Helicopter expert - Single pilot setup risky, poorly thought out

One of our readers who has a heck of a lot of helicopter and fixed wing knowledge in the ADF points out that the single pilot SH-60R (Romeo) that Australia is buying (compared to the 2-pilot USN setup), is operationally risky.


---

Bushranger 71 • 16 hours ago

We are seeing the same mindless rationale re crewing of the MH-60R that was behind the Seasprite debacle.

Basic safety of flight considerations should bar operating ASW and/or ASuW helos single pilot on black nights over wild seas. Dual pilot
and other roles, manning has also been proved essential for battlefield utility helicopter support both day and night.

The Seasprite was designed for 2 pilots up front with systems operators rearwards, as was Sea King. Similarly, the more utilitarian Seahawk MH-60S.

The RAN was allowed to foster an absurd project to redesign the flight deck of the Seasprite so an Observer/Tactical Co-ordinator could replace a pilot up front. Apart from the foolishness of this concept, Australia simply did not have the technical capacity for such design engineering.

Having abandoned that effort at cost upwards of $1billion, all the former RAN platforms have since been returned to original 2 pilot flight deck configuration and were fully refurbished by the manufacturer before being acquired by the RNZAF for peanuts. Apparently, Canberra was so blinded by prior ineptness that it failed to seize this opportunity and opted to squander upwards of $4billion on the MH-60R which is so stuffed full of hardware for occasional use systems that it will have inadequate capability for boarding party roles.

A far wiser choice would have been the 2 pilot utilitarian Sierra version which can be fitted as required with a wide range of modular systems for various roles. Just a few of these and optimization of the S-70B Seahawks would have provided very adequate capabilities and perhaps saved billions of dollars.

Australia has a piddling 59,000 regular military with 3 separate air arms which is of course an extremely costly and unnecessary luxury.

The Air Force was formed in 1921 to provide air support for the other 2 Services and the RAAF provided amphibian support detachments on
various British, Australian and New Zealand warships between 1925 and 1944 involving in major military engagements around the world. That commitment ended when naval air strategy changed after aircraft carriers became more prevalent during WW2.

After the RAAF acquired a few early model Iroquois in 1962/63 to replace crashboats for SAR requirements, the Australian Government
ordered more helicopters and committed the Air Force to rotary wing support for the Army. Despite much misinformation to the contrary, the RAAF excelled in this field with one small squadron of 16 aircraft flying more hours (58,768) during 5.5 years of Vietnam War involvement than any other Air Force unit in any campaign since force inception in 1921.

Subsequently, in response to joint Army/RAAF planning, the Air Force helo component expanded to 3 utility plus 1 MLH squadrons with
substantial outlay on base facilities where requested by Army.

Ultimately, a hugely costly decision was made to transfer battlefield helicopters support assets from Air Force to Army Aviation. This decision was unquestionably triggered by lies regarding RAAF performance peddled to politicians by the highest levels of the Army. Since then, perhaps hundreds of millions of dollars have been squandered through needless parallel development of helicopter support facilities.

So, how does this very fragmented aviation structure affect
aircrew in particular?

Both Navy and Army Aviation are principally helicopter fleets and scope is thus limited for diversification of flying roles. During the 26 years of RAAF helo force existence, there was substantial cross-pollination of pilots and crewmen throughout many aircraft types operated by the Air Force. This was of significant benefit to the RAAF regarding employability potential of people in whom a substantial investment had been made in training. It also of course broadened career opportunities for aircrew and enabled them to acquire significant flying experience during their periods of service.

Due to recent shedding of many air platforms that could be beneficially optimized and cost-effectively operated, and their subsequent replacement by relatively unproven types with hugely increased operating costs; the amount of flying now available to aircrew is rapidly shrinking and cannot be offset by synthetic trainers. Inevitably, many aircrew will become disillusioned and are likely to opt out of military service with a huge worldwide shortage of airline pilots already emerging. It thus seems obvious that the ADF will face acute aircrew shortages, unless there is some rationalization of present air structures.

The Australian Government formed the RAAF to provide air support for the other 2 Services and that was very effectively accomplished over the past 93 years through joint-service cooperation. Any notion that a thinly-veiled unified Australian Defence Force now has more effective air support through embrace of 3 separate air arms is not an argument
that would withstand objective scrutiny.

Australia cannot afford to keep funding a defence force as presently structured and there could be substantial economic and efficiency benefits in getting the respective Service arms back into their principal domains; sea, land and air. Absorbing aircrew and air maintenance personnel from Navy and Army into the Air Force should be seriously addressed.