We have had some failures as an organisation, but I want to put that into context. DMO has many projects that run for 10 years or more – they are big and complex. I have had some work done – that I can't detailed just yet – benchmarking ourselves against the private sector. The preliminary results are very positive.
Typically, we do not have problems remaining within our budgets this seems to be an ongoing method defence projects experience regular budget blowouts. They do not. Around 98% of our work is on or under budget – and that is a better result than industry itself is able to achieve.
How many years did that M-113 upgrade take?
H/T-SR
7 comments:
Those benchmarks comparisons to the private sector will be interesting to read, assuming that there's anything but fluff left in them once they reach the public.
However, is it really fair for DMO to compare itself to the private sector? How many business make the same sorts of risky, complex and expensive purchases of hardware regularly? More to the point, how many businesses regularly overpay for late and under-achieving products, while still remaining in business?
The M113 upgrade took ten years. Pretty complicated project, using existing automotive skills abounding in that region of Victoria. Falls right into that scenario Mr King.
Might be as funny as that other report by the Helmsman Institute that set out to compare project complexity between defence and other sectors.
That one was quite a report and well worth the read, if only for the jokes.
Ah, yes, Monty - the report on complexity in the DMO by the Helmsman Institute.
Should have been titled -
"How DMO processes and senior management overcomplicate things"
Prima facie this document actually validates the Dunning-Kruger Effect is alive and dominant in the DMO.
Much of the analysis of "soft complexity" and "complexity" in general is based on interviews with DMO staff so a more accurate label would be "internally perceived complexity" rather than "complexity".
Helmsman have been measuring primarily perceptions rather than objective hard parameters - if the latter has been measured there is no substantiation for such in the document, other than some claims made by the document author.
What is of concern is that the document fails to cleanly separate the "perceived" from the "objective measurable" and in places seems to confuse the two.
While such confusion is characteristic of DMO one would expect a consultant looking at the problems in the organisation to be capable of separating the two.
Perceptions are reality? Indeed!
Though important, perceptions are only half of the equation.
As a former Marine Corp Commandant said some years ago:
"Perceptions + Knowledge of the Facts = Reality".
Now, if a Marine Commandant understands this, surely Warren can, too.
Though, judging from the reported statement, this might be a bit too challenging.
Leper - you make some very good points.
I would posit that the development of an off shore processing ship for the North West Shelf energy fields is a pretty challenging project and, to reinforce your point, must be done while still making a profit, let alone remaining solvent.
And how many lines of code are there in the software load of an A-380 Airbus and how much of that software is 'mission critical'?
For Bonza:
Your last on a previous thread intimated you and I have the same level of knowledge.
Nothing could be further from the truth, mon ami.
That is like claiming the JSF and the F-22A are both truly 5th Generation fighter aircraft.
Capiche?
I found what Horde is talking about.
Now I understand what the Dunning Kruger Effect means.
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