In the article toward the end it states this.
The move will also make the Navy's case for the new Ford-class carrier harder to make, Sharp said, noting that the Navy could bolster its amphibious fleet as a way to fill that gap.
I agree with the Ford issue. I think the other part depends. Besides the point that an Amphib makes a poor substitute for a carrier against first team threats, in a future with higher prices for fossil fuels, this could be a problem. For force projection in high fossil fuel price times, if you have an all nuclear aircraft carrier group (1 carrier, 2 nuke destroyers, and 2 nuke attack subs), the fossil fuels you bring out to the fleet for replenishment will be less.
The Navy needs to develop a nuclear powered (no outrageous frills) destroyer to escort carriers. This makes good sense and is safe in the long run.
2 comments:
The question is: could icreasing the subfleet make up for the loss of carrier strike groups as long as they are equipped with longe range and eventually dual-mode subsonic-hypersonic cruise missiles. For the Atlantic region and Carribean and Mediterranean the Navy could purchase U212s, let's say 30 of them, continue to fully fund the Virginia class submarine program and have the Virginias operate in the Pacific region. How do pay for it? Cancel the LCS and make the U212 your Littoral Combat ship. I don't think the U212s and Virginas would be worried too much about tight budgets and Chinese carrier-killing ICBMs. And 30 U212s would only need half the personnel of a CVN.
I basically asked this sort of question of VADM Richardson on his COMSUBFOR blog. His answer?
To “Heretic.” The SSKs are part of the threat that is a major part of the design. Adaptive, determined and tenacious adversaries will exploit our weaknesses with little or no notice and our Submarine Force must transform to one of multiple missions in order to combat these efforts. Just see the news in today’s Undersea Warfare News…the market for submarines has never been stronger around the world. Many nations are building significant undersea capabilities that can potentially threaten sea lanes, increasing the pressure to maintain access to the global commons. Anti-access/area denial technologies and tactics will require the submarine force to be positioned forward, ready to seize the initiative if required.
As for the SSN vs SSK discussion for the United States, it boils down to what platform suits our national strategy. SSKs, including those with Air Independent Propulsion (AIP), simply don’t have the power, speed and endurance the Navy and the Nation need for the forward missions we are called on to perform in support of national tasking. For the USN, nuclear powered submarines and UUVs best meet our strategic demands and are our future. This is an interesting topic to blog about in more detail in the future.
So you can pretty much expect plenty of resistance to the *notion* of any SSKs being a part of the USN.
Heretic
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