AIBANO TRAINING AREA, Japan — In a muddy field full of Japanese media and troops watching American military might in action, the Stryker Mobile Gun System unceremoniously broke down.
The vehicle — a variant of the fast, lightweight Stryker armored troop carrier that’s been deployed throughout Iraq and Afghanistan — was able to fire only three of the dozens of rounds that were planned Tuesday morning.
The mechanical glitch turned the demonstration into a watch-us-fix-it event, but the snafu wasn’t all bad. It underscored the point of Orient Shield, a field training exercise that the two allied armies conduct every year for the sake of “interoperability” — military-speak for teamwork.
“The MGS is a helluva machine, but it can break down at critical times,” Maj. Randall Baucom, U.S. Army Japan spokesman, said. The malfunction wasn’t good, but it was beneficial for the Japanese to see that “things don’t always go according to plan.”
Keep spinning it public affairs guy. Depending on the variant, the Stryker is $5~6M each. Useful against somethings (like low-threat wars) but a death trap against the NORKs or the Chicoms. And, the one pictured doesn't even have its Mel Gibson, Road Warrior cage on.
Fortunately, the 105mm gun reliability has never been a problem for this Stryker variant.
Just kidding.
This from the GAO in 2004:
The Mobile Gun System has a 105mm cannon with an autoloader for rapidly loading cannon rounds without outside exposure of its three-person crew. The principal function of the Mobile Gun System is to provide rapid and lethal direct fires to protect assaulting infantry. The Mobile Gun System cannon is designed to defeat bunkers and create openings in reinforced concrete walls through which infantry can pass to accomplish their missions. According to the Army's Stryker Program Management Office, the autoloader system was responsible for 80 percent of the system aborts during initial Mobile Gun System reliability testing because of cannon rounds jamming in the system. As of February 2004, the Army was planning additional testing and working with the autoloader's manufacturer to determine a solution. A functioning autoloader is needed if the Mobile Gun System is to meet its operational requirements because manual loading of cannon rounds both reduces the desired rate of fire and requires brief outside exposure of crew. In its March 2004 Stryker acquisition decision, OSD required the Army to provide changes to the Mobile Gun System developmental exit criteria within 90 days, including the ability to meet cost and system reliability criteria.
What a joke.
Well maybe things like the opening hours of Korea 1950 only happen once. We know the Army has such a good memory.
Just kidding again. As Colonel Hackworth stated, "The Army suffers from CRS:...
...can't remember shit."
I believe the Army has a place in the Pacific. But only with real combat readiness; with robust weapon's systems.
If not, there is always the Bataan Death March II awaiting.
17 comments:
I have a long and running series of videos on Youtube that expose the hidden dangers and follies of the Stryker.
After reading this article, I think the 8-video chapter on the Stryker MGS (yes, it's bad enough that I devoted not only a whole chapter of the series, but also *8 videos* of it) might interest you;
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gbs4-vMSctA
The MGS' problems go all the way back to 1999, and beyond. Expect them to continue all the way to the MGS' retirement.
Thanks for your time Blacktail. The Stryker story has been pretty amazing for sure.
What do the Stryker, Littoral Combat Ship and F-35 have in common?
All DOD Fubars.
The USMC's ground forces are organized appropriately for Pacific operations - medium weight and strategically and tactically mobile. Is it for reasons of "product differentiation" that the US Army's Pacific-based light, airborne and Stryker BCT's are organized differently?
On the brighter side, Chief of Army Staff Gen Odierno has recently announced that, following a review of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army's light and airborne BCT's will each get a third battalion - making them more interchangeable with USMC regiments. However, these BCT's will need to train extensively with tanks and have them on call (like the USMC) to overcome serious opposition.
USMC non-sense. The USMC has even more wheeled trucks that are easily toasted by any enemy fires and cannot go off roads/trails without being stuck than Army light IBCTs. The USMC is not "medium-weight"; a few heavy tanks and medium-weight amtracks and LAV-1s do not make a force "medium-weight"; and who said "medium-weight" is desirable in the closed terrain Pacific? What is needed in the Pacific are LIGHT tracked armored forces that can actually air-deploy by C-130s and thereafter maneuver cross-country--like the 11th ACR in Vietnam...CRS is a disease afflicting both the U.S. Army and the USMC, though with the latter its not a failure to remember, its a failure to have never known what right looks like in the first place.
Bravo Anonymous; your November 7, 2:37AM post. Australia's Abrams tanks and ASLAVs really do not fit the need for operations in the regional wet tropics and quick reaction air deployability. Also; the notion among DoD planners that intervention forces of whatever scale will always be moved by highly expensive to operate (and sluggish) aircraft carriers is pretty inflexible 'group think'. They seem to have forgotten the time-proven Principles of War, FLEXIBILITY, VERSATILITY and ECONOMY OF EFFORT.
Bushranger,
Read some history. The deployment by the Australian Army of relatively small numbers of tanks in the wet tropics of Papua, New Guinea, Bougainville and Borneo in WWII and in the Vietnam war significantly reduced infantry casualties, especially when attacking bunkers.
Light armour has a valuable role to play in terms of recon, speed and mobility. But attacking well defended positions with light armour only causes high causalities.
In other words our forces need to be prepared for a range of contingencies. And that means there are times when lighter forces will be appropriate and times when heavier firepower and protection are needed - and times when both are needed. It is false thinking to set the two in opposition to each other.
The USMC has the capacity to be both air mobile/light and to deploy heavier assets, including tanks, when needed. That's FLEXIBILITY.
Hello NGF,
At 75 years of age with a long family military lineage and having done Confrontation and Vietnam x 3, I doubt that my military history awareness is lacking and I can recall much of WW2.
Tanks employed during the Pacific campaign were generally smaller and lighter than those that have since emerged. I got to Vietnam when Centurions were introduced. The 'Tankies' perhaps had the best operational discipline of the Army's fighting arms and they did some good work. But; they could not go very far without breakdowns and needed big recovery vehicles and on-road transporters to get them most places.
Consider the 60 ton Abrams and the paucity of strong enough wharves, bridges, roads in PNG for example and just whether they would be viable in most wet tropic environs. Also, the comparable lack of mobility in such scenarios for the ASLAV compared with the M113 APC. See the comments in that regard at this link: http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Australias-M113-APC-Family-Upgrades-05133/. Army steered away from the opportunity to create an M113 FSV with cannon and 120mm mortar which would have been C-130 deployable, just the sort of integral fire support needed for rapid intervention deployments in the wet tropics.
As for attacking well defended positions; I much doubt that contemporary military leaders would be willing to risk the scale of casualities that were incurred during WW2 or Vietnam for that matter. More advanced air weaponry available now provides more prudent options.
Post-East Timor intervention, the Army went off on a tangent envisaging trundling sizeable expeditionary forces around the world, which is why we have wound up with 2 dubious merit aircraft carriers. The reality is regional interventions are more likely to be of lesser scale requiring prompt air response for initial lodgement and perhaps force maintenance by more sluggish amphibious support means.
It will be interesting to see what comes up in Defence White Paper 2013 as the primary tasks for the ADF.
Hello Bushranger,
The Abrams can go where a Centurion could go. Several countries in the region either have or are buying MBT's. Indonesia, for example, is purchasing Leopard 2's. Australia should also have the capacity to deploy MBT's when it is tactically necessary to do so.
I agree when it comes to the comparative mobility of the ASLAV vs the M113. And I have also advocated an M113 with a 120mm mortar.
It will be interesting to see what comes of the Army's Land Combat Vehicle program (Land 400). We might even have similar views about the best outcome. (Although I wonder how long it will be delayed, or if it will actually happen, given the current budget environment.)
Where we appear to disagree is about the basic role of the Army. I think the intervention in East Timor was right strategically and morally. But it showed up major gaps in the Army's capacity and it was fortunate that there was no serious fighting. I also supported our interventions in Solomon Islands and Bougainville. Having been in the Solomons before RAMSI I witnessed the level chaos, fear and misery caused by the militias.
Australia's strategic interests extend beyond our shores into the region. As you mentioned, PNG is an important example.
I therefore support Plan Beersheba to create a joint force that has the amphibious and air transport capacity to deploy land forces into the islands to our north in conjunction with our allies and neighbours. And our forces need to be able to operate across the spectrum from peacekeeping to close combat against a well armed adversary.
Australia's Army should be more than a light-weight backstop behind the so called air-sea gap. I hope the 2013 White Paper says as much.
NGF, your are correct about the Centurion and M1.
They do go into the same places,it is just that the hole is deeper when it rains.
They do not move in the wet season in the NT.
Bushranger is correct in this case.
What are the swim qualities/limits of the mod'd M113s?
Bushranger & Anon,
It is a fact that several tropical countries in our region have MBT's in their arsenals: Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore and soon Indonesia.
It is a fact that the USMC deploys tanks in tropical environments.
It is a fact that 50 ton Centurion tanks played a vital role in several battles fought by Australians in Vietnam - Binh Ba and Coral just to name two well known cases.
It is a fact that the Americans successfully used M60 tanks in Vietnam.
It is a fact that the North Vietnamese successfully used T-55 tanks during the last phase of the Vietnam War.
The counter-fact that we move MBT's out of the top end during the wet season in peace time does not render the above untrue.
Can you therefore please present some facts that would demonstrate that removing MBT's from the Australian order of battle would improve the Army's fighting ability.
Hi NGF; good debate. But the overriding considerations are what can Australia afford to operate and man at combat readiness?
My view is 7.5 percent of Federal Government revenue, properly managed, would provide a quite credible defence capability. That would be a reduction in funding on present levels; but if established as a non-exceedable benchmark, then defence planners would have to do their homework much better with wasteful spending across the DoD organisation needing to be ended.
It took conscription to field 9 infantry battalions for the Army during 6 or so years of the Vietnam War, but those 9 units were not all maintained at combat readiness. When a battalion finished a 12 month tour, it was reduced to a skeleton and then began rebuilding over a year with an new intake of Nashos. The next year would be work-up training before deployment back to Vietnam the following year. So, the 3 year cycle effectively had 3 battalions deployed on operations, 3 in various stages of pre-deployment training and 3 re-forming. Similarly for units of the other fighting arms.
The Air Force had National Service training for a time but that ended in the late 1950s. The RAAF was then large enough to sustain the Vietnam commitment with relatively few personnel doing more than one tour. The RAN also managed Vietnam War commitments without National Service.
Consider the multiples of tours in Aghanistan performed by many in the ADF. That indicates the capacity does not exist to man substantial expeditionary forces for continuous operations. If that is the case, it suggests force structuring is too ambitious and may have to be rationalised, for all 3 Services.
Assuming the Australian military should be shaped principally for regional operations, then the affordable focus ought to be on what hardware is most suited for that level of capability and whether it can be maintained and manned at continual operational readiness.
Re tank involvement in Vietnam. The TAOR for 1 ATF was roughly only 200,000 square kilometres with the flatter terrain accessible by tanks reasonably laced by roads/tracks. We also operated a fair bit outside the TAOR (such as at FSB Coral in which I was involved), but that was flat pretty flat country about 40 kilometres north-east of Saigon and tanks were moved on road transporters. Binh Ba was only 7 kilometres from Nui Dat by road.
It was the M113 APCs that excelled in Vietnam; but the Cavalry were unfortunately much under-credited because they were often operating in direct support of other units and especially the infantry battalions. The Cav deserved much more credit for their efforts.
Most of the terrain in Australia's near regional wet tropics like PNG is far more challenging for heavy vehicle surface movement than was Vietnam environs, which is why there is heavy reliance on air (and sea) means for most forms of activity.
Apparently, some of the ADF Abrams tanks have already been consigned to storage!
Hi Bushranger,
A good debate indeed.
I can only agree that the cavalry did great work in Vietnam and could cover more ground than the tank squadron.
I also agree that Defence will always have limited resources and will have to make hard choices. I think we could afford a modest lift in spending - as long as we first stop the waste on multi-billion dollar projects that run over budget and over schedule: eg MRH90 and Tiger. (BTW, the Abrams were on budget, on schedule and comparatively cheap.)
Regarding MBT's... Australia's tank fleet (59) is already small by regional standards. (So you can imagine what I think about the decision to place some in storage!)
Tanks are a specialist capacity. They cannot go everywhere nor are they appropriate in all circumstances. But Australia's military history shows that a relatively small number of heavy tanks in tropical environments can contribute significantly to winning battles and saving Diggers' lives when the going gets rough.
Sure, there is plenty of terrain in the region that is not suitable for tanks. But most of the key urban areas (likely centres of conflict) are tankable and the road nets in SE Asia have developed rapidly in the last 20 years and carry large numbers of heavy vehicles (eg logging trucks).
I therefore think that the current plan for a ratio of 1 tank squadron per multirole brigade is about right - affordable and deployable when needed.
Cheers, NGF
Interesting concept, mounted on lighter vehicles than the Abrams, such as son of ASLAV,LAVH.
http://www.cmigroupe.com/en/p/ct-cv
Add the Trophy system Active Protection System?
Tanks that can't be used in the pacific, f111's that could not be sent to Iraq in 1990 because they were not battle ready, hornets that could only fly minor duties in 2003 because of insufficient protection, subs that are too unreliable to be sent to war, utility helicopters which are unfit for purpose, attack helicopters which are years late, AWD's (really frigates) which are more expensive than off the shelf American destroyers, a defence minister who is at war with the military, and the list is endless. What exactly is the Australian taxpayer getting for the enormous amount of money spent on the military? And let's be honest, if Australia really did go to war with a major country in the pacific, all it would be 1 nuclear bomb on Perth or Darwin and the country would capitulate.
Eric Palmer,
I know I'm a bit late to reply to this, but the M113 FOV has considerable amphibious capability. Here are a few notable examples.
The MTVL series (which were stretched and greatly-improved M113A3s, that were once to be designated the "M113A4") are fully amphibious without preparation. There are a lot of people who dispute that this was ever possible, but there is in fact a published photo of an IFVL (an MTVL with a 25mm turret) swimming across a lake. Lt. Mike Sparks made a video commentary on this, which shows the photo, and a news article that it was used in;
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hvh693TQmnY
That's a pretty big deal, because the combat weight of an IFVL is 20 short tons --- about 5 tons more than a regular MTVL.
The most amphibious M113 of all is the ARISGATOR, a product of ARIS S.p.a. in Italy. It has a special flotation kit that bolts together around any M113 (except possibly stretched ones like the MTVL, but I can't confirm this), which makes it fully-amphibious even in rough seas, doubles as applique armor, and includes a propulsion system. It's used by the Italian Navy's San Marco Brigade (as the "VAL"), and the product page can be found here;
http://www.aris-spa.it/difesa_arisgator_ingl.html
Here's a video of the ARISGATOR;
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O2_HqVNWPtI
Egypt's M113A2 Kader upgrade includes a foam-backed applique armor kit that not only proofs it against RPGs and KE threats up to 23mm shells, but also completely preserves it's amphibious capability;
http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product3767.html
There's also the AIFV series, which are proofed against 14.5mm rounds over the front and sides, yet still remain amphibious;
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gVSJ8Nas8RQ
The regular M113A3 Gavin is amphibious as well, though the US Army refuses to recognize it as such (at first because they were afraid it would upstage the Bradley, which was never safe to swim --- now because of the Stryker, which CAN'T swim).
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