Some reads here and here from "The Strategist" (ASPI blog) in reference to an opinion piece by Mark Thompson.
Thompson may argue that:
"Even taking current shortcomings into account, Australia’s defence force is better equipped and prepared for action than at any time since the end of the Vietnam conflict."
But what is missing, the major issue, is proper adult supervision at the top of the ADF and Defence bureaucracy. Since a purge of Defence critical thinkers in the 1999-2002-era give or take a few years, we now are in no shortage of groupthink and management speak and style over substance. We may be able to do with a smaller ADF but it is less about the size and money spent and more about waste and gross mismanagement.
1.The Collins sub program is a disaster for billions spent and $700M +/- per year on sustainment.
2. The patrol boat sustainment is also very bad. There are around 5 of the 14 Armidale-class boats available and along with that, a variety of crewing and maintenance issues.
3. Our "new" amphib bought from the U.K. who are having a going out of business sale with military gear, is now in repair for 6 months since June due to a mechanical failure. It was marked good-to-go by our genius people that are supposed to look after these things before purchase. It was a response to the DMO-RAN cabal being unable to sustain previous amphib ships.
4. Our helicopter fleet is an expensive quesiton mark when lower-cost solutions will do. I suppose that as we get gouged more and more for gold-plated helicopter "solutions" the voices of the faithful will increase with their praise of the situation.
5. The air power roadmap is a mess. No one thought we would have to sustain old, classic F-18 Hornets out to the 2020s. But that is what is happening. Defence also wanted to waste money on dud jamming gear for the Super Hornet purchase. The Super Hornets were in response to late F-35s. Note: Defence made up all kinds of other reasons after the fact. The F-35 itself has been in serious trouble for years. After the nation spends somewhere north of $20-plus billion on patch-work, the faulty and tens-of-billions F-35 still will not have been here. I am curious what is a-ok with Defence when the Super Hornet costs around $23k per flying hour and the F-35 somewhere around $35k+ per flying hour? And, neither will be able to stand up to emerging threats.
6. Even though it has some problems, thank goodness for the Army. Which along with portions of the RAAF do provide some value.
7. A moribund Navy, an Army that will see more reformation and a RAAF that has some stuff that works and a bunch of other stuff that does not.
Of interest Thompson says:
"First, the sprawling Defence empire must be reformed root and branch."
Well, as I have mentioned, that is show-stopper; a deal-breaker. Any proposals before fixing that are cart-before-the-horse.
Also:
"Recent experience with the so-called Strategic Reform Program shows that this task cannot be left to the generals and mandarins. Outside intervention and independent oversight will be needed to reshape the enterprise so that it can be trusted with taxpayers’ money."
I will continue to observe for more great ideas out of the supposed people with bigger brains on these things than I.
---
-Defence White Paper Fantasy
-Analysing "The ADF Air Combat Capability- On the Record"
-Find out who is responsible for the Air Warfare Destroyer mess
-Analysis of Defence Materiel Organisation Major Projects Management and What Needs to be Fixed
-New DMO Boss warns the staff that business as usual is over
-Project of Concern list
-How dangerous is the Defence Material Organisation to our Defence Industry?
-Australia's Failing Defence Structure and Management Methodology
-More on the dud-jamming gear Defence wants to buy
9 comments:
Since a purge of Defence by critical thinkers in the 1999-2002-era give or take a few years...
Should that be a purge by Defence of critical thinkers, or am I missing a sarcastic usage of critical thinkers?
The worrying implication of the consistent failings within Navy and Air Force procurement and sustainment is that should we actually need to deploy all three arms of our military, the Army is going to get some rough treatment due to failings beyond their control.
@ Leper - Just goes to show the value of open and transparent discourse. ELP has thankfully appreciated your comment.
As for 'the worrying implication', there is at least one scenario that ends with the phrase "results in a whole Brigade finding themselves exposed to the risk of becoming shark bait".
Thanks Leper. I do offer one excuse which is maybe a bit weak but will do. I have limited time during the day to read, compose, and edit all the stuff I want to do. So, amusing mistakes like that will happen.
Take care,
Don't think that without an increase into the region of 2.5% of GDP all the "theatre force" ideas are realistic. The current level is good for territorial defence, beyond that - not so much.
Bravo Eric. Long overdue that ASPI was shed as the notion that an agency sponsored by DoD and big multi-national arms industry players can provide independent advice to government is ridiculous.
Distiller; I have noticed recently that a few of the commentariat are waking up that relating defence expenditure to GDP is just smoke and mirrors stuff. Percentage of national expenditure is what counts and I am tipping that might be near 8 percent of revenue when number crunching for FY2011/2012 evolves, provided true spending is actually revealed. That is about what it was in the 1930s when Australia doubled its defence expenditure due to the emerging threat scenario.
In 2010 dollars, Australia spent more than Italy, Canada, Turkey, UAE, Israel, The Netherlands, Iran; although Israel of course is very heavily subsidised by the US. See this link: http://www.comw.org/pda/120618-Military-Spending-Comparison.html
Notwithstanding that I see ASPI as superfluous, I do agree that the ADF could be streamlined toward better military preparedness based on providing adequate deterrence against interference with trade corridors and reasonable capacity for regional interventions. Australia is simply militarily indefensible against intrusion by multiple means.
The biggest savings though could be made in restructuring the defence realm toward a semblance of the framework existing pre-Tange Reorganisation in 1974 when the armed forces quite successfully managed their own hardware acquisitions. 3 separate ministries managing defence affairs is an absurd organisational shambles. Having non-military identities advise on what an appropriate defence organisational structure should be would be entirely inappropriate when there is a proven model for guidance. But change would require political will to clean out the organisation, including an over-ranked military.
Dear Eric,
I don't/can't dispute the alleged potential for a conflict of interest between ASPI and its sponsors and DOD-it would be great if ASPI was independent. But I raise my puny hand to defend what they do in teasing out and tabling Defence challenges, problems and ongoing deficiencies. Despite the smoke and mirrors they have to contend with in Russell Offices ASPI does it (in my view) fearlessly and more effectively than any other organisation I am aware of apart from ANAO whose TOR's are different by definition. ASPI whoever its parents and patrons are continues to be a small clear voice in an otherwise wilderness. Mark Thompson's work imho is particularly noteworthy. (And BTW I have absolutely no connection with ASPI or MT). Eric, if on this identified occasion MT has the qualitative assessment of the ADF wrong, and I agree with your preliminary assessments, that is probably because he was given crook information just like most everyone else is. I suspect that there are very few who have a good handle on the quality/effectiveness of the ADF's equipment and its performance overall because we continue to not objectively prove that in the operational environments as we should (and it is not clear to me who in DOD is provably accountable for this oversight). As one of the substitute methodologies some equate directly what we spend with operational effectiveness (more equals better). Its a noisy but distracting argument.
I am sure that many within DOD and Defence Industry would love to see ASPI canned but not for the reason that the organisation is in their pockets.
Cheers
Ely
Hi Ely; agreed that some within ASPI have generated worthy thought provoking-material and I ponder whether the Lowy Institute have considered offering them well paid positions. That organisation fosters much broader well-informed debate regarding defence issues and gets wider exposure than ASPI.
Like many, I have a problem with the Federal Government establishing and funding an agency (augmented by arms industry corporate sponsorship) to give them supposed independent advice. The politicians/DoD can really tell ASPI just to shutup whenever they like, but they would have more difficulty trying to do so with an outfit like the Lowy Institute which has a wide range of talented people involved who are prepared to challenge politico-military thinking.
Having said that; your reasoned argument is quality debating.
Dear Eric,
I think BR 71 is right regarding the desirability of independence. And I should yesterday also have acknowledged the work of APA who work tirelessly providing frank and fearless often leading edge advice usually on stoney ground. And that seems to be the problem. Who is listening? Whether it is comment by Lowy, ASPI, ANAO or APA, who is required to take account, address it and actually do something then report objectively to the taxpayer on improvements made or not? The annual DMO/ANAO PM Report is a (too self-serving and subjective) start. The Annual Defence Report is substantially subjective unverified feel-good stuff also. I suspect that we have become functionally lazy in accepting without dissent the usually poor quality of information on how the nuts and bolts or the hard business of Defence is "going".
To lurch a bit closer to the topic you mention Patrol Boat unavailability and the Armidales recently received a belting from the media for the cracking of their hulls because we were are told they have been chasing to hard and to often after the present flood of intending Australians. ADA helpfully (apparently) explained this was really all due to the class not being built to the right spec in the first place. But a few minute's checking reveals that ANAO reported upon the potential issue in its report #29 of 2004-05 (Armidale PM)including how the manufacturer (AUSTAL) and DSTO were going to work with Navy to get a scientific program in place to monitor corrosion, hull stress and cracking in the Armidales (see online DSTO 2006 paper "Installation of a Sensor Network on an RAN Armidale Class Patrol Boat"). Well,what happened? Did the seemingly appropriate risk management strategy work? Were we surprised despite it? Were is Navy's OIC Seaworthiness comment on all this? We should not accept the very poor coverage of the issue and the apparent consequence you report. It is a very simple example of what appears to be malaise within which Defence and Defence Industry are permitted to consume considerable resources usually without honest and objective account to the taxpayer. My bottom line is that the Commentariats need to be hardened up with more intrusive, independent and objective follow-up mechanisms however that is to be legally achieved.
Regards
Ely
PS Your robot test is a PITA (and I aint a robot!)
Advice from any expert agencies is not welcomed in Canberra and the recent Gillard Government effort to tag a disparate group of 3 as 'expert' exhibits unwillingness to appropriately utilise the comprehensive mechanisms of government for objective analysis.
The politicians and bureaucrats primarily respond to overtures from about 4,000 registered lobbyists, many of whom represent mostly foreign-parented defence industries. But recently, both the Government and Opposition combined to defeat a bill proposing much tighter controls on the activities of influential lobbyists. This clearly demonstrates the extent to which governance in Australia has been politicised and influenced by vast sums of money associated with many projects, and not just within the DoD realm.
The culture in Canberra seems to be a propensity to reject objective analysis and somewhat discredit the sources, with poor decisions usually being religiously defended. Nevertheless, I endorse Ely's bottom line view.
The only slight hope I see for change is a looming very significant economic crunch for Australia that will force streamlining of government structuring. Regarding defence, separate ministries for DMO and DSTO are a huge encumbrance and reversion to a single DoD with small DMO cells integrated into the individual armed forces offices would vest more accountability for project management back into the military rather than the Public Service, as presently. Input from expert external agencies might then be more heeded.
Alas; the track record suggests the politicians of both major parties would likely employ identities from the corporate world to advise what organisational changes ought to be made within DoD, instead of using the more effective pre-1974 model for guidance.
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