To add to what Johnno said, that I agree with, Doenitz was a masterful 'system manager' in organizing his service in the face of great hostility from Raeder and the Kriegsmarine as a whole (as well as a compressed wartime schedule) but had lousy operational competency, given that radio triangulation and intelligence gathering had long been known by the armed forces and was used almost exclusively by the Wehrmacht to provide excellent intelligence of both Russian and particularly American intentions, after D-Day when German aerial reconnaissance flagged.
To the problems of daily reports in an HF/DF environment must be added the confusion over who exactly had operational control that saw Doenitz constantly forced to reassign assets, just as they were beginning to score decisive attrition in an offensive setting. This makes a hash of conventional attrition math as not only does the included graph only show one half of the equation but operational redeployment had the effect of moving the lone wolf and later wolf pack units around to new theaters which were not yet familiar with them and did not have adequate (experience, numbers, technology) assets to handle them.
The SWAPR region is huge but the individual chokepoints are actually very focused and this makes the approach to them easy to defend with acoustic and radar sensorization as well as the both the chief countermeasure to submarines and their principle operational tool. Not the torpedo or even the AShM but the mine.
Bearing this in mind, defensive ASW cannot be taken in the same context because it must be, as all defenses are, a constant, not an intermittent, protection against casual attrition (think of the coastal shipping off the American East Coast, backlit by peacetime lighting, which were sunk in their dozens, within sight of shore...).
It must be further understood that a 17-21 knot, Diesel or Diesel Electric container or VLCC hull is not in any way similar to a 7-10 knot Liberty ship as indeed an SSK literally cannot catch one while submerged and must engage as it passes the bows.
This obviates the need for the convoy system even as it alters the balance between sensorization (a sub can hear another sub, through a CZ, from 30-45nm out, a destroyer only from 10-15nm with an LF Tail. While the surface ship that has a valid VTOL UAV, can find a surface target from _several hundred nm_ distance and this is something a sub simply cannot, for cost, match using throwaways) and match these to heavier weapon weight engagement distances.
This obviates the need for the convoy system even as it alters the balance between sensorization (a sub can hear another sub, through a CZ, from 30-45nm out, a destroyer only from 10-15nm with an LF Tail. While the surface ship that has a valid VTOL UAV, can find a surface target from _several hundred nm_ distance and this is something a sub simply cannot, for cost, match using throwaways) and match these to heavier weapon weight engagement distances.
Bluntly, it is very costly, both in initial hull costs and in joint deployment levels as force protection, to engage with a submarine compared to what an air dropped mine or AShM can achieve or even what a Frigate level small craft can do directly in the ASST/ASUW mission environment. And the latter vastly outnumber as well as value the submarine threat as valid commerce targets in an 'Air Sea Battle' condition of trade warfare.
Because of this, the assertion that-
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The starting point for any capability procurement should be to identify and understand the basic strategic need for the capability, and what it will be into the future, over the life of the capability.
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The starting point for any capability procurement should be to identify and understand the basic strategic need for the capability, and what it will be into the future, over the life of the capability.
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DOES NOT necessarily segue automatically into this-
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Given a primary focus on ASW, consideration must then be given to the style of ASW operations to be conducted. This in turn depends on the intended area of operations.
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Given a primary focus on ASW, consideration must then be given to the style of ASW operations to be conducted. This in turn depends on the intended area of operations.
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A submarine which is unable to penetrate a defensive ASW belt defined by submarine-only deep tether, influence or CAPTOR based mines is a useless offensive ASUW asset. A destroyer or helo carrier which cannot penetrate an ICD condition (Brown Water by the way is riverine, Green Water is the 'half tone' between Brown and Blue...) Coastal AShM defense does not require a defensive ASW submarine screen. And neither platform is worth anything if it can ALWAYS be outranged and outcosted by simple MARPAT solutions for individual, non military, commerce target attacks.
MENS (Mission Element Needs Study, what we need it to do) and COEA (Cost And Operational Effectiveness Analysis, what it costs to achieve the mission at a given utilization level in comparison with competing alternatives) absolutely must not derive a platform need from the simple assertion that 'Submarine ASW is the cheapest we can do to retain the platform capability at all'. That's cheating.
Until and unless you associate the full kill chain with the mission and the exigent threats to all elements of that kill chain, you can make neither an economic nor an operational judgment relevant to the strategic picture.
Do you have BAMS access? If you do (and by this I do not mean US Overhead in a permissive environment but organic and survivable, standoff radar assets like the AAS on the P-8 or the MP-RTIP on the Blk.40), you need a bigger boat for a 100-200nm+ cruise missile which can fire from not only beyond the terminal ASW zone of 10-15nm around the DDG or LHD, but also the 100nm of ASW sensorization and mining on either side of...Malacca for instance.
ASW when you are ASUW hunting makes _zero sense_ as a symmetric platform engagement where both sides are at risk of a 500 million dollar loss.
But longrange missiles which can be either-or land attack or anti-shipping dedicated from adequately sized (650mm) tubes or SLS does if it avoids the need for entrance to an A2AD ASW 'no go zone'.
This works for both friend and foe consideration.
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Torpedo tube launches are not viable for this regime of operation, and vertical launch tubes for cruise missiles will incur inevitable costs.
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Torpedo tube launches are not viable for this regime of operation, and vertical launch tubes for cruise missiles will incur inevitable costs.
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Nonsense, any missile with adequate range can be given a holding point orbit or route offset to compensate for multi-shot lag and so long as it is not necessary for ALL weapons to arrive on ALL aimpoints at spatially disparate target sets, it is usually possible for just a few aimpoints to be launched at a time, using modern, semi-automatic, torpedo loading systems, for as long as you have the HP air to do so.
The key thing to remember here is that a merchant ship will not typically shoot back but it's seaway is twice to three times that which justified WWII convoying systems. A sub which is offset from a choke point may never catch such a target with even a 50nm AShM and will waste that shot if it's not properly targeted. But with such targeting, the ability to fire from 100-200nm virtually doubles the LAR for a certain hit.
Similarly, the ability to use a similar (Klub/Milas/Ikara) system to put torpedos onto targets which an ASW bottom lay sensor system says is there but which are beyond direct convergence zone detection by the parent sub makes ASW a lot less difficult as the closure requirements just aren't there.
People forget that mines won WWII in the Pacific, not just through ubiquity along the transit lanes but also because the Japanese had little with which to sweep them. However; a mine is fairly easy to localize and kill today whereas a truly deep sensor system is not. If you have the ranged coverage to shoot what you see.
The converse is also true in that 'brown water' (on shelf) ASW is ASW in a phone booth where there is no place to duck below a thermocline and direct path returns may be muddy but are increasingly doable via digital filtration, so that subs which are localized are _killed outright_, no matter how noised the background flow is (the Clancyesque equivalent here is the sub hiding in the wreck of the Doria in _RSR_).
So really, _even if the mission is ASW_, it behooves both sides to pay for bigger tubes as longer ranged weapons, suitable for land attack or ASUW as well as anti submarine work and targeted via other standoff platforms or limited deployment risk (just another mine) USBS. And so stop trying to chase individual 20 knot commerce hulls with 8-12 knot SSKs looking for 'the perfect kill streak' because _convoying will not happen_.
And without convoying as risk to the SLOCs, you don't need large surface action groups, with or without ASW protection/missioning.
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Even assuming a potent acoustic and aerial detection grid in these areas of interest, to permit a defending submarine to effectively intercept a detected subsurface threat, there will be a strong demand for the submarine to dash from a patrol station to the intercept area.
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Even assuming a potent acoustic and aerial detection grid in these areas of interest, to permit a defending submarine to effectively intercept a detected subsurface threat, there will be a strong demand for the submarine to dash from a patrol station to the intercept area.
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Dead Wrong. You know where the choke is. You ASST seed that area with sensors and/or standoff BAMS coverage and SHOOT INTO IT based on targeting from offboard. We no longer live in an era where individual hulls cannot be hit in a cluttered battlespace. Missile onboard ATR/ATC is quite sophisticated and so the reality is that if there are growls coming from the coat closet, you don't turn off the lights and go in with a broom stick and an attitude. You point a rifle at the door and shoot through it.
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Autonomous robotic submersibles are also advancing, a good example being the LRI Waveglider (http://liquidr.com/technology/.... html). Devices such as this will present ppportunities to rapidly deploy sensor grids in areas of interest, putting a premium on quiet deep submerged operations.
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Autonomous robotic submersibles are also advancing, a good example being the LRI Waveglider (http://liquidr.com/technology/.... html). Devices such as this will present ppportunities to rapidly deploy sensor grids in areas of interest, putting a premium on quiet deep submerged operations.
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They put a priority on staying the hell out of the coat closet chokes where such _short range_ threats now exist and can be on/off cued by predictable locations of unmanned sea bottom sensors.
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The changing strategic environment does not favour the use of diesel-electric boats, with or without Air Independent Propulsion (AIP), in the most critical
blue water operating roles, given the demand for high, sustained transit
speeds and dash speeds. In offensive roles, penetrating into contested or
defended waters, advancing sensors will present unprecedented survivability
challenges for diesel-electric boats, with or without AIP capabilities.
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The changing strategic environment does not favour the use of diesel-electric boats, with or without Air Independent Propulsion (AIP), in the most critical
blue water operating roles, given the demand for high, sustained transit
speeds and dash speeds. In offensive roles, penetrating into contested or
defended waters, advancing sensors will present unprecedented survivability
challenges for diesel-electric boats, with or without AIP capabilities.
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By your own definition, coastal cruise missile attacks take the range-ring beyond the hope of any effective defense by submarine or network USBS due to simple standoff. Nuclearization (30 knot 'supercruise') will not overcome this sensorization deficit to make the the submarine somehow more viable as a defensive ASW tool. The threat boat will simply be long gone by the time you first indication of attack occurs. Assuming anything else is assumes a confirmation bias in favor of supporting the submarine in this role when in fact you are better off defending against the arrows rather than the shooter.
'Defensive' ASW in such a scenario has to begin -offensively-, tracking threat subs as they come out of the barn. This implies strategic foreknowledge of an attack which is equally untenable in a small force which is not in constant deployment rotation to sit off the enemy shore, listening.
However; it does reinvigorate the argument for a 'slow boat' alternative as long range missile shooter, in an ongoing war state condition where close approach is not an issue and targeting does not have to be direct.
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It follows that the merit of any diesel-electric solution to Australia’s extant
and future strategic needs must be critically assessed against some achievable capability and cost baseline. A good baseline for comparison is
the US Navy’s nuclear powered Virginia class SSN/SSGN, which has been
repeatedly proposed in the submarine debate as the solution for Australia.
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It follows that the merit of any diesel-electric solution to Australia’s extant
and future strategic needs must be critically assessed against some achievable capability and cost baseline. A good baseline for comparison is
the US Navy’s nuclear powered Virginia class SSN/SSGN, which has been
repeatedly proposed in the submarine debate as the solution for Australia.
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No. It follows that if you want to kill a tiger you use a tall elephant because the asymmetry of the cat being unable to reach the top of the elephant (as altitude) is matched to the effects dominance of the 'uninvolved' riders in the howdah.
You are doing symmetric studies and not allowing for the tall elephant effect-
A C-295 costs 28 million. A Type 218 runs north of 600. Even if you add another 50 million for customized mission equipment suite and weapons, the total PAUC and Lifetime costs are not compareable while the realities of war at sea are so different from those of war overland (distances as nothing to hide behind) that you are not confronted with 'surprise fighter presence' or 'SA-21s recently purchased from Russia'.
Until and unless you HONESTLY match mission elements to alternative platforms and even services, you are not performing an honest, unbiased, analysis.
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Clearly, there is not a compelling strategic or budgetary case for a dieselelectric solution to SEA 1000, versus the procurement of an Evolved Military Off-The-Shelf (EMOTS) Virginia class derivative boat; that is, if blue water roles are the strategic priority for Australia, which they should be.
Clearly, there is not a compelling strategic or budgetary case for a dieselelectric solution to SEA 1000, versus the procurement of an Evolved Military Off-The-Shelf (EMOTS) Virginia class derivative boat; that is, if blue water roles are the strategic priority for Australia, which they should be.
Conversely, there is a compelling strategic and budgetary case for Australia’s
political leadership to put aside ideological and commercial agendas and
open the submarine contest to nuclear powered boats, with a specific focus
on the Virginia class. Ultimately, strategic effect per dollar invested must be
the final determinant in the SEA 1000 program.
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political leadership to put aside ideological and commercial agendas and
open the submarine contest to nuclear powered boats, with a specific focus
on the Virginia class. Ultimately, strategic effect per dollar invested must be
the final determinant in the SEA 1000 program.
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Dishonest and Agenda driven intellectual codswallop. First, if industrial base sustainment is a legitimate program element if not goal and Australia lacks such modern capability in SSKs as evidenced by it's destruction of Collins class upgrades by making longitudinal cuts through the seaframe and requirements for German, Swedish, French and Japanese manufacturers to build in Australia; then the adoption of nuclear Sub Safe equivalencies for a nuke boat will be twice as hard to create and sustain while further reducing the shortlist of eligible contenders to take an RFI/RFP to a very small competitor group indeed.
Second, nuclear programs extend far beyond the immediate hull life of the boat and included costs on what amounts to 'forever' as secure sequestration of the core hull in controlled environment conditions.
Not only are nuke boats not cheap but their costs extend well beyond those of acquisition. While the third largest producer of Uranium, the total lack of an Australian nuclear power industry brings with the purchase of a 'pure' nuclear boat a nightmare of incipient standup logistics and security support, from scratch.
Even ignoring the added noise factors and detectable radiological signatures and radiological mazcat risks of a nuclear steam kettle in shallow waters, in wartime, nuclear boats for Australia are a step too far.
That said, the principle problem with AIP is it's endurance and the critical vulnerability of even Lilon batteries is the eventual recharge interval which means snorting at the surface as a blatantly detectable signature.
A partial resolution to this might come from the ability to separate primary propulsion from combat systems load draws on tuned lithium battery stacks. And the means to such a load splitting, while nuclear, doesn't imply a full cooling loop as it's own volumetric bias. An RFG or BVB might require 10 tons of insulative protection and produces electricity directly whereas AIP is reliably a 200 ton hull insert as plumbing modification.
Something to consider.
ARGUMENT:
IMO, the true drivers on submarine warfare will be trifold:
IMO, the true drivers on submarine warfare will be trifold:
1. Effects Based.
Small, supersonic, turbofans and reliable scramjet technology will greatly increase the distance and profile options of weapons as well as increasing their speed.
Small, supersonic, turbofans and reliable scramjet technology will greatly increase the distance and profile options of weapons as well as increasing their speed.
2. Multi-environment NCW Targeting.
With the range of 500-1,000lb class weapons quadrupling and their speeds trebling (to the extent that they become partial KE weapons as well as better defense penetrators) the need to provide targeting beyond that which a submarine can generate 'from the mast' or even the lateral arrays will grow. And with that need will come the requirement to relay, securely, in the absence of assured overhead. We haven't seen this as either buoy or UAV based, directional MEMS/AESA based systems development lines. At least not in the white world.
With the range of 500-1,000lb class weapons quadrupling and their speeds trebling (to the extent that they become partial KE weapons as well as better defense penetrators) the need to provide targeting beyond that which a submarine can generate 'from the mast' or even the lateral arrays will grow. And with that need will come the requirement to relay, securely, in the absence of assured overhead. We haven't seen this as either buoy or UAV based, directional MEMS/AESA based systems development lines. At least not in the white world.
3. Power Generation.
This will indeed be pointed towards true 'submarine' class performance rather than submersible boat limitations but will be done as a function of equal parts reduced crew volume, increased systems density/reliability and _specifically_ by convergent design evolution which rids the boats of two out of three of the primary power/propulsion generators.
This will indeed be pointed towards true 'submarine' class performance rather than submersible boat limitations but will be done as a function of equal parts reduced crew volume, increased systems density/reliability and _specifically_ by convergent design evolution which rids the boats of two out of three of the primary power/propulsion generators.
Whether that be Diesel/Battery/AIP/Nuclear/Exotic, something will have to give so that more volume can be provided for the remaining methods to gain in endurance and raw performance to levels comparable to nuclear boats.
This will NOT be because of the need to avoid shots (SCT based active protection systems will rule and gyrotrons with tailored impulse/UWB generation to penetrate airgaps as well as saltwater will follow) but rather to deploy and track at useful silent speeds in the 15-20 knot sustained realm.
CONCLUSION:
Until and unless we see real evidence of the above, predicting a systems spec for the Collins replacement is an exercise in sheep-gut prognostication based on a 2030 in-service date.
Until and unless we see real evidence of the above, predicting a systems spec for the Collins replacement is an exercise in sheep-gut prognostication based on a 2030 in-service date.
As such, it will be better for Australia to continue to explore alternative (airborne) sensor and payload systems while purchasing _small numbers_ of direct buy (cheaper) hulls from a well qualified source. I like the Type 218 but the Swedes and the French also have good boats.
The key to this 'Gen 4.5' equivalent transitional capability will be to familiarize crews with modern systems and maintain high competence on an up to date hull while PLANNING (MENS+COEA) for a genuine followon solution.
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