Saturday, August 25, 2012

Amos happy to make it up as he goes along

Amos, the CEO of the United States Marketing Corps F-35 cheerleaders, says no to the ECM support mission for the F-35B.

This was hyped forever by various F-35 faith-based communities. Even if the aircraft's faulty design has paper-thin to no usable weight margins.

Pipe-dream.

Amos fibs:

Amos said the AN/APG-81 Active Electronically Scanned Array radar installed on the F-35 already sets the fifth generation fighter apart as an electronic warfare platform.

“The airplane itself … with the AESA radar and sensors and information sharing capability is a pretty significant EW platform right now,” said Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Amos at a roundtable meeting with reporters in the Pentagon Aug. 23.

Good luck with that. Besides the fact that his F-35 as a "fifth-generation" meme still will not die, a forward arc-only, limited to in-band (X-band), limited power vs. thermal issues and limited over-all sustained power output AESA radar, Amos is out of his depth on this one.

For example, the Block II Super Hornets delivered to Australia show this as one thing hyped on the sales room floor that was only hope: that an on-board AESA fighter-radar could do realistic jamming (let alone the fantasy of being labeled credible electronic defense gear). AND, at least the Super Block II has a balanced and fused defensive suite; defensive jammer, towed decoy, etc. The F-35? When naked, it has some expendable decoys and (if the software works) enough situational awareness to see what will kill it.

Amos adds another fib at the end of this description of obsolete capability:

The Growler carries up to five ALQ-99 jamming pods as well as AIM-120 AMRAAM or AGM-88 HARM missiles to attack air defenses.

Of course, these ALQ-99s are three decades old and the Navy continues to build its Next Generation Jammer that will fool enemy radars with false returns. Amos said he didn’t see any reason the F-35 couldn’t carry these pods too.

Again, current Growler gear is obsolete against emerging threats, so it is interesting that one would bother putting on such gear to, again, the F-35 which has paper-thin to no usable weight margins in the design.

Also, the dumb idea of the F-35 being an EWO platform; limited aircrew. When they went from the EA-6 to Super-G, they went from 4 to 2 aircrew. This was mentioned as a problem in various reports. This causes workload problems. Maybe Amos can explain how one crew-person can manage all that workload, assuming the lash-up even works.

As time marches on, Amos, with his weak air power theory and his deceptive statements to elected officials, does more harm to the reputation of Marine Air than good.

He finishes though with the cost issue in a rare display of common sense. Like a lot of fantasy "notional" Block 4,5 and 6 efforts for the F-35, what is needed now is to stick to the knitting of making a warfighter-capable F-35 Block 3 exist.

This is far from guaranteed.

5 comments:

NICO said...

I never quite got how the -B version was ever considered for EW when it is going to be the most weight constrained version of the 3 available. How exactly was it supposed to take off and land vertically with a bunch of heavy EW pods hanging on its wings?

If Marine Corps wants to replace its old Prowlers, they should only consider Growlers....

Anonymous said...

I'm not sure anyone is claiming that the stock F-35 will be a fully fledged dedicated EW platform. But I'm sure it will be quite capable within certain limitations (some of which you have mentioned). Most fire control radars today and in the forseeable future are X-band and its size and performance characteristics will probably result in a wide proliferation on the future battlefield.

But I think the biggest capability change will be the fact that not just a single escort, but all F-35s in the formation will be EW capable. You can mount coordinated attacks based the combined multispectral SA of the formation, and of course integrated with other platforms.

So naturally much of this will happen in software and I think that's what will distinguish the good from the bad in the future.

Bolsøy/Oslo

Unknown said...

Faith is a wonderful thing.

Anonymous said...

Well Eric, see your point. :-) However, in my experience information is good, even if it's some bad information. Can't say the same about Russians or Chinese information which is virtually non-existant.

Bolsøy/Oslo

Anonymous said...

I have to agree with NICO.

A USMC Growler, or even a Growler-lite configuration would arguably prove to be the more strategically prudent and superior EW platform acquisition at least in the near-term/medium-term, over a hypothetical, hope-based, eventual F-35B block upgrade which could finally perform equal support-missions in the SEAD role.

So, vs the notional, initial block III configuration spoken of here by Gen. Amos, a properly configured USMC Growler/-lite would likely be a far more reliable medium-term solution to fill USMC's next-gen EW platform requirements.

That being said, it could be justified to support accelerated development of the conceived Super Hornet CFT concept being proposed.

A 'poor-mans' interim EW platform as such, could include a configuration of an F-18F II+ (with Type IV computer) + CFT + an evolved 'all-in-one' Elta/Rafael or Thales heavy AEA/Support jamming pod to be integrated on the centerline station. Conceivably add 4x AGM-88E type rounds or equivalent stand-off SEAD munitions under the wing, plus a couple MALD-J potentially mounted on the side-fuselage points and that could be quite a capable and reliable operational medium-term EW/SEAD platform by around 2016-2017.

What it comes down to unfortunately is this: the US Armed Forces need next-gen, modernized replacement capabilities and platforms TODAY! Not in notional and hopeful 2020+ schedules!

The latter risky recapitalization strategy would thus seem to leave gaping capability and deterrence risks, which given the future's increasingly uncertain matrix simply does not seem to be acceptable.

Hence, it's arguably more strategic and prudent to go with a reliable and operational option in the near/medium-term, and then phase-in any proven and potent next-gen F-35 platform capabilities accordingly, if/when they become a strategically prudent option.