Look at the core issues

This is a fair read, but like many of the crew that post on ASPI and similar they make a big leap over the first few steps.

This government, has to show improvement in doing proper risk management. Canberra is awash in usable how-to manuals for the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy and friends to start, from step one to a complete project. Proper risk assessment also allows the question to be asked, 'Should we be doing this?'

Consider the followiing:

1. The MU-90 torpedo.
2. MRH-90 helicopter.
3. ARH Tiger helicopter.
4. SeaSprite.
5. M-1 tank acquisition.
6. Retirement of the F-111
7. Collins submarine combat system.
8. Collins submarine sustainment.
9. The Air Warfare Destroyer.
10. The Canberra Class LHD
11. Wedgetail.
12. Bushmaster (good recovery on this as it is now an excellent product).
13. Hornet defensive systems.
14. Super Hornet procurement.
15. Air-refueling tanker.
16. F-35 project.
17. Sustainment of amphibious ships.


That is a short list but good enough to see a trend. There can be a difference between poor risk assessment, ignoring risks that were presented and doing no risk assessment. Those symptoms are present on the list above.

Fixing core-values (getting rid of self-before-service attitudes); skilling up with the right people; doing a complete leadership process remake and so on...that is, many of the things on this fix-it list, should be the majority of conversations we see in regard to Defence.

Finally, back to the ASPI post. I do not agree with this quote:

We should therefore build them in batches of three, allowing significant design improvements between batches, i.e. at 6-year intervals.

Not 'significant', but well thought-out low-risk evolutionary steps.

Maybe those in and around the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy will stop misusing the words 'significant' and 'complex'.


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