You can read the whole thing but what is stated in summary is clear enough:
Findings
The F-35 Program did not sufficiently implement or flow down technical and quality management system requirements to prevent the fielding of nonconforming hardware and software. This could adversely affect aircraft performance, reliability, maintainability, and ultimately program cost. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company (Lockheed Martin) and its subcontractors did not follow disciplined AS9100 Quality Management System practices, as evidenced by 363 findings, which contained 719 issues.
The Joint Program Office did not:
• Ensure that Lockheed Martin and its subcontractors were applying rigor to design, manufacturing, and quality assurance processes.
• Flow down critical safety item requirements.
• Ensure that Lockheed Martin flowed down quality assurance
and technical requirements to subcontractors.
• Establish an effective quality assurance organization.
• Ensure that the Defense Contract Management Agency perform adequate quality assurance oversight.
In addition, the Defense Contract Management Agency did not:
• Sufficiently perform Government quality assurance oversight of F-35 contractors.
Why is this really bad? Because this is 2013 not 2007.
Why is 2007 important?
Back in 2007, a Lockheed Martin year in review video stated that the F-35C carrier variant (CV) JSF had passed critical design review (CDR). The video and similar public statements said, "2007 saw the completion of the critical design review for the F-35C. The completion of CDR is a sign that each F-35 variant is mature and ready for production." Ditto for the A and B.
All the happy language about production learning curve for the past 5-6 ears seems to be a deception.
The fan-club writer at Reuters tries to explain today's news away with this title heading:
Lockheed, Pentagon cite improved F-35 quality work since end 2012
It is difficult for the F-35 fan-club to claim lower prices and an effectively engineered combat aircraft when the team management of DOD/Lockheed Martin are not following quality production standards.
There are also no effective mission systems on the aircraft that would qualify it as a combat system. 12 years after contract award.
The idea that there is somehow a $109M or $89M F-35 is fantasy.
Actual costs from the FY2014 budget request:--F-35A $176m, F-35B $237m, F-35C $236m (PDF)
The following article describes workers but given all the cash we have handed over to the defective F-35, it may as well be an analogy about the competence of any involved senior program official: Lockheed Martin Workers Caught Boozing It Up On Break
"The air superiority this nation has enjoyed for 60 years is not an accident and gaining and maintaining it is not easy. I believe the F-35 is essential to ensuring we can provide that air superiority in the future."
-- Air Force Gen. Mark Welsh III, during testimony at a Senate Armed Services subcommittee hearing in June--
The general is a fraud.
-Time's Battleland - 5 Part series on F-35 procurement - 2013
-Summary of Air Power Australia F-35 points
-Aviation Week (ARES blog) F-35 posts (2007 to present)
-U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) F-35 reports
-F-35 JSF: Cold War Anachronism Without a Mission
-History of F-35 Production Cuts
-Looking at the three Japan contenders (maneuverability)
-How the Canadian DND misleads the public about the F-35
-Value of STOVL F-35B over-hyped
-Cuckoo in the nest--U.S. DOD DOT&E F-35 report is out
-6 Feb 2012 Letter from SASC to DOD boss Panetta questioning the decision to lift probation on the F-35B STOVL.
-USAFs F-35 procurement plan is not believable
-December 2011 Australia/Canada Brief
-F-35 Key Performance Perimeters (KPP) and Feb 2012 CRS report
-F-35 DOD Select Acquisition Report (SAR) FY2012
-Release of F-35 2012 test report card shows continued waste on a dud program
-Australian Defence answers serious F-35 project concerns with "so what?"
-Land of the Lost (production cut history update March 2013)
-Outgoing LM F-35 program boss admits to flawed weight assumptions (March 2013)
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