Losing regional air supremacy--a given with the current F-35 plan--means that in our local waters we will not be able to shoo away ASW aircraft or if needed, shoot them down. That will be difficult with a future, more powerful, Operation: SHIRTFRONT or similar where, in addition to large area surface-to-air missiles, and/or the other side has big SUs or worse. Their ASW aircraft can thrive. Ours cannot.
This becomes much worse when our subs venture further away--like the South China Sea.
It isn't helped by the U.S. Navy being on-track to have an obsolete-to-the-threat carrier air wing.
Not enough F-22s for the USAF. No real F-22 replacement in the works.
Diesel electric subs may be dangerous but once they are spotted, they can't run. ASW aircraft will locate them and hunt them down.
It gets worse in shallow water. Depending on the water conditions, and lighting, you can spot a submerged submarine 45 meters under the surface from the air.
Lots of big talk in the national jokes that are our last two Defence White Papers. Our new subs will sneak into shallow water and drop off commandos. Well, in that case, it better be against a threat that has little or no defences.
Existing threats are getting more dangerous.
1. ASW weapons, including mines.
2. Sensors from all platforms: air, space, sea, land and sea bottom.
3. Improved counter-mine technology is helping with the improved sensor issue to help ASW.
4. The big one which China has and no one else will have: quantity of sensors.
Add air and sea robotic platforms for persistence and our subs will have about as much chance of coming home as a WWII German U-boat after April of 1943. At that time, the German submarine methods became obsolete. In large part because there was no ability to contest the enemy air threat, quantity and persistence of sensors.
Future RAN submarine concept of operations will have to address these realities when defining what they want a submarine to do in regard to a high-threat environment.
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