Sunday, July 13, 2014

More in regard to Canberra disallowing real change for Defence

Comment from a reader worthy of its own post. In regard to used equipment and other things...

Bushranger 71

The problem for Australia Eric is support of mostly foreign-parented defence industry takes precedence over maintaining continuous credible and cost-effective military preparedness.

For decades, there has been a 'replacement' mindset in Canberra, usually driven in response to lobbying from the major arms manufacturers supported by their home politicians at the highest levels. This results in equipment requirements being formulated around a minority of new platforms, mostly hitherto unproven operationally. It is thus not a genuine competitive process because t he cost- effective options of optimizing proven platforms in service are largely dismissed, also the obvious benefits of being a downstream customer.

Australia has ideal dry climate storage for supposed obsolescent air platforms at Woomera, yet we choose to virtually give them away and they are eagerly snapped up by the rest of the world. There are still former RAAF C-130A operating elsewhere and 5 x refurbished C-130E are an airlift mainstay of the Pakistani Air Force.

The major defence policy shortcoming is lack of clearly defined capabilities requirements for r egional military operations. If such virtually unchanging criteria were established and any hardware wish lists generated by the military, politicians or whoever were subjected to rigorous cost-effective analysis at the outset and all subsequent steps of acquisition proposals, it would be less likely that unsuitable and unaffordable platforms would ever be acquired. A strengthened cell of the Australian National Audit Office with appropriate scrutineering clout would be the obvious justification auditing vehicle.

Had such a process been in place, would acquisition of 2 x LPDs have originated when there are arguably more suitable amphibious support platforms for regional archipelago operations?

None of the then reigning Service Chiefs were held accountable for allowing the previous RAN amphibious support capabilities to slide toward unseaworthiness. Yet what was the strategic threat scenario justifying knee-jerk acquisition of the Largs Bay (HMAS Choules) and Skandi Bergen (ACV Ocean Protector) when a more measured approach would have been appropriate?

Neither of these platforms were subjected to adequate scrutiny and the latter was built as an offshore support vessel for the oil/gas industry and apparently acquired via the defence vote (a very murky transaction not hitherto adequately exposed), yet is now operated by Australian C ustoms a nd Border Protection Service!

It is a buyer's market for some good condition well-proven military hardware, as evidenced by the RNZAF acquisition of former RAN Seasprites; but the Canberra culture has to change from just throwing money at rent seekers for political purposes toward basing military hardware requirements on fundamental regional capabilities. Alas, I cannot see that happening with either of the major political parties in Australia as they are too captive to US and Brit hegemonic influences.

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