What should a future defence white paper look like; one that works?
I don’t think many in Australia know, but here is some advice from a U.S. Army guy 2 years after the scene of the crime that was the 2009 defence white paper. Defence CSI if you will.
Defence white paper wrong, says US officer
and
Defence strategy 'out of touch' with region
Certainly, with a culture of non-accountability, a broken procurement and sustainment system and an industry that can’t trust government, there is hope for Defence? I don’t know.
I do know that it isn’t worthwhile talking about much else until we dissolve the Defence Material Organisation (DMO) and give procurement planning (all aspects) back to the uniform services.
For Australia, that by itself is a strategy. Thinking of anything else before that is fixed won’t be very useful.
10 comments:
While we could definitely save plenty of money by relying on the US to supply any high-end weapons systems, we're making ourselves dependent upon the US, which doesn't appear to be a safe long term bet given their dysfunctional civilian and military leadership and unstable economy.
Whilst I agree that Aust simply does not have the capacity to "go it alone" in a major conflict, we do need to structure our defence force around the defence of continental Aust & our territorial waters.
As such I agree with the idea that our ground forces should be expanded, & structured around 10+ full strength, rapidly deployable mechanized battalions & associated support units.
Instead of the highly capable but gold plated AWD's, a larger fleet of ANZAC class frigates with a smaller crew requirement & expanded anti air capabilities would have been a better option IMO. Not dissimmilar to the German Type 212 sub, a small but highly capable boat with a smaller crew compared to the Collins Class, that would give us the capability to field more units at any given time.
As far as permanantly basing American equip in Aust such as the F22, absolutly.
Bravo Eric your statement:
'I do know that it isn’t worthwhile talking about much else until we dissolve the Defence Material Organisation (DMO) and give procurement planning (all aspects) back to the uniform services.'
The big challenge is convincing the politicians that restructuring of the Defence organisation along lines that once worked well, is essential. Maybe 5,000 public servants are superfluous.
Matt; the DWP2009 premise that Australia can be defended against armed attack is militarily impractical considering our geography, and why would anybody bother when it is so easy to enter the country legally and disrupt communications, utilities, etcetera to exert political influence?
But affordable military capacities to deter interference with trade corridors and provide light-weight military assistance in the region are realistic goals.
The acquisition of LPDs to move largish expeditionary forces embracing heavily armoured elements ignores the lessons of previous war-fighting and our long experience in PNG. Better to have 5 or 6 smallish amphibious ships and air transportable Army hardware such as the M113 APC which is more suited than anything else to wet tropics operations.
The MRTT and C-17 cannot go to many regional airfields accessible by C-130 and tactical air transport capacity is in decline. It needs expanding to embrace long range/long endurance fire support capability (AC-130/Harvest Hawk). We also need flight refuellable Blackhawks for special operations, submarine support and offshore search and rescue.
Essential utility helo capability should be reacquired through low cost upgrade of remaining Iroquois to Huey II and acquistion of more at just $2million unit cost. Huey II beats the pants off anything else for necessary hot and high performance and cost-effective maintenance and operations in remote areas; also deployable by C-130.
I largely agree with the thrust of what you say Matt, except not an enlarged Army. We need to get away from the stereotyped thinking of big and diverse Army structures and head toward lighter more flexible capabilities, as seems to be happening with some armies elsewhere.
Bushranger71, I may have not made myself clear in the time I had to post.
I dont believe that we should expand our defence force to an unsupportable size nor did I mean armoured in ref to mechanised infantry. By mechanised I am referring to the improved M113's & ASLAV's incorporating an anti armour capability such as the LAHAT from Israel. Our Army should be trimmed of units such as heavy armour that are logisticly hard to support & operate.
By trimming excess fat, a lighter, faster, harder hitting & more efficient army would evolve.
You are right in that Australia's size & relative isolation are a natural defensive barrier & even though we "sort of" disagree, this forms part of the basis of my argument.
As for the MRTT, what an "expletive" waste of good money. I view the aircraft in the same light as the AWD, effective but ultimatly too little & too expensive, with better options available. Unless we are prepared to at least double our order we will get no value as a tanker.
With refrence to the LPD's, we are not even going to fit a CIWS on them because...wait for it...the AWD's will protect them...what a crock.
As you said, light, flexible & fast is what is required, not big, expensive & cumbersome.
Hi again Matt; we are on the same frequency and some rationalisation of capabilities will be forced upon all 3 Australian armed forces by economics if nothing else.
The absurd Force 2030 'dream' and compounding of increasing defence expenditure toward that end - primarily aimed at giving defence industry certainty - is inappropriate and unaffordable.
The strategists have got it wrong and we need to focus back toward capabilities we had post-Vietnam when we operated extensively throughout the neighbouring archipelago. The capability gaps emerging through flawed defence policy are alarming and mostly generated by failure to progressively optimise in-service hardware (where cost-effective) to maintain continual adequate and credible military preparedness.
Talking lean and mean structures, methinks Army erred in not embracing a cannon/mortar tracked fire support vehicle in the M113 upgrade program. ASLAV was arguably a waste of funding and is too limited for operations off road in the wet tropics.
Regarding US basing in Australia; YES, even if only intermittently. US fortress Guam and Canberra are about equidistant from Darwin and our military capacity should be structured for northwards operations (South West Pacific Ocean), eastwards of China's perceived First Island Chain.
Hi, Bushranger,
The M113AS3/AS4 upgrade has a mortar carrier variant. It is carrying the in-service 81mm mortar at present, but Army has a long range mortar replacement project. I expect that mortar when in-service will re-equip the M113 fleet, providing better firepower.
The ASLAV-25 was the first Australian armour deployed to Timor during Interfet(in the middle of their wet season).
ASLAV's are also primarily based in Darwin (with some in Brisbane and Puckapunyal) and routinely operate in the far north's well known wet season. For a wheeled vehicle they have excellent off-road mobility and encountered few significant problems in the jungles of Timor from all accounts.
In any case, they are not a close combat, infantry carrying vehicle like the M113, so their off-road capability, despite it actually being quite good, is less important than it is in the case of the M113, due to the ASLAV's differing role. It doesn't need the ability to close with the enemy. It's standoff range capable weapon is very well matched to it's role.
In terms of lighter forces, they work very well logistically. Until you run into a force heavier than yours. Then they don't work very well at all. Heavier doesn't always mean equipped with armour. Most conflicts are now fought in built up or urban areas and conflicts are seeing an increase in RPG and other anti-tank weapons, high explosive effects (IED's, mines etc) heavy machine fire and extensive fortifications needing breaching.
In such environments "equalling" the force is not enough. You need heavy armour in such an environment as the Israelis have repeatedly shown. You don't necessarily need high end cannon equipped IFV's, but you certainly require armoured vehicles capable of absorbing a huge amount of punishment.
Vehicles similar to the Namer APC (based on a Merkava tank chassis) and armoured bulldozers are an absolute must for such environments. Light armour and non-armour equipped light infantry gets chewed up very, very quickly if you have to actually fight there.
Army experimented with "light" forces extensively in the 90's under A21, when light armoured vehicles and 105mm cannon equipped vehicles equipped the brigades (similar to American Stryker brigades) fared very well on open plains and in widely dispersed operations, but extremely poorly in close combat operations in either jungle or urban scenarios.
Hence why Army is moving toward a heavier force. A heavier force can work on the open plains and in widely dispersed operations at the cost of increased logistical effort and overall cost, but it can also work in the jungle and in urban operations. The reverse is demonstrably not true for the "light" armies.
Hi again Bonza.
I was aware that the M113 upgrade program includes a mortar carrying variant (http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Australias-M113-APC-Family-Upgrades-05133/), but ponder why a 120mm weapon was not embraced, as elsewhere.
The main thrust of my argument is we should be equipping more for regional wet tropics operations than for involvement in conflicts elsewhere, which might require different hardware. Tactical air deployability and off road mobility are key requirements.
I spent about 4 years overall at Darwin flying Dakota and Sabre with significant involvement in Iroquois operations throughout the northern archipelago. Vehicular operations in the plains country of northern Australia during the wet season do not present the same problems as in the rugged and wetter northern islands environment.
I opined earlier that Navy, Army, Air Force may eventually all be forced to rationalize their capabilities due to economic constraints. Thinking that way perhaps leads to more flexible and versatile hardware or a more general purpose approach. The Dutch Army and others seem to be going down that track, shedding heavy armour in favour of tracked 155mm firepower complemented by a suitable fire support vehicle. We should have moved earlier toward light weight tracked 155mm airtransportable artillery and shed much of the towed stuff. To again use Eric's expression: 'Just too many toys in the sandbox' at present.
I have difficulty believing that lighter air deployable forces would get too minced up in regional warfare. M113 losses and casualties in Vietnam were arguably acceptable with the threats not unlike those prevailing today, and the M113s have since been enhanced.
In my view, Australian defence planning got somewhat derailed in the aftermath of East Timor intervention and the notion of moving largish expeditionary forces with heavy armour around on cumbersome LPDs ignores the lessons of previous conflicts and the hugely penalizing protection implications.
Our more likely need would be prompt insertion/extraction of smaller scale forces, mainly by air means, with attendant modest size amphibious ship logistic support. It seems the Malaysians and other regional nations are on a wiser course aiming for smaller amphibious support vessels with just a few embarked helos. I suspect the LPDs will become a very substantial penalty for the ADF.
All just debate of course and nobody can predict the outcome of long overdue closer scrutiny of Australian defence planning, which now seems to be gathering momentum.
Sorry. The last bit from Bushranger 71.
Sorry just thinking aloud here, does anyone know if the Canberra/Juan Carlos class hulls can be converted to angled deck carriers? It is common knowledge that they have a ski ramp for harrier type ops but do they have the basics for angled deck ops? I was just thinking that if possible down the track they could be converted for fixed wing STOBAR or CATOBAR ops and a smaller more numerous class of vessel be used for regional ops. Perhaps they could be based upon multi hulls that deliver a few hundred troops or supplies at high speed and medium range a la HMAS Jervis Bay during the East Timor operation? And if needed then some form of air power could be provided by modified Canberra carriers.
It's only hypothetical but food for thought. Just wondering if anyone knows.
It's never been done with the JuanCarlos class, so I'm quite certain RAN would not be taking on such a project, they'd be more likely to look at a clean sheet design with an angled deck, than converting an existing design.
That said, I see little to no likelyhood that RAN will be operating fixed wing airpower at sea, any time soon.
At best we might see some future UAV capability, that is probably mre likely to be rotary wing / VTOL based, than operating in a conventional manner.
The only reason the Canberra Class have the ski-jumps, is because it was too expensive to modify the design and remove them...
That should give some insight into RAN and the Australian Government's thinking about naval airpower in ADF and the likelyhood of fixed wing air operations by RAN.
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