That all depends.
For example, if it is the role of the U.S. to be Team America: WORLD POLICE the U.S. will need more aircraft in the class of the F-22.
Before the last cut in numbers for F-22 production, the USAF requirement toward the end for 383 was valid.
It was based around having 10 "AEFs". Air Expeditionary Force is a deployment management system that puts any unit in the USAF (combat, support, whatever) into properly managed deployment cycles. It worked very well. As an aside, with all of the mismanagement in the service these days (crying about budget cuts) the deployment management system struggles.
With 383 for the USAF and 10 AEFs, this would give you about 240 combat-coded F-22s, where 24 would make up one AEF bucket. The remainder of F-22s above the 240 being used for training, refurb and depot cycles, local phase/ISO maintenance, test and attrition replacement.
A contingency may require 1, 2, or 3 AEFs to kick in depending on the severity of the campaign.
Regardless, it was a good, predictable management system. You know that if you are in "X" squadron that your next AEF would be around "Y, M" year/month. This could slide left or right but it was at least workable.
Today with only 120 combat-coded F-22s and a fair portion of airframes that will be training only (that is what you get with an "A" model, a series of mistake-jets)... the USAF will struggle to not only keep power where and when it needs it, but just as important: deterrence.
The F-22 concept IS a good idea. It has been both poorly managed and well managed. Or in other words, inconsistent.
America needs F-22s and the follow-on next generation aircraft would do well to be an evolved F-22 design.
F-22B evolved for USAF.
F-22C FMS friendly for the "ABCs" (Australia, Britian and Canada) regardless if they go this way or not.
F-22D FMS friendly for Japan and S.Korea
F-22I FMS friendly for Israel
FB-22 2 air-crew. Streteched for 1500 mile radius strike.
F-22E Stripped not equiped. Degraded avionics/systems for other FMS.
Today, the F-22 faces some capability problems. When it goes to the merge, it does so without a high-off-bore-sight aiming capability for the AIM-9. This is a real concern as every other threat of worth has it.
For example, the SU-35 may not have stealth but it has the ability to jam down the AIM-120. It has the ability to acquire the F-22 via IRST. It has enough performance to be something much different from the easy "copy-kill" call-outs found in rigged practice combat. It shows up to the merge with HOBS dog-fight missiles. The PAK/FA will be even more challenging.
Currently HOBS won't happen on the F-22 until sometime around 2020. 15 years after IOC and 10-15 years before retirement. My money is on 10 years given some of the fatigue issues.
Not only does the F-22 need HOBS it needs an IR/optical terminal version of the AIM-120.
IRST on the F-22 would help also.
The F-22 does well in small numbers when mixed with other blue-air legacy aircraft. This combination is good enough to clear the table of legacy red-air threats. The F-22's passive AN/ALR-94 fused with the APG-77 radar gives the force a survivable AWACS/RIVIT-JOINT capability.
For the emerging threats, a small number of F-22s and legacy aircraft may not be enough.
There are solutions for quitting the F-35. The big one is to take all that talent currently used building the wrong aircraft and have it build the right aircraft.
Our allies will thank us for such a mature leadership decision: learning from mistakes.
(Click image to make larger. (APA image above). Correction to illustration. There are no external fuel tanks for the F-35. This was removed via a 2006 contract because of too much development risk).
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-Time's Battleland - 5 Part series on F-35 procurement - 2013
-Summary of Air Power Australia F-35 points
-Aviation Week (ARES blog) F-35 posts (2007 to present)
-U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) F-35 reports
-F-35 JSF: Cold War Anachronism Without a Mission
-History of F-35 Production Cuts
-Looking at the three Japan contenders (maneuverability)
-How the Canadian DND misleads the public about the F-35
-Value of STOVL F-35B over-hyped
-Cuckoo in the nest--U.S. DOD DOT&E F-35 report is out
-6 Feb 2012 Letter from SASC to DOD boss Panetta questioning the decision to lift probation on the F-35B STOVL.
-USAFs F-35 procurement plan is not believable
-December 2011 Australia/Canada Brief
-F-35 Key Performance Perimeters (KPP) and Feb 2012 CRS report
-F-35 DOD Select Acquisition Report (SAR) FY2012
-Release of F-35 2012 test report card shows continued waste on a dud program
-Australian Defence answers serious F-35 project concerns with "so what?"
-Land of the Lost (production cut history update March 2013)
-Outgoing LM F-35 program boss admits to flawed weight assumptions (March 2013)
-A look at the F-35 program's astro-turfing
-F-35 and F-16 cost per flying hour
-Is this aircraft worth over $51B of USMC tac-air funding?
-Combat radius and altitude, A model
-F-35A, noise abatement and airfields and the USAF
-Deceptive marketing practice: F-35 blocks
-The concurrency fraud
-The dung beetle's "it's known" lie
-F-35's air-to-air ability limited
-F-35 Blocks--2006 and today
-The F-35B design is leaking fuel
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