There is some pretty accurate stuff (many DOD processes just do not work), and some bad assumptions. The bad assumptions case in point is the F-35.
While external fuel tanks can extend the F-35C’s range, such tanks compromise its stealth and thereby sacrifice an essential attribute. By buying fewer F-35s more quickly, the Navy will revitalize its strike fleet sooner.”
Shrinking the F-35 procurement would free up more money to invest in what might be the Navy’s future - the X-47 unmanned combat drone being developed by Northrop Grumman Corp., the report says.
There is no proof that external fuel tanks will be cleared for the F-35. Money for this development effort was pulled in 2006 because it was too complex and troublesome. The original bad assumption was that it would use legacy F-18 tanks. Once development started, studies and wind-tunnel tests showed this to be high-risk indicating external stores bouncing into each other and the airframe. 3 different elongated tear-drop designs were looked at as a substitute for the legacy F-18 tanks, but they caused different weapons clearance and stores centre-of-gravity issues.
Then there is the issue of aircraft carrier operations. How does the F-35C behave in ship recovery with an asymmetric stores configuration where one tank punched off and the other didn't? How does it act on approach and recovery with both tanks? So at this time, external fuel tanks on the F-35 are far from being a slam-dunk. Interesting is that after the external tank issue was removed from play, PowerPoint sales pukes started hawking how great it was that this aircraft doesn't need external tanks.
Stating that the F-35 needs to be cut down to a magic number of 1000 assumes that the aircraft even works as a useful weapon of war. The jury is out on that one. It is doubtful that the F-35 will be survivable in anti-access scenarios. It is doubtful that it will be affordable (a major goal of the program).
So; why waste limited dollars on building the Littoral Combat Ship of the skies?
The X-47 has to pass OPEVAL in some credible fashion. It is a very bad idea to bank on this as a stalwart capability until there is more solid proof in hand.
The think-tank in question needs to do their homework before making statements on air power issues. They are obviously lacking in this area of understanding.
2 comments:
Indeed a recurring fatal flaw in US's acquisition process:
Take from Procurement budgets, to add to a sexier but high-risk and complex development program in the works.
Stop F-15 and F-16 procurement to develop the ATF/F-22. Retire F-117 to pay for more F-22 procurement. Yet instead, stop F-22 procurement to pay for F-35 development and LRIP. Then cut F-35 Procurement requirements to an arbitrary number (deciding even before F-35 is 3-4 years from completing SDD) in order to fund UCAV development... and so on.
And how exactly does the USN buy "More quickly early on, fewer F-35C?" than the original and current plans?
I guess they're proposing to Congress to give a lopsided lump-sum combat aviation Procurement budget for early-on FRP? eg, FY18-FY24? With the new expectation that the F-35C line will close down prematurely as fewer jets in total will be requested? I don't know, it just sounds fishy, and one can almost hear Congress in FY19 saying "wow, look at that juicy Procurement budget over the next 5 years... let's skim off that and put it into developing something even cooler".
It's just both a broken acquisition process and strategic planning process all around.
The job will go much faster and more smoothly if you can get someone to help you. Try to find someone who has done this before.
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