what I think about the DMO, senior Defence leadership and so on. But you know that drill already.
Imagine what the Army could do with $1.4B wasted on the C-27, or up to $1.7B of potential waste for obsolete Super Hornet jamming kit. How much would $214M have helped the M113 issue instead of being wasted on a rent-seeking submarine study?
Things mentioned in the M113 audit are a cancer that we must stop as a core interest in paying attention to the basics. If not, there will be no such thing as national security.
--
Click on the following images to make them larger.
---
H/T- Richard
Friday, March 16, 2012
Canadian AG report states DND misled Parliament over the F-35
The Canadian government voyage of discovery with the F-35 program is getting more dramatic.
Next month, their Auditor-General’s office will report that the DND misled Parliament over the F-35.
Lockheed Martin talking points and gross over optimism are not suitable analysis products.
Also of interest, the government has repeatedly stated that the acquisition ceiling for a CF-18 replacement is 9-billion dollars.
Poor procurement research an analysis is nothing new for the DND. They have dropped the ball with the submarine debacle and the Chinook purchase. The C-130 purchase was not pretty either.
Parliament--who should have been more on the ball--now have a solid trend of DNDs lack of ability to research and produce procurement plans for weapons systems.
What is Parliament going to do to correct these negative trends by the DND?
Next month, their Auditor-General’s office will report that the DND misled Parliament over the F-35.
Lockheed Martin talking points and gross over optimism are not suitable analysis products.
Also of interest, the government has repeatedly stated that the acquisition ceiling for a CF-18 replacement is 9-billion dollars.
Poor procurement research an analysis is nothing new for the DND. They have dropped the ball with the submarine debacle and the Chinook purchase. The C-130 purchase was not pretty either.
Parliament--who should have been more on the ball--now have a solid trend of DNDs lack of ability to research and produce procurement plans for weapons systems.
What is Parliament going to do to correct these negative trends by the DND?
Still no time left for Canada
DND costing figures on the F-35 are wrong
Exploring another option for Canada's CF-18 replacement
A CF-18 replacement scenario for Canada
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