I'm curious how many in the entrenched defence bureaucracy or defence-wide voted labor?
Elections have consequences.
What I find funny is anyone that thinks the joke of the 2009 Defence White Paper has value.
I would suggest that if money is low for Defence, that this would be a good time to get rid of the dead wood. That would be the excess of Defence civilians, flag-ranks and senior executive service.
Showing posts with label budget. Show all posts
Showing posts with label budget. Show all posts
Thursday, September 13, 2012
Friday, July 6, 2012
Motion for Dutch to get out of F-35 program tabled
A motion has been tabled for the Dutch to get out of the F-35 program.
This by itself is not an absolute that the Dutch will get out of the F-35 program. It only allows for more parliamentary discussion leading up to the election later this year.
See this post by JSF News (Google translate Dutch to English) on the details which are still in progress.
Dutch proponents of the F-35 are now waving the jobs flag. Yet, due to significant development delays in the program, there are hundreds of lost orders against the original overly optimistic plan from over 10 years ago. Business investors have many risk, value and return-on-investment issues left unanswered.
High F-35 operating and procurement costs means that the Dutch will not see the original 80-some F-35 jet fleet. It is now closer to well South of 40 if not worse.
Also of interest, some are still addressing this as an F-16 replacement decision and not an F-35 decision.
To date, with all the budget and down-sizing issues present in the Dutch military, only the Saab Gripen appears to be an affordable F-16 replacement.
This by itself is not an absolute that the Dutch will get out of the F-35 program. It only allows for more parliamentary discussion leading up to the election later this year.
See this post by JSF News (Google translate Dutch to English) on the details which are still in progress.
Dutch proponents of the F-35 are now waving the jobs flag. Yet, due to significant development delays in the program, there are hundreds of lost orders against the original overly optimistic plan from over 10 years ago. Business investors have many risk, value and return-on-investment issues left unanswered.
High F-35 operating and procurement costs means that the Dutch will not see the original 80-some F-35 jet fleet. It is now closer to well South of 40 if not worse.
Also of interest, some are still addressing this as an F-16 replacement decision and not an F-35 decision.
To date, with all the budget and down-sizing issues present in the Dutch military, only the Saab Gripen appears to be an affordable F-16 replacement.
Monday, June 4, 2012
Bad relationship
If I was going to stereotype, one thing I learned from Korea is that the people can have a short temper.
So when I read in today's Australian Financial Review (AFR), "Howitzer bombshell angers South Korea", (Geoffry Barker), my first thought was that this was not the kind of business partner to leave in the lurch.
S.Korean defence industry was rightly upset when they heard of the cancellation of the Australian self-propelled artillery project (to be made in S.Korea) by radio news with no forewarning. The South Korean embassy was informed 20 minutes before the public announcement.
Did I just mention "upset"? Furious would be a better description. Business reprisal in some form from S.Korea is a guarantee.
Aside from the idea if Australia even needs this kind of weapon's system, officials made this cancellation decision as part of an effort to save money. Even though gross excess like 22,000 defence civilian employees, a war in Afghanistan that provides no defensive value to the nation, too many flag-ranks and SES and a spend-thrift buying policy still exist.
S.Korea offers a lot of potential defence industry solutions for land, sea and air. How the future Australian-S. Korean defence industry relationship progresses is an open question.
So when I read in today's Australian Financial Review (AFR), "Howitzer bombshell angers South Korea", (Geoffry Barker), my first thought was that this was not the kind of business partner to leave in the lurch.
S.Korean defence industry was rightly upset when they heard of the cancellation of the Australian self-propelled artillery project (to be made in S.Korea) by radio news with no forewarning. The South Korean embassy was informed 20 minutes before the public announcement.
Did I just mention "upset"? Furious would be a better description. Business reprisal in some form from S.Korea is a guarantee.
Aside from the idea if Australia even needs this kind of weapon's system, officials made this cancellation decision as part of an effort to save money. Even though gross excess like 22,000 defence civilian employees, a war in Afghanistan that provides no defensive value to the nation, too many flag-ranks and SES and a spend-thrift buying policy still exist.
S.Korea offers a lot of potential defence industry solutions for land, sea and air. How the future Australian-S. Korean defence industry relationship progresses is an open question.
Friday, May 25, 2012
Yet oxygen thieves still have a job
Interesting.
Yet, our despicable Defence senior leadership can't trim the fat on flag-ranks and senior executive staff. That says it all right there on the quality of senior leadership in Defence.
Wow, General Hurley. A whole dozen.
Yet, our despicable Defence senior leadership can't trim the fat on flag-ranks and senior executive staff. That says it all right there on the quality of senior leadership in Defence.
General Hurley also revealed the number of senior military officers, which has grown by 70 per cent in recent years, would be cut by a dozen jobs when the Afghanistan mission was over in 2014.
Wow, General Hurley. A whole dozen.
Sunday, May 13, 2012
Easy way to destroy NATO air power
The desperation of the F-35 cheer-leading squad continues:
Given the lack of money everywhere, the "joint" solution calls for the Gripen. Or, just sign up for the F-35 so it can destroy a shrinking defense budget situation by gobbling up any money available for less than half the aircraft planned. As a "combat" force, it will be mostly defective.
One of smartest examples of the practical pooling of assets is the international program for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. A number of NATO allies including Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, Norway and Turkey are not only acquiring the Joint Strike Fighter but are participating in the development and production of the aircraft. At least for now, Great Britain is the only other country besides the United States that is acquiring the STOVL variant, the F-35B.----
Not only does the international program reduce the cost of acquiring fifth-generation fighters for all participants, but there will be tremendous advantages to be gained by virtue of the global supply chain, availability of shared facilities and standardized procedures. When it comes to conducting actual combat operations, the “pool” of F-35s in NATO will be one of the smartest defense investments the alliance has ever made.
—-
Daniel Goure, Ph.D.
Early Warning Blog, Lexington Institute
Given the lack of money everywhere, the "joint" solution calls for the Gripen. Or, just sign up for the F-35 so it can destroy a shrinking defense budget situation by gobbling up any money available for less than half the aircraft planned. As a "combat" force, it will be mostly defective.
Weekend fear
The Australian's Weekend Edition is a weekend omission.
In a Defence piece by Greg Sheridan called "Our forces reduced to impotence", the message is fear-mongering. The latest budget and the Labor government have destroyed Defence. And isn't it a shame that the Defence White Paper of 2009 isn't being followed? The fact that Defence leadership has made significant procurement errors over the years isn't mentioned.
The article spreads over 8 columns and goes on to another page. The online version is here.
Lots of words. No real substance.
First, the Defence White Paper of 2009. It was garbage when it came out. I painted it as such, and was, unfortunately correct. Sheridan defends one of its authors Mr. Babbage; who back in 2007, seemed to be all glowing about the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. It would be powerful because it had networking and gosh, that would make us superior that is for sure. Unfortunately for Babbage, flying the flag of the system-of-systems approach only works when your assumptions are sound. Otherwise it turns into the South-side product of a North-bound bovine. Babbage also ignored the fact that an enemy has a will of their own, funding (and the ability) to create combat networks and jam ours. The U.S., the most experienced user of net-centric-warfare, knows the limitations. This, Babbage didn't see fit to mention to Parliament or anyone else. This assumes he even had knowledge of such things.
Combat networking isn't owned by the "fifth-generation-fighter" dreamers.
Not mentioned by Sheridan (and Babbage) are the staggering F-35 development problems. Sheridan presses on trying to make the reader believe the F-35 is better than the Super Hornet, and that the Super is good for 10 years against the threat and the solution is that we need to get those Joint Strike Failures.
This is a Sheridan (or whoever told him this) fiction.
The Super Hornet dominates the F-35 in every operational need for a joint coalition commander. The F-35 can only sprinkle fairy dust in hoping that it will be more survivable or even useful. And, the F-35 is in no way, just a smaller F-22. If Sheridan's view is that the Super Hornet will not be able to take on emerging threats in 10 years, the F-35 will fare worse. The F-35 is too defective (by the very nature of its design) to handle emerging threats and is too expensive to own and operate for lesser threats handled just fine by today's technology.
Sheridan goes on to mention the 12 rent-seeking replacements for the Collins class submarines. Not mentioned is that Australia is unable to crew 6 boats let alone 12. One would think that from the beginning, one would want to see proof of life on the ability to crew 6 submarines before building 12.
While Labor might not be the brightest tool in the bag on Defence issues, at least their extreme red-ways of this current government have started to chop the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy into a manner of where they will have to spend within their means. I say that, but the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy just spent over 3-times the money for a light transport aircraft versus a competing product ($1B over); and was even silly enough to think it was a valid Caribou replacement when it was not. They also just threw away $214M on a submarine study for the rent-seekers when that same money would have made a nice down-payment on an off-the shelf sub. The Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy also wants to waste hundreds of millions on obsolete jamming gear for 12 Super Hornets. The Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy has a gross excess of star-ranked officers and senior-service executives. And yes, why do we need 7000 DMO employees for military procurement?
I don't believe the cry-me-a-river routine by those refusing to look in the mirror and neither should you.
The sad thing is that many will read The Australian article and believe it.
Some of the "defence" writers in this part of the world need help. Their imaginative writing (or is it fear of being cut off from Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy sources?) is only white-wash which fails to illuminate the weaknesses of today's senior Defence planners (and White Paper hacks) along with their choice of faulty and expensive weapons systems that don't contribute to national security.
More investigative journalism has to be done on why the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy wastes so much money for so little value. Being an advocate for change by reporting accurately is valuable. Being an advocate for the faulty Entrenched Defence Bureacracy is a disservice to this nation.
In a Defence piece by Greg Sheridan called "Our forces reduced to impotence", the message is fear-mongering. The latest budget and the Labor government have destroyed Defence. And isn't it a shame that the Defence White Paper of 2009 isn't being followed? The fact that Defence leadership has made significant procurement errors over the years isn't mentioned.
The article spreads over 8 columns and goes on to another page. The online version is here.
Lots of words. No real substance.
First, the Defence White Paper of 2009. It was garbage when it came out. I painted it as such, and was, unfortunately correct. Sheridan defends one of its authors Mr. Babbage; who back in 2007, seemed to be all glowing about the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. It would be powerful because it had networking and gosh, that would make us superior that is for sure. Unfortunately for Babbage, flying the flag of the system-of-systems approach only works when your assumptions are sound. Otherwise it turns into the South-side product of a North-bound bovine. Babbage also ignored the fact that an enemy has a will of their own, funding (and the ability) to create combat networks and jam ours. The U.S., the most experienced user of net-centric-warfare, knows the limitations. This, Babbage didn't see fit to mention to Parliament or anyone else. This assumes he even had knowledge of such things.
Combat networking isn't owned by the "fifth-generation-fighter" dreamers.
Not mentioned by Sheridan (and Babbage) are the staggering F-35 development problems. Sheridan presses on trying to make the reader believe the F-35 is better than the Super Hornet, and that the Super is good for 10 years against the threat and the solution is that we need to get those Joint Strike Failures.
This is a Sheridan (or whoever told him this) fiction.
The Super Hornet dominates the F-35 in every operational need for a joint coalition commander. The F-35 can only sprinkle fairy dust in hoping that it will be more survivable or even useful. And, the F-35 is in no way, just a smaller F-22. If Sheridan's view is that the Super Hornet will not be able to take on emerging threats in 10 years, the F-35 will fare worse. The F-35 is too defective (by the very nature of its design) to handle emerging threats and is too expensive to own and operate for lesser threats handled just fine by today's technology.
Sheridan goes on to mention the 12 rent-seeking replacements for the Collins class submarines. Not mentioned is that Australia is unable to crew 6 boats let alone 12. One would think that from the beginning, one would want to see proof of life on the ability to crew 6 submarines before building 12.
While Labor might not be the brightest tool in the bag on Defence issues, at least their extreme red-ways of this current government have started to chop the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy into a manner of where they will have to spend within their means. I say that, but the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy just spent over 3-times the money for a light transport aircraft versus a competing product ($1B over); and was even silly enough to think it was a valid Caribou replacement when it was not. They also just threw away $214M on a submarine study for the rent-seekers when that same money would have made a nice down-payment on an off-the shelf sub. The Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy also wants to waste hundreds of millions on obsolete jamming gear for 12 Super Hornets. The Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy has a gross excess of star-ranked officers and senior-service executives. And yes, why do we need 7000 DMO employees for military procurement?
I don't believe the cry-me-a-river routine by those refusing to look in the mirror and neither should you.
The sad thing is that many will read The Australian article and believe it.
Some of the "defence" writers in this part of the world need help. Their imaginative writing (or is it fear of being cut off from Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy sources?) is only white-wash which fails to illuminate the weaknesses of today's senior Defence planners (and White Paper hacks) along with their choice of faulty and expensive weapons systems that don't contribute to national security.
More investigative journalism has to be done on why the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy wastes so much money for so little value. Being an advocate for change by reporting accurately is valuable. Being an advocate for the faulty Entrenched Defence Bureacracy is a disservice to this nation.
Friday, May 11, 2012
RAAF boss practices deception; or just doesn't know
The top RAAF boss makes some statements that lack credibility.
He states that the Growler upgrade for 12 of our 24 Super Hornets is a good idea, when in fact, such an effort will be a waste of money.
He states this about the F-35:
No evidence. The fifth-generation meme is just valueless. Worse, Brown tries to imply that just because an F-22 will clear the table of all threats, that the same can be done with the F-35.
The F-35 is not just a smaller F-22.
The F-35--by defects in its design--will not be combat effective for Australia's (or anyone else's) needs.
In an effort to save money for the ADF, I can think of one star-ranked officer that isn't up for the job and needs to find a different line of work. A star-ranked officer spreading disinformation, or just being badly informed (pick one) doesn't add any value to the defence of the nation.
Additional reading (PDF files):
Review of the Defence Annual Report 2010-2011
--Submission 2--“CHECKING THE DATA & THE FACTS;. . . .THEN TESTING THE EVIDENCE” a.k.a. TRUTH DERIVED FROM DATA & FACTS VS A TOTAL INDIFFERENCE TO WHAT IS REAL
--Submission 3--THE EVOLVING THREAT ENVIRONMENT Reference Threat Capabilities versus the Joint Strike Fighter (Materialised Predictions from APA Founders’ Threat Assessments dating back to Circa 1998)
--Submission 5--F-35 JSF Air Combat Capability Information for Defence Sub-Committee Members
--Submission 6--From Mr. Erik Peacock, To the secretariat, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Review of the Defence Annual Report 2010-2011
--Submission 7--Answers to the 07 February 2012 Defence Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Simulation assumptions, issues and visualisation, REPSIM Pty Ltd
--Submission 9--There is Nothing Normal nor Usual let alone Standard about the JSF . . .
--Submission 10--RE: APA Submission No 4 to the JSCFADT Hearings into the JSF - Thana Marketing, KPIs and the JSF Program
--Submission 11--ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY AVM KYM OSLEY, NEW AIR COMBAT CAPABILITY PROJECT MANAGER
--Submission 12--COMPLAINT REGARDING THE PRESENTATION BY AVM KYM OSLEY,DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE AND LOCKHEED MARTIN REGARDING REPSIM PTY LTD
He states that the Growler upgrade for 12 of our 24 Super Hornets is a good idea, when in fact, such an effort will be a waste of money.
He states this about the F-35:
Air Marshal Brown said the fifth-generation JSF would meet Australia's needs for many decades, providing control of the air across the entire spectrum of conflict.
No evidence. The fifth-generation meme is just valueless. Worse, Brown tries to imply that just because an F-22 will clear the table of all threats, that the same can be done with the F-35.
The F-35 is not just a smaller F-22.
The F-35--by defects in its design--will not be combat effective for Australia's (or anyone else's) needs.
In an effort to save money for the ADF, I can think of one star-ranked officer that isn't up for the job and needs to find a different line of work. A star-ranked officer spreading disinformation, or just being badly informed (pick one) doesn't add any value to the defence of the nation.
Additional reading (PDF files):
Review of the Defence Annual Report 2010-2011
--Submission 2--“CHECKING THE DATA & THE FACTS;. . . .THEN TESTING THE EVIDENCE” a.k.a. TRUTH DERIVED FROM DATA & FACTS VS A TOTAL INDIFFERENCE TO WHAT IS REAL
--Submission 3--THE EVOLVING THREAT ENVIRONMENT Reference Threat Capabilities versus the Joint Strike Fighter (Materialised Predictions from APA Founders’ Threat Assessments dating back to Circa 1998)
--Submission 5--F-35 JSF Air Combat Capability Information for Defence Sub-Committee Members
--Submission 6--From Mr. Erik Peacock, To the secretariat, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Review of the Defence Annual Report 2010-2011
--Submission 7--Answers to the 07 February 2012 Defence Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Simulation assumptions, issues and visualisation, REPSIM Pty Ltd
--Submission 9--There is Nothing Normal nor Usual let alone Standard about the JSF . . .
--Submission 10--RE: APA Submission No 4 to the JSCFADT Hearings into the JSF - Thana Marketing, KPIs and the JSF Program
--Submission 11--ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY AVM KYM OSLEY, NEW AIR COMBAT CAPABILITY PROJECT MANAGER
--Submission 12--COMPLAINT REGARDING THE PRESENTATION BY AVM KYM OSLEY,DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE AND LOCKHEED MARTIN REGARDING REPSIM PTY LTD
Thursday, May 10, 2012
Defence--live within a budget
New news: Defence has to live within a realistic budget. THAT is your Defence White Paper in a nutshell and not the 2009 fantasy.
Budget is policy.
The effects on Defence from Tuesday's budget announcement shows that senior leadership is making both good and bad decisions on force structure cuts.
The Australian reports that some of the Army's M-1 tanks will go into storage. The article states that no reason was given. I have a few ideas on that. They drink fuel like mad, making for expensive upkeep when there are other more pressing operational demands.
C-130Hs will be retired. 4 of the 12 were already parked. The RAAF has J models and the whole of the C-130 community is having some of its business taken away by C-17 ops. I would be interested on the life (airframe hours) of the H community. A shame they can't be refurbished and turned into maritime ISR assets or other flavours of C-130 conversions.
The F-35 has been delayed. A good move. A better move would be to cancel it since by-design, it will never be combat effective against high-end threats and current aircraft can do the job better against any other kind of threat.
Sad is that Defence options for the air power roadmap seem to be that of air-policing and light strike work.
So be it.
The Gripen costs less than half of what it takes to run a Super Hornet in cost per flying hour. Defence states that the Super-F is currently trending at A$23,000 per flying hour. Classic Hornet around A$18,000 per flying hour. By inflating the Gripen cost per flying hour--assuming a contract screw-ups by the Defence Material Organisation (DMO) right off the bat--you get around A$10,000 per flying hour.
The Gripen can be turned for the next mission in 10 minutes. We don't even need the next-gen Gripen. The C/D will be OK.
For around $9B with 10 years of cost per flying hour, weapons, initial spares and training, facilities, 10pc contingency, $500M in hand-outs to local industry, we can replace most of the legacy Hornet fleet with Gripens.
So you want to fight big wars? Great. Pony up some funds for annual deployment training exercises from the U.S. which would include F-22s, F-15Es, B-1s, B-2s, and so-on.
ANZUS membership has its privileges.
Funds for jamming gear for 12 of the Super-Hornets to make them G-model "Growlers" has been put off. A better move would be to cancel this effort altogether because the U.S. Navy has stated on two occasions that it is obsolete kit.
Money has been wasted to the tune of $214M to do a submarine replacement study. The White Paper fantasy of 12 subs was a made-up number. Two issues here: Order 6 off-the-shelf subs. 6 because until Defence can prove they can crew up to that level, it is the limit. The $214M would have been better spent as a down-payment on an off-the-shelf sub. Opportunity lost for the sake of buying votes.
Defence should only start projects that can be realistically completed; and produce real value. By that measure, the F-35 effort or refurbishing classics Hornets, are disqualified. So is the home-grown sub-fantasy.
There are other places to put cuts. I would take-aim at the bloat of star-rank officers, senior-executives and civilian workforce chair-warmers.
With the right kind of management, working inside the recent budget isn't a problem. The problem is getting the right kind of work out of the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy.
Budget is policy.
The effects on Defence from Tuesday's budget announcement shows that senior leadership is making both good and bad decisions on force structure cuts.
The Australian reports that some of the Army's M-1 tanks will go into storage. The article states that no reason was given. I have a few ideas on that. They drink fuel like mad, making for expensive upkeep when there are other more pressing operational demands.
C-130Hs will be retired. 4 of the 12 were already parked. The RAAF has J models and the whole of the C-130 community is having some of its business taken away by C-17 ops. I would be interested on the life (airframe hours) of the H community. A shame they can't be refurbished and turned into maritime ISR assets or other flavours of C-130 conversions.
The F-35 has been delayed. A good move. A better move would be to cancel it since by-design, it will never be combat effective against high-end threats and current aircraft can do the job better against any other kind of threat.
Sad is that Defence options for the air power roadmap seem to be that of air-policing and light strike work.
So be it.
The Gripen costs less than half of what it takes to run a Super Hornet in cost per flying hour. Defence states that the Super-F is currently trending at A$23,000 per flying hour. Classic Hornet around A$18,000 per flying hour. By inflating the Gripen cost per flying hour--assuming a contract screw-ups by the Defence Material Organisation (DMO) right off the bat--you get around A$10,000 per flying hour.
The Gripen can be turned for the next mission in 10 minutes. We don't even need the next-gen Gripen. The C/D will be OK.
For around $9B with 10 years of cost per flying hour, weapons, initial spares and training, facilities, 10pc contingency, $500M in hand-outs to local industry, we can replace most of the legacy Hornet fleet with Gripens.
So you want to fight big wars? Great. Pony up some funds for annual deployment training exercises from the U.S. which would include F-22s, F-15Es, B-1s, B-2s, and so-on.
ANZUS membership has its privileges.
Funds for jamming gear for 12 of the Super-Hornets to make them G-model "Growlers" has been put off. A better move would be to cancel this effort altogether because the U.S. Navy has stated on two occasions that it is obsolete kit.
Money has been wasted to the tune of $214M to do a submarine replacement study. The White Paper fantasy of 12 subs was a made-up number. Two issues here: Order 6 off-the-shelf subs. 6 because until Defence can prove they can crew up to that level, it is the limit. The $214M would have been better spent as a down-payment on an off-the-shelf sub. Opportunity lost for the sake of buying votes.
Defence should only start projects that can be realistically completed; and produce real value. By that measure, the F-35 effort or refurbishing classics Hornets, are disqualified. So is the home-grown sub-fantasy.
There are other places to put cuts. I would take-aim at the bloat of star-rank officers, senior-executives and civilian workforce chair-warmers.
With the right kind of management, working inside the recent budget isn't a problem. The problem is getting the right kind of work out of the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy.
Monday, May 7, 2012
Saving $37B on reality
Have a look at one of the men that wants to take your money and waste it on Operation: BARKING MAD.
It is an unfortunate fact that the Australian Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy (EDB) has to live within a realistic budget.
The assumptions that the rent-seekers make about an off-the-shelf sub not being suitable for Australian waters is a non-sense. If the same guy was hawking batteries in Euro-land guess what he would say?
The following is a comparison of savings that can be had in future procurements for fighter aircraft and subs. Realism vs. what the rent-seekers want.
Note that, since air policing is now the only option for Australia for its air power roadmap until budgets and the mental-health of Defence senior leadership improves (I know. Grossly optimistic. That's me.), best to get something one can actually afford; the Gripen. And I am talking about the C/D and not the future one.
Rent-seekers: $36B for subs that might not work; $16B for fighter aircraft that certainly will not work. Total waste: $52B.
Reality: $6B For 6 subs that will work. The dumbassery of the 2009 Defence White Paper with 12 subs was an imaginary number. Good. I will throw one out too: 6. More; but only if it is proven that we can crew and operate 6.
$9B for 72 C/D Gripens and 10 years of flying costs. I even pumped up the cost per flying hour significantly to make up for DMO goof ups. 10 years of flying costs is good enough because that is about as far as one can predict for labor, fuel and anything else.
Total capability: $15B
Savings of Reality vs. The Rent-seekers: $37B, if not more that doesn't have to be wasted on the low-productivity EDB.
It is an unfortunate fact that the Australian Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy (EDB) has to live within a realistic budget.
The assumptions that the rent-seekers make about an off-the-shelf sub not being suitable for Australian waters is a non-sense. If the same guy was hawking batteries in Euro-land guess what he would say?
The following is a comparison of savings that can be had in future procurements for fighter aircraft and subs. Realism vs. what the rent-seekers want.
Note that, since air policing is now the only option for Australia for its air power roadmap until budgets and the mental-health of Defence senior leadership improves (I know. Grossly optimistic. That's me.), best to get something one can actually afford; the Gripen. And I am talking about the C/D and not the future one.
Rent-seekers: $36B for subs that might not work; $16B for fighter aircraft that certainly will not work. Total waste: $52B.
Reality: $6B For 6 subs that will work. The dumbassery of the 2009 Defence White Paper with 12 subs was an imaginary number. Good. I will throw one out too: 6. More; but only if it is proven that we can crew and operate 6.
$9B for 72 C/D Gripens and 10 years of flying costs. I even pumped up the cost per flying hour significantly to make up for DMO goof ups. 10 years of flying costs is good enough because that is about as far as one can predict for labor, fuel and anything else.
Total capability: $15B
Savings of Reality vs. The Rent-seekers: $37B, if not more that doesn't have to be wasted on the low-productivity EDB.
Tuesday, May 1, 2012
May Day
The next budget is coming out.
The bloated defence budget--going on toward $27B per year--does need a haircut.
Not because of the moronic spend-thrift nature of the labor government since they took power but because of the moronic spend-thrift nature of the entrenched defence bureaucracy (EDB).
The EDB except maybe for the Army, has gotten just about everything wrong.
-Giving away air-refueling tankers before an operational replacement exists. That is not only dumb but dangerous behaviour.
-Wishing that Australia can have new and high-risk Collins-class sub replacements at tens-of-billions of dollars, even though the idea is barking-mad.
-Giving away long-range strike of the F-111 on a lie.
-Buying the Super-Hornet on a lie.
-Spending money to upgrade half of the Super Hornets with obsolete jamming gear.
-The endless propaganda about needing the defective and overly expensive F-35.
-Not being able to do basic corrosion control on existing ships.
-Doing impulse buys of military hardware near the end of a budget year because that money can't be spent on existing faulty and delayed programs on the project-of-concern list.
-Having a gold-plated, and ineffective helicopter force-structure roadmap.
-Wanting to buy Air Warfare Destroyers and large amphibious flat-tops that are expensive, hard to find crew for and can't be protected because of a faulty air power and submarine roadmap.
-Fat on flag-ranks, senior executives, and civilian personnel. That is a lot of office furniture (executive style and otherwise).
-Being hostile to home industry.
-Black-listing contractors. This costs the nation in loss of valuable strategic and technical consultation.
-And a few other things.
Yes...poor Defence.
And Mr. Babbage implies that now the 2009 White Paper has "failed". But it was "failed" as soon as it was released.
The bloated defence budget--going on toward $27B per year--does need a haircut.
Not because of the moronic spend-thrift nature of the labor government since they took power but because of the moronic spend-thrift nature of the entrenched defence bureaucracy (EDB).
The EDB except maybe for the Army, has gotten just about everything wrong.
-Giving away air-refueling tankers before an operational replacement exists. That is not only dumb but dangerous behaviour.
-Wishing that Australia can have new and high-risk Collins-class sub replacements at tens-of-billions of dollars, even though the idea is barking-mad.
-Giving away long-range strike of the F-111 on a lie.
-Buying the Super-Hornet on a lie.
-Spending money to upgrade half of the Super Hornets with obsolete jamming gear.
-The endless propaganda about needing the defective and overly expensive F-35.
-Not being able to do basic corrosion control on existing ships.
-Doing impulse buys of military hardware near the end of a budget year because that money can't be spent on existing faulty and delayed programs on the project-of-concern list.
-Having a gold-plated, and ineffective helicopter force-structure roadmap.
-Wanting to buy Air Warfare Destroyers and large amphibious flat-tops that are expensive, hard to find crew for and can't be protected because of a faulty air power and submarine roadmap.
-Fat on flag-ranks, senior executives, and civilian personnel. That is a lot of office furniture (executive style and otherwise).
-Being hostile to home industry.
-Black-listing contractors. This costs the nation in loss of valuable strategic and technical consultation.
-And a few other things.
Yes...poor Defence.
And Mr. Babbage implies that now the 2009 White Paper has "failed". But it was "failed" as soon as it was released.
Sunday, April 1, 2012
New Fed Budget: Canada seeks "affordable" CF-18 replacement
The new Canadian federal budget has been released.
This article led me there.
I expected to find more mentions about Defence and the CF-18 replacement than what the reporter found. But I did not.
It says in the budget, that Canada seeks an "affordable" CF-18 replacement.
If the DND was confused before, they have no reason to be now. What ever replaces the CF-18 has to be affordable.
Sometime before 2020 would be nice.
This article led me there.
I expected to find more mentions about Defence and the CF-18 replacement than what the reporter found. But I did not.
It says in the budget, that Canada seeks an "affordable" CF-18 replacement.
Updating Defence Capital Funding (page 223)
The Government of Canada has made significant progress towards the implementation of the Canada First Defence Strategy, which outlines a comprehensive, long-term plan to provide the Canadian Forces with the people, equipment and support they need to carry out their core missions in Canada and elsewhere in North America and abroad.
The Government will continue to replace key equipment, including purchasing new ships built in Canada through the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, as well as by acquiring an affordable replacement for Canada’s aging CF-18 fleet to better equip Canada’s men and women in uniform. In order to ensure that funding for major capital equipment procurements is available when it is needed, the Government is adjusting the National Defence funding profileto move $3.54 billion over seven years into the future period in which purchases will be made.
If the DND was confused before, they have no reason to be now. What ever replaces the CF-18 has to be affordable.
Sometime before 2020 would be nice.
Tuesday, May 24, 2011
Defence cutting hazard allowances from the troops?
If this is true, I could think of a lot of places to do more Defence cuts without taking any money away from the pointy end of the spear.
Oh yeah, and unlike a safe dead-wood job in the DMO or similar, the pointy end of the spear can get shot at, blown up or face numerous other job related hazards not even conceived of by the chairborne rangers.
Defence bean counters plan to rip tens of thousands in tax-free pay from overseas-serving personnel.
Details of the new pay scales were due to be released later this week for comment, but the Federal Government last night denied any knowledge of the plan.
Tax-free allowances have been a key sweetener for military personnel forced to spend months away from family and friends working seven-day shifts often in temperatures above 50C.
Oh yeah, and unlike a safe dead-wood job in the DMO or similar, the pointy end of the spear can get shot at, blown up or face numerous other job related hazards not even conceived of by the chairborne rangers.
Wednesday, May 18, 2011
Defence budget-national "Ponzi scheme"
So well said from James Brown on duty over at the Lowy Institute. I will add to it that this is the fault of an entrenched senior bureaucracy that is bleeding our tax dollars for very little return.
Well, Australia could never be "on track" to do much with the failed 2009 Defence White Paper which was dead on arrival.
"The defence budget is increasingly becoming a national ponzi scheme: drawing down on our strategic future to meet the political promises of our past. Australia is no longer on track to build the defence force outlined in the 2009 Defence White Paper."
Well, Australia could never be "on track" to do much with the failed 2009 Defence White Paper which was dead on arrival.
Cry for Defence, but only cry for the lack of leadership, not money
I am not a fan of Mr. Babbage. He was one of the contributors to the nonsensical 2009 Defence White Paper that some are so quick to quote as if it has worth.
Defence does not need more money. It needs real leadership and a real plan. When we as a nation demand that the dead wood in the Defence bureaucracy be gotten rid of, then maybe we won't see so many failures on the infamous project of concern list.
Defence does not need more money. It needs real leadership and a real plan. When we as a nation demand that the dead wood in the Defence bureaucracy be gotten rid of, then maybe we won't see so many failures on the infamous project of concern list.
Defence--$500M short in facilities management
Facilities management is part of the job of the Defence bureaucracy. So why are we finding out that they claim to be $500M short in this area over the next three years?
There is money out there to be had to fix this. Simply because there are Defence projects out there that we just do not need. On a whim, Defence just got approval of $500M for a C-17 that was never before mentioned as a need.
Who in the Defence bureaucracy is not doing their job?
"The Australian Defence Force faces a $500 million shortfall in the funds needed to maintain its extensive array of bases, training areas and buildings over the next three years."
There is money out there to be had to fix this. Simply because there are Defence projects out there that we just do not need. On a whim, Defence just got approval of $500M for a C-17 that was never before mentioned as a need.
Who in the Defence bureaucracy is not doing their job?
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