Maybe some of the readers can chime in to add their opinions in order to quality control with the first part of this document and the words of the ASPI. A government funded "think-tank" that pretends to be "independent".
"A Japanese submarine brings strategic benefits with it that the Europeans can’t match, while Australian industry would likely benefit most if the Europeans get up."
For the Japanese that would be: cramped crew accommodations? Less range? While their next build Soryus will have Lithium-ion batteries and no air independent propulsion (AIP), the AIP Defence pointed out once a while back...comes from..."Europeans".
"I’ll explain later why I don’t think subs have to be built in Australia ..."
The reason for that view is you get paid by a Defence budget line item. Top Defence has already stated such a thing.
"If we think it’s necessary to be able to project western sea power anywhere in the Pacific region at times of crisis or conflict, we’re going to need to be able to do it in a much less vulnerable way than sailing large surface vessels into harm’s way."
Not addressed? The enemy gets a vote too. They can project submarines (they have enough of them), to inhibit or cut off shipping traffic to this country. And...we only have less than a months supply of fuel on-hand. Curious how do various red-force scenarios from independent experts game that? While that is going on, our air power roadmap, is...a dead end.
"We’re a long way away from the more contested parts of the western Pacific, and even with 12 subs we couldn’t hope to continuously deploy more than one or two into north Asian waters."
Again, the enemy gets to vote on that.
"We also have to work out how to get subs. No one builds the large, high-endurance conventionally-powered boat we want, so we’re necessarily going to be looking for a partner to help us modify an existing design, or produce a new one to suit. The consensus now seems to be that the latter course is too risky (and might take too long). So we’re in the market for a submarine designer — and perhaps builder — to help.
In practice, that means we need to work with either Europeans (France or Germany, since Sweden was dropped) or Japan; nobody else really fits the bill."
It is assumed we would have to partner with a skilled sub-design house. The idea that Sweden was dropped from this list of potential helpers is, and I don't mean to insult, moronic and illogical.
"The Japanese alternative seems to have the inside running, not least because it fits into the Pacific alliance framework described above. As well as being a well-established builder of submarines, involving another US ally would help further cement alliance relationships, especially if we put American weapons and other systems into Japanese hulls."
What? Many Japanese would disagree with that. Politicians and industry. How does a much shorter range submarine that uses some European tech somehow meet the bar of being top consideration? As for American weapons, Defence already goofed themselves on that one. Tomahawk cruise missile...also run with a British combat system on their subs. Multiple users of the German inspired subs? They use Mk48 and Harpoon. It isn't just the sub, it is ...the combat system. And for that, the American's are not top drawer.
"This brings us to the vexed question — especially for South Australians — of where the boats will be built. One of the last things David Johnston did as Defence Minister was to announce the government’s intention to develop an Australian “sovereign submarine capability”. That was interpreted by some as implying a local build, but that isn’t necessarily the case."
Instead of mentioning a failed and fired Defence Minister, the political focus is on the current PM's election promise. Google that.
"A sovereign capability simply means having the ability to safely and effectively operate submarines. The RAN successfully did that with British-built Oberon submarines during the Cold War, as well as performing a substantial upgrade in Australia. Conversely, for much of its first decade the Adelaide-built Collins class didn’t offer the navy much in the way of capability at all."
Interesting as there are many experts that would give you a different explanation of "sovereign" submarine "capability". And yes, please let us bring up the Oberon era. Those skilled sub force and defence science engineers and leaders, successfully evaluated the then German bid to build the Collins. What our skilled people found is that the Germans (while capable of brilliant sub design and production) failed to understand our needs. They stated that their submission met all our needs. When our experts looked at it, this was not true. For example, electrical consumption needs were based on how the Germans used their subs and not how a skilled RAN Oberon operated subs. History is clear on this. Our people correctly scored them lower than the Swedes.
And, this is why we have true, competitive bids for spending billions of taxpayer money.
As for the first decade of the Collins, yes. We know that. What is interesting about that since it is brought up is the later part of that "decade" and how the entrenched defence bureaucracy leadership was purged of those that know things and well on the way to being at its final goal today: run by generalists, that don't know, what they don't know. Memory hole. Ministry of Truth. All of it.
I would suggest that if the purging of non-yes-men did not happen, the later part of that "decade" would have shown growing improvement from lessons learned.
"It’s over a decade since ASC launched the final new-build Collins, but it’s only now becoming a reliable maintainer of that fleet. It seems that the build location isn’t as critical as the support and management arrangements put in place."
This is more of a monument of what happens when the DMO gets their grubby mitts on a project. The Collins sustainment history is really just one of many ailments in weapons project management caused by those that believe service before self is a goal. Sea Sprite, Air Warfare Destroyer, and so much more. Let us all have a conversation about that, shall we?
"Those are complex issues — much more so than some public discussion suggests — and I’m sure the government is looking hard at them. In a nutshell, the European countries will probably pitch a build almost entirely here in Australia, and the Japanese probably won’t, though they’re said to be willing to share work with ASC."
Throw-away statements. There is that "complex" word again.
-Explanation of the title of this blog post.
-Australian Defence Reading List
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