I applaud some in Canada who, more and more, are discussing alternatives to the failed project known as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. With that, the discussion seems to be in error when specifics of aircraft performance are mentioned; for instance, suggesting that drones can do air policing duty.
When looking at a plan-B to the F-35 one has to first identify all the problems before suggesting a solution. Paramount in the discovery process is noting that DND leadership either has no available skill-sets in the profession of air power or, senior leadership is ignoring the in-house experts (if there are any). This is the very first thing that has to be sorted out.
Next everyone has to come to grips with the fact that there isn’t a lot of money to spend on a replacement for the CF-18. Note that when the CF-18 was being considered years ago, aircraft like the F-14 and F-15 were ruled out because they were too expensive. Today is no different. Canada is a price-only buyer.
Another error I have seen mentioned recently are those crowing that the CF-18s had a recent refurb and are good out to 2020. This is a grave error. If the Canadian government does not start a solid replacement action for the CF-18s by 2013, there will be significant operational problems retiring these old jets by 2020. While the jets may have had some refurbishment, it is not a zeroing out of their airframe life hours. Time is short.
There is talk of the Super Hornet. No matter what; this will always be a second-tier fighter solution that will be unable to take on serious anti-access threats in the coming years. Yet, in every area of practical proven performance, it will beat the F-35 (even if the Just so Failed gets fixed). And, the F-35 will never be able to take on serious anti-access threats by the very nature of the requirement that was its blueprint.
I have thrown around very rough calculations (nothing serious) and figure that in order for Canada to go with the Super Hornet option, it would look something like this:
12x F-18F two-seaters
60x F-18E single-seaters
20 years operations and sustainment costs (300 hours per year per airframe)
Upgrade of facilities at 3 major bases and up to 8 deployable locations with in Canada
Weapons and spares
For around $13 billion dollars; not counting industrial off-sets.
I will defer to someone that has hard access to figures.
And while one can point fingers at this idea and state it makes no sense. It makes significantly more sense than committing to a disaster of project management (the F-35) based entirely on Lockheed Martin talking points.
5 comments:
But your suggested Total Program cost for 72 Supers, possibly even including upgrades one could assume (similar to the F-35's proposed cost estimate), would come in at about only 1/2 the cost for the estimated 20 yr bill cost for 65 F-35s!?
Are you sure about that?
Maybe it's worth a serious high-level Canadian evaluation at this point, I give up.
Either that, or possibly Lease RCAF Supers for 10 years (USN taking them over to replace earlier block I Supers) and jointly-develop (with a third-party) a truly next-gen indigenous Royal Canadian multi-role/Interceptor?
Best choice for RCAF? Sukhoi T-50. LOL.
Range, range, range. If you can't get where you need to be it's pointless.
An F-35C will have only half the range I'd say the RCAF will need up north in the 2020+ timeframe.
A SHornet would have to certify the large 600 gal tanks, and even then it would fall considerably short.
The only U.S. fastmover in production with an interesting range is the F-15.
And in the improbable case RCAF looks towards Europe, a drop-tanked Rafale goes pretty far; and it's carrier capable.
Re UAV: They should have a good look at the MQ-4C.
Re bases: I think the FOLs should be upgraded to full bases, and the fastmover units be prepared to move north.
Unless common sence & logic prevails within Western Air Power planning, & sooner rather than later, we will need to be prepared to be humble in the face of our likley adversaries should a shooting war start.
Canada's Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) released a report in March 2011 on the Fiscal impact of the F35 acquisition.
http://www.parl.gc.ca/PBO-DPB/documents/F-35_Cost_Estimate_EN.pdf
The report was supported by a peer review of three independents:
Andrew Davies, Ph.D.
Program Director; Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Douglas Bland, Ph.D.
Professor and Chair of Defence Management Studies, Queen’s University, Kingston CANADA
David A. Arthur, Ph.D.
Principal Analyst, National Security Division, United States Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Washington DC USA
The report shows a wide gap between the DND's numbers and the PBO's estimate. The major difference showing $17.6B over 20 years for the DND estimate and $29.3B over 30 years for the PBO. The initial acquisition price differential being $6B vs $9.7B or translated to $92M vs $150M per plane for a 65 plane order.
One has to severely question the legitimacy of the DND numbers given all the information sources available over the last year. Canada can not acquire the F35 for less than the US DOD as US law requires export sales can not be less than domestic.
In addition to this Fighter purchase scenario, consider that the government has recently committed to a $35B Naval shipbuilding program (21 combat ships + 8 arctic patrol), and a $3.1B upgrade of the Halifax frigates. Over the last 5 years, it has spent $Billions on naval helicopters (CH-148), C-130J's, C-17's, CH47's, Leopard tanks, and others. Much of which was necessary to re-capitalize the Canadian military.
While the requirement to replace the legacy F-18 is necessary, and time is running out quickly, one has to question, "What is the role of the RCAF?" The RCAF has not participated in a 1st strike scenario for many decades. It generally has a supportive role in NATO operations, humanitarian roles, or has North American air defense responsibilities.
The delayed (flawed) F35 program, along with the global economy presents an opportunity for many to re-think the hype of the F35 and to return to more practical assessments of air power needs. Sinking the nation's limited "gold" into a flawed program, surely does not seem to be the route to follow.
The acquisition of 72 Super Hornets would recapitalize the RCAF air fleet for a min of 20 years. It is not a perfect aircraft, but the latest potential version based on the International roadmap make it a very capable aircraft, with a known, and low operating cost per plane relatively speaking. A factor that a small, lean RCAF must take into account.
The International Roadmap Super Hornet potentially has the following advanced features:
1) CFTs - up to 3,000 lbs of fuel in conformal fuel tanks increasing the internal capacity with no drag penalty.
2) Next Gen Cockpit - Situational awareness, large area display
3) Enclosed weapons pod - reduced RCS and better drag perfromance
4) Internal IRST/Missile warning system/sensors
5) GE414 EPE engine - 20% increase in thrust with no fuel consumption penalty. Transonic acceleration improvements up to 3X depending on configuration.
Existing Block ii features on current USN production.
1) APG-79 AESA radars with potential Growler configurations.
2) Fibre optic communications
3) One of the lowest RCS aircraft for non 5th gen aircraft.
This aircraft should be a serious consideration by the CDN Government rather than the constant soap box we are getting about the F35. Frankly it's embarrassing to see Canadian politicians talking like a "drawstring" doll, when US politicians like McCain and others are way ahead of them and more informed. A "we're monitoring the F35 progress and assessing our needs", would be a more intelligent and respectful response by our politicians instead of trying to tell us something that we all know is incorrect.
Even more important, we should get some clarity about what the RCAF mission actually is rather than the hype of the technological wonders of the F35, many of which exist on powerpoint documents and not reality. Canada has had only two primary roles in the air since WW2.
1) Sovereign air defense - Something that does not require significant stealth, but more importantly requires long range, larger weapons payloads and mechanical survivability (i.e. 2 engines)
2) 2nd tier air support - Once US or other coalition planes have cleared out the air defenses, the RCAF has then flown air combat or CAS missions to assist in the operational tempo.
I don't see either of these scenarios changing in the future. I personally would like so see a more serious look at the latest F15 variants, particularly the SE version if it comes into play due to a South Korea commitment. I suspect however, even the F15 is beyond our budgetary means.
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