Here is another news piece which tells us what we already know. That would be: even if the Air Warfare Destroyer requirement was rock solid, it was still poorly planned. I am not convinced on the need/requirement.
Mr Thorne, the general manager of land and maritime with DMO, said the big problem with the project had been low productivity at the ASC shipyard.
"There are no tired divisions; only tired Division Commanders. -George S. Patton-
Add poor project planning from years ago. That will always produce lower productivity if you force it. Chickens coming home to roost.
Some still report that the project is $800M over budget.
It is not.
Along with that, there is a U.S. $275M sustainment contract coming.
This would be for the obsolete variant of the U.S. AEGIS system that was picked for the Hobart-class.
I do not believe the following words:
"The Hobart-class air warfare destroyer (AWD) programme is intended to deliver an affordable, effective, flexible and sustainable platform to the Australian Navy.
The AWD programme, known as SEA 4000, will deliver three advanced multirole warships to replace the FFGs of the RAN."
The current Defence Minister has a plan. It starts out with blaming Labor.
And then blaming Labor.
No hint that if we want to play political football, it was the other party and friends that handed us the troubled Air Warfare Destroyer program.
And off-topic a bit but hang in there for one of the connections: the DM mentions RAND but note that this report doesn't tell us much about the Collins submarine replacement.
There is also more talk making the rounds about the Japanese for the sub replacement.
What we can learn from the Japanese is:
1. Continuous build.
2. Not putting up with morons when it comes to big project management.
We will hand it over to Hans. He is one of the guys that convinced Australia it needed to build the Collins. Odd how some don't mention or don't know that fact.
"This reflects the views of the former chief executive and managing director of ASC, Hans Ohff, who gave an important address last March to a conference in Adelaide on Australia’s Future Submarines.
Mr Ohff said: “In its wisdom, or more the lack of it, the Government no longer funds a Naval Design Directorate, and the corporate memory of vast numbers of civilian and government naval engineers is largely lost for ever.
“As to artificers, the RAN no longer schools apprentices. A 38-week basic technical training course will have to do since much of its skill-based requirements are outsourced to the private sector, which now rarely indentures new apprentices itself.
“From the mid-1990s onwards the federal and state governments discontinued their campaigns for local manufacturing.”
Mr Ohff pointed out, however, that maintaining a naval shipbuilding capability was needed to preserve the sovereignty of Australia. He said: “Notwithstanding binding treaties, bilateral agreements and an historical connection with the Anglosphere and NATO, our guarantor, the United States, may not be able or even prepared to rush to our aid at a moment’s notice.
“It is therefore prudent to plan for uncertainty, and to be sufficiently realistic in our planning to include scenarios that require us to be largely, if not wholly, self-sufficient in our ability to maintain, repair, upgrade and, when required, rapidly expand the future submarine fleet.
“Why, I ask, would anyone even contemplate anything other than building and maintaining the RAN’s next generation submarine squadron also in Australia?”
Emphasis added.
The Japanese sub bit is important to the Air Warfare Destroyer for another reason. An audit of the Air Warfare Destroyer project showed that export inexperience of the Spanish contributed to some of the problems. The Japanese, will have that same issue to get over, if they are selected for the Collins sub replacement. This can only magnify risk.
As for the Air Warfare Destroyer, weapons integration is still some ways off. Based on the current ships project history, we will see more, significant problems. All of those changes to the original design, are just waiting to provide their own, unique kinds of trouble.
Trouble for a deskilled, entrenched defence bureaucracy.
-New Defence White Paper fails to address Australia's core security needs
-2009 Defence White Paper Fantasy
-Analysing "The ADF Air Combat Capability- On the Record"
-Find out who is responsible for the Air Warfare Destroyer mess
-Analysis of Defence Materiel Organisation Major Projects Management and What Needs to be Fixed
-New DMO Boss warns the staff that business as usual is over
-How dangerous is the Defence Material Organisation to our Defence Industry?
-Australia's Failing Defence Structure and Management Methodology
-More on the dud-jamming gear Defence wants to buy
-ADF cost per flying hour
-I will wipe out bullying vows new Defence chief (Houston 2005)
-Vacancy
-Put Vol 2 Report of DLA Piper Review into the light of day
-Rory and Jim
-Parasitism as an Abstraction for Organizational Dysfunctions
-Hobart-class "Air Warfare Destroyer" to be fielded with obsolete radar guidance technology
-The Decay Of Critical Military Thinking And Writing-With Particular Reference To The RAAF
-The great M-1 tank myth
-*UPDATE* Fear and loathing in Canberra - Audit released on MRH-90 helicopter project
-RAN bullies contractor over Collins sub replacement
-2014-15 ADF budget shocker - Star-ranks
-Air Warfare Destroyer -- Billions, not millions over budget
-Australia's M-1 tanks are... a downgrade compared to what it had
-Weak links put on rubber-stamp Defence panel
-Insert Joke Here
-Tyranny of distance--Long, drawn out helicopter projects are unsustainable
-2014-15 ADF budget shocker - cost per flying hour over the last budget year
-Tiger savaged by Navy League of Australia
-Tiger helicopter update
-Overview of corruption in Australia
-Government ignores its own 'rescue' report created to fix Air Warfare Destroyer woes
-DM Johnston fired in cabinet reshuffle
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