Friday, June 17, 2011

Where is the compelling argument from Defence?

Since the joke that is the Defence White Paper of 2009 doesn't qualify as a valid justification to increase Defence spending, where is the "compelling argument"?

Here are some thoughts; ending with some great words.

"Following Jim's line of argument that it is 'all' due to insufficient money, Defence for the last 40 years has been demonstrably unable — or did not feel the need to — present governments with a persuasive and compelling case for sustained increased spending relative to the other needs of all Australians. Has the ADF been let down in this regard? Jim's 'Constructive Subversion' may be one thing but a compelling argument is a much more difficult and onerous task. Maybe Defence thinks so too!"

8 comments:

Ely said...

Peter Layton starts his riposte as follows:
"Jim Molan has refined his argument on the ADF's troubles and now suggests this is 'all' due to successive governments' budgetary failings going back some 40 years. Importantly, this is not an argument for more money to cut losses in current combat operations but instead for more money long-term for Defence as a department of state" unquote.

But as I read it Jim doesn't argue that it is all about the money. And nor does his argument exclude the enhancement of combat effectiveness and suvivability as Peter suggests I think (I am a bit bewildered by this observation and allow that maybe I missed something important. I don't know enough about how well Defence has mounted its arguments to say whether they have been compelling or not. It is tempting to agree that this is self evident and also with Peter's suggestion that nothing bad has happened so maybe the powers that be got it right. But for me this particular conclusion is a hazardous non sequitur.

Anonymous said...

What is largely avoided in debate re defence budgets is just how much better value for money (and military preparedness) could be achieved by progressively optimising in-service hardware, where cost-effective.

The Iroquois fleet of about 25 airframes for example could have been refurbished/optimised to Bell Huey II manufacturer program standard for around $50million dollars overall (or about the cost of just 1 Tiger or MRH90) and the work maybe negotiated for Australian industry.

Now it seems, part of the super-expensive $3.2billion deal for 24 MH-60R will involve Lockheed-Martin/Sikorsky upgrading the 16 RAN Seahawks and 34 Army Blackhawks in Australia for sale to third party nations and splitting the profits with the Australian government (see: http://www.mh-60.com/team-romeo/).

So why did we not just refurbish/optimise the Seahawks and Blackhawks for ongoing ADF utilisation and perhaps save $2billion for allocation to other capability shortcomings; like C-130H refurbishment, more Chinooks, Caribou replacement, Global Hawk?

The problem is politicians, military leaders and the DoD at large are captive to major arms manufacturer influence and get bribed into murky deals that will siphon much funding out of the country which could be more cost-effectively spent. The big high cost projects are of course promoted as providing more employment opportunities downstream, whereas refurbishment/optimisation of military assets in Australia, to manufacturer specifications, could also provide adequate employment offsets.

I have constructive ongoing dialogue with Jim Molan via other channels and we agree that Australia's defence 'strategists' are virtually ignoring the mounting capability gaps. But there is difficulty injecting adequate debate on foregoing issues in some think tanks and forums, probably because it would publicly challenge the contentious Canberra 'group think' mindset re defence matters.

The obvious course to more adequate and credible military preparedness in Australia is not increased funding, but more cost-effective application of defence expenditure.

Bushranger 71 said...

Sorry; last post from Bushranger 71.

Wājué jī Ào yuán Nemis said...

Bushranger you are correct once again

Wājué jī Ào yuán Nemisis said...

Ah, Bushranger, 9 Squadron, left Vietnam about November , 1971?
Remember 161 Recon who you left behind.

Goldeel1 said...

If I recall correctly from my service days, were not 161 a signals squadron embedded with special forces? Im sure that was the case, at least in later years.

Anonymous said...

Going back to CH47 etc, here is an interesting take on subject.
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/awx/2011/06/20/awx_06_20_2011_p0-337878.xml&channel=defense

Bushranger 71 said...

There were units of multiple nations with a 161 identifier, so just guessing our friend may be referring to a Vietnamese unit!