It has many critical errors. For example, the report uses USAF budget figures for "fly away cost". Credible costs for USAF are the year they pay for it as all previous USAF budget projections on the aircraft have been wrong. And when looking at the USAF budgets, weapons system unit cost, is what it takes to get it to an active squadron. This does not count R&D costs. It does not count more engineering changes to fix the mistake jets; which LRIP aircraft are. Fly-away cost is almost always useless.
The report under-estimates the critical development problems.
It does not take into account the seriously high cost per flying hour.
It does not take into account the idea that the aircraft will not be able to take on emerging threats.
It does not take into account that one USAF general stated that without the F-22, the F-35 is irrelevant. That assumes a fully working F-35 by the way, which we are far from seeing.
It doesn't take into account that the West has two reference air-to-air threats. The Typhoon, as a somewhat'ish close SU-35 analog and the F-22 as a PAK-FA threat.
With the AMRAAM as a single point of failure and the F-35's known air-to-air weakness, ASPI appears to be out of their depth when looking at the F-35.
The Typhoon and F-22 would kill an F-35.
Also, some amusement. The range figures in this ASPI chart show an unrefueled F-35A radius...well below the JSF JORD KPP.
(click on image to make larger)
*UPDATE* U.S. Official misled Australia in 2002 about the F-35:
"The CV variant is outward to 700-plus nautical miles, the Air Force I think about 590,. . . . oh almost 700 as well, I'm sorry. So very significant range."
Colonel Dwyer Dennis, US JSF JPO, Aug 2002 Also: - AVM Ray Conroy, JSF Program Chief Negotiator; ACDRE John Harvey, NACC PO, 2002-2004
ALSO:
“It’s about $37 million for the CTOL aircraft, which is the air force variant.”
- Colonel Dwyer Dennis, U.S. JSF Program Office brief to Australian journalists, 2002-
'Independent' Think Tank, misleads Australian public
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-Time's Battleland - 5 Part series on F-35 procurement - 2013
-Summary of Air Power Australia F-35 points
-Aviation Week (ARES blog) F-35 posts (2007 to present)
-U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) F-35 reports
-F-35 JSF: Cold War Anachronism Without a Mission
-History of F-35 Production Cuts
-Looking at the three Japan contenders (maneuverability)
-How the Canadian DND misleads the public about the F-35
-Value of STOVL F-35B over-hyped
-Cuckoo in the nest--U.S. DOD DOT&E F-35 report is out
-6 Feb 2012 Letter from SASC to DOD boss Panetta questioning the decision to lift probation on the F-35B STOVL.
-USAFs F-35 procurement plan is not believable
-December 2011 Australia/Canada Brief
-F-35 Key Performance Perimeters (KPP) and Feb 2012 CRS report
-F-35 DOD Select Acquisition Report (SAR) FY2012
-Release of F-35 2012 test report card shows continued waste on a dud program
-Australian Defence answers serious F-35 project concerns with "so what?"
-Land of the Lost (production cut history update March 2013)
-Outgoing LM F-35 program boss admits to flawed weight assumptions (March 2013)
-A look at the F-35 program's astro-turfing
-F-35 and F-16 cost per flying hour
-Is this aircraft worth over $51B of USMC tac-air funding?
-Combat radius and altitude, A model
-F-35A, noise abatement and airfields and the USAF
-Deceptive marketing practice: F-35 blocks
-The concurrency fraud
-The dung beetle's "it's known" lie
-F-35's air-to-air ability limited
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