The author displays glaring ignorance about the program and would rather depend on F-35 fan-based talking points instead of investing shoe leather and talking to a variety of people. You know, the qualities of real journalism.
Little journalism to be found here.
What was reported in 2002 by this author?
$12bn to buy experimental war plane
Australasian Business Intelligence
By Geoffrey Barker
June 27, 2002
The Australian Government has committed itself to the largest single spending item in the area of defence in Australian history. On 27 June 2002, the Australian Minister for Defence, Robert Hill, announced that Australia would participate in the development phase of the Lockheed Martin F-35 joint strike fighter. However, rather than merely committing $US150m ($A266m) over 10 years, the government will purchase up to 100 of the fighters for $US80m each from 2012, to replace the Royal Australian Air Force's F/A-18 Hornets and F-111 strike bombers. Hill added that Australia may receive up to $A4bn in contracts from the commitment.
How is that working out? Note the $12B at that time was for 100. And $12B today only gets 58 faulty, mistake jets. With no real support over years (closer to $24B for 58). And, back in 2002, there was no credible analysis performed by the Australian government to make such a decision. Even the title is scary. The use of "experimental" brings no confidence.
Hold on to that "$US80m each from 2012" comment when compared to this:
“It’s about $37 million for the CTOL aircraft, which is the air force variant.”
- Colonel Dwyer Dennis, U.S. JSF Program Office brief to Australian journalists, 2002-
". . . US$40 million dollars . . "
-Senate Estimates/Media Air Commodore John Harvey, AM Angus Houston, Mr Mick Roche, USDM, 2003-
" . . US$45 million in 2002 dollars . ."
-JSCFADT/Senate Estimates, Air Commodore John Harvey, Mr Mick Roche, USDM, 2003/2004-
". . average unit recurring flyaway cost of the JSF will be around US$48 million, in 2002 dollars . . "
-Senate Estimates/Press Club Briefing, Air Commodore John Harvey, 2006
". . the JSF Price (for Australia) - US$55 million average for our aircraft . . in 2006 dollars . ."
-Senate Estimates/Media AVM John Harvey ACM Angus Houston, Nov. 2006-
“…DMO is budgeting around A$131 million in 2005 dollars as the unit procurement cost for the JSF. .”
-AVM John Harvey Briefing, Office of the Minister for Defence, May 2007-
“There are 108 different cost figures for the JSF that I am working with and each of them is correct”
-Dr Steve Gumley, CEO of the DMO, Sep./Oct. 2007-
“…I would be surprised if the JSF cost us anymore than A$75 million … in 2008 dollars at an exchange rate of 0.92”
-JSCFADT Dr Steve Gumley, CEO DMO, July 2008-
". . Dr Gumley's evidence on the cost of the JSF was for the average unit recurring flyaway cost for the Australian buy of 100 aircraft . ."
-JSCFADT/Media AVM John Harvey, Aug. 2008-
Confirmed previous advice i.e. A$75 million in 2008 dollars at an exchange rate of 0.92,
-JSCFADT Dr Steve Gumley, CEO of the DMO, Sep. 2009-
" ...about $77 million per copy."
-Robert Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Feb. 2008.
Moving right along.
Today, Barker brings up 5 points in favour of the Just So Failed that are easy to shoot down.
History he alleges and the "look at the F-111 meme". That the F-111 had trouble and needed an interm fighter. This doesn't work because in the case of the Super Hornet (as an interm fighter waiting on JSF delay and not the lie that the F-111 was at risk) it was decided one month after ADF told elected officials, no interm fighter was needed if there was F-35 delay.
While it had trouble, the F-111 saw combat in the late '60's soon after IOC. The F-35 is nearing the 13 year mark for the U.S. and the 12 year mark for Australia.
With serious development problems.
Next. Commitment. Hey we are buying from the U.S. .... "and the US military aviation record leaves little doubt they have the technological competence and creativity to overcome developmental difficulties.
Lets ask Dick Cheney about the A-12.
"The A-12 I did terminate. It was not an easy decision to make because it's an important requirement that we're trying to fulfill. But no one could tell me how much the program was going to cost, even just through the full scale development phase, or when it would be available. And data that had been presented at one point a few months ago turned out to be invalid and inaccurate."
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, 1991
Too old of a reference (from a time when when the U.S. had more defense companies and a larger pool of talent)? It isn't just aviation, but a broader scope of land, sea, air and space. Look at today's littoral combat ship and missile defense program as a few examples of roaring failure.
Barker claims, "combat realities". Stealth and...wait for it..."First radar lock wins the fight". We can view some of the F-35's serious concerns with air-to-air here. And, over all, problems facing integrated air defense systems.
Fourth claims Barker: system integration. He mentions AWACS (unfortunate as they can get shot down...that is why the F-22 is a "mini- AWACS"). Hint about AWACs. It doesn't work all the time. Reference F-15 vs. MiG-29 events over the former Yugoslavia. Then... "Growler" says Barker. Sure. The rest he claims is the network. Not knowing that networks can be denied and geo-located and that the enemy is working on having their own capable network.
Finally claims Barker: alternatives. "Eurofighter, Rafale and Gripon (sic) would not fit easily with Australia's Hornet history". Sure. Interesting because no version of the Hornet fits Australia's needs. Needs harped on, again and again to maintain regional air supremacy. Euro-flubber would have a good chance of killing things currently in the region and is a handful for... the F-22. Ralf-e-al? Good. Not shabby. Gripen? Well it isn't bad and considering Australia only has about 30 days of fuel on-hand in case of a war, it doesn't burn much. You can also get better off-set deals with these aircraft.
No current Western aircraft in production will be able to take on threats like the PAK/FA which represent emerging threats that the F-35 may face during its alleged lifetime.
Yesterday was good journalist day. Those that have observed the F-35 program for years would probably agree today is not one of those days.
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-Time's Battleland - 5 Part series on F-35 procurement - 2013
-Summary of Air Power Australia F-35 points
-Bill Sweetman, Aviation Week and the F-35
-U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) F-35 reports
-F-35 JSF: Cold War Anachronism Without a Mission
-History of F-35 Production Cuts
-Looking at the three Japan contenders (maneuverability)
-How the Canadian DND misleads the public about the F-35
-Value of STOVL F-35B over-hyped
-Cuckoo in the nest--U.S. DOD DOT&E F-35 report is out
-6 Feb 2012 Letter from SASC to DOD boss Panetta questioning the decision to lift probation on the F-35B STOVL.
-USAFs F-35 procurement plan is not believable
-December 2011 Australia/Canada Brief
-F-35 Key Performance Perimeters (KPP) and Feb 2012 CRS report
-F-35 DOD Select Acquisition Report (SAR) FY2012
-Release of F-35 2012 test report card shows continued waste on a dud program
-Australian Defence answers serious F-35 project concerns with "so what?"
-Land of the Lost (production cut history update March 2013)
-Outgoing LM F-35 program boss admits to flawed weight assumptions (March 2013)
-A look at the F-35 program's astro-turfing
-F-35 and F-16 cost per flying hour
-Is this aircraft worth over $51B of USMC tac-air funding?
-Combat radius and altitude, A model
-F-35A, noise abatement and airfields and the USAF
-Deceptive marketing practice: F-35 blocks
-The concurrency fraud
-The dung beetle's "it's known" lie
-F-35's air-to-air ability limited
-F-35 Blocks--2006 and today
-The F-35B design is leaking fuel
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