Here is some more thoughts on history repeating itself with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program.
With the early plans of the TFX program failing to work with the fleet, the USAF ended up holding the bag. The F-111 eventually proved itself in USAF combat operations, but the procurement method was a mess. It was not the way to field a combat jet.
The distance from what the TFX program was supposed to give the U.S. military and what they eventually got is large. The result was a third of the original number of TFX aircraft at five times the cost.(1)
What ended up being the real joint service fighter in that era? The F-4 Phantom.
Those that sold the Joint Strike Fighter program to a gullible Congress are guilty of the same over-optimism. They claim they learned from past acquisition programs but that just does not show as being true.
With the severe budget problems now facing all parts of the Federal government, could the Super Hornet be the Phantom of our era? With the USAF painted into a corner of its own making and where budget is policy, I think it is possible.
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(1)MICHAEL E. GANTT, "STRAPPING IN AND BAILING OUT:NAVY AND AIR FORCE JOINT ACQUISITION OF AIRCRAFT", SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES, AIR UNIVERSITY, MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA, JUNE 2002
5 comments:
I see your point Eric, but the Super Slug is no F 4. Not even close. The Phantom proved to be not just a capable air-ground platform but was more than a match against its air-to-air opposition. Does anybody seriously think the Super has that capability?
Back here in OZ, I cant help thinking that rather than the F35, we should be getting this: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F-15SE_Silent_Eagle
Different times of course. Yes the Super lacks the speed and energy of the F-4. I don't see how anyone is going to graft the very awesome Block II avionics from the Super into the sunset years of the F-4.
....of their era .... also the Super flies easier....easier to trap on a carrier, easier maintenance and so-on. I think for today the comparison is OK. Remember, even the F-4 in Vietnam fought under a terrible ROE. Look how it dominated War of Attrition (Egypt v Israel).
Anyway... the Super can be considered as the true "joint strike fighter" and that includes the goal of the original Just So Failed program .... Affordability....
Well in recent times there seems to be more and more people in Canberra whispering in corners that the RAAF is resigning itself towards operating just the Rhino. As either the Government will grow a pair and put a bullet in Australia's involvement with the F-35, or the project as a whole will go belly up all on it's own.
If the RAAF is left with just the Super Bug then perhaps it may end up being a blessing in disguise. For although it's got it's share of failings, it's still relativly cheap to operate, and more than capable in low threat environments, think Iraq & Afghanistan. At least then the RAAF could deploy a platform that could support the Army.
With the money saved the RAAF could procure more Tankers, God knows the Bug will need them - lot's of them. Oh and more C-17's, you can never have to many Globemasters.
Eric,
I thought a lot about your post last night. And I came to two hypotheses.
1) Attempts to use central, command planning to create anything as complex as a manned jet are failing, with a probability of 1. And have been failing for a number of decades.
2) The current project dynamics of the JSF are particularly bad. The design revisions being implemented aren't being marked-to-competitor aircraft, or marked-to-market. They're just being implemented.
VADM Venlet may be the best there is, but this will not result in an outcome anyone will objectively assess as favorable.
I think the next round of manned jets will evolve out of successful unmanned designs. For whatever reason, DOD seems willing to let competitive markets evolve in those areas.
Your comments regarding the Collins class have also been quite good. The amount of group-think in the submarine community is staggering. As far as I can tell, the four key ideas in submarining remain
1) stay undetected
2) maintain advantage
3) drive to firing position
4) don't leave the other guy with any options once you've fired.
Don't see how "domestic production" or "nuclear propulsion" are prerequisites for any of these. If we spent as much time training crews as we spent on powerpoints, sigh.
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