April 19/13: Sold! In the wake of a successful RNZAF flight trial and independent trials by Canada’s Marinvent Corporation, New Zealand’s government signs a NZ$ 242 million (about $204 million) contract with Kaman. They’re buying 8 SH-2G(I) upgraded Super Seasprites, 2 spare airframes, spare parts, Penguin missiles, and a training simulator. Kaman will return the helicopters to flyable status from storage in Connecticut, USA, followed by flight testing and airworthiness certification by New Zealand. They’ll be manned by a crew of 3 instead of Australia’s 2, and the absence of the “no hands” autopilot feature means it will be hands-on at all times. The first 3 helicopters are due in late 2014, and deliveries should be done in 2016. Estimated service life is “out to 2030,” according to New Zealand’s National Party government, who also states that “All other technical issues have been resolved by the manufacturer Kaman”.
What were some of the causes of this failed Australian project? The ANAO stated the following:
-the risks associated with the Project were increased by the decision to seek to incorporate extensive capability enhancements into a smaller helicopter than the ANZAC ship is designed to operate;
-an adequate understanding of the significance of the risks associated with the acquisition was not attained through the requirement definition and tender evaluation processes;
-inadequacies in cost estimation resulted in a significant shortfall in the approved Project budget which was addressed by reducing the number of helicopters acquired, other cost saving measures that placed the delivery of the desired capability to Navy at additional risk, and through significant expenditure funded from outside the Project budget;
-financial leverage available through the Prime Contract was ineffectively applied in the early stages of the Project, allowing a large proportion of the funds to be expended despite evidence of schedule slippage and burgeoning risk;
-the Project Office experienced ongoing difficulties in attracting and retaining appropriately qualified personnel which inhibited its capacity to manage a large and complex project;
-software and system development activities undertaken by sub-contractors to the Prime Contractor were critical to project success, but DMO had limited contractual capacity to resolve risks as they emerged;
-the decision to provisionally accept the Super Seasprites in an interim configuration did not deliver the desired outcomes, was poorly implemented and shifted much of the risk associated with the Project to DMO;
-Defence did not seek to amend the Prime Contract to reflect contemporary ADF airworthiness management practices creating a disparity between contractual and ADF certification requirements which Defence and DMO were ineffective in addressing;
-and poor contract management practices within Defence and DMO, over the life of the Project, contributed to ongoing contractual uncertainty.
The Sea Sprite might be gone, but much of this bad behavior in the Entrenched Defence Bureaucracy still exists today.
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-Australia's Failing Defence Structure and Management Methodology
-More on the dud-jamming gear Defence wants to buy
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-Vacancy
-Put Vol 2 Report of DLA Piper Review into the light of day
-Rory and Jim
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