Reader Blacktail has provided a wonderful set of YouTube videos made from 2009, about the U.S. Army's faulty Stryker AFV. There are 8 chapters with multiple parts. I have linked the videos from Chapter 2 below which deals with Stryker protection or the lack of it.
I have been aware of Stryker failings for a long time. No other presentation method you may have seen on Stryker failings tops Blacktail's efforts.
I would go so far to say that these are award winning videos based on the information presented. The non-perfect presentation method has a charm all its own with the frack from a high-school band coronet around the 1 minute and 1 second mark of many videos.
I am a believer in the U.S. Army; to a point. What we can see is that in future real wars against non-dirt insurgents, the U.S. Army Stryker Brigade concept is less survivable than a Sherman tank in Operation:GOODWOOD.
This means all those Stryker Brigades are essentially undeployable against a hardcore threat. Please take the time to view all the videos in Chapther 2 below. And don't forget, there are 7 other chapters that tell of the Stryker fraud.
--Chapter 2 (Stryker protection)
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3 (best music award)
Part 4
Part 5
Part 6
Part 7
Part 8
2 comments:
The Army has ALWAYS stressed the Stryker cannot face an anti-armor threat. And it isn't an infantry fighting vehicle. It's an infantry carrier vehicle. It's to provide mobility to dismount infantry. Protection from fragments and small arms, and limited fire and ISR support is a feature, but not the primary weapon. The infantry squad itself is.
The Stryker addresses a couple different problems the army has long faced.
1. Dismounted light infantry had great strategic mobility, but once on the battlefield, lacked tactical mobility. Heavy combat forces lacked strategic mobility. Great on the battlefield, but if it takes 3 months to get there, the fight is over. The attempt to find a middle ground was obviously going to compromise the armor capability of any vehicle chosen. But the paradigm of the Stryker program wasn't "mech light." The brigades that converted to Strykers were former light infantry brigades. And however thin the Stryker's armor, it's a lot thicker than the cotton BDU shirts we had as light infantry.
2. The other problem Stryker addressed was a shortage of riflemen. A Bradley infantry unit has tons of firepower, but damn few riflemen. IIRC, in an entire armored division, with 4 mech battalions, there were less than 1000 dismounts. That's not a whole lot out of a 17,000 man division. A full-strength Stryker squad, in addition to a two man vehicle crew, is actually a squad, rather than an overstrength fire team that a Bradley carries.
You can argue that the Stryker is an imperfect solution to the problem of light vs. heavy. And I'd certainly agree with that. But the point is, it's certainly better than no solution at all. When the program was begun 15 years ago, before our current wars, the Army actually moved rather swiftly to choose, fund and field a program. As a consistent critic of overdeveloped weapons, you of all people should appreciate the rapidity and economy with which the Stryker acquisition program was run.
If not the Stryker, what then?
M113
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