U.S. Army and CRS

The Strategist reminds us that it is 20 years since The Battle of Mogadishu, aka Blackhawk Down.

I'll add to that. One of America's most decorated combat field commanders, the late Colonel David Hackworth applied Iraq 2003 and what should have been learned from Blackhawk Down as well as other places.

He stated post 2003 in regards to Iraq, that, "the Army suffers from CRS...Can't Remember Shit".

In that besides the questionable operational plan, the Blackhawk Down event showed that soft vehicles like the Humvee don't do so well in a small-arms-rich / RPG-rich environment.

Surprised? Even though the then DOD boss lost his job over Blackhawk Down, one has to wonder who recommended the original force structure deployment.

One would have thought that by the Iraq 2003 campaign the Army would have acknowledged this risk. Yet many people died in soft-vehicles during the Iraq effort (and other places) because the Army suffered from CRS. Hillbilly armor (not new in the history of the Army), was a dubious and desperate response.

Interesting to note about Blackhawk Down, was some of the vehicle composition the Pakistani and Malaysian troops used to help with the rescue. Not the hammer of Thor but it beat soft vehicles.