The funny thing is that all 3 jets hobbled to Yuma, yet were envisioned last month by Amos to arrive together for this ceremony. He even wanted 2 of them to perform a slow landing and a vertical landing, respectively, for the press and Sen McCain. That was vetoed by the test community as they have no test instrumentation with which to telemeter data to ground test stations (which Yuma doesn't have, either). Enough STOVL things still have a limited life on them or can't be trusted without external monitoring, yet "probation" was cleared??? Oh, and the Yuma pilots were not qualified in Mode 4 STOVL operations, either. Details.
Only 1 jet was ready last week, so off it went from Fort Worth with its KC-130 tanker (TX to AZ w/o weapons...tell me about the great range again...) and an F-18 chase plane. The "operational" F-35B still can't squawk an IFF code, thus part of the reason for the F-18 chase. The F-35B encountered clutch heating problems before the halfway point, and was forced to a lower altitude to open up a cooling envelope where the clutch cooling fan could be used. Sounds like the clutch drag problem isn't quite as solved as LM and the USG have told us. Be advised that none of this involved converting to STOVL inflight, it was merely cruising in CTOL-type mode at 20K feet.
The second and third jets were to deliver together today. Alas, one had a flight control problem and had to abort. So one went on its own with its KC-130 and F-18 to Yuma. As it held for the ceremonial arrival, it lost all nav systems. So elegant.
The third one departed hours later after having undergone emergency maintenance (any pressure to perform on a day like today??!!!). And yes, it too had its own KC-130 and F-18 chase. It had yet to arrive and some press releases already stated that 3 jets were on the ramp at Yuma. That's our beloved press, to include the cut and paste aerospace press beholden to their advertisers - as you have pointed out so well, Eric. Can't wait to hear about the state of F-35B #3 when it arrived at Yuma.
Operational...hmmm, I don't think so
Wednesday, November 21, 2012
Faulty F-35s limp to Yuma's Operational Test Community
From a reader in relation to the Yuma fraud:
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29 comments:
If this is true, it will be interesting to hear how many flights this "operational" unit performs. Makes me really apprehensive about now having regular pilots at the commands when F35 hasn't finished testing and still would appear that a number of faults still exist. This is, sadly to say, an accident waiting to happen...
Why was the clutch heating up when in CTOL mode? Doesn't really make a lot of sense...
You guys seem to think that test pilots are some sort of mythical creature that has better hands and feet, better knowledge of aircraft systems etc than what a standard Fighter pilot has.
If a regular joe fighter pilot flies it within the cleared flight envelope, and has been trained to a suitable standard in emergency handling it is unlikely to be any problems that would make it far better to have a TP than a FP.
That presupposes a reasonable level of system reliability. How many aircraft is one willing to dump to prove a pet theory that the jet is ready for the ops test community?
Have they dropped any more bombs from the B model? I can only remember the one press release from Pax. I know the A finally dropped a bomb a few weeks ago. This whole thing stinks to high heaven. The Marine F-18 community cannot be pleased with the Harrier mafia. Could've had F-18F models with all the fixings by now and saved a bunch of money. And they would be there to support Marine ops on the ground with all the weapons in the inventory. And data links. Cancel this thing and get Marines tools that work, not what some retired enlisted USMC blogger without a modern clue wants to defend.
Mr Anonymous of the "regular joe fighter pilot" fame, you are sadly mistaken.
Though Test Pilots are gifted and members of "the golden arm" club, it is their exposure to the Engineering of aircraft design and flight at Test Pilot School and in their subsequent careers as Test Pilots that makes them a cut above your "regular joe fighter pilot".
However, the most significant point in relation to this furtherance of the concurrency risk so endemic in the JSF Program is releasing yet to be proven and certificated aircraft designs into the hands of fleet pilots without the requisite adult supervision provided by the flight test instrumentation and a competently manned Telemetry Ground Station.
Standard risk analysis and assessment says you can expect to see more in-flight mishaps,increasing in severity, while the probability of losing an aircraft or three, possibly with crew, is rising with every supposed 'operational' (and test) flight.
As for your belief that all will be well provided your "regular joe fighter pilot" stays "within the cleared flight envelope and has been trained to a suitable standard in emergency handling", good luck with that. You might also consider a few other bibs and bobs, like:
1. How can you be sure the flight envelope is cleared when the flight test program, like most other aspects of this program, is being done arse backwards?; and,
2. What about those emergency procedures that have yet to be developed e.g. recoveries from departures from controlled flight, FADEC overheat'runaway', etc?
Nico: The clutch heating is due to the clutch plates, though disengaged when in CTOL mode, 'dragging' against each other.
Horde
1. So are you suggesting that they wait until they actually have an inflight emergency before developing boldface procedures?
2. If they are operating in a relatively benign part of the envelope away from the nasty corners (which I'm sure they are) can you please explain why they are going to "depart from controlled flight"
3. I reckon that the powers that be understand the risks, have analysed things like MTBF for parts, severity of failure and all that sort of good stuff and have decided that the benefit is greater. Standard risk management.. It would seem that they are reasonably happy to proceed, because given the high level of scrutiny the program is under if someone did have to punch out there would be some questions.
Mr/Ms Anonymous:
1. Am not suggesting any such thing and to claim so is, yet, just another logical fallacy i.e. strawman.
2. Sadly, such mishaps only get explained during the accident/incident investigation.
3. Ah, the good old 'risk/reward' perception masquarading as 'Standard Risk Management. Ask yourself what are the rewards and who benefits from such parlous management?
Standby for the questions that will almost certainly be asked.
The above back and forth, like most back and forths about the F-35 and other high profile defense projects, boils down someones faith in authority and there identification with the authority. The exceptional thing about the above exchange is that the authoritarian actually outs themselves as such. Anytime someone is reckoning that the powers that be know what there doing chances are there doing it because they take comfort in having biases that are easily confirmed by those very same powers that be that they support and identify with.
Its amazing how often countries that value an open political process turn to unquestionable official expert wisdom to defend that open process. In recent history these same countries find thier increasingly unpopulad elites becoming increasingly embroiled in scandals and outright failures. The highest profile western general of the last decade can build an empire on PR olny to have it crumble because of his willy, which was probably the most adventurous part of this particular "heroes" anatomy. Still, somehow the people working for Lockmart (or who will be once they retire pampered and promoted) are above reproach.
"Appeal to Authority" - one of the many logical fallacies that LM got the DKE-ed senior officials in Depts and Ministries of Defence around the western world to use when they marketed the JSF to their political masters.
The others that were close behind included 'argumentum ad populum', 'non-sequitur', 'red herring' and that all time favourite 'strawman' while 'argumentum ad hominem' was used to stifle any countervailing views.
Horde,
1. If that is the case why then would you write "What about those emergency procedures that have yet to be developed "? What are they waiting for?
2. Cute.
3. All risk management is a balance, thats why you get risks As Low as Reasonably Practical, rather than as low as Possible... So given they have flown a bunch of instrumented jets a bunch of times, had a whole heap of Hardware bench tests, someone somewhere, has decided that the reliability is sufficient to take the risk... Obviously some may think it is premature. I'm sure the guy who will get the sack, and the guys strapping into the seat feel okay about it.
Sorry meant to add additionally that obviously for Aviation Risk management theyre probably using some sort of matrix looking at evaluating the probability of said critical failure and balancing with the outcome... numbers acceptable for different levels of outcome changing but for a critical outcome typically 1: 10million chance / 1 in 20 years being acceptable etc.
Anyway, the story Eric tells in the Op reminds me of the F-111 anyway.
Plan/Brief a 4ship, Walk 3, Taxi 2, Launch 1.
Eric, Nico and others:
Multiple sources have confirmed the comments posted by Eric to be, as many have said, 'spot on'!
So, you can take it as read.
Seems the 'fleet' is suffering from 'high fault rates' in 'various aircraft systems'.
Wonder why the 3.5 and 4th Estate folks have not picked up on any of this, yet?
Mr/Ms Anonymous:
1. A prudent,managed risk approach would be to, firstly, apply the knowledge determined from the information derived from the data acquired through testing (ground and flight), then certificating the aircraft on that basis before standing up an operational squadron. To do otherwise flies in the face of due diligence and duty of care. It is also quite innane and wasteful of resources.
2. ...but, sadly and none the less, true.
3. "All risk management is a balance, that's why you get risks". Mmmh. So, are you saying balance begats risks?
If so, that is an interesting view of the origins of risk.
This along with your other assertions about risk management are reminiscent of what some former aircrew (usually the non piloting types) senior officers say about risks and risk management without the logical and rationalising presence of any substantive Engineering experience or knowledge, let alone training in Risk Management. They know plenty of the buzz words, though.
Now, not knowing who hides behind your Anonymous title, can't say with any real certainty that you are one of them but....
Therefore, would be interesting to hear your considered comments about the identified risks and associated assessments outlined in the following:
http://tinyurl.com/abkguu8
And, while you are at it, you are welcome to answer the following question and outline the reasons for your answer -
Have the DMO and Defence followed their own risk management guidelines?
Eric and Mr/Ms Anonymous:
The link in my last post was to Submission 13 of the JSCFADT Parliamentary Committee inquiry into, inter alia, Australia's involvement in the JSF Program.
The submission page may be found here, if that link, for some reason, doesn't work -
http://tinyurl.com/brywgor
There are so many mistakes made by the F-35 program that repeated the F-111's follies. This publicity stunt is one of them, and it reminds me a lot of a cheap trick the USAF (Br)asshats tried to pull with the F-111D, which I learned about in "The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard" (the book --- not to be confused with the movie, which was largely fictionalized in order to avoid imaginary legal troubles that would result from naming names).
I'll just copy-and-paste my notes on that into the next comment, so I don't have to type the whole thing all over again. ;-)
And I reiterate --- my source on this is Col. James G. Burton's "The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard".
Here are my notes on the F-111D "Dog" debacle (I have to split this into more than 1 post, due to the length). See how many parallels you can spot!
- The F-111D Raven was an attempt at addressing the problems and limitations experienced by the earlier F-111A and F-111C (the F-111B never saw service).
- The single most celebrated new component was the Mark II avionics suite, which was claimed to allow the F-111D to fly at supersonic speeds over the deck, at any time of day, and through any terrain or weather conditions. However, it generally didn't work.
- As revealed in Franklin C. Spinney's presentation, "Defense Facts of Life: Plans-Reality Mismatch", the Mark II didn't work long enough or well often enough to be of any use. It also ended up under repair over 23 times longer on average than the USAF and General Dynamics had previously promised. Even more shocking was that every time an F-111D flew, a second had to be cannabalized for parts to make the flight of the first plane possible!
Continued from above...
- The F-111D was so expensive that the branch of the USAF that operated them --- TAC (the "Tactical Air Command") --- was literally pushed to the edge of bankruptcy by it. In May of 1978, the USAF informally stated to SecDef Harold Brown and Congress that they were going to retire the F-111D.
- The USAF also told Congress that they intended to replace the F-111D with a MORE complex and expensive aircraft; the "Enhanced Tactical Fighter", or ETF. This, in spite of the fact the F-111D had *itself* proven too complex and expensive for the USAF to operate without going broke!
- However, despite the fact that the F-111D was single-handedly *destroying* TAC, and that TAC had pleaded to Congress to get rid of it, the higher-ups at the USAF were far too comfortable with the "Dog" to get rid of it --- and they also decided to try to decieve Congress, SecDef Brown, and the public into believing that it worked just fine as-is. It all went downhill from there.
- In Spring of 1979, USAF Vice Chief of Staff Gen. James Hill put the F-111D back into the USAF budget. This drew fierce criticism from within the USAF --- notably Col. John Boyd's "TacAir Shop", better-known as the "Lightweight Fighter Mafia" --- that this should not have been done until the problems with the "Dog" were fixed. However, everyone wanting to keep their paychecks instead of *earning* them in the USAF leadership (i.e., ALL of them) just parroted the Vice Chief.
- TacAir Shop member and USAF analyst Franklin "Chuck" Spinney produced some particularly damning analyses and presentations on the F-111D. The Air Staff did everything possible to discredit him and refute his arguments, but Spinney was always 3 steps ahead --- especially since TAC commander Gen. William "Wild Bill" Creech, the man whom the Air Staff ordered to write the rebuttals, slipped Spinney copies in advance!
Again, continued from above...
- Later in 1979, the Air Staff came up with a Lucy & Ethel Scheme to trick everyone else into thinking that Spinney and the TacAir Shop were wrong all along. They had some F-111Ds forward-deploy from their base in New Mexico to the Australian Outback, where they would perform simulated combat missions. Six F-111Ds arrived in Australia and performed these missions, and the Air Staff boasted loudly about how that had "put the naysayers to rest", but it was soon be revealed that they slipped on a banana peel.
- It turns out that the whole thing was observed from start to finish by another USAF analyst named Frank McDonald --- who was also a member of the TacAir Shop. In a note to SecDef Brown on October 24th 1979, McDonald revealed that although 6 F-111Ds arrived in Australia, TWELVE had originally been sent --- of the other 6 that the USAF didn't mention, 4 broke down by the time they reached Hawaii, and the other 2 didn't even get that far. He also pointed out that the 6 F-111Ds were maintained by civilian contractor mechanics upon arrival --- not USAF ground crews. Even worse, ALL OTHER F-111Ds were grounded during this mission, so that the 12 aircraft sent to Australia would have enough spare parts to get there.
- McDonald's revelations were soon after admitted to the USAF's PA&E (Program Analysis & Evaluation) Chief Russel Murray in a letter written to him by USAF Under Secretaty Antonia Cheyes. An official admission was a huge embarrassment to the "Good ol' Boys" in the Air Staff, who told a civilian employee of the USAF named Willard Mitchel to change the story. Needless to say, this backfired big time.
- The F-111D scandal reached a crescendo on October 30th 1979, when USAF Chief of Staff Gen. Lew Allen briefed SecDef Brown on the status of the program. Gen. Allen painted a pretty picture of the F-111D, which made it come out smelling like roses. At least, that is, until Gen. Allen finished his briefing. Then Russel Murray produced earlier drafts of Allen's "talking points", which proved that Allen had just briefed Brown using FALSIFIED DATA --- it had been altered no less than twice to portray the OPPOSITE of the truth! Murray's rebuttal revealed to Brown that the F-111D's performance and reliability was getting *worse*, not better!
Here's the last of it --- sorry for making this so long, but the full story has never been told on the internet.
- The October 30th briefing was a double embarrassment for the USAF. Not only did it expose that the Air Staff were deliberately misleading SecDef Brown, but also because it was intended to be an internal rebuttal to a book written by James Fallows, titled "Muscle-Bound Superpower".
- Even after the USAF's embarrassments with the Australia Deployment, their dishonest rebuttal to criticism of it, and their exposed attempt to decieve SecDef Brown, the USAF *still* wouldn't yield. They just didn't know when to quit.
- The USAF's next Keystone Kops operation was to try to discredit Chuck Spinney's premise that Radar Bombing --- the main purpose of the F-111D --- is ineffective. Dr. Walter LeBerge, the second-highest-ranking civilian in the OSD who was in charge of developing new weapons, sent a very nasty letter to Russel Murray, with a video tape attached. The tape had the USAF's analysis of the F-111A's bombing results in the Vietnam War, including combat footage from the radar scopes. LeBerge triumphantly declared that the data, which showed that the F-111A's bombs landed close to where the crosshairs were laid, proved that Radar Bombing was effective. However, Murray got in touch with Chuck Spinney, who then pointed out in his presentation, "Defense Facts of Life" that the footage showed no referrence to the location of the TARGETS --- in fact, when the BDA (Bomb Damage Assessment) photos were overlaid onto the footage, they proved that the actual accuracy was FOUR TIMES WORSE than what the USAF had claimed! Moreover, Spinney also published a rebuttal to this letter, that proved the USAF had *deliberately* ignored the actual data.
- That should have been the end of the story, but in the Spring of 1980, things were about to get a lot worse --- Gen. Robert Mathis, previously the Project Manager of both the F-15 Eagle AND the F-111 Aardvark, became the new USAF Chief of Staff. Since the foundation of Mathis' power, influence, and credibility was in these aircraft, his involvement in them went beyond the realm of Advocacy, into Surrogacy; an attack upon the F-15 or F-111 was seen by Mathis as an attack upon him. Thus, Mathis made every attempt possible to sabotage and suppress every percieved threat to his pet rocks --- he portrayed the Reform Movement as anti-defense conspirators, who sought to tear-down the whole defense establishment. He even had the gall to frequenetly and openly declare that this camp of dissenting opinions were "dark and statanic forces" in his briefings and public statements.
- The solution devised by USAF Chief of Staff Gen. Mathis to prove to everybody that the F-111D and Radar Bombing worked, and the critics were all wrong, was a demonstration of the F-111D's attack capabilities. In this demo, an F-111D bombed an old aircraft hulk set near a runway, and the demo was declared a success. However, Col. James G. Burton (a member of the TacAir Shop, though Mathis never found out) pointed-out to the good General that the results were completely unconvincing --- the target was in the open on flat terrain with nothing to cause radar clutter, with no air defenses, and was bombed in calm, clear weather in broad daylight.
- The F-111Ds were finally retired in 1992, with few flight hours on them, simply because it was impossible to get them into the air over most of the duration of their service lives.
Little doubt the F-111D was a reach too far for the technology of the day and to market it otherwise was just plain silly.
However, the Australian experience with the F-111C was nothing short of outstanding.
Studying this and reading the likes of 'From Controversy to Cutting Edge' by Max Lax provides a different perspective to the mythology that surrounds the F-111 and its capabilities.
As for comparisons between the Programs of Record of the JSF and the F-111, the substantive aspects are really chalk and cheese. Some are outlined in Submissions to be found on the Australian Parliamentary website:
http://tinyurl.com/brywgor
*This is an unconfirmed report and wholly at odds with anything I have been hearing. whether Palmer is lying, or his source is just that wrong, I do not know
*The purpose of the ceremony was to stand up and activate VFMA-121, it was never intended to be a mini air show, especially with a Senator in John McCain who has been no fan of the F-35. General Amos is not so silly as to put on a show that would embarrass senator McCain.
*F-35Bs are trying to limit STOVL operations in order to not unduly stress components. If anyone has been to flying demos in Yuma they would note that the USMC takes even standard fare Harrier demos very seriously already, and several mini test flights with lots of mechanics checking between flights are standard procedure. the Marines weren't going to put on a mini air show with these details in mind. The purpose was to get the jets there and get some positive PR going, not blow your wod early and increase the chances of mistakes and embarrassment. In a few years, I am sure the STOVL demo will be so standardly uneventful as to be boring. Its a marathon, not a sprint, and opening with such a stunt would be unprofession and foolish.
*I also confirm what frontline says above about 1 aircraft Friday, 2 on Tuesday as well.
*In response to ELPs comments, and some of ELPs commenters (who's views are well censored) VMFA-121 is not an "ordinary unit" or one that is somehow beyond its depth. -121 is hand picked by the USMC. Its CO is a former enlisted infantryman who has been in Iraq 3 times in 2 seperate wars and is a well regarded fighter pilot, Its XO is a Naval Academy Grad. Major Liberman who flew the first F-35 to Yuma is a former enlisted Navy SEAL with an excellent reputation in both services, the Sgt. Maj. is an experienced leader and extremely well liked. Even the Admin guys are some of the most technically/mechanically gifted people I know (And my dad is an avaition mech with nearly 40 years experience, I know some very mechanically smart people) Their NCOs are first class leaders who know their jobs expertly. The F-35B is obviously a big deal to the Marines, they are not going to send a bunch of average joes.
*Forwarding ELPs blog to one of VMFA-121s people he simply asked "Who pissed in that guys wheaties?" Which tells me an awful lot
*Beyond ELP being wrong in so many areas with the F-35 already, We see this piece which shows a significant lack of knowledge in Operational procedures, and even basic nomenclature, to the point that he is once again lying, or his source is a newly arrived private passing on the latest rumor. I hope his source is just stupid, and Mr. Palmer isn't openly lying, or "inventing his source."
VMFA-121 just changed the game for those against the F-35. Many people believe the F-35 is just a heartbeat away from cancellation. That has never really been the case, but now its starkly evident that with the F-35 isn't a matter of "if" but simply "how many?" and the arrival of the Bees at Yuma proved that the Silent Eagle, or whatever will not be making an appearance. The Dinosaurs are starting to see the Meteor that has been inbound the last 10 years I expect the shrinking echo chamber to get really loud with horrifically "non factual" (Bulls**t) reports like EPL's before it hits and takes them out for good.
Best Wishes,
Superbugfanatic
Blacktail,
Thank you for sharing your notes. I have been getting really interested in the fighter mafia folks as of late yet I did not know that The Pentagon Wars was a book before it was a bad movie. I blame google... Anyways its amazing that the strongest arguments for the f-111 come from Australia. While I would not consider an American plane that was a failure for America a success no matter how it fiared down under, I am intereted in what made the experiences different. Im sure the Australians used the F-111 differently and had different expectations of it. They also have different strategic needs and goals, and they didnt have to pay the development bill. Still, I wonder if part of the problem on the US end was cultural. Can a hardware focused force make due with faulty hardware?
It's actually not true at all...it's fabricated. The delivery of one aircraft and then the two on the day of the actual ceremony was planned a long time ago. There were no issues. The jets hit the tanker due to holding for the ceremony.
So tell me. Which hearsay do we believe?
Will, let Google be your friend.
We are friends. Our favorite game is scapegoat. While I find search engines to be less helpful than they use to be, there are plenty of reasons for that. As for my occassional difficulty in finding accessible material on defense reform, I really dont blame google. Entrenched interest are good at staying entrenched, and that includes PR savy.
Will;
"I am intereted in what made the experiences different. Im sure the Australians used the F-111 differently"
Because we do,cobber.Read the published information.
Helpful, thank you.
Will:
Apologies for last anon post whom I suspect is not even an Australian.
And thanks to Blacktail for sharing his notes.
In some respects, the RAAF did operate the F-111C differently to the USAF.
For example, 'Kill Box Interdiction'/'Persistent Bombardment' tactics has their origins in the RAAF F-111 Squadrons.
However, we also did maintain the aircraft differently but worked closely with USAF and GD/FWD on any of the issues and problems that arose, identifying them and coming up with fixes often before our friends.
Hope this helps.
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