There is a lot of talk about Australia getting a free ride by underspending on Defence in relation to the U.S. umbrella of protection.
Let us examine some of this a bit closer.
Currently, the Australian military procurement system is broken. And, not just a little bit. Any increase of Defence spending at this point in time, is just a licence to see more of our tax dollars wasted.
In other words: fix the substance abuser first, before handing them more money.
Also, may we look at some of the other free riders out there? Take the time to look at some of the other U.S. allies.
I am generally a “hawk” on military issues. However, with the current situation, giving the DMO and friends more money to waste means that we will have to spend billions more fixing the procurement of new, yet irrelevant weapons wanted by the corrupt Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy.
Example: field the defective F-35; spend billions more to get something that is actually tactically useful to make up for the colossal mistake.
Ditto: for the troubled RAN. For example: Defence bought a used ship from the U.K. who was having a going-out-of-business sale in relation to their former empire and now the new one: feeding the welfare state. That ship was not properly evaluated; broke recently and went into repair for months.
A sarcastic “thank you” to our imbeciles in senior Defence circles.
And finally for the alleged security wonks out there: knock off the percent-of-GDP-valuation of Defence spending.
It is stupid because it doesn’t address anything of value. What counts is the percentage of Defence spending , in the Federal budget.
Australia not fixing its cancer known as the DMO and friends is like driving a car with a flat tire; buying 3 new tires for the other hubs, and, still driving on the flat tire.
And then calling it progress.
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-Some of what ails Defence-
Showing posts with label waste. Show all posts
Showing posts with label waste. Show all posts
Thursday, November 15, 2012
Sunday, September 23, 2012
Making the USMC worthwhile for a nation over $16T in the red
The U.S. cannot, and should not, fund, parts of the military that provide no value.
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) does have vaule. Just, not the way we are using it or funding it.
Unfortunately, today, the USMC depends much on its image as opposed to its actual vaule to America's warfighting ability.
Does it field nuclear weapons for strategic deterrance? No. Does it have the force to handle large wars? No. Is it useful in the National Guard structure? No.
Is the idea of fielding a large number of assets to refight Tarawa a good idea? No. For one reason being that against a real opponent, there is such a diverse collection of weapons to make plinking landing craft easy. Look again at the failed Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) requirement that got to $25M each. It was imagined that EFV ability would allow its big mother-ships to be farther out to sea when performing against opposed beach-heads. Reason distance from shore was used as a selling point? The diverse range of weapons available for a capable enemy to use.
History has not been kind to this kind of warfare thinking in an era where the military industrial congressional complex struggles to find an enemy worthy of American tax-payer support. A USMC amphibious landing could not be done in Desert Storm because it was too risky. Those forces sat out to sea. For starters, naval mines stopped that idea. Imagine if the enemy had been more capable. Also in Desert Storm we used a USMC land task force...doing the job of a second land army.
Like today, the United States Marketing Corps (Marketing is the mission not Marines) has to be where the main action is to keep funds rolling in, even if there is plenty of work for small-force USMC security actions in today's littorals. For some years now, new Marines have arrived in Afghanistan having never been near a boat.
We no longer have the funds to pay for such waste of resources.
Today, the second-land-army title fits. We do not need to fund a second land army. DOD planners should re-look at the map and recognize that Afghanistan is not a littoral environment. The littoral environment is the ONLY justification for having the USMC.
After Afghanistan, oh what will the United States Marketing Corps do?
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) does have vaule. Just, not the way we are using it or funding it.
Unfortunately, today, the USMC depends much on its image as opposed to its actual vaule to America's warfighting ability.
Does it field nuclear weapons for strategic deterrance? No. Does it have the force to handle large wars? No. Is it useful in the National Guard structure? No.
Is the idea of fielding a large number of assets to refight Tarawa a good idea? No. For one reason being that against a real opponent, there is such a diverse collection of weapons to make plinking landing craft easy. Look again at the failed Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) requirement that got to $25M each. It was imagined that EFV ability would allow its big mother-ships to be farther out to sea when performing against opposed beach-heads. Reason distance from shore was used as a selling point? The diverse range of weapons available for a capable enemy to use.
History has not been kind to this kind of warfare thinking in an era where the military industrial congressional complex struggles to find an enemy worthy of American tax-payer support. A USMC amphibious landing could not be done in Desert Storm because it was too risky. Those forces sat out to sea. For starters, naval mines stopped that idea. Imagine if the enemy had been more capable. Also in Desert Storm we used a USMC land task force...doing the job of a second land army.
Like today, the United States Marketing Corps (Marketing is the mission not Marines) has to be where the main action is to keep funds rolling in, even if there is plenty of work for small-force USMC security actions in today's littorals. For some years now, new Marines have arrived in Afghanistan having never been near a boat.
We no longer have the funds to pay for such waste of resources.
Today, the second-land-army title fits. We do not need to fund a second land army. DOD planners should re-look at the map and recognize that Afghanistan is not a littoral environment. The littoral environment is the ONLY justification for having the USMC.
After Afghanistan, oh what will the United States Marketing Corps do?
Friday, July 13, 2012
Update on wasteful C-130 resourcing by Defence
Yet another company that can refurb C-130s.
Something to think about (again) as Australia wastes taxpayer dollars by retiring C-130H aircraft and even giving some of them to Indonesia.
Indonesia has enough funds to maintain airlift/utility aircraft. They even ordered some new light attack trainers the other day.
Many C-130s around the world can have their service life extended by having the Center Wing Box replaced. As the main load-bearing component of the C-130’s airframe, it is this structure that usually determines the overall operational life of the aircraft.
Something to think about (again) as Australia wastes taxpayer dollars by retiring C-130H aircraft and even giving some of them to Indonesia.
Indonesia has enough funds to maintain airlift/utility aircraft. They even ordered some new light attack trainers the other day.
Monday, July 9, 2012
Giving away C-130s
Just a reminder of how your tax dollars are being wasted. Defence could have picked from multiple skilled vendors to upgrade these aircraft.
Instead, they are given away to a country who already isn't hurting in its ability to spend on transport aircraft.
Hey, they can even afford main battle tanks, even if it isn't always the best tank country for that weight class.
Instead, they are given away to a country who already isn't hurting in its ability to spend on transport aircraft.
Hey, they can even afford main battle tanks, even if it isn't always the best tank country for that weight class.
Monday, June 4, 2012
$5B Target
Hard to take the U.S. DOD very seriously on providing bang for the buck with this kind of waste.
That, and an ever more obsolete-to-the-threat carrier air wing; well, one distinct possibility is this.
But at more than $3 billion a pop, critics say the new DDG-1000 destroyer sucks away funds that could be better used to bolster a thinly stretched conventional fleet.
That, and an ever more obsolete-to-the-threat carrier air wing; well, one distinct possibility is this.
Sunday, May 13, 2012
Weekend fear
The Australian's Weekend Edition is a weekend omission.
In a Defence piece by Greg Sheridan called "Our forces reduced to impotence", the message is fear-mongering. The latest budget and the Labor government have destroyed Defence. And isn't it a shame that the Defence White Paper of 2009 isn't being followed? The fact that Defence leadership has made significant procurement errors over the years isn't mentioned.
The article spreads over 8 columns and goes on to another page. The online version is here.
Lots of words. No real substance.
First, the Defence White Paper of 2009. It was garbage when it came out. I painted it as such, and was, unfortunately correct. Sheridan defends one of its authors Mr. Babbage; who back in 2007, seemed to be all glowing about the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. It would be powerful because it had networking and gosh, that would make us superior that is for sure. Unfortunately for Babbage, flying the flag of the system-of-systems approach only works when your assumptions are sound. Otherwise it turns into the South-side product of a North-bound bovine. Babbage also ignored the fact that an enemy has a will of their own, funding (and the ability) to create combat networks and jam ours. The U.S., the most experienced user of net-centric-warfare, knows the limitations. This, Babbage didn't see fit to mention to Parliament or anyone else. This assumes he even had knowledge of such things.
Combat networking isn't owned by the "fifth-generation-fighter" dreamers.
Not mentioned by Sheridan (and Babbage) are the staggering F-35 development problems. Sheridan presses on trying to make the reader believe the F-35 is better than the Super Hornet, and that the Super is good for 10 years against the threat and the solution is that we need to get those Joint Strike Failures.
This is a Sheridan (or whoever told him this) fiction.
The Super Hornet dominates the F-35 in every operational need for a joint coalition commander. The F-35 can only sprinkle fairy dust in hoping that it will be more survivable or even useful. And, the F-35 is in no way, just a smaller F-22. If Sheridan's view is that the Super Hornet will not be able to take on emerging threats in 10 years, the F-35 will fare worse. The F-35 is too defective (by the very nature of its design) to handle emerging threats and is too expensive to own and operate for lesser threats handled just fine by today's technology.
Sheridan goes on to mention the 12 rent-seeking replacements for the Collins class submarines. Not mentioned is that Australia is unable to crew 6 boats let alone 12. One would think that from the beginning, one would want to see proof of life on the ability to crew 6 submarines before building 12.
While Labor might not be the brightest tool in the bag on Defence issues, at least their extreme red-ways of this current government have started to chop the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy into a manner of where they will have to spend within their means. I say that, but the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy just spent over 3-times the money for a light transport aircraft versus a competing product ($1B over); and was even silly enough to think it was a valid Caribou replacement when it was not. They also just threw away $214M on a submarine study for the rent-seekers when that same money would have made a nice down-payment on an off-the shelf sub. The Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy also wants to waste hundreds of millions on obsolete jamming gear for 12 Super Hornets. The Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy has a gross excess of star-ranked officers and senior-service executives. And yes, why do we need 7000 DMO employees for military procurement?
I don't believe the cry-me-a-river routine by those refusing to look in the mirror and neither should you.
The sad thing is that many will read The Australian article and believe it.
Some of the "defence" writers in this part of the world need help. Their imaginative writing (or is it fear of being cut off from Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy sources?) is only white-wash which fails to illuminate the weaknesses of today's senior Defence planners (and White Paper hacks) along with their choice of faulty and expensive weapons systems that don't contribute to national security.
More investigative journalism has to be done on why the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy wastes so much money for so little value. Being an advocate for change by reporting accurately is valuable. Being an advocate for the faulty Entrenched Defence Bureacracy is a disservice to this nation.
In a Defence piece by Greg Sheridan called "Our forces reduced to impotence", the message is fear-mongering. The latest budget and the Labor government have destroyed Defence. And isn't it a shame that the Defence White Paper of 2009 isn't being followed? The fact that Defence leadership has made significant procurement errors over the years isn't mentioned.
The article spreads over 8 columns and goes on to another page. The online version is here.
Lots of words. No real substance.
First, the Defence White Paper of 2009. It was garbage when it came out. I painted it as such, and was, unfortunately correct. Sheridan defends one of its authors Mr. Babbage; who back in 2007, seemed to be all glowing about the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. It would be powerful because it had networking and gosh, that would make us superior that is for sure. Unfortunately for Babbage, flying the flag of the system-of-systems approach only works when your assumptions are sound. Otherwise it turns into the South-side product of a North-bound bovine. Babbage also ignored the fact that an enemy has a will of their own, funding (and the ability) to create combat networks and jam ours. The U.S., the most experienced user of net-centric-warfare, knows the limitations. This, Babbage didn't see fit to mention to Parliament or anyone else. This assumes he even had knowledge of such things.
Combat networking isn't owned by the "fifth-generation-fighter" dreamers.
Not mentioned by Sheridan (and Babbage) are the staggering F-35 development problems. Sheridan presses on trying to make the reader believe the F-35 is better than the Super Hornet, and that the Super is good for 10 years against the threat and the solution is that we need to get those Joint Strike Failures.
This is a Sheridan (or whoever told him this) fiction.
The Super Hornet dominates the F-35 in every operational need for a joint coalition commander. The F-35 can only sprinkle fairy dust in hoping that it will be more survivable or even useful. And, the F-35 is in no way, just a smaller F-22. If Sheridan's view is that the Super Hornet will not be able to take on emerging threats in 10 years, the F-35 will fare worse. The F-35 is too defective (by the very nature of its design) to handle emerging threats and is too expensive to own and operate for lesser threats handled just fine by today's technology.
Sheridan goes on to mention the 12 rent-seeking replacements for the Collins class submarines. Not mentioned is that Australia is unable to crew 6 boats let alone 12. One would think that from the beginning, one would want to see proof of life on the ability to crew 6 submarines before building 12.
While Labor might not be the brightest tool in the bag on Defence issues, at least their extreme red-ways of this current government have started to chop the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy into a manner of where they will have to spend within their means. I say that, but the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy just spent over 3-times the money for a light transport aircraft versus a competing product ($1B over); and was even silly enough to think it was a valid Caribou replacement when it was not. They also just threw away $214M on a submarine study for the rent-seekers when that same money would have made a nice down-payment on an off-the shelf sub. The Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy also wants to waste hundreds of millions on obsolete jamming gear for 12 Super Hornets. The Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy has a gross excess of star-ranked officers and senior-service executives. And yes, why do we need 7000 DMO employees for military procurement?
I don't believe the cry-me-a-river routine by those refusing to look in the mirror and neither should you.
The sad thing is that many will read The Australian article and believe it.
Some of the "defence" writers in this part of the world need help. Their imaginative writing (or is it fear of being cut off from Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy sources?) is only white-wash which fails to illuminate the weaknesses of today's senior Defence planners (and White Paper hacks) along with their choice of faulty and expensive weapons systems that don't contribute to national security.
More investigative journalism has to be done on why the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy wastes so much money for so little value. Being an advocate for change by reporting accurately is valuable. Being an advocate for the faulty Entrenched Defence Bureacracy is a disservice to this nation.
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