USMC F-35 talking points are lies

The cabal inside the United States Marine Corps, known as the United States Marketing Corps has no trouble spreading lies about the F-35 program.

"Lie" is now an accurate statement.  For years, there has been plenty of evidence to show that what the cabal is saying is untrue.

Let us look at these USMC F-35 "Talking Points" to be pushed by USMC public affairs. My comments are inserted in red.

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Current As of: Wednesday, December 12, 2012
F-35B LIGHTNING II—JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

TALKING POINTS

•As we modernize Marine fixed-wing aviation assets for the future, the continued development and fielding of the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B Joint Strike Fighter remains the centerpiece of this effort.

This is true for some in the USMC. What is more interesting is that a faulty STOVL aircraft does not define the value of a Marine. If anything, the resources poured into this program detract from other Marine missions.

•The F-35B supports our doctrinal form of maneuver warfare and our tactical and operational needs for close air support in austere conditions and locations where traditional fighters will potentially be unable to get access when our Marines and Sailors need them the most.

Two points. Yes it is the doctrine and it is bad doctrine. The United States has never performed a war where STOVL jets were useful. History shows that they are a gimmick that eats up resources.

•The capability inherent in a STOVL jet allows the Marine Corps to operate in harsh conditions and from remote locations where few airfields are available for conventional aircraft. It is also specifically designed to operate from amphibious ships—a capability that no other tactical aircraft possesses.

A few points. The Harrier has never operated in harsh conditions where "few airfields are available for conventional aircraft" except, again, as a gimmick that brought no warfighting value. The second part is kind of true. Unless you consider that a.) Helicopters are tactical aircraft. b.) The Harrier provides little value for this. If it is a real war, what is needed is an aircraft carrier...and land-based tactical aircraft, to protect the Amphib.

•The F-35B represents the Marine Corps’ ongoing effort to modernize our aging fleet of aircraft and to take advantage of fifth generation technology that will greatly enhance our capabilities as America’s expeditionary crisis response force.

Moderizing aircraft is one thing. Doing this with the wrong solution is bad. The F-35 qualifies as a "fifth-generation" fighter, only in the minds of the marketeers.

•From Operation Desert Storm to today’s present conflict in Afghanistan, STOVL technology has enabled tactical fixed-wing aviation to operate from expeditionary locations ashore and afloat in close proximity to ground forces. The responsive and persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and strike capabilities have saved lives and provided operational commanders with a tremendous tactical advantage.

Now for the embarrassing part for the USMC. STOVL never had a useful effect in Desert Storm, or any other campaign. What exists in this talking point is creative fantasy.

•The F-35B program has been a success story throughout the past year. Due to the performance of F-35B prototypes in 2011, the program was recently removed 12 months early from a fixed period of scrutiny.

Great, unless you read this letter.

•The F-35B completed all planned test points, made a total of 260 vertical landings (versus 10 total in 2010) and successfully completed initial ship trials on USS Wasp

With no relevant warfighting capability in the aircraft. Also as of today, changing the F-35B's $27M engine on-board ship has not been demonstrated.

•The strategic value of the F-35B can't be underscored enough. With a fully-fielded fleet of F-35Bs and Cs, the Nation will maintain 22 capital ships – 11 carrier and 11 amphibious assault – with strike assets capable of projecting influence and conducting strike operations

More insanity from the spin-cycle. The alleged "strategic value" of the F-35B can't be underscored spun enough. Interesting as the same person in the USMC who is doing this act of deception was also involved in inflating MV-22 Osprey maintenance uptimes years ago. Now as for the USMC getting the C model, that hasn't even been shown to get aboard ship and along with the other types, is lacking in robust proof of working mission systems. The last bit? Nothing says dead Marines and Sailors in a real war like a Amphib with F-35s.

H/T- Solomon
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Additional reading:

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UPDATE- Marine questions value of STOVL Harrier and F-35B

A Marine has stated a different opinion compared to the party line.

The Harrier has surely been a large part of Marine aviation since 9/11, but its STOVL characteristics were rarely, if ever, critical to the conduct of operations. If anything, the capability was a liability when it came to the requirement for long on-station times, multiple ordnance options, and tedious scanning of compounds and cities with targeting pods in support of troops on the ground.

While Harriers have conducted some forward rearming and refueling at shorter strips, these were more driven by the Harrier's limitations and the desire to validate its expeditionary capability than a value added to the fight. That is, while a Harrier was rearming and refueling, a Hornet would be overhead, sensor still on target, refueling from a KC-130, more weapons still on the wing.

So, when the program hits a rough spot again, which I think it will, and when the budget adjusters come knocking, the Marine Corps needs to be honest about how much STOVL capability it really needs to maintain its close air support capability aboard amphibious shipping, how soon unmanned aerial systems can fill that gap, and what the best option is for the rest of our close air support needs.

H/T- Sky Talk

Here are some other thoughts I blogged last year about the limited value of STOVL jets at any price vs. how the U.S. fights air wars. And for the F-35B, consider 7 tons of gas per sortie from an "austere" base.

In every major conflict involving US ground troops since Operation DESERT STORM, the USMC Harriers have not been unique in their ability to “move forward” and operate “close to the fight”. For example, during DESERT STORM “Hornets based at Shaik Isa utilized the airfield at Jabayl as a FARP [Forward Arming Refueling Point], just as the Harriers did at Tanajib, thus reducing transit time to and from the target area”.
Furthermore, USAF “F16s…generated a tremendous number of sorties while operating from a forward operating location (FOL) at King Khalid Military City (KKMC) in Saudi Arabia, located just 60 miles from the Iraqi border”.

“F-16s operating there were able to exchange their drop-tanks for extra ordnance: KKMC-based missions carried four Mk-84 2,000-pound bombs (double the normal load of two). FOL operations allowed the wing to fly more sorties per day; KKMC missions launched from the…main base in Abu Dhabi to bomb the KTO [Kuwait theater of operations]; landed and rearmed at KKMC for a second sortie to the KTO (which did not require refueling); landed and rearmed at KKMC for a third mission and after attacking the KTO, air refueled to return to Abu Dhabi.”

Like the USMC Harrier, the USAF F-16’s took advantage of a FOL, but the “F-16 carried a larger payload than either the Harrier or the Hornet, and delivered tons of ordnance…with a very small transit and turnaround time”.

Again, nearly ten-years later, during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), the USMC Harriers were not alone in their ability to move forward and operate “close to the fight”. In October 2002, a six-airplane detachment of Harriers from Marine Attack Squadron (VMA)-513 set up shop at Bagram, near Kabul, where A-10s had been operating since March of that year.

Later during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), Harriers took advantage of a FARP “at An Numaniyah, 60 miles south of Baghdad” but USAF A-10’s also “deployed forward” and operated out of “Tallil Air Base in Iraq”. However, logistics hampered Harrier operations. According to a “Harrier squadron commander…it was a major task keeping such aircraft supplied with jet fuel at that site”. This squadron commander went on to say, “It takes a lot of support and logistics…so we chose to use other platforms”.

Like the Harrier, the F-35B will be a logistics challenge. A number of logistics risks exist with the STOVL variant that do not exist for the other JSF variants, the primary being the vertical lift fan. Although a revolutionary design concept, the reliability and maintainability of the lift fan is still unproven. The lift fan operates on a single shaft that connects to the main engine and spins at a high-rate of speed. According to one study, this lift fan design causes “ added complexity” due to “the need for the clutch to engage and disengage the lift fan”.

Repair of the vertical lift components would very likely call for removing the engine, a traditionally “high repair time task”. Further, the lift fan and swivel nozzle adds to the logistics footprint especially when forward deployed.

According to one study, “While the JSF designers strive to reduce the complexity of the aircraft systems, the fact remains that the STOVL…will by nature be more difficult to maintain than either corresponding CTOL or [Navy] version”. This conclusion centered on “Naval Post Graduate School [studies] which compare projected component designs for the STOVL JSF to current Harrier design and projected [F-35C] design”.

Of course that paper assumes a working F-35C.

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Update:

On that day, after the fall of Kandahar, the Marines dispatched two Harriers to a partly destroyed airstrip there. Marine leaders touted this as evidence that the planes were operating where others could not.

But the two planes stayed only one night, flying four sorties and dropping no bombs, according to the Marines. Capt. Chris Raible, who piloted Harriers in Afghanistan, said the flights "were like photo ops."

When medals were awarded for Operation Anaconda, the major battle in eastern Afghanistan in March, the honors went to the Marine helicopter pilots who provided low-level fire for ground troops while the Harriers circled above.

Harriers have been operating alongside A-10s at a high-altitude air base at Bagram since October, where the Marines say they have provided "essential support to ground units." But the thin air and a torn-up runway have restricted vertical flight.

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-Is this aircraft worth over $51B of USMC tac-air funding?

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-Time's Battleland - 5 Part series on F-35 procurement - 2013 
-Summary of Air Power Australia F-35 points
-Aviation Week (ARES blog) F-35 posts (2007 to present)
-U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) F-35 reports
-F-35 JSF: Cold War Anachronism Without a Mission
-History of F-35 Production Cuts
-Looking at the three Japan contenders (maneuverability)
-How the Canadian DND misleads the public about the F-35
-Value of STOVL F-35B over-hyped
-Cuckoo in the nest--U.S. DOD DOT&E F-35 report is out
-6 Feb 2012 Letter from SASC to DOD boss Panetta questioning the decision to lift probation on the F-35B STOVL.
-USAFs F-35 procurement plan is not believable
-December 2011 Australia/Canada Brief
-F-35 Key Performance Perimeters (KPP) and Feb 2012 CRS report
-F-35 DOD Select Acquisition Report (SAR) FY2012
-Release of F-35 2012 test report card shows continued waste on a dud program
-Australian Defence answers serious F-35 project concerns with "so what?"
-Land of the Lost (production cut history update March 2013)
-Outgoing LM F-35 program boss admits to flawed weight assumptions (March 2013)
-A look at the F-35 program's astro-turfing
-F-35 and F-16 cost per flying hour