It may be that the best replacement for the Collins-class submarine is an improved, Collins-class submarine. Slight improvements, not major improvements.
How would this be done? First, would be to keep the DMO mostly out of the picture. We do after-all, want this to succeed.
One way to do that is to waiver it as a commercial product. A properly harnessed DMO will be involved in the sustainment, with severe limits. Just as it is with a C-17 buy.
Breakdown of who does what to get these built.
-Requirement (Minister for Defence & RAN): Collins capability with improvements as deemed by today's available technology. Not bleeding edge. Do not over-reach or we have had it.
-Chief management of responsibility for the project (Minister for Defence & ASC); leadership; communication between agencies.
-Training facility for manufacturing and sustainment workers (Minister for Employment & ASC): technical, safety, human resources: all recurrent. Always on-going: 5-days a week.
-Skill resourcing (Minister for Employment & ASC): All Australian. Don't be afraid to bring in talented workers and leaders from other industries.
-Intellectual property (Minister for Trade and Investment & ASC): Legal leadership for any licensing needed to do all work in Australia.
-Contracting skilling (Minister for Industry and Science & ASC): Make sure contracts of all shapes and sizes are written to proper standards.
To kick off the program we need the requirement. SEA1000 needs to be scrapped. It is damaged goods. Make a new requirement.
Next, with speed, get the computer aided design going. Then a team will have to determine how to license build everything that is not organic. Or, create new components that do not interfere with another country's intellectual property.
Certainly the combat system and weaponry offer some challenges.
Practical exercises must then commence to show proof of manufacturing capability in all the various skill-sets. Power-plant, hull and other critical submarine systems. Electronics and software. Proof of sustainability. All of these simulations can be graded. Once past, start building a prototype submarine. Once that prototype is done. Trial it for a very long time until there is significant confidence in mass building. Mistakes in the prototype should be welcomed and learned from. For example: is the fuel tank idea where salt-water fills in the empty space for buoyancy still manageable in a new build? Can we get away with 4 torpedo tubes instead of 6 to commit that weight difference to something else? Is AIP (not in the current Collins) worth the weight and space and maintenance effort given the preference for long range?
That is as far as I can think for now, if the nation (as a wanted political football) insists on building submarines, at home.
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