More on the big display for the Super

Maybe Mr. Thomson's 60 Super Hornets can have this display.

Marketing and such.

60 more Super Hornets for Australia?

Mr. Thomson of ASPI isn't stupid. He is just a bit misinformed on various things that have to do with tribal knowledge of military issues.

With that, he does have his sources. Even if he comes up with some really odd conclusions. There are things that he has to be informed on; or that someone "in the know" told him.

Take for example his opinion piece the other day, and this:

"Second, some of the remaining big-ticket items from the 2009 White Paper need to be discarded in favour of more modest alternatives. Think along the lines of an air force built around 60 F/A 18 Super Hornets rather than 100 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters..."

One does not need a tin-foil-hat to consider that it is possible that the number of 60 was not pulled out of thin air or part of Thomson's imagination.

I believe it is possible that you are looking at a fall-back plan by Defence when faced with limited future budgets, an unworkable F-35 program and the really bad idea of pushing old classic Hornets through the refurb mill (again) to make them last out to the 2020's. Whatever happens, Australia's most expensive flying club, must go on.

Status-quo is something hard to deal with. How would 60 fall into the current legacy Hornet RAAF squadron structure when 71-72 are needed?

It is still workable with some adjustment.

The F-35 may show up someday. However, it is unaffordable and ineffective for any non-anti-access scenario done better by the Super Hornet. Both are unsurvivable for emerging Pacific threats.

Ponder the finer details of squadron conversion amongst yourselves.

The ADF that is not

Some reads here and here from "The Strategist" (ASPI blog) in reference to an opinion piece by Mark Thompson.

Thompson may argue that:

"Even taking current shortcomings into account, Australia’s defence force is better equipped and prepared for action than at any time since the end of the Vietnam conflict."

But what is missing, the major issue, is proper adult supervision at the top of the ADF and Defence bureaucracy. Since a purge of Defence critical thinkers in the 1999-2002-era give or take a few years, we now are in no shortage of groupthink and management speak and style over substance. We may be able to do with a smaller ADF but it is less about the size and money spent and more about waste and gross mismanagement.

1.The Collins sub program is a disaster for billions spent and $700M +/- per year on sustainment.

2. The patrol boat sustainment is also very bad. There are around 5 of the 14 Armidale-class boats available and along with that, a variety of crewing and maintenance issues.

3. Our "new" amphib bought from the U.K. who are having a going out of business sale with military gear, is now in repair for 6 months since June due to a mechanical failure. It was marked good-to-go by our genius people that are supposed to look after these things before purchase. It was a response to the DMO-RAN cabal being unable to sustain previous amphib ships.

4. Our helicopter fleet is an expensive quesiton mark when lower-cost solutions will do. I suppose that as we get gouged more and more for gold-plated helicopter "solutions" the voices of the faithful will increase with their praise of the situation.

5. The air power roadmap is a mess. No one thought we would have to sustain old, classic F-18 Hornets out to the 2020s. But that is what is happening. Defence also wanted to waste money on dud jamming gear for the Super Hornet purchase. The Super Hornets were in response to late F-35s. Note: Defence made up all kinds of other reasons after the fact. The F-35 itself has been in serious trouble for years. After the nation spends somewhere north of $20-plus billion on patch-work, the faulty and tens-of-billions F-35 still will not have been here. I am curious what is a-ok with Defence when the Super Hornet costs around $23k per flying hour and the F-35 somewhere around $35k+ per flying hour? And, neither will be able to stand up to emerging threats.

6. Even though it has some problems, thank goodness for the Army. Which along with portions of the RAAF do provide some value.

7. A moribund Navy, an Army that will see more reformation and a RAAF that has some stuff that works and a bunch of other stuff that does not.

Of interest Thompson says:

"First, the sprawling Defence empire must be reformed root and branch."

Well, as I have mentioned, that is show-stopper; a deal-breaker. Any proposals before fixing that are cart-before-the-horse.

Also:

"Recent experience with the so-called Strategic Reform Program shows that this task cannot be left to the generals and mandarins. Outside intervention and independent oversight will be needed to reshape the enterprise so that it can be trusted with taxpayers’ money."

I will continue to observe for more great ideas out of the supposed people with bigger brains on these things than I.

---

-Defence White Paper Fantasy
-Analysing "The ADF Air Combat Capability- On the Record"
-Find out who is responsible for the Air Warfare Destroyer mess
-Analysis of Defence Materiel Organisation Major Projects Management and What Needs to be Fixed
-New DMO Boss warns the staff that business as usual is over
-Project of Concern list
-How dangerous is the Defence Material Organisation to our Defence Industry?
-Australia's Failing Defence Structure and Management Methodology
-More on the dud-jamming gear Defence wants to buy

ASPI Defence White Paper delirium

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) comments on the new Defence White Paper.

A few points.

The term "fifth-generation fighter" is useless. Using that term shows a real lack of air power knowledge.

The noise about GDP, 1938 and so on is nonsense. What is important is that Defence consumes 7-8 percent of the federal budget and it gets wasted on silly things. $1.4B for the C-27 which is not a Caribou replacement and was also not purchased as a competitive tender. Other than their word, where are the documents? Two-F-35 mistake-jets. The coming $1.7B of waste for obsolete jamming gear for 12 of our Super Hornets.

And that is just recent.

ASPI is just starting to see the light, but they have a very long way to go. Unless someone is willing to address the incredibly bad advice Defence Ministers receive, the force structure problem will always be half-baked.

Another update on the Collins replacement fantasy

The allegedly independent Australian Strategic Policy Institute is in the news again about the countries running sore of a submarine program.

Yes, the situation is not getting any better.

Even some deception by Defence and DMO is mentioned.

Since 2006 and according to Defence records, the number of annual ''ready days'' has been steadily decreasing, from about 240 days per submarine in 2005-06 to barely over 100 days in 2008-09, they say. The government stopped reporting on ready days after 2008-09, on national security grounds.

The usual suspects quote the 2009 White Paper as if it has value. Again I say, it does not.

There is some illumination. Even if it is late to the game.

"Many options, including that of a locally designed submarine, are looking increasingly implausible."

:::shock:::

The rent-seekers that want to destroy a bunch of tax-dollars on home grown subs are still crying.

I say, let them cry. We need submarines, but not at any price and not some fantasy capability.

Does anyone find it interesting that during the last few years Defence does impulse buys of things because the senior DMO/Defence cabal can't spend on the dud project of concern list due to incompetent program management?

We could be well on our way now to starting a replacement submarine with off-the shelf solutions.

Instead, money is wasted on making dud-electronic warfare aircraft out of the Super Hornet situation; an extra Navy ship is bought while being called an amphib, and another C-17 is being purchased.

You may also add the bad idea of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter along with the extra insult of supposedly being contractually committed to buying two "test" aircraft. These aircraft are mistake jets piled on to a gargantuan mistake of an air capability plan.

Add the additional waste of money that is Operation:USELESS DIRT, the Hobart-class Air Warfare Destroyer and Canberra-class amphib projects.

Defence and politicians are not committed to having a real submarine force. They have demonstrated this with their impulse buys and other silliness.

In sum:

ASPI estimates 12 home-built submarines would cost about $36 billion compared with only $9bn for smaller off-the-shelf boats. The ASPI report says there are grave doubts about how long the Collins-class boats will last given their chronic unreliability.

Some of us figured this out already, but nice to see it again.

If it comes down to no submarines or a home-grown jobs program with gold-plated submarines, I prefer no submarines.

Until sane strategic thought appears.

ASPI off the mark again on air power issues

The taxpayer hands over cash via Defence for "studies" from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

On the topic of Australia's air power roadmap, the results from ASPI have been weak, off-the-mark, and not very independent.

A recent article in the Canberra Times shows at least 3 statements from ASPI that show their research skills are off.

"Further deferrals [in the number of planes being ordered by the US military] are a plausible eventuality,'' he said. ''But the future of the US Air Force is the first order concern [for the Americans]. There is no fallback option. What will they [the US] do? Revive the even more expensive F-22?"

Let us look at these three statements:

“There is no fallback option.” This is untrue no matter how many bought and paid for Congressmen, or flag-ranks promoted beyond their ability say it. First; the U.S. can win wars without short take-off and vertical landing ability. Including the fact that U.S. Marine aviation existed before the Harrier. Next, the F-35 is a second-tier fighter aircraft. It needs the F-22 to take on high-end threats that are supposed to exist over the alleged lifetime of the F-35. I have shown more than once that after the U.S. is on-track to spending $60B developing the F-35, what is delivered will have less usefulness to a joint coalition commander than the lowest performing “fast” jet in U.S. full-rate production; the Super Hornet. Also, the F-35 program has not proven that the aircraft can perform to its original specifications. Two of those specifications are that it would be “affordable” and “a model acquisition program”.

Which leads to the another point stated by the ASPI; the fib that the F-22 is somehow more expensive than the F-35. The F-35 has a long way to go before the aircraft can show real capability or wear the badge of being “affordable”. While the F-22 production supply chain is shutting down, the F-22 line has not been torn down all the way, yet. When it was in full swing, the F-22 was putting out an aircraft that was around $141M each and reducing. Any warfighting comparison of the F-22 to the F-35 is weak simply because even if an F-35 is delivered in go-to-war trim, it will have half the capability of the F-22. Simply because the F-22 is survivable against high-end threats. This by itself, disqualifies the F-35 as a "first-day" stealth aircraft unless you are bombing Belgrade in 1999.

“What will the U.S. do?” First, would be to stop procuring and sustaining dud weapons systems like the F-35, the Littoral Combat Ship, the Zumwalt-class “destroyer” which should be broken up now and cut our losses while there is time.

Since the U.S. seems destined to not restart F-22 production, the only way to have any hope of capability against “anti-access” threats is to develop long-range air-to-surface super-sonic cruise missiles. You can drop just about anything from a B-52 and we can keep them in the air for a long, long time. And, since range is needed, there is no justification for retiring long range bombers.

The United States Air Force has options. New-build F-15 strike eagles with modern avionics will be able to back up F-22s. For any other work, they have more range and versatility than the F-35 could ever see. Also, as per the early JSF plan, even though it was stated it could replace the A-10, that is not so. There is no replacement for the A-10.

Unless FA-XX delivers something useful, the carrier air-wing as we know it will be obsolete against anti-access threats. The Brewster Buffalo II and the Super Hornet are not up to the job. However the Super Hornet is up to the job of second-tier threat strike work. So, unless someone has some bright ideas, our tens of billions invested into every carrier battle group will not be able to take on emerging threats without being put at risk. With or without the F-35.

So, the ASPI is way off the mark on their statements.

Again.

At best, their “analysis” of air power issues can be best described as “meme theory”.

Faith is not quality Mr. Davies--ASPI opinon on the F-35 is unsupportable

This wouldn't be so bad if it was just one guy with an opinion.

The problem is that this one guy does taxpayer funded reports that Defence and politicians--in their own ignorance on the topic--seriously consider.

That is a big problem when what Mr. Davies states about air power is mostly wrong.

Over the years in hearings before our elected officials, the media, think-tanks and so on, one will see mention about maintaining air superiority.

The F-35 has not shown any proof that it is capable of doing this. So the question should be; why are we not an intelligent purchaser of military equipment? In other words; we should see a completed go-to-war, fully tested F-35 before we make a buying decison. One of these may not exist for many years.

A total indifference to what is real? It sure seems so. Consider this which is quite different from what ASPI writes about the F-35.

(note some of the following links are PDF files)

Affordability

Background:

Independent analyses on JSF affordability have been done. A summary of earlier analyses (circa 2002-06) may be found here. The attached file (USMC_DoN_2008.pdf) provides a summary of costs for the DoN JSF for the projected FYDP (pre-WEC).

Australia terminated evaluations under the Air6000 New Air Combat Capability Project and entered the JSF SDD Program back in 2002. The Chief of the Air Force advised the unit price for the JSF aircraft was going to be “…about forty million dollars”.

Current Australian Defence and JSF Program Office Plans have initial procurements of Block 3 F-35A JSF aircraft in the 2012-2014 period.

The results of risk based analyses of JSF costing data from the pre-World Economic Crisis (WEC) era have been provided to Defence. These show the JSF unit price would likely be around US$168 million (-10%/+30% variance range) in the 2012-14 timeframe.

Using the same methods of analysis, the price estimated for the F-22A Raptor is around US$136 million.

Recent articles published by the IEEE put the unit price figure for the F-22A Raptor at US$137 million.

In summary, in 2014 on a per unit procurement cost basis, the Block 3 F-35A JSF would likely cost as much, if not more, than the F-22A Raptor would cost.

Opening Questions:

1. In US dollars, what was the pre-WEC estimate of the unit procurement cost (UPC) for the Block 3 Configuration F-35A JSF aircraft planned to be delivered in 2014?
   
2. Does this price estimate include any dollar amounts to cover any developmental or procurement or other risks?
   
3. If so, what are these risks and what amounts of money, in 2014 US dollars, have been allocated (in cost per aircraft terms, please) to cover each of these risks?

Lethality

Background:

Lethality is measure of how much physical damage a combat aircraft can inflict upon the enemy. It can be measured, in the tactical context, by the number and size of munitions carried, and in the strategic context by the same plus the range to which such weapons can be delivered and the resulting effectiveness.

With survivability dictating internal carriage, the JSF is constrained to a pair of weapon bays, each sized around a single MK.84 size bomb, and a single AMRAAM.

Since the start of the SDD, a progressive reduction in the range of weapon types intended to be integrated and cleared has been observed, with only a small fraction of the initially stated weapon types now planned for SDD.

The world has moved on since the JSF was first specified, but somehow those defining capability requirements have failed to keep pace, if not gone backwards due to CAIV.

This is a new world where the aphorism ‘the quick and the dead’ applies.

Opening Questions:

1. Why has the range of weapon types intended under SDD been so dramatically scaled back?
   
2. Is not moving the certification of the remaining weapons out of the SDD Phase and into the Operational Phase what, in keeping with modern day Risk Management Standards such as AS/NZS4360:2004, should be called Extreme Risk?
   
3. The weapon bay configuration of the JSF with its canted carriage (about 5 degrees nose in to the centreline, I believe) and forward centroid location (both mass and aerodynamic) relative to the aircraft’s CoG range, also presents significant risk to the carriage and clearance of weapons from these bays.
   
4. How is LM planning to mitigate all such risks to the clearance of weapons from these bays?
   
5. How does the JSF Program intend to accommodate internal carriage of more than two AAMs, and how many will the aircraft be able to ultimately carry internally and deliver?
   
6. Will each of the JSF weapon bays accommodate the carriage and delivery of 4 x SDB + an AAM and, if so, when will this be certificated?
   
7. What are the in flight opening/closing times for the weapon bay doors?

Survivability

Background:

Survivability is a measure of what fraction of a combat fleet remains alive in a given threat environment, flying repeated sorties over a sustained period of time.

The survivability paradigm for the JSF was defined around the ability to survive in a battlefield interdiction environment where the aircraft would be confronted by medium range and short range SAMs, and AAA systems, assuming that hostile fighters, long range SAMs and supporting radars will have been already destroyed by the F-22 fleet.

The JSF’s stealth performance, reflected in shaping, was optimised around this model, with independent technical analyses showing that the aircraft will have viable stealth in the front sector, but much weaker stealth performance in the beam and aft sectors.

The evolving market for radars and surface to air missiles has, however, taken a different turn to that anticipated when the JSF program was launched.

Highly mobile long range SAMs, supported by high power-aperture radars, have been far more popular in the market than the short and medium range weapons which the JSF was defined to and built to defeat.

Opening Questions:

1. What threat Surface to Air Missile systems and supporting radars was the JSF’s stealth capability modelled against, and which was it not modelled against? For your convenience, a summary of the threat systems may be found here.
   
2. What threat combat aircraft types and supporting systems was JSF’s stealth and aerodynamic capability modelled against, and which was it not modelled against? A range of the threat combat aircraft and supporting system may be found here.
   
3. Why did the JSF Program discard the flat lower centre fuselage design of the X-35, and replace it with the complex curvature design of the SDD F-35, given that even the basic RCS modelling shows this would adversely impact the stealthiness of the aircraft when illuminated from its side aspect?
   
4. Why does the JSF Program believe that opposing threat systems will not use all of their capabilities to survive when confronted by the JSF in combat?
   
5. Where is the JSF escape system (pilot ejection system) in its certification program and when do you expect the system to be certificated?
   
6. What will be the envelope of the JSF pilot ejection system?
   
7. What will be the maximum speed at which the JSF canopy will be certificated for bird strikes?

Supportability

Background:

Over the past 30 years, there have been various attempts to reduce the life cycle costs of operating military aircraft. Options strongly supported by Industry have encouraged the transfer of risk and responsibilities to Industry. Such options have included Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) contracting models, Public Private Partnership (PPP) contracting models and various other outsourcing contract models.

With noted exceptions, the military customers’ satisfaction with such arrangements and their outcomes has been less than optimal. One recurring series of complaint has been the consequential deskilling of the military while cost overall have not reduced and, from those of the pre-deskilling era, observations and concerns about increasing loss of control of assets leading to truly sovereign risks for the clients – loss of the most basic of sovereign controls of air combat assets – the aircraft’s configuration.

The latest forms of addressing life cycle costs are the performance based agreement (PBA) models and such things as the Autonomic Logistics Model of the JSF Program – elements of both having been proposed to the P-3 Orion Maritime Patrol Aircraft community and, more recently, the C-130J Hercules Strategic Air Lift Aircraft community.

Opening Questions:

1. What is the estimated total cost per flying hour, in USD/FH, for the Block 3 F-35A JSF in 2014 for a per aircraft flying rate of 350 hrs per annum and a fleet size of 100 aircraft performing all training missions and roles that achieves a level of preparedness able to fully utilise the full JSF capabilities, with repeatability?
   
2. What are the JSF capabilities, training sequences and rates of effort (ROEs) used to determine the answer to the preceding question?
   
3. Which organisation or organisations will have the ability and capabilities to control and change the technical configurations of the JSF and its airborne and ground based systems?
   
4. By all accounts, including using some of the tools you and I were trained in at USNTPS, the approach speed of the F-35A is inordinately high – reportedly 180 KCAS. Is this the case?
   
5. If so, what modelling/simulations have been done to determine the levels of risk and hazards such a high approach speed presents to the operations and support of the F-35A JSF?
   
6. What is the means of controlling the temperatures of the ElectroHydroStatic Actuators (EHSA) used to drive the F-35 JSF control surfaces and are these actuators rated for a continuous duty cycle at a loading above 100% of the JSF operational loading? If not, what is their duty cycle rating?

Finally and more generally, the results of analyses undertaken by a number of domain experts around the world do not support the notion that the JSF will not be able to meet its original specification. What they do indicate is, due to the effects of management decisions under paradigms like Cost as An Independent Variable (CAIV); the transfer of risks from the SDD Phase to the Operational Phase; and, the extensive deskilling that has occurred in Departments and Ministries of Defence around the Western World, due to the end of the Cold War ‘peace dividend’, this specification will most likely not be met till around Block 6/7, circa 2020 or later.

However, where these independent analyses converge is full agreement that the original JSF JORD specification and the specification to which the aircraft has been designed and is being built are based on threat assessments from an era past. This combined with the constraining nature of the original air vehicle specification and the on going effects of expeditious management decisions made under CAIV, mean the overall capabilities of the JSF will have been surpassed by the middle of the next decade, if not earlier.

In summary, all the indicators point to a penultimate question -

Will the F-35 JSF be obsolete before its time?

If not, then why not, given where the JSF Program is in its schedule and overall life cycle compared with where the developing threats are in theirs?

That being said, there is much reason for a robust and strong debate. We look forward to your answers, along with the supporting data, information and knowledge, at your earliest, in the spirit of working with you to get the best we can for those who fly as our aim, and confidently demonstrating this thesis (or its antithesis) with hard data and facts as the paramount measures of effectiveness of a strong debate.

Faith will not give Australia a proper air power solution. It would be nice if ASPI would consider that when they produce advice with the big label "Analysis" on the first page.