iPolitics wanders-Group-think-think-tank

Unfortunately, good intentions and fancy titles are no replacement for actual knowledge about Just So Failed F-35.

Funny how editors without a clue, let uninformed nonsense pose as useful information.

Other than PowerPoint, the author has nothing to base their theory on.

The ADF that is not

Some reads here and here from "The Strategist" (ASPI blog) in reference to an opinion piece by Mark Thompson.

Thompson may argue that:

"Even taking current shortcomings into account, Australia’s defence force is better equipped and prepared for action than at any time since the end of the Vietnam conflict."

But what is missing, the major issue, is proper adult supervision at the top of the ADF and Defence bureaucracy. Since a purge of Defence critical thinkers in the 1999-2002-era give or take a few years, we now are in no shortage of groupthink and management speak and style over substance. We may be able to do with a smaller ADF but it is less about the size and money spent and more about waste and gross mismanagement.

1.The Collins sub program is a disaster for billions spent and $700M +/- per year on sustainment.

2. The patrol boat sustainment is also very bad. There are around 5 of the 14 Armidale-class boats available and along with that, a variety of crewing and maintenance issues.

3. Our "new" amphib bought from the U.K. who are having a going out of business sale with military gear, is now in repair for 6 months since June due to a mechanical failure. It was marked good-to-go by our genius people that are supposed to look after these things before purchase. It was a response to the DMO-RAN cabal being unable to sustain previous amphib ships.

4. Our helicopter fleet is an expensive quesiton mark when lower-cost solutions will do. I suppose that as we get gouged more and more for gold-plated helicopter "solutions" the voices of the faithful will increase with their praise of the situation.

5. The air power roadmap is a mess. No one thought we would have to sustain old, classic F-18 Hornets out to the 2020s. But that is what is happening. Defence also wanted to waste money on dud jamming gear for the Super Hornet purchase. The Super Hornets were in response to late F-35s. Note: Defence made up all kinds of other reasons after the fact. The F-35 itself has been in serious trouble for years. After the nation spends somewhere north of $20-plus billion on patch-work, the faulty and tens-of-billions F-35 still will not have been here. I am curious what is a-ok with Defence when the Super Hornet costs around $23k per flying hour and the F-35 somewhere around $35k+ per flying hour? And, neither will be able to stand up to emerging threats.

6. Even though it has some problems, thank goodness for the Army. Which along with portions of the RAAF do provide some value.

7. A moribund Navy, an Army that will see more reformation and a RAAF that has some stuff that works and a bunch of other stuff that does not.

Of interest Thompson says:

"First, the sprawling Defence empire must be reformed root and branch."

Well, as I have mentioned, that is show-stopper; a deal-breaker. Any proposals before fixing that are cart-before-the-horse.

Also:

"Recent experience with the so-called Strategic Reform Program shows that this task cannot be left to the generals and mandarins. Outside intervention and independent oversight will be needed to reshape the enterprise so that it can be trusted with taxpayers’ money."

I will continue to observe for more great ideas out of the supposed people with bigger brains on these things than I.

---

-Defence White Paper Fantasy
-Analysing "The ADF Air Combat Capability- On the Record"
-Find out who is responsible for the Air Warfare Destroyer mess
-Analysis of Defence Materiel Organisation Major Projects Management and What Needs to be Fixed
-New DMO Boss warns the staff that business as usual is over
-Project of Concern list
-How dangerous is the Defence Material Organisation to our Defence Industry?
-Australia's Failing Defence Structure and Management Methodology
-More on the dud-jamming gear Defence wants to buy

Think-tank off the mark

A U.S. think-tank has some words to say about the DOD.

There is some pretty accurate stuff (many DOD processes just do not work), and some bad assumptions. The bad assumptions case in point is the F-35.

While external fuel tanks can extend the F-35C’s range, such tanks compromise its stealth and thereby sacrifice an essential attribute. By buying fewer F-35s more quickly, the Navy will revitalize its strike fleet sooner.”

Shrinking the F-35 procurement would free up more money to invest in what might be the Navy’s future - the X-47 unmanned combat drone being developed by Northrop Grumman Corp., the report says.

There is no proof that external fuel tanks will be cleared for the F-35. Money for this development effort was pulled in 2006 because it was too complex and troublesome. The original bad assumption was that it would use legacy F-18 tanks. Once development started, studies and wind-tunnel tests showed this to be high-risk indicating external stores bouncing into each other and the airframe. 3 different elongated tear-drop designs were looked at as a substitute for the legacy F-18 tanks, but they caused different weapons clearance and stores centre-of-gravity issues.

Then there is the issue of aircraft carrier operations. How does the F-35C behave in ship recovery with an asymmetric stores configuration where one tank punched off and the other didn't? How does it act on approach and recovery with both tanks? So at this time, external fuel tanks on the F-35 are far from being a slam-dunk. Interesting is that after the external tank issue was removed from play, PowerPoint sales pukes started hawking how great it was that this aircraft doesn't need external tanks.

Stating that the F-35 needs to be cut down to a magic number of 1000 assumes that the aircraft even works as a useful weapon of war. The jury is out on that one. It is doubtful that the F-35 will be survivable in anti-access scenarios. It is doubtful that it will be affordable (a major goal of the program).

So; why waste limited dollars on building the Littoral Combat Ship of the skies?

The X-47 has to pass OPEVAL in some credible fashion. It is a very bad idea to bank on this as a stalwart capability until there is more solid proof in hand.

The think-tank in question needs to do their homework before making statements on air power issues. They are obviously lacking in this area of understanding.